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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The public transport sector is rapidly evolving.  Its development includes regulatory 
reform, industrial restructuring, and technological innovation.  A unique topic in 
public transport is government intervention on various levels.  Changes in the level of 
government involvement have had a drastic impact on the public transport industry.  
This thesis focuses more specifically on the effects of regulatory changes in 
innovation in the public transport sector. 
 
Technological innovation plays an important role in improving public transport 
services.  Over the last few decades, many new technologies have been introduced 
such as low floor buses, electronic ticketing systems, and dynamic travel information.  
However, there is very little research that examines technological innovation in the 
public transport sector explicitly.  Most research concentrates on the economic effects 
of regulatory changes, i.e. privatisation and deregulation of public transport services. 
 
Undoubtedly, regulatory reform affects the technological development.  For example, 
when privatisation occurs, it brings about a new institutional setting in that the public 
transport operator is switched from a public to a private company.  The consequences 
of this change are massive as the overall decision toward innovation changes.  A 
pertinent issue is how this change affects innovation.  This issue is the main objective 
of this thesis: to examine the effects of regulatory change on technological innovation 
in the public transport market. 
 
This chapter is an introduction to the thesis.  The next section explains the dynamic 
environment of the public transport market and how it affects technological 
development within a sector.  In this dynamic environment, the most important 
development is regulatory reform.  Section 1.3 discusses whether regulatory reform 
leads to more opportunities for innovation.  Additionally, it describes the development 
of regulatory reform and its relationship with innovation.  Finally, Section 1.4 
presents the main research question, methodology, and structure of this thesis. 
1.2 Public transport organisation and innovation in dynamic environment 
It is important to realise that a public transport organisation is somewhat unstable due 
to the fact that regulatory reform perpetually creates new forms of organisations with 
diverse objectives.  In the bus industry, for example, privatisation of national bus 
companies brought on competition.  These changes have a direct impact on the 
organisation of the public transport industry. 
  1
 Innovation and Regulatory Reform in Public Transport 
 
 
2
There are several terms that are used to define regulatory reform in the public 
transport market.  Most regulatory reform plays a role in both changing the ownership 
structure of a public transport organisation, and introducing competition.  The former 
is usually referred as privatisation which is the transfer of a public-owned company to 
a private one.  When defining competition, one must take into account two factors.  
First, (economic) deregulation is the cancellation of regulation (usually involving 
entry and exit control, and price and quantity restriction) which leads to direct 
competition in the market.  Second, tendering or franchising (usually referred to as 
competition for the market) is when operators bid for the right to a contract within an 
area or a system.  Different public transport systems (or countries) might use different 
terms for the same definition.  For example, tendering is commonly used within the 
bus sector, where in railway, franchising is used, especially in UK.  
 
The main reason for regulatory reform is to reduce government involvement in the 
public transport services.  Governmental response to public needs is ineffectual and 
counterproductive for a number of reasons (Berechman, 1993).  First, government 
(organisation) is inefficient and costly.  Second, it does not encourage the personal 
initiative of individuals and organisations.  Third, private sector operations 
outperform the public sector since they are sensitive to economic incentives.  Fourth, 
it does not follow that a service not provided by the market must be provided by 
public sector.  If the public sector wants this service to be provided without actually 
producing it, it can finance its provision (through, for example, contracting out).  This 
is the ideology which calls for reforms aiming at less government involvement and 
increased roles for market forces (Savas, 1987). 
 
However, as previously mentioned, there is very little research that discusses how 
regulatory reform affects innovation in the public transport system.  Most research 
examines the economic aspect of regulatory change, especially in terms of gains in 
efficiency due to regulatory change.  The topic of innovation is scarcely analysed for 
two main reasons. 
 
First, innovation typically has an ad-hoc meaning.  The perception of innovation is 
not straightforward; innovation involves newness, but the crucial question is how this 
newness is observed objectively.  For example, the introduction of the Automatic 
Vehicle Location (AVL) devise in buses may not be seen as innovation to the user as 
it is rarely seen by passengers.  But, it helps the operator manage the fleet in the 
system more effectively.  
 
Second, it is often the case that an innovative change is not financially viable at the 
first stage of introduction.  For example, the low floor buses were not adopted 
speedily as the cost of the bus was higher than that of a standard bus.  Later, however, 
some measures, such as regulation and financial incentives, were used to speed up the 
implementation of the low floor buses. 
 
Usually, there are many actors involved in the introduction of innovation.  Thus, this 
leads to complex interactions between actors in the innovation process.  These actors 
are passengers, public transport operators, and government agencies.  The success or 
failure of a public transport system is the result of the actions and interactions 
between the actors (Veeneman, 2002).  Furthermore, regulatory reform further 
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complicates the innovative process in public transport because it affects the roles of 
each actor in the system.   
 
Regulatory change introduces two important elements in innovation.  First, it 
influences the organisational structure as well as the behaviours of the decision-
makers in the system. In many cases, regulatory change is the result of a transfer from 
public to private operator.  This formulates a new organisational setting wherein 
private firms provide public transport services commercially while public authority 
subsidises loss-making services.  Thus, the incentive to introduce innovation changes 
as a result of this new organisational setting. 
 
The second element is the competitive environment.  Regulatory change often 
introduces competition through competitive tendering (with the exception of bus 
deregulation in the UK).  In order to win the right to operate in the market, an 
operator may adopt an innovation that increases the chances of winning.  Therefore, 
the winning criteria in the tender documents play a crucial role in influencing the 
innovation that is employed by an operator.   
 
This leads to the question as to how regulatory reform affects innovation in the public 
transport sector.  We discussed above the technological and organisational aspects 
that have an impact on innovation.  In the next section, we will discuss the 
relationship between regulatory reform and innovation. 
1.3 Regulatory reform and opportunities for innovation 
1.3.1 Relationship between technology and regulatory reform 
New transport technologies are vital for both social and economic development.  New 
technology enhances the efficiency of the mobility of both people and goods.  Some 
new technologies help specific groups of people for social inclusion purposes, such as 
disabled individuals.  The use of new technology, such as Vehicle Scheduling, 
enhances both operating efficiency and service quality.   
 
Innovation also plays an important role in the public transport system.  In general, 
technological developments can be explained as processes of small incremental 
changes (Geerlings, 1999).  Public transport benefits from the development of 
Information and Telecommunication Technology (ICT).  ICT plays an important part 
in the Travel Information System in that it informs passengers of any unexpected 
delays, both pre-trip and during the trip.  Further, ICT helps the operator in managing 
the fleet.  Another important element that influences technological development 
within a sector is the regulatory factor. 
 
When regulatory reform occurs, the most important issue is the changing role of each 
actor in the new setting.  The duties that were once the responsibility of public 
companies change drastically as the result of reform; therefore, the way each actor 
develops and implements innovation is crucial.  In general, regulatory change 
transpires in order to ameliorate the overall performance of the system.  Thus, this 
new setting can be seen as a dynamic capability development.  
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Institutional changes are also important here.  The organisations that are created by 
way of regulatory reform have new organisational objectives.  Before reforms, most 
public transport agencies were public-owned companies.  Their objectives were to 
provide public transport services as social services.  Prices were often set at marginal 
costs to maximise social welfare.  However, increases in subsidy levels created a 
difficult situation for the public transport sector.  The government saw this as a result 
of the inefficiency of the public transport operation.  Furthermore, publicly-owned 
companies do not typically introduce innovative changes into the system due to the 
fact that they have little incentive to innovate as they do not face any competition.  
Hence, competition seems to be a solution to this problem and, in order to create a 
competitive environment, regulatory reform must be introduced. 
 
1.3.2 Effects of regulatory reform on innovation 
The relationship between market mechanism and innovative activity has been a much-
debated issue (Symeonidis, 2002).  The overriding factor is the size of the firm.  
Larger firms in a concentrated market are often seen as the main pioneers of 
technological progress for reasons that relate to the higher scale of research and 
development (R&D) and innovation within the economy.  However, it is often argued 
(Symeonidis, 2002) that the lack of competitive pressure may lead to managerial 
inefficiency and slack, and so to a reduced level of innovative activity. 
 
In public transport, there is not much research on the topic of the relationship between 
competition and innovation.  The reasons for this might be twofold.  First, 
competition in the public transport market has only recently been introduced.  Second, 
the issue of innovation is not well-defined in transport research.  The meaning of 
innovation is narrowly defined, and only defined in terms of technological 
developments.  This narrow perspective limits the way in which innovation can be 
studied in both theory and practice.  Furthermore, innovation in the service sector1 is 
even more difficult to measure. 
 
The industry’s reaction to reform is also crucial here.  The organisations (i.e. both the 
public authority and private operator) developed as a result of regulatory reform may 
act differently regarding the issue of innovation because they have different goals and 
objectives.  We need to understand how decision-makers change in and adapt to the 
new regulatory framework, and more importantly, how these behavioural changes 
affect the innovative process. 
1.4 Research method and outline 
This research topic covers two main disciplines: regulatory reform and technological 
dynamics.  This thesis will bridge these two topics to analyse the effects of regulatory 
reforms on innovation.  Both theory and practice must be taken into consideration in 
order to carry out this research.   
 
The theory of regulatory reform is a well-studied issue based primarily on economic 
disciplines.  The main rationale of privatisation and deregulation stem from the 
market failure argument and the Contestable Theory (Baulmal et al., 1982).  However, 
                                                 
1 We regard the public transport sector as service sector. 
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the field of technological dynamics is a relatively new subject.  Thus, we need to 
develop a new theoretical approach that incorporates technological elements into the 
framework of regulatory reform.  We also need empirical evidence that provides a 
source of proof for this thesis.  Therefore, this thesis will cover both theoretical and 
empirical aspects of the main topic. 
 
1.4.1 Research questions 
This thesis focuses on the relationship between regulatory reform and technological 
innovation in the public transport sector.  The main research question can be 
formulated as follows: 
 
‘What effect does regulatory reform (in the public transport market) have on 
innovative capability of the actor, and which routes of innovation will prevail?’ 
 
As described above, this thesis is divided into two parts: a theoretical and an empirical 
part.  The theoretical part will be described as a concept that links regulatory issues 
and innovation together.  The empirical component uses an already developed 
framework to perform a case study in the public transport sector.  These two parts 
form four sub-questions that will be addressed in this thesis.  The first two sub-
questions are related to theory, and the latter two sub-questions are empirical in 
nature. 
 
The term ‘innovation’ is ill-defined.  People are usually concerned with innovation in 
terms of technological advancements.  However, innovation can be defined in various 
ways; both technological and organisational elements should be taken into account.  A 
broader definition is necessary in order to fully comprehend the mechanism of 
innovation as well as how it responds to regulatory change. This leads to the first sub-
question: 
 
1) What is innovation in public transport? 
 
The regulatory reforms of public transport change the industry dramatically.  It is our 
main objective to study the effects of regulatory reform on innovation in great detail.  
This thesis will focus primarily on both technical and organisational effects.  The 
behavioural changes of stakeholders are also analysed because those changes 
determine the direction of innovation in the sector.  Thus, the second question is 
addressed as follows: 
 
2) How does regulatory reform in the public transport sector affect innovation? 
 
Due to the fact that there is change in the organisational structure of public transport, 
the actors’ behaviour in the sector also changes.  This thesis will investigate how 
actors in the public transport sector change their actions and ideas about innovation as 
a result of regulatory reform.  The third question is as follows: 
 
3) What are the behavioural changes (with respect to innovation) of public 
transport actors when influenced by regulatory reform? 
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Finally, policy recommendations will be addressed.  Public transport policy-makers 
may need advice on how to design a policy that can benefit from an existing 
innovation.  Thus, the final question is the following: 
 
4) What are the policy recommendations for public transport stakeholders on 
innovation? 
 
1.4.2 Methodologies 
The aim of this research is to provide insight on the relationship between regulatory 
reform and innovation in the public transport sector.  In order to answer the research 
questions, we need both a well-defined theoretical approach and concrete empirical 
evidence that supports the theory.  This poses two difficult issues.  First, the topic of 
innovation in public transport is rather new.  The background theory on this topic 
must be drawn from outside the field of transport.  Second, as the theory is not well-
developed, empirical evidence seems strewn.  In addition, the regulatory reform that 
has taken place in this sector is very diverse, from country to country, even from city 
to city.  We need to consider the research methodology comprehensively, and 
consequently, we need to design the research framework carefully.   
 
This topic necessitates a multi-disciplinary perspective.  The theories used in this 
thesis emerge from two disciplines, namely the Innovation Study and the Regulatory 
Study.  The Regulatory Study concerns both the economic and social effects of 
regulatory changes in a given industry.  For the public transport industry, most 
research on regulatory changes focuses on the economic effects.  However, a broader 
perspective can be found in the study of regulatory changes in other industries, such 
as electricity, energy, and telecommunications.  
 
The Innovation Study is composed of many different theories.  The main theory that 
this thesis employs is the Evolutionary Theory of Technological Dynamics.  An 
important stimulus in the development of these theories is the work of Nelson and 
Winter (1977) and Dosi (1982, 1988a, 1988b).  The models of theories on 
technological change they developed are referred to as the contextual approach to 
technological change.  Nelson and Winter (1977) see technological change as a 
continuous series of variation and selection processes aimed at solving technically-
defined problems.  These processes do not take place in a random manner, but are 
clearly structured.  There is certain rigidity and inertia present in the extent of 
technological change which stops unlimited variation.  And, there is certain regularity 
to the development of technology referred to as ‘trajectories’.  A trajectory comprises 
the changes in technology which take place within the framework of a technological 
regime or paradigm, i.e. the ‘direction of progress’ within a technological regime. 
 
The Regulatory Study and Innovation Study provide a theoretical backbone for this 
research.  Subsequently, it is necessary to illustrate the validity of the thesis using 
empirical evidence.  The method we choose is a qualitative analysis using the case 
study approach.  The overall nature of innovation is that it is variable.  Innovation 
means change, and change is very difficult to quantify.  The case study approach 
allows us to analyse both quantitative and qualitative information.  This will allow us 
to suggest the implications of this thesis. 
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1.4.3 Structure of thesis 
Chapters 2 through 5 deal with various theories on which this thesis is based.  
Chapters 6 to 8 present empirical evidence in the form of case studies to support the 
validity of the theoretical aspect.  Lastly, Chapter 9 presents the conclusions of this 
thesis. 
 
The theoretical aspect begins with Chapter 2 which introduces the subjects of 
innovation and public transport.  First, the current situation of public transport is 
reviewed.  Then, the issue of technological developments in the transport sector is 
discussed.  Finally, the theoretical background on institutional and organisational 
aspects is described. 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the innovation theory for public transport.  Based on the theory 
of evolutionary economics, the twin characteristics approach is used as a framework 
to define and analyse innovation in public transport. 
 
Chapter 4 reviews theories related to regulatory changes.  Public transport institutions 
and organisations are both important issues.  This chapter looks at the relationship 
between the institution, organisation, and innovation.  Furthermore, the concept of 
dynamic capability and learning will be introduced here. 
 
Chapter 5 constructs an analytical framework for this thesis.  First, the chapter 
outlines the dynamic elements of regulatory reform and innovation.  It then discusses 
the interactive process between innovation and regulatory reform.  The chapter 
concludes with the proposed analytical framework. 
 
The empirical part consists of three chapters, Chapters 6 to Chapter 8.  Chapter 6 
describes the development of regulatory reform in European countries.  The chapter 
concentrates on two modes namely local public transport (mainly bus) and railways.  
The recent trend in regulatory reform is the move towards the tendering model in both 
the bus and railway sectors.  The detailed development of this trend is discussed in 
this chapter. 
 
The next two chapters present the empirical evidence in the form of a case study.  
Chapter 7 presents a bus tendering case study.  This chapter deals with an analysis of 
the tendering process in the bus sector with respect to innovation using the analytical 
framework developed in Chapter 5.  The cases consist of detailed studies in three 
specific areas in the Netherlands.  Then, a comparison is made with the London 
tendering system. 
 
Chapter 8 presents innovation in the railway tendering process.  This chapter uses the 
same analytical framework to analyse the effects of railway tendering on innovation.  
There are two cases on which we focus in this chapter: the Groningen and Merseyrail 
Electrics cases.  The role of rolling stock developments in the railway sector is also 
examined. 
 
Finally, Chapter 9 presents a summary and conclusions for the thesis. 
Recommendations for the future studies will be presented as well.  
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It should be noted that some parts of this thesis were published in journals and 
presented in conferences.  The references to those papers will be given at the 
footnotes of relevant chapters. 
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Chapter 2 Exploring Public Transport, Regulatory 
Reform, and Innovation1 
2.1 Introduction 
Public transport plays an important role in the transport system.  In urban areas, where 
many cities are facing a congestion problem, public transport is the key to resolving 
this problem.  Providing transport services where people can travel together in mass 
quantities would result in a considerable reduction in the number of vehicles on the 
road.  Moreover, in the lesser-congested areas, like rural districts, the issue of social 
inclusion arises and, again, public transport is the key.  Children, elderly citizens, and 
disabled individuals rely on public transport services. 
 
The public transport sector is traditionally a regulated industry.  The rationale for 
regulation includes the following reasons: to ensure social services, to guarantee the 
safety standard of the services, to protect the market from monopolistic behaviour, 
and to prevent wasteful competition.  These various bases result in differences in 
regulation both modally and geographically.  Different public transport modes like 
rail, tram, or bus lines have different criteria and details of regulation.  Although most 
modes are regulated under a monopoly, price, service quantity, and quality may be 
controlled differently.  Furthermore, different countries or regions could also have 
different regulations and regulatory styles, such as regulatory practices or industry 
cultures. 
 
New technologies also bring about changes in public transport services.  These 
changes result in an overall improvement of the public transport quality, and they also 
shape the way public transport services are provided.  In other words, these changes 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public transport systems and shape the 
regulation in the systems.  An example of the former is that better bus engines 
increase both speed of the bus and fuel efficiency.  An example of the latter is the 
invention of the catalyst converter which is now a common requirement for every bus.  
These are only examples of improvements in bus technology; there are many other 
examples that can be noted nowadays. 
 
Besides new technologies, both institutional and organisational developments also 
play an important role in the public transport sector.  A remarkable change in the past 
decade was the trend towards privatisation and deregulation of the public transport 
sector.  In European countries, various forms of competition were introduced resulting 
in the reformation of both institutions and organisations in the industry.  These 
                                                 
1 Section 2.3 of this chapter is partly based on an article in the Journal of The Eastern Asia Society for 
Transportation Studies (Geerlings, Ast, and Ongkittikul, 2005). 
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changes still occur, and what is most interesting is ‘how these changes affect 
innovation in the industry.’ This theme will be addressed throughout this thesis. 
 
This chapter aims at reviewing the topics of innovation as well as institutional and 
organisational changes in public transport sector.  The latter topic is typically 
addressed in the context of the economics of regulation or regulatory reform.  
Unfortunately, there is not much research on innovation or the relationship between 
innovation and regulatory reforms.   
 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows.  Section 2.2 examines the current 
situation of the public transport sector in European countries focusing primarily on the 
regulatory changes.  Section 2.3 reviews the study of technological development in 
transport.  The relationship between innovation and regulatory reform is discussed in 
Section 2.4.  Section 2.5 discusses characteristics of public transport services.  Then, 
Section 2.6 provides an overview of the distinction between institution and 
organisation.  This section also provides implications of the institutional and 
organisational aspects in the public transport sector.  Finally, Section 2.7 summarises 
the chapter and places an emphasis on the importance of understanding the 
complexity of the relationship between innovation and regulatory reform in the public 
transport sector. 
2.2 Public transport sector in a changing environment 
2.2.1 Current situations in public transport 
Public transport still faces fierce competition with the private car.  The evidence from 
European countries clearly shows that the private car is a dominant mode of transport 
in most developed countries.  The demand for car ownership and use is almost 
insatiable.  The growing number of automobiles in most major cities indicates that 
people prefer to use a private car.    Table 2-1 confirms this point.  The modal share of 
passengers has increased from 75 percent in 1970 to 84 percent in 2002.  This 
dominant position even seems to be getting stronger.  In the meantime, public 
transport struggles to maintain its small share.  
Table 2-1 Passenger-km by inland transport mode in EU-15 countries 
Year 
Passenger Cars 
’000 Million 
Passenger-Km 
Bus & Coach 
’000 Million 
Passenger-Km 
Railway 
’000 Million 
Passenger-Km 
Tram & Metro
’000 Million 
Passenger-Km 
Total 
’000 Million 
Passenger-Km 
1970 1562 (75%) 269 (13%) 219 (10%) 34 (2%) 2084 
1980 2246 (78%) 348 (12%) 248 (9%) 35 (1%) 2877 
1990 3139 (82%) 369 (10%) 268 (7%) 42 (1%) 3818 
1991 3210 (82%) 374 (10%) 276 (7%) 44 (1%) 3904 
1995 3463 (83%) 377 (9%) 274 (7%) 41 (1%) 4155 
1997 3576 (83%) 389 (9%) 285 (7%) 43 (1%) 4293 
1998 3655 (83%) 395 (9%) 287 (7%) 44 (1%) 4381 
1999 3726 (83%) 398 (9%) 295 (7%) 45 (1%) 4464 
2000 3780 (83%) 402 (9%) 304 (7%) 47 (1%) 4533 
2001 3816 (83%) 405 (9%) 308 (7%) 48 (1%) 4577 
2002 3882 (83%) 411 (9%) 307 (7%) 48 (1%) 4648 
Source:  Euro Stat 2003 
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The provision of government intervention is also a key factor in the operation of the 
public transport services.  Generally, government contributions to public transport are 
significant.  Figure 2-1 shows a trend of government subsidies to public transport in 
the Netherlands.  An increase in subsidy is one reason, among others, that the 
governments in many countries transfer public transport services to the private sector. 
Formerly, public-owned companies were operating the public transport sector in a 
monopoly position.  However, the trend towards privatisation and regulatory reforms 
is taking place in many countries, notably European countries. 
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Figure 2-1 Public transport subsidies in the Netherlands 
Source: CBS (2003) 
 
The key objective of regulatory reform is to enhance the efficiency of the sector.  
However, it appears that the government also expects innovation from the operator as 
well.  Clearly, the way innovation is introduced in a monopoly situation will be 
different when operating under a new regulatory framework.   
 
In Europe, the European Commission realises the importance of encouraging a modal 
shift from the private car to more sustainable forms of transport (public transport, 
walking, cycling).  The European Commission published its Green Paper, “The 
Citizens’ Network – fulfilling the potential of public passenger transport,” in 1995.  
This paper suggested various ways of making public transport more attractive and 
usable.  Examples included improvements to vehicles and rolling stocks, system 
integration, information provision, quality of service, and planning priorities for 
public transport projects. 
 
The European Commission began the process of improving the performance of the 
public transport system by identifying the best organisational structures for public 
transport operations in European countries.  This was the ISOTOPE project which 
commenced in 1995 and ended in 1997.  Later, the MARETOPE project, which ran 
from 2000 to 2004, continued the work produced by the ISOTOPE project.  Both 
projects concern the economic efficiency of the public transport systems in different 
regulatory frameworks. 
 
Not only is the efficiency aspect important to the public transport sector, but also the 
improvement of the quality of public transport services.  The European Commission’s 
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plan to support the relevant actors (the local authority, the operator, and manufacturer) 
in public transport was apparent in the funding of the QUATTRO project, which 
proceeded from 1996 to 1998.  QUATTRO was able to make specific 
recommendations to enhance public transport quality, and this included the use of 
benchmarking.    
 
There are several ways to improve the quality of public transport, and one of them is 
the benchmarking method.  The European Commission funded the EQUIP project 
which studied the implementation of the benchmarking approach in public transport.  
In this project, 91 indicators are identified in order to measure the performance of the 
public transport system (Geerlings et al., 2006).   
 
The above projects illustrate that the European Commission recognises the 
importance of the public transport sector.  The problems associated with congestion 
have been noted for some time, and the effects of increasing emissions have led to a 
significant effort in trying to resolve the problem.  It is obvious that the public 
transport has an important part to play in this respect. 
 
Additionally, the aforementioned developments illustrate the evolution of trends in 
the public transport policy.  We can divide the development into three separate trends.  
The first trend is the economic efficiency trend.  This trend came with the economic 
reform (i.e. privatisation and deregulation) aiming to increase the efficiency of the 
sector and reduce the subsidy burden of the public transport services.  The second 
trend is the quality improvement trend.  This trend was realised when cities required 
high quality public transport services in order to attract people away from their cars.  
We are currently in this trend.  Finally, the third trend is the environmental concern.  
It seems that the congestion in many urban areas is the greatest source of pollution.  
Not only do cars pollute, but also public transport vehicles.  Thus, there are some 
initiatives to introduce a cleaner-engine vehicle into the public transport sector.  
However, this trend is still in its early phase where only a few cases have actually 
been implemented.   
 
2.2.2 Public transport policy and the regulatory reform 
The European Union (EU) realises the importance of public transport and makes it 
clear that the quality of public transport must improve in order to compete with the 
private car.  Public transport needs to achieve levels of comfort, quality and speed that 
meet people’s expectations.  The European Commission proposed an approach to 
open up the public transport market while guaranteeing the transparency, quality and 
performance of public transport services by means of regulated competition 
(European Commission, 2001b).   
 
Competition policy at the European level influences the direction of the public 
transport industry.  In the near future, hundreds of cities will be forced to open their 
local bus, tram, and metro (underground train) systems to private competition.  This 
brings about radical changes from both an institutional and organisational standpoint.  
Public authorities, especially local governments, face difficulties in that, on the one 
hand, they are obliged to provide affordable public transport services; while on the 
other hand, they have to subsidise the service effectively through open competition in 
the market (tendering process). 
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Innovation seems to be a promising option for the situations described above.  In fact, 
the open market for the private sector gives an opportunity for an innovative idea 
from private operator.  It is generally accepted that the private sector is more 
consumer-driven than the public one.  However, a policy that can attract innovation is 
not easy to design. Innovation is a complex process.  The complication occurs since 
the effects of innovation and regulatory change are hardly predictable. 
 
The regulatory reform of public transport creates a wide variety of organisational 
forms in European public transport.  One of the common features is the growing 
involvement of the private sector in service production through either deregulation or 
competitive tendering regimes.  Velde (2003) observes that the growth of private 
involvement has led to the development of major international operators.  These 
operators have originated almost exclusively from Britain and France in the past 
decade.  The British deregulation of the local bus outside London led to the 
appearance of new private operators: Arriva, Frist Group, Go-Ahead and Stagecoach.  
In France, the new European trend of public transport tendering led to the expansion 
of French operators: Connex, Keolis and Transdev. 
 
If we look back to the history of the regulatory reforms in Europe, the greatest 
breakthrough of the public transport regulatory reform occurred during the British 
deregulation case in 1985.  It came from the Transport Act of 1985 which set the new 
rules for the local bus service in Great Britain.  The new rules included the following 
requirements: to abolish quantity controls (road service licensing) on local bus 
services outside London; to restrict subsidy payments in support of public transport 
for local services to unprofitable routes required to meet social need; and to make 
fundamental structural changes to public sector bus ownership (McGuinness et al., 
1994).  The essential element of this regime is that the operators can determine fares 
and services on a purely commercial basis, with the exception of those areas that are 
not commercially feasible, such as areas social services. 
 
It was anticipated that deregulation would result in a number of consequences.  It was 
contended that through the process of deregulation, new operators would be able to 
enter the market, and incumbent bus undertakings would be transformed into more 
innovative, market-oriented and commercial companies (McGuinness et al., 1994).  
Furthermore, one of the main aims behind the 1985 legislation was to introduce a 
contestable competitive operating environment (Banister, 1985).  Competition, it was 
contended, would bring with it a combination of lower operating costs, lower fares, 
and improved services (McGuinness et al., 1994).  This British approach allows the 
operator to play a major role in the operating and planning of the public transport 
service.  It leaves little room for public authorities to participate in the design and 
planning of the service.  Thus, the service is solely in the hands of the operators.  With 
respect to innovation, Mackie et al. (1995) reveal that established firms have been 
quite willing to develop new service patterns, and to switch from big bus to mini or 
midibus operation.  They conclude that a large, well-managed incumbent has 
sufficient sources of competitive advantage to deter entry successfully, or at least to 
restrict competition. 
 
In the railway sector, the UK rail industry has been radically reformed since the 
beginning of the privatisation process in 1994.  The details of this process are well 
documented elsewhere (see for example Kain (1998)).  Briefly, the industry was 
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restructured into potentially profitable units that were privatised by outright sale, and 
non-profitable units that were privatised by franchising.  The potentially profitable 
units are the rolling stock leasing companies (ROSCOs), NetworkRail (formerly 
RailTrack), the infrastructure supply companies (ISCOs) and the trainload freight 
companies.  However, a unique aspect of British Rail’s privatisation was the transfer 
of businesses to the private sector that had little chance of making a profit, i.e. a 
passenger rail industry (Preston et al., 2000).  This transfer process has become 
known as franchising. 
 
Scandinavian countries use a different approach to introducing competition into the 
public transport sector.  Sweden and Denmark have employed the limited competition 
approach on the bus service.  In Sweden, before deregulation in 1989, it was 
compulsory that the authorities allow the scheduled bus services to be performed by 
those bus companies that had exclusive licences to operate certain routes 
(Alexandersson et al., 1998).  Bus companies faced no competition on their routes.  
Deregulation came into force in 1989, when all earlier road licences were abolished.  
This reform opened up the opportunity, but not the obligation, for each local authority 
to promote competition among the bus companies by purchasing public transport 
services through competitive tendering.  It should be noted that the Swedish reform, 
especially when compared to the British deregulation, is less radical (Alexandersson 
et al., 1998).  It was designed with the main purpose of making it easier for the local 
authorities to coordinate and restructure their bus services and to bring down their 
costs.  Most importantly, it is still not possible for bus companies to start up their 
services wherever they wish – neither on new routes nor on parallel routes competing 
with existing ones. 
 
In the Netherlands, prior to the year 2000, local and regional public transport was 
historically based upon the principle of market initiative but moved de facto gradually 
away from that principle, giving a great degree of stability to incumbent operators, 
which were mostly authority-owned (Velde and Leijenaar, 2001).  Although it was 
legally possible for the new entry from private operators, it rarely took place in 
practice.  
 
A major development in the Dutch public transport in recent years was the 
introduction of the new Passenger Transport Act 2000.  This reform’s aim was 
twofold: more attractive public transport services (especially in areas worst hit by 
congestion) and an improvement in cost recovery ratios (Velde, 2003).  This act 
decentralised the powers to provincial and regional authorities, and gradually 
introduced the competitive tendering of public transport services for concessions.  
Additionally, the act stated that authority-owned local transport companies were to be 
put at arm’s length or privatised.  The process of reform was set to be complete by the 
year 2006.  In an early assessment of this reform, Hermans and Stoelinga (2003) 
studied impacts of the reform in terms of service level, patronage, and cost efficiency.  
The positive results are an increase in service level and patronage, and cost efficiency 
while some barriers still remain.  The details of the Dutch public transport 
development regarding the regulatory reform will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 6. 
 
In sum, there is a great deal of variance in the way each country implements 
regulatory reform in public transport.  Also, the implementation of a reform evolves 
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over time.  The European experiences of regulatory reform in the public transport 
sector will be given in more detail in Chapter 6. 
 
2.2.3 Structural change of the public transport market 
Regulatory reform leads to structural changes in the public transport.  Over the years, 
the public transport industry has been changing the administrative/company-
orientated balance of powers both in the nature of the relationship and of the 
organisation.  Focusing on these developments from a long term perspective, Vroome 
and Wetzels (1995) observe that there are three waves which can be interpreted as 
follows.  
 
During the initial ‘exploratory’ phase in the first wave (1925-1935), there was a 
period of all-out competition on the roads.  At that time, wasteful competition 
occurred and the government decided during the second half of 1930s to regulate the 
market and to exclude competition.  By means of statutory regulations, authorisations, 
permits and other means, protected zones were assigned to different companies.  
Local transport was assigned to municipal companies or to private transport operators, 
while regional transport was given over to private operators.  Direct competition had 
been eliminated (Vroome and Wetzels, 1995).  The second wave was the period 
during which the model was one of statutory ‘heavily subsidised and regulated public 
transport’.  In this phase, the government planned and regulated public transport, 
while the transport companies carried out only what the government had developed in 
terms of transport planning.  The statutory contributions to public transport were very 
substantial at the end of the 1980s.  This event led away from the second wave into 
the third phase of ‘reorganisation’.  The government, during this phase, tried in 
various ways to control (or reduce) its financial contributions to the 
commercialisation of public transport.  The shift from the second wave to the third 
wave can be observed when analysing the concept of reducing government 
involvement in public transport planning and control.  The government withdraws 
from the sector and accepts a newly defined role; this marks the transition to a third 
wave with a fundamentally new time period and pattern.  Vroome and Wetzels (1995) 
refer to the third wave as a period characterised by the pattern of ‘conditional free 
enterprise’. 
 
The observation of Vroome and Wetzels above is in line with Velde (2005).  Velde 
(2005) observes that the bus sector was functioning on the free market until the 1930s.  
The operators called for regulation because they started to face problems such as 
fierce competition from other modes of transport.  The intervention of government in 
the following period (after 1940) was ‘the coordination’ period that remained in place 
until the 1980s (Velde, 2005).  After this coordination period, fundamental changes 
took place in the European public transport sector at the end of the 1980s.  These 
fundamental changes came in the form of an ideology of deregulation, liberalisation, 
and privatisation.  These fundamental changes are still evolving. 
 
The structural change in the public transport industry affects not only the ownership 
but also the organisational structure of the operators’ companies.  Clearly, this change 
is dependent on the regulatory reform.  The organisational change affects planning the 
responsibilities of each stakeholder.  In this case, the stakeholders are the authority 
and operators.  With respect to the level of planning and control, Velde (1999) makes 
a distinction between the Strategic, Tactical, and Operational functions of public 
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transport (STO) of the authority and operators.  Strategy involves answering the 
question of what we want to achieve.  Tactics involve determining the services that 
can meet the policy goals. Operations involve producing those services to meet the 
policy goals.  Considering these three levels of planning and control, the operator 
would previously have responded only at an operational level.  The public authority 
took over the task at the tactical level.  However, regulatory reform has increased the 
opportunities for private operators to get more involved in the tactical tasks.  This is a 
complicated matter since, as mentioned above, there are differences in the details and 
approaches countries utilise in managing their public transport services.  In other 
words, there is no universal solution to organising and regulating public transport 
services.  This is due to the differences in the cultural backgrounds in each area and 
the previous regulations in each country.  This is a (sort of) path dependency where 
the current situation was the result of history.  The cumulative knowledge of both 
authority and operator plays an important role in the evolution process.  For instance, 
deregulation in the UK was implemented because the authority (in this case the 
central government) perceived the inefficiency of the existing monopoly regime. 
Once the deregulation was implemented, the operators modified their strategies to 
survive in the market and tried to achieve their business objectives.  The results of the 
new operators’ actions were cost reduction and an increase in fare level resulting in a 
dramatic decrease in patronage.  It was then that the government realised the mistake 
and tried to introduce the Quality Partnership (QP) regime to boost the public 
transport use.  What we can see from this point is that each stakeholder is learning, 
and the actions they take are based on the past.  
 
Undoubtedly, we need a thorough understanding of both the process of regulatory 
reform and the structural change.  It is also important to study the interaction between 
actors in the public transport sector which affects the regulatory reform and structural 
change.  We will deal with this issue in more detail in Chapter 4. 
2.3 Technological development in public transport 
Technological innovation plays several important roles in the transport sector.  
Technology is important as a means towards a certain (technical) objective.  For 
example, the new propulsion system aims at reducing the pollution produced by an 
automobile.  However, it also serves as a (indirect) means to fulfil the policy 
objective.  An example is the opportunities offered by electronic contactless payment 
systems.  This may facilitate the implementation of efficient pricing for different 
transport modes (Zuylen and Weber, 2002). 
 
Innovation in public transport is not new to us. Much research addresses significant 
development and innovation in the public transport sector. For instance, the use of 
electrification or breaking technology in railway was usually regarded as an 
innovation.  Gallamore (1999) studies the diffusion of technology in the American 
railroad industry and Lancaster and Taylor (1988) study the innovations with respect 
to the high speed train. 
 
The term ‘transport innovation’ includes both new ways to manage transport systems 
(mostly by use of various policy tools) and new technologies (Feitelson and Salomon, 
2004).  If we accept this wider definition of innovation which includes organisational 
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and institutional aspects, it could be revealed that the regulatory reforms could also be 
considered as an innovation.  There are a number of studies in regulatory reforms, 
especially from an economic aspect.  Not surprisingly, innovation is also a subject in 
which research on regulatory reforms is interested.   
 
It is also clear that the growth of transport will generate sincere negative effects (such 
as congestion, emission, accidents).  But since the transport sector can be 
characterised as a dynamic sector, it is expected that some of these effects can be 
addressed by technological innovation.  However, a ‘technological fix’ will never be 
envisaged (Gwilliam and Geerlings, 1992); technology can contribute to a more 
dynamic economic development as well as fight the external effects.  This section will 
present a quick scan of the technologies in the transport sector. 
  
2.3.1 Decomposition of technological involvement in transport 
To examine the effects of technology, it is useful to decompose the technological 
composition of the transport system.  This decomposition is called the transport mode 
concept proposed by Zwaneveld et al. (1999).  This concept partitions transport into 
three components: propulsion system (PS); vehicle concept (VC); and transport 
concept (TC).  Then, the transport mode concept (TMC) illustrates how the three 
items (PS, VC and TC) are utilised in the transport system.  The definitions and some 
of the relationships between the terms are given in Figure 2-2. 
 
Propulsion System
(PS)
Vehicle Concept
(VC)
Transport Concept
(TC)
Fuel and technology 
used for the 
movement of 
vehicles
Vehicle (with 
corresponding 
infrastructure) used 
for the movement of 
goods and persons
Organisational form 
of use and operation 
of vehicles and 
corresponding 
infrastructure
Transport Mode Concept (TMC)
Combination of a PS, VC, and TC, a supplier of mobility
 
Figure 2-2 Transport mode concept 
Source:  Zwaneveld et al. (1999) 
 
In each system, there are several potential technologies that could make an impact to 
the system.  Each system has its own path of technological development.  The 
propulsion system focuses on the fuel and technology that is used for the movement 
of the vehicle.  As far as the vehicle concept is concerned, both the vehicle and 
infrastructure develop concurrently.  The transport concept goes beyond the 
individual vehicle.  This concept involves the aspects of organising and facilitating 
the system.  Finally, the transport mode concept combines all concepts mentioned 
above and takes into account the individual behaviours of the system to manage and 
control mobility. 
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Fuel and propulsion technology  
The development of fuel technology is an important trend in transport technology.  In 
the past, fuel and propulsion technology have improved the performance of the 
transport system in terms of speed.  If we look closely at the development of the 
transport system, in any mode, the speed has gradually increased over time.  One of 
the key elements is the propulsion system.  For example, in the railway system, the 
change from coal to diesel engine increased the railway speed.  However, each mode 
has its own speed capacity.  For instance, automobiles have reached their maximum 
practical speed (150 kmph at max) due to safety reasons.  Further concerns are the 
environmental impacts from each propulsion system.  Recently, environmental issues 
have become more important to the society.  As transport is one of the sources of 
pollution, the fuel and propulsion technology have worked to improve the 
environmental performance of transport systems, especially in the automobile sector. 
 
An important development in this category is the alternative fuel vehicle.  There are 
several fuel technologies that are in the development period now, such as fuel cell 
(FC) technology and bio-fuel.  Clearly, engine replacement is not relevant to the 
mobility and congestion issue, i.e. the use of alternative fuel vehicles neither reduces 
nor increases the level of congestion.  What it does affect is the environment.  
Gwilliam and Geerlings (1992) observe four alternative fuels, namely hydrocarbon 
fuels, biofuels, hydrogen, and electric propulsion (fuel cells).  These technologies are 
promising means of moving toward more environmentally friendly transport systems; 
however, the introduction of such technologies will occur in the long-term.  Indeed, 
after more than a decade of these reports and findings, the significant implementation 
has not yet been realised in this field. 
 
Helmreich and Leiss (2000) indicate two important technologies in the field of fuel 
and propulsion technologies that could make a major contribution in the future, 
namely fuel cell technology and hybrid propulsion.  First, fuel cell propulsion may be 
based upon several different fuel and technology combinations depending upon the 
rate of technological development, fuel availability and infrastructure development.  
There is uncertainty over what the impacts may be from each of these combinations.  
Full life-cycle analysis is required to appreciate the contributions of fuel production 
and distribution on resource use and greenhouse gas emissions.  There is little doubt 
that fuel cells will lead to significant improvements (>90%) in local emissions of key 
pollutant species.  Fuel cell technologies are expected to be significant in almost all 
scenarios and with many different vehicle and transport technologies.  They are 
expected to have the most positive impact on greenhouse gas emissions and air 
quality, and will deliver improvements to noise pollution (mainly urban traffic noise).  
Fuel cells are expected to show a 50% improvement in fuel efficiency in 2030 
compared to conventional petrol in 1995.  
 
Second, hybrid propulsion is also expected to play a significant role in the medium 
term, and to become an important core technology connected to fuel cell deployment 
(Ongkittikul and Geerlings, 2004).  Whilst enabling significant reductions in resource 
use, and therefore greenhouse gas reductions, hybrid drive technology (for all-purpose 
cars, buses and possibly freight vehicles) will allow zero emission operation of these 
vehicles within urban areas, where air quality improvements are of the highest 
priority.  Noise pollution will also see remarkable improvements in slow-speed urban 
operations. 
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Although propulsion technology is unlikely to contribute to mobility and congestion 
problems, if we consider the external effects of congestion, such as pollution and 
noise, this technology can be beneficial.  In sum, two technological trends can be 
identified.  The first trend is that the conventional propulsion system be adopted.  This 
can be seen as a short-term path that would dominate the propulsion system in the 
next five years (or so).  The second path is the new propulsion system.  This is a sort 
of technological breakthrough in the long term (10-15 years).  However, there is 
uncertainty in terms of which technology would dominate the market as a  wide range 
of technologies, such as fuel cell and hydrogen technologies, will become available in 
the future. 
 
Vehicle and Infrastructure Technology 
Vehicle and infrastructure have a close relationship.  The development of vehicle 
design, in some instances, is based on the infrastructure with which it is associated.  It 
is obvious that the infrastructure is the main determinant of spatial development.  
Thus, the issue of technological development in the infrastructure component should 
also be considered in the standardisation of the system.  In general, the vehicle and 
infrastructure technologies can be split into two modes, namely road and rail systems.  
 
In this section we will examine several potential technologies: Automated Vehicle 
Guidance (AVG), the Magnetic Levitation Technology (Maglev), and the 
Underground Logistic System (ULG). 
− AVG is a system that helps the vehicle to manoeuvre automatically on a provided 
path.  This system has the potential of increasing the road capacity.  Theoretically, 
it reduces the distance between vehicles and, possibly, the lane width.  Hence, a 
direct impact of congestion reduction can be expected.  Furthermore, it also 
increases the comfort of driving, especially in congested areas.  Drivers become 
able to use their in-vehicle time for other activities as well.  However, given the 
improvement in driving comfort, this system may stimulate car use which may, in 
turn, increase congestion.  When focusing on the environmental aspects, the 
impacts of this system are mainly associated with the level of congestion.  But, as 
mentioned above, this system could both reduce and increase congestion; the 
outcome cannot be certain.  However, if we assume that this system makes traffic 
flow smoothly, higher energy savings are possible, which would consequently 
result in the reduction of pollution.  
− Maglev technology is the utilisation of magnetic levitation, guidance and 
propulsion to greatly increase vehicle speed.  It is comparable to the high-speed 
train.  Maglev has high acceleration and deceleration, high payload, low energy 
consumption, low emission and noise (see Geerlings (1999) for more detail).  
With respect to congestion and mobility issues, Maglev may not directly affect the 
system since it deals with long distance travel.  However, it could be used to 
construct regional versions of the system that correspond to the corridor area 
where a high capacity and efficiency link is needed. 
− ULG is a new concept of transport with its own infrastructure; it offers an 
alternative to road and rail freight transport (Heyma et al., 2000).  It potentially 
reduces the congestion in urban areas because it replaces short distance road 
transport.  Furthermore, its environmental impacts seem to be minimal compared 
to a conventional heavy goods vehicle because it uses electric propulsion. 
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Helmreich and Leiss (2000) identify three promising concepts in the field of vehicle 
and infrastructure technologies, namely: all-purpose car, personal rapid transit, and 
road train. 
− All-purpose car: The all-purpose car (APCAR) in its various forms satisfies 
essentially all requirements of individual mobility including urban, long-distance, 
business, leisure/fun, etc. applications.  This includes more specialised variants 
such as all-terrain vehicles, sports cars, and multi-person vehicles.  The all-
purpose car is expected to show the most significant improvements.  A reduction 
of the negative impacts of air quality is expected due to a slow turnover of the 
fleet from internal combustion engines that harm the environment to advanced 
diesel turbine engines as well as other more advanced engines like hybrid or fuel 
cell propulsion systems. 
− New systems for personal rapid transit: This concept refers to light rail and people 
mover systems that are usually associated with urban transport.  Research in this 
area has been conducted over the past few years.  This concept could benefit from 
a better knowledge transfer, based on the assessment of pilots and demos. But the 
main problems for such a new system are financial barriers and potential 
mismatches with current dominant public transport technologies.  
− Road trains: These are road vehicles used specifically to carry heavy goods on 
medium to long distances.  This includes the road train vehicle (for long-distance, 
high capacity freight movement) as well as designs for freight intermodality.  A 
similar concept is the Autoshuttle which is utilised for  passenger transport. 
 
Overall, the vehicle concept is a more promising means of improving mobility and 
congestion problems than that of the propulsion system.  Furthermore, new 
developments appear to be more environmentally friendly due to the global trend 
toward a sustainable society.  A major barrier in implementing the above-mentioned 
technologies is the issue of investment.  As each technology relies heavily on the 
infrastructure, the costs of both infrastructure and vehicle are very high.  This means 
that area-wide implementation necessitates a considerable diffusion period.  
Additionally, some regulations are needed to organise the new systems and also, in 
some instances, to accelerate the technology diffusion. 
 
Transport Demand Management Trends 
The demand management issue is based on both the transport concept and the 
transport mode concept (see Figure 2-2).  Elements of this are, for example, parking 
facilities, supply system, and pricing concepts.  In this section, two promising trends 
are selected, namely the demand responsive concept and road charging. 
 
The demand responsive concept offers an individual public transport that supplies 
services upon request.  The size of the vehicle tends to be small and it functions 
mostly in an urban area.  This concept could increase mobility and, as it has higher 
occupancy than a private car, it could also reduce congestion. Technology, such as 
ICT and AGV, is very important to make this system successful.  As the pattern of 
demand will rely on each individual, the ICT will help to minimise the operational 
route.  AGV can also improve the service quality in terms of the speed and capacity of 
the system. 
 
Congestion charging is a pricing measure aimed at reducing travel demands in 
congested timeframes and areas.  In this case, the technology is not the main subject, 
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but it is a tool that makes this scheme possible.  There is an example using ICT in the 
congestion-charging scheme in London, UK.  According to Derek Turner, boss of the 
capital’s street management department, the scheme reduced traffic in the area by 
20% and cut delays by nearly 30% (Economist, 2003).  Clearly, it reduces congestion 
and increases mobility.  Furthermore, as the congestion decreased, the pollution level 
also decreased.  However, in many countries, the congestion scheme was delayed or 
even dismissed due to public rejection.  
 
In sum, technology takes part in the transport concepts in various levels. In some 
instances, technology plays a leading role in the introduction of a concept.  
Sometimes, technology plays an accelerated part in stimulating the scheme.  One 
element that should be mentioned is that technological uncertainty and the public 
interest may influence the scheme.  At the same time, individual needs and transport 
demand have elements of autonomous processes.  As stated before, they are partly the 
result of the potential for new technology and, in turn, they lead to eventual 
innovations in transport modes. 
 
2.3.2 Information and Communication Technology 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) plays a role in the transport sector 
in two manners.  Firstly, it helps the physical transport to operate smoothly.  For 
example, the real time information, which builds on state-of-the-art ICT, helps 
passengers reduce travel time.  Secondly, ICT can substitute the transport demand.  
For example, in the past, letter writing as a means of communication was substituted 
by telephone calls.  Recently, telecommuting has become more plausible in the 
information age.  
 
In general, ICT is involved in the transport section in two ways.  It helps the operation 
and management of transport networks (in all modes), such as railway-signalised 
system, area-wide traffic control, and variable message signs.  It also gives 
information and guidance to the users such as a travel information system. 
 
One ICT application, which has been implemented in several areas already, is a travel 
information and trip planning system.  This technology also extends to the recent 
transport trend in the multi-modal issue.  This multimodal travel information provides 
information over several modes of travel which can be beneficial to both the traveller 
and service provider (Helmreich and Leiss, 2000).  Another ICT that will be 
implemented in the near future is smart card technology.  A smart card is a cashless 
fare system that substitutes cash, ticket, and tariff information.  The user has to 
register and to cancel.  A smart card can hold information such as the current balance, 
transaction history and user profile.  The use of smart cards is increasing.  Smart cards 
offer the option of totally anonymous usage for applications such as Autonomous 
Route Guidance, driver information and congestion charging, and public transport 
fare collection. 
 
Instead of transporting people, it is also possible for individuals to avoid making trips 
by using other means to fulfil their desired activities.  In other words, by transporting 
information, there would be less need for travel.  Such as with places of employment 
that allow people to work from home or at a location in closer proximity, and use the 
Internet as a means of communication with other colleagues.  The advanced Internet 
technology makes this idea plausible through the telecommuting approach 
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(Mokhtarian and Salomon, 1997).  Telecommuting reduces actual travel and, 
subsequently, reduces transport externalities.  This measure can directly reduce the 
congestion problem and would therefore lead to a decrease in environmental pollution 
from transport.  However, it should be noted that there are limitations in terms of the 
type of work that can apply this measure.  Furthermore, although there is no scientific 
work supporting the argument, it is likely that the time that people can save from this 
telecommuting is going to be spent in travelling for other purposes.  Thus, mobility 
could remain at the same level.  
 
In summary, there is growing attention on the role of technology in society.  We 
observe a certain fascination and technological optimism.  Technology is seen as the 
key to resolving a number of different problems.  This opinion is often expressed 
when society confronts 'new' issues, such as environmental problems or limitations in 
energy supply.  Technological solutions can be politically preferable as they involve 
the least amount of government intervention and restriction. 
2.4 Innovation and regulatory reform in the public transport sector 
The relationship between innovation and regulatory change in public transport is not 
new.  There are a number of examples that show the interaction between these two 
aspects.  The importance of both regulation and innovation has been illustrated in 
many transport sectors.  For example, Gallamore (1999) shows the relationship 
between innovation and regulation in the American railroad industry.  He finds that 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regulation could delay or thwart 
innovation whereas the deregulation has fostered railroad innovation and change. 
 
To exemplify some ideas of the relationship between innovation and regulatory 
reforms, let us consider a simple linear relationship of this kind.  Table 2-2 shows 
patterns of developments of innovation and regulatory change.  Note that these 
examples are simplified linear relationships; the real-world situation may be much 
more complex and may have an interaction (feedback loop) between regulatory 
change and innovation. 
Table 2-2 Patterns of the development of innovation and regulatory change 
Innovation Regulatory change
Regulatory change Innovation
Pattern of development Examples
Pattern
· Innovation is first developed
· Then the change in regulation booted the diffusion of innovation
Examples
· Unleaded gasoline (Technological innovation)
· Low-floor buses (Technological innovation)
· Smart card (Technological Innovation)
Pattern
· First the regulation was changed
· Then the innovation occurred
Examples
· The use of mini-van (Technological innovation)
· Multinational operator (Organisational innovation)
 
Source: Ongkittikul and Geerlings (2006) 
 
There are a number of examples that illustrate how regulatory changes lead to 
innovation.  For instance, the bus deregulation in Great Britain affected vehicle size 
from larger to smaller buses (minibus effect).  Deregulation also affects the 
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organisational reforms of the industry.  After years of deregulation, there were several 
mergers and acquisitions which lead to the creation of multinational public transport 
operators. 
 
Another pattern of development is that innovation leads to changes in regulation.  In 
this case, the innovation is first realised to benefit the society, but there may not be 
any incentive to the users.  Regulatory tools are seen as a means of accelerating the 
diffusion of the innovation which may come in forms of fiscal incentive or regulation.  
For example, the case of switching to unleaded gasoline in the UK shows that 
regulations have been an effective instrument in stimulating the desired shift from 
leaded to unleaded gasoline (Stoneman, 2002).  Another good example is the smart 
card system (electronic payment).  In the Netherlands, there will be an 
implementation of the smart card system at national level, due to the government 
funded project (see later in Chapter 6 and 7). 
2.5 Characteristics of public transport services 
Recently, there has been wide interest in the public transport service industry.  The 
important aspects are both service performance, offered to users, and operator 
performance, which refer to a firm’s productivity.  These two aspects are closely 
related since the public transport is a service in which users take part in the production 
process.  This process consists of two main functions: the production of the service 
and its utilisation (Costa, 1997).  Those functions are performed by different agents: 
the producers of the service are the operators and the users are a subset of potential 
passengers.  Figure 2-3 shows the relationship between these agents and their simple 
indicators showing inputs and outputs of those activities. 
 
Staff
Vehicles
Energy
Seat x Km
Veh x Km
Veh x Hours 
Passenger x Km
Passengers 
Potential passenger
Inputs Outputs
Inputs Outputs
Operator
 
Figure 2-3 Inputs and outputs of an urban public transport system  
Source: Costa (1997) 
 
The production of the public transport service is a process of transforming inputs 
(such as staff, vehicle and energy) into outputs (such as distance covered by the fleet, 
distance covered by each seat in the fleet, or hours of vehicle operation).  These 
outputs, which we usually call supply-related outputs, will be available to potential 
users.  However, it should be realised that these outputs, which are services by nature, 
can neither be stored nor produced under client order; the service provided must 
match instant client needs.  As a result, the potential users can become actual 
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passengers only if the service meets their demands.  These utilised outputs are called 
demand-related outputs.  The supply-related and demand-related outputs, which are 
expressed in the literature as efficiency and effectiveness respectively, have lead to 
different measures of productivity and, consequently, to a different conclusion as to 
whether a specific transit system is efficient or not (Berechman, 1993). 
 
In general, the efficiency and effectiveness of the public transport service can be 
assessed in several ways. Of particular interest and complexity are cost or production 
frontiers.  These approaches have sought to analyse the relationship between the 
physical outputs of a service and the amounts of inputs used.  For instance, efficiency 
measures the extent to which a firm has managed to produce a given level of output at 
the least cost (Berechman, 1993). 
 
There are two broad ways of defining the production frontier from such sets of 
resource inputs used to produce a level of outputs: parametric and non-parametric 
approaches (Button and Costa, 1999).  The parametric approach is based on standard 
econometrics and involves selecting a functional form for the production function, 
making assumptions about the distribution of the inefficiency terms and fitting the 
function to the data.  In contrast, with non-parametric, programming approaches, such 
as Data Envelope Analysis (DEA), the frontier envelops all the units and no 
functional form is assumed. 
 
Many researchers have employed these production frontier approaches to analyse the 
technical efficiency of the public transport service operator.  The crucial elements of 
using production frontier approaches are selection and specification of input and 
output indicators.  Borger et al. (2002) state that there is a wide variability in the use 
of inputs and outputs in urban transit technology specifications.  They observe that 
most studies use labour and capital as inputs, but not all include energy, while, on the 
output side, a similar wide variety of indicators is observed.  Parametric studies 
mainly use supply-oriented indicators such as seat-km or vehicle-km.  In non-
parametric studies, there is a broader choice of outputs, although the vehicle-km or 
seat-km specifications are still the most common. 
 
However, the previously mentioned methods suffer from a limitation in that these 
approaches ignore quality changes in both inputs and outputs.  Most productivity and 
efficiency studies implicitly assume that the quality of input and output are constant 
(Oum et al., 1999).  Moreover, it is pointed out by Saviotti (1996) that conventional 
economic treatments of technological change have two shortcomings: first, they are 
implicit analyses of the phenomenon, and second, they deal only with the growing 
output and increasing efficiency of economic development, but they neglect the 
growing output variety aspect. 
 
The variety of public transport services can be found in both the input and output.  
Sources of variety can be identified in the areas of technology and organisation.  
Technological development brings about a better use of inputs and better quantity and 
quality of outputs.  For instance, low floor bus technology has been developed over 
the past decade.  This technology leads to a better quality of bus services in terms of 
improving accessibility and thus reducing boarding time.  Another example of 
technological development in urban public transport is the guided bus technology.  
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This technology, combined with other traffic management technologies, leads to 
higher speed and better reliability of bus services. 
 
The organisational developments also created diversity in public transport services.  
These developments may come either from within public transport firms or from 
public sectors.  However, the characteristics of public transport are still influenced by 
public sectors.  Government intervention in the sector is widespread and has 
traditionally been justified by reference to a series of market failures.  In the past two 
decades, however, concerns about possible regulatory failures lead to a reassessment 
of the role of the state in the organisation of the sector (Borger et al., 2002). 
 
Over the past decade, public transport has been dominated by an economic rationale 
of regulation.  While the level of public transport subsidy is growing in many 
countries, many regulatory regimes have been put forward through the deregulation 
and privatisation processes.  The hope is that private operators, disciplined by 
competition, can reduce the costs of providing service and thus cut subsidy 
requirements.  Moreover, it is expected that the competition in public transport 
services may create opportunities for innovations.  Although the effects of those 
regulatory regimes are still being assessed, many studies have sought to analyse some 
primary outcomes, especially with respect to efficiency improvements.  For instance, 
in Great Britain, deregulation in the bus industry is associated with lower subsidies 
and has lead to large reductions in costs (Preston, 2001b).  In sum, changes in the way 
public transport services are provided by a well-chosen use of a mixture of 
competition and regulation have shown themselves to be capable of major 
improvements to services at lower costs to passengers and taxpayers (Bayliss, 2002). 
 
Recently, the quality of public transport services has been given considerable 
attention on the part of both researchers and practitioners.  The production of transport 
services requires passenger participation.  Passengers evaluate and perceive services 
in many ways.  The service quality which passengers perceive may contain many 
attributes which also depend on modes.  The important attributes of the public 
transport service include reliability, access to the system, and cleanliness of seats and 
vehicles.  Hensher and Prioni (2002) have recently developed an approach for 
quantifying a service quality index to enable the public authorities and bus operators 
to benchmark service effectiveness.  In practice, the aspects of improving service 
quality are found in many countries.  For instance, there is a development of Quality 
Bus Partnerships (QBPs) in the UK to deliver better bus service.  Also, as previously 
mentioned in Section 2.2.1, there is an attempt to implement a benchmarking 
approach in the public transport sector to improve performance in terms of both 
financial and quality of the public transport services (Geerlings et al., 2006). 
 
We have seen that the characteristics of the public transport service are complex and 
are changing over time.  Undoubtedly, the technological and organisational 
developments have crucially affected the development of the urban public transport 
industry.  However, there is a lack of empirical research to gain a complete 
perspective of how these developments initially took place and were established in the 
systems.  
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2.6 Institutional and organisational aspects for public transport 
2.6.1 Institution and organisation of the public transport sector in Europe 
It is important to understand how institutions and organisations play a role in the 
public transport sector.  The institutional aspects come in the form of regulatory 
framework.  It is normal for government intervention in the public transport sector to 
aid and control in areas such as price, quantity, and quality.  Moreover, we see the 
regulatory setting as an institution and the stakeholder as an organisation.  Thus, it is 
essential to understand the mechanism of institutional and organisational changes in 
order to understand the innovation process in the public transport sector.  
Furthermore, the regulatory change ties in with the issue of the organisational change 
because it creates new organisations due to the privatisation process.  It is necessary 
to understand the role of the organisational aspect in the presence of regulatory 
reform.  
 
North (1994) makes a clear distinction between institution and organisation by stating 
that  if institutions are the rule of the game, organisations and their entrepreneurs are 
the players.  To elaborate, institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction (North, 
1990b).  Institutions include any form of constraint, both formal constraints – such as 
rules that human beings devise – and informal constraints – such as conventions and 
codes of behaviour.  Like institutions, organisations provide a structure to human 
interaction.  However, as we put above, a crucial distinction is that the purpose of the 
rules is to define the way the game is played.  But the objective of the team within 
that set of rules is to win the game.  Thus, organisations are made up of groups of 
individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives (North, 1990b).  
Organisations include political bodies (e.g., political parties, regulatory bodies), 
economic bodies (e.g., firms, trade unions, cooperatives), social bodies (e.g. churches, 
athletic associations), and educational bodies (e.g., schools, universities). 
 
In public transport, institution and organisation exist at various levels.  In the 
European Union (EU), in terms of institutions, we have legislations and directives that 
member states must follow.  They guide both the member state’s government in 
organising the public transport services for citizens and the public transport company 
in providing and operating the services.  For example, the European Directive 91/440, 
on the accounting separation of infrastructure and operation, brought about the 
industrial restructuring in the railway sector throughout member states.  This directive 
required the separation of infrastructure and operation of the member states’ railways, 
at least to the extent of separate accounting.  We will describe this issue in more detail 
in Chapter 6.  For the public transport services, a much-debated regulation 1191/692 is 
still in the process of revision which could have a substantial impact on the way 
public transport services are provided in the member states.  This regulation concerns 
the competitive tendering for the public transport services.  Again, we will explore the 
empirical evidence of regulatory reform in the bus and railway sectors in detail in 
Chapter 6. 
 
From an organisational standpoint, the public transport industry is in a transition 
period.  The regulatory reforms in the sector have radically changed the industry 
                                                 
2 See European Commission (2000, 2002, 2005). 
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structure in the past decade.  We have seen many new organisational forms, both 
public and private, that have emerged.  That is partially due to the fact that the 
privatisation process creates many new public and private organisations.  For public 
organisations, we see the establishment of a public transport authority that is 
responsible for the tendering process.  For private organisations, the evolution inside 
the firm has been considerable, as a new type of division is initiated in the firm in 
order to be competitive in the market.  We will see these issues again clearly in the 
empirical part of this thesis. 
 
Another remarkable organisational development in public transport sector in recent 
years is the multinational public transport operator companies.  We see Arriva (British 
origin company), Connex (French origin company), and Keolis (French origin 
company) operating throughout Europe.  These companies operate not only 
internationally, but also multimodally (i.e. both bus and railway).  For example, 
Arriva in the Netherlands operates both bus services and railways.  This trend seems 
to be increasing in European countries at the moment.  As new organisations have 
emerged, (traditional) national operators, such as Deutsche Bahn (DB), the national 
railway operator in Germany, and Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS), the national 
railway operator in the Netherlands, compete wherever possible.  Without a doubt, 
they have benefited from this development by intervening in the operations or by 
acquiring participation in new markets, either in their own countries (e.g. RATP, the 
urban transport operator in Paris, in Mulhouse and Clermont-Ferrand) or in other 
countries (such as NS, through their daughter company, NedRailway, which has won 
the contract for urban railway transport in Liverpool) (European Commission, 2005). 
  
2.6.2 Actors in the public transport sector and the effects of regulatory reform 
There are generally three major actors in the public transport sector: government 
agency, public transport operator, and passenger.  Each actor has its goals, objectives, 
and expectations in terms of the way public transport services are organised.  In 
general, government agencies want to provide adequate public transport services (e.g. 
reasonable price, quantity, and quality) to its citizens.  The public transport operator 
(in the case of a private firm) aims at the profitability while the passenger prefers a 
reasonable public transport service.  Furthermore, the complexity of the organisation 
is found within these three actors themselves.  Next, we will discuss the role and the 
organisational structure of these actors. 
 
The role of the government in public transport is substantial in that it influences both 
public transport operator and passenger in the public transport system.  Generally, the 
government controls the public transport operator in various ways.  The important 
elements are the regulatory framework and the subsidy.  The regulatory framework 
determines the degree of freedom that the operator has in providing the public 
transport services.  The government usually uses regulatory tools to stimulate the 
efficiency and enhance the quality of the public transport services.  Also, the 
passenger interests are heard via the government.  
 
Government agencies are typically divided into two levels: the central (or national) 
government and the local/regional authority.  In principal, the central government 
aims to improve the efficiency of the public transport sector as a whole.  The central 
government intervenes with the public transport operator when dealing with the 
structure of the company.  For instance, the central government uses privatisation as a 
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tool to enhance efficiency.  Another significant example of government involvement 
is financial support (subsidy).  The subsidy level of the local public transport service 
in the Netherlands, for example, accounts for roughly half of the operating cost.  The 
local/regional authority is also important in organising public transport services.  In 
the past, the local/regional authority often owned the public transport companies.  
However, the current trend towards regulatory reform changes the role of the 
local/regional authority so that it now coordinates and monitors instead.  
 
Furthermore, the role of the government is limited not only to the public transport 
sector, but also to the policies related to other transport modes.  The government must 
improve intermodal passenger transport in a door-to-door chain.  This task is difficult 
to achieve from both a political and an economic point of view.  Developing public 
transport is hardly reconcilable with the overwhelming use of private cars.  This 
brings us to another important issue revolving around the fact that the government has 
to take into account the environmental impact and congestion cost.  The fact that 
public transport is still largely subsidised through taxes and that the pricing structure 
does not usually reflect the marginal costs of providing the public transport services 
(i.e. prices are uniform, independent of time and distance) complicates the situation 
(IDEI, 1999).  Local authorities would have to face the trade-off between improving 
the market share of public transport while reducing pollution at the price of higher 
subsidies, and imposing drastic conditions on the use of private vehicles.  
Technological progress may help solve the problem and should be encouraged.  In 
this respect, regulatory reform plays a significant role in enhancing technological 
development in the pubic transport sector.  
 
We have seen a dramatic change in the structure of the public transport operator in the 
past decades (see Section 2.2.3).  The transformation from public-owned companies 
to private companies by way of the privatisation process has affected the way the 
firms operate.  Currently, (private) public transport operators aim to optimise their 
profit and to ensure continuity.   
 
The operator is caught between government steering and passenger demand 
(Veeneman, 2002).  The relationship between the operator and government is affected 
essentially by the types of regulatory framework.  The operator’s position relies 
heavily on how government intervention exists in the system.  We see, for example, 
the deregulated system, where the operator has full responsibility for the passenger’s 
contentment, and they can interact with the passenger through market mechanisms 
(price, quantity and quality of services).  By taking a look at the tendering system, we 
can observe how the government also plays a part in the interaction with the 
passenger through the service specification of the tender. 
 
The passengers can voice their need in two ways.  The first, which is the direct 
method, is to travel via public transport.  This is a market interaction where the 
services provided must be in conjunction with the price that passengers pay.  
Although there are some captive passengers who have no other choice but to utilise 
the public transport system, the number of passengers is a good indicator of 
passengers’ voices.  The other means is through formal organisation.  Often, there is a 
representative for the passengers, such as a consumer organisation, that reflects the 
needs of passengers in a more systematic way.    
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2.6.3 External factors  
There are also external actors and factors that influence the public transport sector.   
In this section, we will discuss briefly two external actors. 
 
The first external actor that influences the way public transport services are provided 
is the infrastructure company.  The infrastructure company may not be of importance 
for the local public transport (i.e. the bus sector), but it is very important for the 
railway sector.  The infrastructure is a factor that determines what innovation will be 
implemented by the operators.  For instance, when introducing a new type of train, it 
must function in the existing infrastructure.  The crucial element is that the planning 
of both the infrastructure development and the service operation must be integrated.  
Thus, the overall performance of the services can be achieved. 
 
The second external actor is the vehicle manufacturer.  In general, the operators do 
not develop and manufacture vehicles.  The vehicles are made by the car (or coach) or 
train manufacturing company.  Vehicle development is closely related to innovation 
in the public transport sector.  Cooperation between the operators and the 
manufacturers is needed in order to reflect the actual market needs for any innovation 
that could benefit the public transport system.  
 
Both internal and external considerations are needed for analysing the actors involved 
in the public transport sector.  Additionally, of particular importance are the 
behavioural changes of each actor as the result of regulatory reform through either 
privatisation or deregulation.  The way in which actors react and adjust themselves to 
the new environments affects the public transport systems.  Clearly, this is a point 
where the topics of innovation and regulatory reform have emerged.  
2.7 The complexity of innovation and regulatory reform in public transport 
This chapter reviews essential elements for the analysis of the technological 
development and regulatory reform in public transport.  It is very important to realise 
that the public transport sector now faces a challenging task.  The modal competition 
is fierce.  And, the government expects the regulatory reform to produce a better 
public transport service while still reducing the overall subsidy. 
 
We revealed in this chapter that the public transport sector is in a transition phase.  
The EU has placed more attention to the public transport sector as a means to 
decrease congestion problems.  It has stressed that the public transport must improve 
both the efficiency, and quality of the public services.  As a part of this development, 
we see how regulatory reform is used as a tool to enhance both efficiency of the 
public transport operations and quality of the public transport services.  Regulatory 
reform creates a wide variety of organisational forms in the European public transport 
industry.  One of the common features is the growing involvement of the private 
sector in the public transport industry.  This can be seen as a structural change in the 
public transport industry.  Undoubtedly, we need a thorough understanding of both 
the process of regulatory reform and the structural change in order to identify 
innovation in the public transport sector. 
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Technological innovation also plays an important role in the transport sector.  In this 
chapter, we reviewed the transport mode concept (Zwaneveld et al., 1999) which 
partitions transport into three components: propulsion system, vehicle concept, and 
transport concept.  Additionally, we pointed out several implications of ICT in the 
transport sector.  Technology also seems to be closely connected with government 
interventions.  In Section 2.4, we illustrated examples of the relationship between 
innovation and regulatory change in the transport sector.  
 
Alongside technological development, both institutional and organisational 
developments play an important role in public transport.  The institutional aspect was 
introduced in the form of the regulatory framework.  The regulatory reform then 
brings in the issue of organisational change because of the creation of new 
organisations due to the privatisation and deregulation processes.  Thus, it is crucial to 
understand the role of the organisational aspect in the presence of regulatory reform.  
In general, there are three major actors involved in the public transport sector: 
government agency, public transport operator, and passenger.  Each actor has its 
goals, objectives, and expectations from the way public transport services are 
organised.  In this regulatory changing environment, we see each actor adapt its role 
in order to achieve its goals, especially the government agency and public transport 
operator. 
 
The relationship between innovation and regulatory reform is complex.  In this 
chapter, we reviewed the complexity of both technological innovation and the 
institutional and organisational factors in the public transport sector.  Here we arrived 
at two important issues: understanding innovation and understanding the behaviour of 
decision-makers in public transport.  We need to understand how regulatory reform 
affects innovation. 
 
The research in this field is multidisciplinary.  The institutional study (regulatory 
reform topic) lies heavily in the economic discipline, whereas the innovation study 
lies in the business management and social sciences disciplines.  In order to 
understand the relationship between these two topics (innovation and regulatory 
reform), we need to construct a new framework that can bridge them together.  Next, 
we will discuss the topic of innovation in Chapter 3 and the topic of regulatory reform 
in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 3 Innovation Theory for Public Transport1 
3.1 Introduction 
With the pressure from modal competition, public transport faces a difficult situation.  
The increase of car ownership implies that people prefer to be in possession of a 
private car over public transport.  It means fewer passengers, and consequently lower 
revenue.  Despite these facts, public transport still has to maintain its service for social 
reasons.  Thus, the subsidy inevitably increases.  In recent years, many governments 
in Europe have attempted to solve this problem by means of regulatory reforms.  The 
regulatory reform of the public transport sector aims at reducing subsidy and 
increasing operating efficiency through competition in the sector.  Moreover, it is 
hoped that the reforms could bring about more innovation to the sector.  Yet, 
questions arise as to what kind of innovation we are hoping for.  In fact, what does 
innovation mean to public transport?  
 
Innovation is a complex subject.  Its can be characterised as a change or adoption 
process of new technologies or techniques.  Not only it is complicated to predict the 
consequences of such innovation, but it is even more difficult to measure its effects in 
a systematic way.  Since the regulatory reform of public transport has taken place, the 
organisation of public transport has changed.  The main impact of regulatory reform is 
the increasing role of the private sector in providing public transport services.  The 
impression exists that most reforms involve the transfer of ownership, namely 
privatisation and, consequently, the introduction of competition.  But there are also 
new organisational set-ups resulting in a more complex decision-making process in 
public transport services.  And to make it even more complex, there are significant 
differences in the objectives of both the public and private sectors in providing public 
transport services.  The public sector aims to serve the public interest whereas the 
private sector aims to make a profit.  Innovations pursued by both organisations may 
differ in nature, thus complicating the (implementation of) innovation.  Although 
innovation is not a new topic to the transport field, innovation in public transport is 
less studied.  The meaning of innovation for public transport is unclear and subjective.  
This indicates the need for a more systematic study on this topic.  There is a need to 
specify that public transport is a service sector, so innovation in this area will differ 
from that of manufacturing.  
 
This chapter will analyse innovation in public transport.  The central themes of this 
chapter are to classify innovation and identify innovative capabilities in the public 
transport sector.  As mentioned above, the process of innovation is complex and, as a 
result, it is difficult to give it a certain definition.  What is considered innovation in 
                                                 
1 This chapter is partly based on an article in Transport Policy (Ongkittikul and Geerlings, 2006). 
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one case may not be considered innovation in another.  However, in order to make the 
analyses in this thesis possible, a common definition is vital.  This thesis constructs an 
innovation model to assist in measuring innovation objectively.  In this chapter, the 
twin characteristics approach, first developed by Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984), is 
selected to provide a general framework for innovation classification.  
 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows.  Section 3.2 provides an overview of 
the theory of innovation from various disciplines.  Section 3.3 reviews taxonomies 
and measurements of innovation in both the manufacturing and service sectors.  
Section 3.4 contains a critical element, the ‘twin characteristics approach’, for 
analysing public transport innovation in this study.  Section 3.5 deals with the 
conceptual model of innovation that will be used for the rest of this thesis.  Finally, 
Section 3.6 summarises the chapter as the basis for the analytical framework of this 
thesis. 
3.2 Innovation theory 
3.2.1 Invention, innovation, and diffusion 
In order to introduce new technology to the market, it needs to be adopted by users in 
the systems.  This adoption process can be described by an invention-innovation-
diffusion model based on the work of Schumpeter (1939).  This model divides the 
adoption process into three stages: invention, innovation, and diffusion. The first 
stage, invention, is described as the initial development of a new artefact or process.  
The second stage, innovation, entails economic application of an invention.  The third 
stage, diffusion, entails the acceptance of innovation into the market of buyers and 
competitors.  
 
Schumpeter also makes a distinction between stages of technological development, 
which are also used in the invention-innovation-diffusion model.  He defines three 
different stages in the successful introduction of a technological change2: 
 
- The concept of innovation. In this stage, the technology is made technically 
feasible. Technological factors are dominant.  In a way we are dealing here with 
beta-oriented scientific aspects. 
- The concept of interpretation. Technology is equipped for commercial use, but the 
question arises whether entrepreneurs are willing to take risks in investing in it.  
Economic factors (gamma-science orientation) are dominant. 
- The concept of technological dynamics. For Schumpeter, diffusion is, in essence, a 
process of technical imitation (which refers to alpha-science aspects).  When 
innovation is in the diffusion stage but, despite its economic profitability, is not 
adopted, the explanation is invariably related to the conservatism and irrational 
resistance to change of the early adopters. 
 
However, the invention-innovation-diffusion model has been heavily criticised.  The 
main criticism is that it is a linear process.  Dosi (1991) comments that this model is a 
rather rough and ‘heroic’ conceptual distinction, which can hardly be found in 
practices.  For instance, the invention is often introduced from the start as an 
                                                 
2 This summary is taken from Geerlings (1999) 
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innovation by economically-minded research establishments.  Diffusion entails 
further innovation on the part of both developers and users.  All three activities are 
often associated with changes in the characteristics of, and incentives for, potential 
innovators/adopters.  Although this model has drawbacks, it is still a useful theoretical 
concept in clarifying the process of innovation.  For example, invention is suggestive 
of some sort of exploited potential for technological processes, while innovation and 
diffusion hint at the economic, social and organisational incentives and impediments 
to the incorporation of technological advances into economic products and processes.  
 
This thesis focuses on two processes: innovation and diffusion.  These processes are 
interesting here because we want to understand how (a new technology or technique) 
was implemented (innovation) and how quick it was diffused into the market 
(diffusion).  We must consider innovation in a wider perspective, that is, innovation is 
‘any idea, practice, or material artefact perceived to be new by the relevant unit 
adoption’ (Zaltman et al., 1973). 
 
Not only is innovation itself important, but also the process of innovation.  In fact, as 
innovation contains unpredictable uncertainty, the outcomes of innovation can hardly 
be foreseen.  Thus the driving forces within innovation can be studied by looking at 
the innovation process ex post facto.  Dosi (1988a) states that innovation concerns the 
search for, and the discovery, experimentation, development, imitation, and adoption 
of new products, new production processes, and new organisational set-ups.  
Therefore, the study of innovation emerges from various disciplines.  It considers not 
only the economic aspect of innovation, but also how the psychology/acceptance of 
the users or legislation can play a role as well. 
 
Dosi (1988a, , 1988b) characterises common features of innovation into five aspects.  
- Firstly, innovation involves a fundamental element of uncertainty (Dosi, 1988a).  
It is not due simply to a lack of relevant information, but the underlying issue is 
twofold.  The first is the existence of techno-economic problems whose solution 
procedures are unknown.  The second is that an innovative solution to a particular 
problem involves discovery and creation since no general algorithm can be 
derived from the information about a problem that generates its solution 
‘automatically’.   
- Secondly, technological innovation has been able to draw from novel 
opportunities stemming from scientific advances (Dosi, 1988a).  The second 
property is the increasing reliance of new, major technological opportunities on 
advances in scientific knowledge.  
- Thirdly, the nature of the search activities leading to new products and processes 
has also changed.  That is, the increasing complexity of research and an 
innovative activity militates in favour of formal organisations (firms’ research and 
development facilities, universities, etc.).   
- Fourthly, a significant amount of innovations and improvements are originated 
through ‘learning-by-doing’ and ‘learning-by-using’ (Rosenberg, 1976).  People 
and organisations can learn how to use/improve/produce things by the process of 
doing them, through their ‘informal’ activities such as solving production 
problems. 
- Finally, it is unlikely that the patterns of technological change can be described as 
simple and flexible reactions to changes in market conditions.  Rather technical 
change is a cumulative activity (Dosi, 1988a). 
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Innovation can also occur through a process of variation and selection (Nelson and 
Winter, 1982).  This is another important aspect of innovation where the technological 
developments play an important part in the process.  It is argued (Arthur, 1988) that 
past technological developments leave a permanent mark on future developments.  
This is where technology plays a prominent role in creating the innovation.  Arthur 
(1994) identifies four generic sources of increasing returns: (1) large set-up or fixed 
costs (which give the advantage of falling unit costs to increased output); (2) learning 
effects (which act to improve products or lower their cost as their prevalence 
increases); (3) coordination effects (which confer advantages to “going along” with 
other economic agents taking similar action); and (4) self-reinforcing expectations 
(where increased prevalence on the market enhances beliefs of further prevalence).  
 
Given the increasing returns situation above, four interesting properties arise (Arthur, 
1994). 
(1) Multiple equilibria. In this problem, two different asymptotic market-share 
“solutions” are possible.  The outcome is indeterminate; it is not unique and 
predictable. 
(2) Possible inefficiency. If one technology is inherently “better” than the other 
(under some measure of economic welfare), but has “bad luck” in gaining early 
adherents, the eventual outcome may not be of maximum possible benefit. 
(3) Lock-in. Once a “solution” is reached, it is difficult to exit. 
(4) Path dependence. The early history of market shares – in part the consequence 
of small events and chance circumstances – can determine which solution prevails. 
 
Further implication of the innovation is that diffusion (of any technology) always 
takes time.  Dosi (1991) suggests that rates of diffusion plausibly depend on the 
followings: the features of those technologies which are to be adopted; the features of 
those technologies which are to be substituted; the incentives that the economic 
environment provides for adoption on the characteristics of the potential adopters; the 
information available to them; and their technological competence.  The topic of 
diffusion is discussed in turn. 
 
3.2.2 Empirical patterns in the diffusion of new technology 
In the field of technology studies, the diffusion of a new technology is a widely-
researched subject.  The diffusion process is characterised by increases over time in 
both the number of firms using or owning a technology (inter-firm diffusion) and 
more incentives to use the technology by the firm (intra-firm diffusion) (Stoneman, 
2002). 
 
There are a number of characteristics of an innovation have been found to affect 
diffusion (Rogers, 1995, Tidd et al., 2005). 
- Relative advantage: Relative advantage is the degree to which an innovation is 
perceived as better than the product it displaces, or competing products.  In theory, 
the greater the perceived advantage, the faster the rate of adoption. 
- Compatibility: Compatibility is the degree to which an innovation is perceived to 
be consistent with the existing values, experience and needs of potential adopters. 
- Complexity: Complexity is the degree to which an innovation is perceived as 
being difficult to use.  Innovations which require the adopter to develop new skills 
and knowledge will be diffused slower than innovations which are simpler for the 
adopter to use.  
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- Trialability: Trialability is the degree to which an innovation can be experimented 
with a limited basis.  
- Observability: Observability is the degree to which the results of an innovation are 
visible to others.  
 
The diffusion of an innovation is typically described by an S-shaped (logistic) curve.  
In general, the S-shaped curve is plotted using historical data.  This historical data 
often reveals a period of time that technology diffuses.  In general, technological 
diffusion time refers to the period from the date of first use of a technology to the date 
of approximately 90% use or ownership of this technology.  This technological 
diffusion time may span anywhere from five to fifty years (Mansfield, 1968).  
 
The classic observations with respect to diffusion refer to the inter-firm diffusion of 
new process technology (Stoneman, 2002).  Griliches’ (1957) work on the diffusion 
of hybrid corn in different states in the U.S. is an early example.  Griliches (1957) 
observed that if one plotted the proportion of total corn acreage in a state I that is 
planted with a hybrid seed against time, then the resulting plot is usually found to be 
S-shaped.  This S-shape suggests that the rate of using a new technology starts at a 
low level and, at first, increases slowly.  The rate of increase then gets larger until a 
point of inflection, after which the level of use still increases but at a decreasing rate.  
Another example is Mansfield’s (1968), which is a case of intra-firm diffusion.  Table 
3-1 presents Mansfield’s (1968) data on the intra-firm diffusion of diesel locomotives 
in U.S. railroads.  In this case, Mansfield finds that the intra-firm diffusion of 
technologies also follows an S-shaped curve. 
Table 3-1 Dieselisation in the US railroads: time intervals between 10 and 90 
per cent usage 
Time interval (years)  Number of firms 
14 or more  3 
11-13  7 
8-10  11 
5-7  3 
3-4  6 
Source: Mansfield (1968) 
 
It is commonly observed that during the diffusion process technologies become 
cheaper and/or improve in quality (Stoneman, 2002).  Although it is hard to make a 
comparison due to the changing environment and economic conditions, some 
examples can be easily found, especially in the field of computers, microprocessors, 
and telecommunications.  Stonemand and Toivanen (1997) illustrate this point using 
some quality-adjusted price series for computers and microprocessors in the UK.  
Table 3-2 shows their results. 
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Table 3-2 Quality-adjusted prices for computers and microprocessors in the 
UK, 1960-1992 
Year Computers (1972=100) 
 Microprocessors 
(1981=100) 
 
1960 2088.2 n/a  
1965 525.0  n/a  
1970 177.9  n/a  
1975 79.2  1093.2  
1980 29.7  228.1  
1985 26.5  32.0  
1990 12.8  4.1  
1992 6.6  1.9  
Source: Stoneman and Toivanen (1997) 
 
Stoneman (2002) deduces a number of empirical regularities relating to the diffusion 
process.  Firstly, the diffusion of technology takes time, and often a considerable 
period of time.  Diffusion rates differ across industries, regions, and countries and also 
across technologies.  Secondly, the commonly found empirical regularity curve is S-
shaped, illustrating a low initial rate of growth of ownership followed by faster rates 
up to a point of inflection after which rates of growth decline.  Finally, as new 
technologies mature, they tend to exhibit both improved performance and reduced 
prices.  The nature of the product may also change. 
 
Moreover, considering the diffusion of innovation, there was a debate among 
economists, sociologists, and historians about theories of “science (or technology)-
push” and “demand-pull” (Freeman, 1996).  The role of demand in driving innovation 
is undoubtedly important and there have been numerous examples of inventions and 
innovations that were initiated and driven largely in response to pressing social 
demands.  However, Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) show that empirical studies of 
innovation that were often cited in support of “demand-pull” did not justify these 
conclusions.  They further resolve the discrepancy in the literature between “needs” 
and “demand” and between “potential demand” and “effective demand”.  Because 
human “needs” are varied and often unsatisfied for long periods, they cannot alone 
explain the emergence of particular innovations at a particular time.  Thus, innovation 
should not be viewed as a linear process, whether led by demand or by technology, 
but as a complex interaction of potential users with new developments in science and 
technology. 
 
3.2.3 Product and process innovation 
One frequently made distinction is between product innovation and process 
innovation. This helps to shed some light on the motives for, and results of, certain 
kinds of technological advancements.  Product and process innovations are not 
separated processes.  Rather, ‘innovation’ is an iterative process initiated by the 
perception of a new market and/or new service opportunity for a technology-based 
invention which leads to development, production, and marketing tasks striving for 
the commercial success of the invention (Freeman, 1991). 
 
Utterback and Abernathy (1975) describe the iterative process of innovation as 
follows: “A basic idea underlying the proposed model of product innovation is that 
products will be developed over time in a predictable manner with initial emphasis on 
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product performance, then emphasis on product variety and later emphasis on product 
standardisation and costs.”  Moreover, product innovation and process innovation are 
interdependent; as the rate of product innovation decreases, it is common to observe a 
growing rate of process innovation (Utterback, 1994).  Those patterns can be 
illustrated in Figure 3-1. 
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Figure 3-1 The dynamics of innovation 
Source: Utterback (1994) 
 
A product innovation is a new technology or combination of technologies introduced 
commercially to meet a user or a market need (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975).  In 
this model Utterback and Abernathy (1975) describe that a firm at one time may 
attempt to be the first to introduce technically-advanced products (performance-
maximising), or to watch others innovate but be prepared to adapt and introduce new 
product variations and features (sales-maximising), or to enter the market later in the 
product life cycle with simpler and less expensive versions (cost-minimising).  In 
process innovation, as the production process develops over time toward levels of 
improved output productivity, it does so with a characteristic evolutionary pattern. For 
example, it becomes more capital intensive, and direct labour productivity improves 
through greater division of labour and specialisation.  Productivity gains 
incrementally, some of which is stimulated by changes in the market, external to the 
firm (i.e. volume and product standardisation) and some of which arises from within 
the firm (Utterback and Abernathy, 1975). 
 
The distinction between product and process innovation does not mean that these two 
are independent.  Product and process innovation are interdependent.  As the rate of 
product innovation decreases, it is common to observe a growing rate of process 
innovation. 
 
In addition to the product and process innovation model, Utterback (1994) proposes 
the model of dynamics of innovation.  His model focuses on the concept of product 
and process innovation, and also considers it in connection with business-oriented 
characteristics such as organisational change, market characteristics and competitive 
environments.  Table 3-3 provides a summary of the model. 
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Table 3-3 The dynamics of innovation 
Product From high variety to dominant design, to incremental innovation on 
standardised products 
Process Manufacturing progresses from heavy reliance on skilled labour and general-
purpose equipment to specialised equipment tended by low-skilled labour 
Organisation From entrepreneurial organic firm to hierarchical mechanistic firm with defined 
tasks and procedures and few rewards for radical innovation 
Market From fragmented and unstable with diverse products and rapid feedback to 
commodity-like with largely undifferentiated products 
Competition From many small firms with unique products to an oligopoly of firms with 
similar products 
Source: Utterback (1994) 
 
The table above needs more explanation.  Not only do changes in products and 
processes occur in a systematic pattern, but organisational requirements may also be 
expected to vary according to a similar pattern.  In the first stage, when there is a high 
technical uncertainty, a productive unit must be the focus in order to make successful 
progress.  Individuals in the organisation must act together.  This type of structure is 
called organic; it emphasises on frequent adjustment and redefinition of tasks, limited 
hierarchy, and high lateral communication (Utterback, 1994).  This individual in the 
organic firm is related to their assumption of entrepreneurial roles.  At later stages, a 
production process and a set of market relationships and expectations become highly 
developed with respect to a specified and standardised product. When the business 
environment is better known and operations become routine, it is seen as necessary to 
provide coordination that minimises inefficiency and costs in operations.  This type of 
structure is known as mechanistic (Utterback, 1994).   
 
Furthermore, the market characteristics also change during the period of innovation.  
When a technology is at the beginning period of its development and many producers 
are rushing to join the industry, the market shares of each firm are highly unstable.  
But when the technology is mature, products are likely to standardise and become 
undifferentiated in terms of function and features.  Stable market shares will imply the 
existence of only a few significant and dominant producers.  Market feedback will 
tend to be slow (Utterback, 1994).   
 
As the process of decreasing product innovation and increasing process innovation 
moves forward, it is common to observe important changes in the competitive 
environment.  In the early days of an industry, when products are unique in design 
and capabilities, competition focuses on winning over customers to the new 
technology embodied in an unrefined product.  But when product capabilities and 
features are crystallised through the emergence of a dominant design, competition 
between rival firms stabilises.  The number of competitors drops off quickly and the 
basis of competition shifts to refinements in product features, reliability, and cost.  
From this point, the competitive environment reaches a point of stability in which 
there are only a few firms producing standardised or slightly differentiated products.  
A number of small firms may remain in the industry serving specialised market 
segments, but compared with the small firms entering special segments early in the 
industry, they have little growth potential (Utterback, 1994).  
 
The model of dynamics of innovation shows how the product innovation, process 
innovation, and other elements can play important roles in the way innovation 
succeeds in the market.  Although the model is based on experiences in manufacturing 
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products, the idea is helpful to identify some similar characteristics of innovation in 
the public transport sector.   
 
3.2.4 Innovation in services 
Concerning the service sector, innovations have contributed to the growth in a number 
of service firms and to the scale of their operations, which in turn has increased their 
economic benefits (Aa and Elfring, 2002).  Innovations provide opportunities to 
increase the efficiency and quality of the service delivery process. 
 
Service sectors are of importance in a global economy.  Output and employment in 
the service sectors have grown significantly throughout the industrial world, notably 
in Europe.  Table 3-4 shows that as early as the 1970s, services represented more than 
half of the value added in European Union countries, and by the year 2001 they 
contributed nearly two-thirds. 
 
Table 3-4 Share (%) of gross value added in services in total GDP in EU 
countries 
 EC-9 
(1973) 
EC-10 
(1981) 
EC-12 
(1986) 
EC-15 
(1995) 
EC-15 
(2001) 
EC/EU 50.7 56.3 59.0 63.1 65.3 
Ireland 44.5 49.4 50.4 48.6 49.0 
Finland n/a 49.8 53.0 56.4 57.1 
Portugal n/a 48.8 54.1 59.1 61.0 
Austria n/a 55.5 58.6 63.3 63.6 
Denmark 58.8 60.9 60.3 64.0 64.0 
Spain 47.8 57.3 58.0 63.7 64.2 
Germany 48.1 54.2 55.9 62.5 64.9 
Italy 51.1 56.4 60.6 62.8 64.9 
Greece 40.3 47.7 48.9 62.6 65.4 
Sweden n/a 60.1 59.7 62.2 65.5 
Netherlands 52.2 58.8 60.4 63.9 65.5 
France 50.8 57.4 61.1 65.3 66.8 
UK 54.7 54.5 57.1 62.1 67.2 
Belgium 54.6 60.7 62.8 66.1 673. 
Luxembourg 46.9 65.2 76.4 83.7 83.8 
Source: Eurostat (2003) 
 
In any economy, the service sectors are important for productivity, economic 
competitiveness, and quality of life (Miles, 2004).  In other words, the service sectors 
are the great economic importance.  But innovation in services is important for other 
reasons beyond the economy.  Miles (2004) identifies two important aspects of the 
services innovation.  First, innovation in services affects properties not only within the 
sector itself, but also other services activities.  Second, some services play central 
roles in the innovation process.  These roles are, among others, agents of transfer, 
innovation support, and sources of innovations for other sectors. 
 
However, relatively few studies have focused on innovations in services (Aa and 
Elfring, 2002).  Innovative developments in service industries seem to be difficult to 
explain in terms of traditional innovation theories and typologies (Damanpour, 1991).  
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The main emphasis of innovation research is on new products and production 
processes, especially in manufacturing.  For example, the product and process 
innovations (Utterback, 1994) do not necessarily provide any deeper understanding of 
the factors responsible for the successful development of service innovations.  
Although it is known that service firms may innovate more or less in the same way as 
industrial firms, Sundbo et al. (2001) emphasise that innovations seem to be much 
less technologically driven and most of them are organisational or social in nature.  
Service firms have also been found to conduct very few research and development 
activities.  Moreover, such innovations, if found, are usually somewhat unsystematic 
work of individuals in the firms.  In other words, the innovation process is more 
informal in service than in manufacturing.  Innovations in service firms also tend to 
be more driven, among other factors, by the market and by consumers (Sundbo et al., 
2001).   
 
3.2.5 Innovative driving forces  
To understand an innovation process, it is also necessary to identify potential sources 
of innovative activities.  However, we must realise that innovation involves complex 
interactions between a firm and its environment.  Sundbo and Gallouj (1998) propose 
a model of the driving forces behind service innovations.  In this model, there are 
external and internal driving forces.  Table 3-5 shows the detail of each driving force.   
Table 3-5 Driving forces behind service innovations 
External Internal Actors Trajectories 
Management and strategy Competitors Technological 
Innovation department and R&D Customers Services professional 
Employees Public sector Managerial 
 Suppliers Institutional 
  Social 
Source: Sundbo & Gallouj (1998) 
 
There are three internal forces: management and strategy; innovation department and 
research and development (R&D); and employees.  Firstly, the management of the 
service firm often has a strategy or some idea of the direction the firm should take.  
The second driving force is formalised R&D departments or any other type of 
formalised department which has the responsibility for ensuring that innovations will 
appear.  Since the innovation process in service is mostly a loosely coupled process in 
which the employees are involved, or they simply function as corporate entrepreneurs 
and start the process, they are the third internal driving force. 
 
The external forces can be divided into external actors and trajectories.  External 
actors can be either a person, firm or organisation whose behaviour has importance to 
the service firm’s possibilities for selling services and therefore also their innovation 
activities (Sundbo and Gallouj, 1998).  These external actors can be broadly 
categorised into four groups: customers, competitors, public sectors and suppliers.  
Customers are actors of major importance in service innovation since producing the 
service requires the customer’s involvement.  Competitors are also important for 
innovation activities since, in a competitive environment, service-providing firms 
have to compete with other firms who provide a similar type of service.  The public 
sector also plays an important role, especially in a public transport sector where 
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government intervention is common.  Suppliers are important sources of innovation 
since the service firm tends to be a technology adopter rather than the innovators per 
se. 
 
Trajectories are ideas and logic that are diffused through the social system.  There 
may be five types of trajectories.  The first type is the service professional trajectories 
which are methods, general knowledge, and behaviour rules that exist within the 
different service professions.  The second type is a managerial trajectory which is an 
idea for a new organisational form.  The third type is technological trajectory which is 
a new logic for using technology that generally influences service products and 
production processes.  The fourth type is the institutional trajectory which describes 
the general trend of the evolution of regulations and political institutions.  The final 
type is the social trajectory which displays the evolutions of general social rules and 
conventions. 
 
3.2.6 The measurement of technological activity  
It is a complicated task to measure technological capability and innovation when we 
turn from methodological matter to the empirical world.  Often we are forced to use 
approximate measures due to the lack of awareness to collect such data.  Archibugi 
(1988) suggests four measurements of innovation that surface mainly at the aggregate 
level.  The most frequently used in economic studies are: 1) statistics of research and 
development (R&D) in terms of personnel employed and of expenditure, 2) the 
technological balance of payments, 3) patent statistics, and 4) direct monitoring of 
innovations introduced. 
 
Firstly, the widely used indicator in most research is the Research and Development 
(R&D) indicator.  The data on R&D activities can be found in the official national 
statistic.  This data enables us to identify the major, common and largely invariant 
features of technological activities in the industrially advanced countries.  Patel and 
Pavitt (1995) outline that R&D is better at measuring technological activities in the 
science-based classes of technology (chemical and electrical-electronic) than in the 
production-based and information-based classes (mechanical and software).  
 
Secondly, the Technology Balance of Payments (TBP) approach measures 
transactions between firms and sectors of different countries.  Unlike R&D data, the 
TBP regards technology transfers with a commercial objective and thus excludes non-
commercial inventive and innovative activities, such as the majority of those carried 
out by the public sector.  However, the TBP, by definition, provides no indication of 
the amount of resources devoted to innovative activity but, at best, only of the amount 
of technological activity internationally transferred.  In other words, all those 
technologies that are not the object of commercial transaction are excluded 
(Archibugi, 1988). 
 
The third type of data on technological activity is a patent.  Since it is a record of 
invention, many economists treat the patent as an intermediate output of R&D 
activities (Patel and Pavitt, 1995).  Patent statistics are available in almost all 
industrialised countries and in many developing countries, broken down for very 
detailed technological sectors.  However, Archibugi (1988) argues that unless patents 
are analysed individually, they provide no information about a specific sector’s 
utilisation of an innovative activity. 
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Finally, it is also possible to monitor an innovation that is carried out directly.  An 
important aspect of this data collection is the subject and method the survey adopts.  
There are two different ways on the basis of which innovation data can be collected 
(Archibugi, 1988).  The first is in terms of innovations as objects.  In this category, it 
is a matter of looking back to the sectors of production and utilisation from the 
available information regarding individual innovations.  The second is to ask firms 
(and possibly other bodies involved in producing or utilising innovations), i.e. 
subjects, to indicate relevant innovations produced and/or used by them.  The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has moved 
towards the standardisation of the survey methodology by proposing the Oslo 
manuals.  The first version was issued in 1992 (OECD, 1992) and the second one in 
1997 (OECD, 1997). 
 
Due to the fact that the Oslo manual concentrates on creating an indicator for science 
and technology in the manufacturing industries, we still lack the measurement method 
for innovation in the service sector.  Innovation in service sectors tends to involve 
both product and process innovation, which is hardly captured by this kind of data 
collection.  The variety of the characteristics of service poses a difficult task for the 
measurement of innovation in this sector.  Nevertheless, we will use some of the 
knowledge and experiences from the manufacturing sectors as a starting point. 
 
3.2.7 Measuring innovation activities in services 
The experience accumulated in measuring innovation in the manufacturing sector 
represents a good starting point for measuring innovation in services.  However, it is 
unclear as to whether or not and to what extent the methodological and conceptual 
framework developed over the past decade with reference to manufacturing activities 
(notably the Oslo manual).  Due to this ambiguity, utilising this information may or 
may not be constructive.  Tether (2001) reveals that all of our understanding of 
innovation and of innovation processes at the micro level has been derived from 
studies of manufacturing. Services and service innovation were omitted from the 
Community Innovation Survey (CIS) which followed the Oslo manual in order to 
collect the innovation data in most countries, despite the fact that services account for 
roughly two-thirds of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and employment in Europe. 
 
Evangelista and Sirilli (1998) have summarised a few distinctive features of services 
which are thought to bear important implications for innovations.  Even though a 
general consensus on the basic features of services is lacking, some aspects are 
commonly recalled in the literature: 
- A close interaction between production and consumption (co-terminality) 
- A high information-intangible content of services products and processes 
- An increasing role played by human resources as a key to competitive factors 
- A critical role played by organisational factors for firms’ performance 
 
However, Tether (2001) argues that the CIS survey is based on the manufacturing 
discipline by expanding the Oslo manual, and the CIS embraces the service sector.  
As a result, survey for service is simply an adopted version of the manufacturing 
version, largely through the replacement of the word ‘product’ by the word ‘service’.  
The revised Oslo manual (OECD, 1997) has effectively assimilated (Coombs and 
Miles, 2000) services into an approach to understanding innovation which is based on 
studies of manufacturers, and which centres on the product-process dichotomy. 
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Nevertheless, the second European Community Innovation Survey (CIS-2) reflects 
some new attitudes on innovation in the service industry.  It provides the first 
internationally systematic data on services’ technological innovation behaviour. 
Tether et al. (2002) found that services certainly do emerge as innovators – though 
slightly less so than manufacturing firms of comparable size.  Moreover, large firms 
tended to report innovative activities more frequently, so that about three-quarters of 
firms with more than 250 employees had engaged in these activities. Within the CIS-
2, Tether et al. (2001) establish that, using the data from the German case, the 
generally ‘scale-intensive’ sectors of trade, transport and communications as well as 
banking and insurance tend to be largely oriented towards the provision of 
standardised services.  By contrast, in the ‘specialist supplier’ sectors of technical 
services and other financial services, university graduates constitute a much larger 
proportion of total employment, and firms in these sectors tend to earn a larger 
average proportion of their income from bespoke and partially customised services.  
This variation shows that even within the service sector there is the tremendous 
diversity that is repeatedly found.  There are broad trends, which reflect the sectoral 
categorisations discussed earlier, but there is also immense variation in behaviour 
within each broad sector (Tether et al., 2001).  
 
This reveals an attempt at measuring innovation in the service sector.  It shows that 
the topic of innovation measurement is now attracting a lot of attention.  In the 
sectoral comparison, it is essential that the measurement system will be generalised.  
The complexity of the innovation itself makes the measurement difficult. 
 
The traditional innovation measurement seems to be ineffective as a means for 
measuring innovation in the public transport sector. The generalisation of the data 
measurement, such as R&D statistics, loses the richness of the information that is the 
essence to understanding innovation in a specific product. Archibugi (1988) suggests 
that it is also possible to assess specific products or research projects by utilising an 
exclusively sectoral approach.  The main approaches are based on the theory of 
technometrics (Sahal, 1985).  In contrast to the use of R&D statistics which measure 
at an aggregate level, this approach focuses on a measurement of technological 
advances from a specific set of technologies. 
 
An important aspect for studying an innovation in a specific industry is the ability to 
analyse changes of components within an industry. One approach that is applicable 
here is the Twin Characteristics Approach (Saviotti and Metcalfe, 1984). This 
approach analyses innovation or changes in a specific sector in detail. It will be 
discussed in the next section. 
3.3 A twin characteristics approach 
The twin characteristics approach initiated by Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984) is a good 
starting point to represent the variety of technological developments of public 
transport services.  The starting point of this approach is a characteristic description of 
a given technology.  A product will then be defined in terms of a set of characteristics.  
At any point in time this set of characteristics defines the current state of technology, 
each characteristic having variable levels.  In this approach, a product could be 
described as the combination of two sets of characteristics, called technical ( iX ) and 
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service ( jY ) characteristics respectively.  The two sets of characteristics are 
interrelated in that the purpose of technical characteristics is to provide services.  This 
relationship is illustrated by a mapping pattern as shown in Figure 3-2.  Moreover, the 
two sets of characteristics can be conceptualised as the inner structure (technical 
characteristics) and the interface (service characteristics) of the technological system 
and the interface or boundary of the system. 
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Figure 3-2 The twin characteristics 
Source: Saviotti & Metcalfe (1984) 
 
The twin characteristics approach has a number of relevant applications, since it 
allows us to distinguish between radical and incremental innovation, and to define 
elementary phenomena in technological evolution (Frenken et al., 1999).  A radical 
innovation is one that gives rise to entirely new technical characteristics which need 
to be represented by different variables, whereas an incremental innovation is one 
which improves services without any qualitative change in internal structure or 
technical characteristics (Saviotti, 1996).  To be more precise, the distinction between 
radical and incremental innovations corresponds to the relationship between 
qualitative and quantitative changes.  A completely new technology differs from any 
previous one, at least in its technical characteristics, and possibly also in its service 
characteristics.  In other words, a radical innovation leading to qualitative change 
needs to be represented in a new dimension of technical characteristics space.  On the 
other hand, an incremental innovation will only lead to changes in the values of the 
existing characteristics (Saviotti, 2001). 
 
This characteristics approach allows us to understand the process of innovation in any 
given system.  The notion, developed by Saviotti and Metcalfe (1984), of the product 
(goods) as a combination of technical and service characteristics is now familiar in the 
economics of innovation and technical change (Gallouj, 2002).  This approach is 
based on the evolutionary theory of economic change (Nelson and Winter, 1982). 
 
In this approach, technical characteristics are components which produce the final 
services.  In public transport services, the technical characteristics can be divided into 
three categories: basic inputs, technological compositions, and managerial and 
operational compositions.  Basic inputs represent the general production requirements 
of the industry.  For instance, to produce transport services, like any other businesses, 
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capital and labour are norms.  Technological compositions represent the variety of 
transport technology used presently.  This component will be useful when we explore 
technological innovation because it will help us to identify the differences and variety 
of technological development in a systematic way.  Finally, managerial and 
operational compositions bring together the elements that are involved in the 
production of services in an indirect way.  This may be called the competence 
(Gallouj and Weinstein, 1997), which represents the utilisation of basic inputs and 
technological compositions. 
 
We will now augment this structure to characterise public transport services in more 
detail.  The proposed framework is to divide the technical characteristics into two 
groups, namely technical and competence characteristics.  This framework, which 
was originally proposed by Gallouj and Weinstein (1997), is more applicable within 
the service sector.  The idea of introducing ‘competence’ is that the provision of a 
service is generally the result of a combination of the following two mechanisms: the 
utilisation of (tangible or intangible) technical characteristics that are themselves 
based on competences and the direct mobilisation of competences (Gallouj, 2002).  
Figure 3-3 shows the service characteristics (Yi) as a combination of technical 
characteristics (Ti) and competences (Ci). 
 
In this notion, a product (goods or service) is represented by a set of service 
characteristics (Yi).  These service characteristics are obtained by a certain subset of 
the technical characteristics (Tj), with each Yi being obtained by a certain subset of the 
Tj.  Similarly, each technical characteristic mobilises the competence Ck (certain 
competences may involve the ability to combine different technologies); in certain 
situations, those same competences may be mobilised directly to produce the product 
(Gallouj, 2002).  These competences are derived from various sources: initial 
education, continued training, organisational learning, and experiences. 
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Figure 3-3 A representation of a product or service as a system of 
characteristics and competences 
Source:  Gallouj and Weinstein (1997) 
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For the public transport sector, Ongkittikul (2002) elaborates on the twin 
characteristics approach by using the simple twin characteristics framework which 
consists only technical and service characteristics.  The modified framework 
reclassifies the technical characteristics (Xi) into two new groups: technical 
characteristic (T) and competence (C). For public transport services, the technical 
characteristic is a hardware component such as vehicle, infrastructure and propulsion 
systems.  Competences refer to the managerial skills of operators running the public 
transport system.  These skills include labour, organisational structure, and 
contractual arrangement.  The public transport sector is a labour-intensive sector;  the 
division of labour plays an important role.  The competence for the labour component 
is to utilise the staff’s activity to achieve high performance.  Further, marketing and 
ticketing activities can also be considered as essential operator’s competences.  In 
recent years, it has been realised that the operation of public transport is not only a 
matter of transporting people, but also reaching and encouraging people to use public 
transport systems.  To do this, many activities are required such as advertising and 
marketing campaigns.  Finally, public transport operators normally face contractual 
arrangements with the public authority with the main concentration on subsidisation 
level.  Contractual arrangements also include aspects such as subsidy, level of service 
requirement, and ownerships.  Note that the service characteristics are similar to those 
described in the previous section.  Figure 3-4 shows the new characteristics-based 
approach of public transport service. 
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Figure 3-4 The characteristics-based approach of public transport service 
Source:  Developed from Gallouj and Weinstein (1997) and Ongkittikul (2002) 
 
It is also useful to divide the production activity of public transport service into two 
main categories: core and supplementary activities.  Core activities refer to the 
essential part of the service which the operator must carry out to fulfil the basic 
passenger needs.  A core activity is the task of transporting people from an origin to a 
destination.  This involves the operations of the coordination between vehicle, 
infrastructure, and driver.  Supplementary activity refers to the other tasks that make 
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public transport more attractive to the users.  This includes travel information 
services, marketing, and ticketing systems (see later in Figure 3-5). 
3.4 Classification of innovation in public transport 
Using the characteristics-based approach described above, innovation can be defined 
as any change affecting one or more terms of one or more vectors of characteristics 
(of whatever kind – service, technical or competence).  However, we are concerned 
with not only technological changes, but also organisational innovations in all their 
tangible and intangible aspects.  This notion can be adopted here to exploit the 
process of innovation in public transport service.  Gallouj (2002) identifies six models 
of innovation, namely radical innovation, ameliorative innovation, incremental 
innovation, ad hoc innovation, recombination innovation, and objectifying or 
formulisation innovation.  
 
- Radical innovation. It is the creation of a totally new product, i.e. one defined in 
terms of a system of characteristics and competences unconnected with those of 
an old product.  
- Improvement innovation. According to the strictest definition, this type of 
innovation consists simply of improving certain characteristics, without any 
change to the structure of the system.  
- Incremental innovation (innovation by substitution or addition of characteristics). 
The general structure of the system remains the same, but the system is changed 
marginally through the addition of new elements to [T] and/or [Y] or through the 
substitution of elements. 
- Ad hoc innovation. Ad hoc innovation can be defined, in general terms, as the 
interactive (social) construction of a solution to a particular problem posed by a 
given client.  
- Recombinative innovation. Innovation of this kind exploits the possibilities 
opened up by new combinations of various final and technical characteristics, 
derived from an established stock of knowledge and a given technological 
trajectory.  
- Formalisation innovation. This model consists of putting service characteristics 
‘into order’, specifying them, making them less hazy, making them concrete, 
giving them a shape.  
 
For innovation in public transport service, it is not necessary to employ all six models 
of innovation mentioned above.  Rather, this study proposes the systematic 
classification of innovation into three categories: 1) service innovation, 2) pure 
technical innovation, and 3) competence development.  This classification is 
described as follows. 
 
3.4.1 Service innovation  
Service characteristics play a central role in classifying innovation.  Most innovations 
aim to improve (or, at least, not decrease) service characteristics.  As a result, any 
change in service characteristics could be considered as innovation in this category.  
Thus, the two sub-categories suggested are endogenous service innovation and 
exogenous service innovation.  The endogenous service innovation comes from any 
change in competences and/or technical characteristics whereas the exogenous service 
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innovation relates to any external force or constraint.  In the endogenous category, 
two groups of innovation can be distinguished: (pure technical) innovation and 
competence development.  These categories are described in more detail below.  
Secondly, the exogenous type includes the change caused by external factors.  For 
instance, if the intervention of public authority forces every operator to provide 
standard travel information, this could also be considered a service innovation in this 
category.  Figure 3-5 shows the classification of innovation in public transport.  
 
3.4.2 Pure technical innovation  
Pure technical innovation includes the changes in technical characteristics, for 
instance, change of propulsion, vehicle or infrastructure systems.  This innovation 
may or may not require and/or affect any change in other characteristic groups.  This 
could be the case for incremental or radical innovation of the systems.  Thus, three 
sub-groups can be identified as follows:  
- Incremental innovation: This innovation does not require any change in 
competence and service characteristics.  For example, the use of new 
propulsion systems (e.g. natural gas) does not require a change of driver skill, 
and the services provided are nearly the same.  
- Componential innovation: This innovation does require a development of new 
competence to acquire a new component.  For example, a trolley bus may 
need a driver to develop his/her skill to operate.  However, the service 
characteristics remain mostly unchanged.  
- System shift or radical innovation: An introduction of a new system that 
requires the operator to develop new competences to handle such a new 
system, and it consequently brings about new service characteristics.  
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Figure 3-5 Classifying innovation in public transport 
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3.4.3 Competence development  
At the firm level, there is a learning process that can be the result of competitive 
pressure or constraint from the industrial environment.  Thus, innovation is required 
to maintain the position of the firm.  This category entails both endogenous and 
exogenous forces on innovative activities.  The development of competences could 
occur endogenously, such as managerial skills in the division of labour.  A contractual 
arrangement is also an essential part of public transport service nowadays.  The 
company’s competence dealing with different kinds of contracts in different 
environments is also beneficial in this industry.  The move toward regulatory reforms, 
such as liberalisation, deregulation or tendering makes this competence more 
important.  Further, a firm could be forced to develop new competences due to an 
exogenous constraint such as a new regulatory framework or new technology.  New 
technology in the competence development differs from the one used in pure technical 
innovation which focuses mainly on the improvement of main service characteristics, 
such as fare, speed, and frequency.  New technology in competence development 
refers to other supplementary technology that can marginally improve the service 
characteristics.  For instance, relaying travel information is a new technology that 
public transport firms have to develop.  This innovation may or may not affect service 
characteristics.  
 
This classification implies the aim of introducing such innovation.  Technical 
innovation aims to improve technological elements toward better performance.  In 
other words, given constraints in other dimensions, an improvement can be made 
through technical characteristics.  The competences can be seen as organisational 
learning tasks.  This mainly deals within the organisation of public transport 
operators.  Finally, the service exogenous innovation may overlap both technical 
innovation and competence development.  However, the overall aim of innovation is 
presented through service innovation which leads to the improvement of service 
attributes.  
3.5 A concept of innovation in public transport: from theory to practice 
It is always difficult when one wants to bring theory into practice.  Innovation is a 
complex system where elements within the systems are connected and interdependent.  
The classification developed in the previous section aims at decomposing the 
elements of innovation in the public transport system.  However, when we look at 
‘innovation’, as we defined, in the real world, the variety seems more complicated 
than any framework could fully describe.  
 
The classification analyses the public transport services as a system.  However, when 
we look at the public transport sector, the organisation of the public transport plays a 
very important role in the innovation process.  This section integrated the 
organisational element into the classification of innovation in public transport.  
Furthermore, the regulatory elements corresponding to the organisation can be 
integrated as well.  This allows us to study the relationship between regulatory change 
and innovation. 
 
The concept of innovation in public transport introduced here is divided into two 
parts.  First, this section introduces the innovative capability of public transport 
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system (Ongkittikul, 2004a).  Second, the subject of innovation and diffusion are 
discussed.  These two aspects are crucial to understanding the meaning of innovation 
in public transport throughout this thesis. 
 
3.5.1 Sources and procedures of innovation in public transport 
Innovation is a knowledge cumulative process where each actor in the system 
assumes to be a knowledge processor.  The actors process the available information 
and decide the course of action.  This exemplifies the close relationship between 
source and procedures in innovation processes because the actors perceive the 
information (source) and then take an action (procedure).  In the course of action, the 
outcomes are available as information, and actors would decide the course of action 
again, as a repetition process. 
 
The public transport policy also follows this mechanism.  Therefore, it is useful to 
determine the sources and procedures of innovation in public transport, namely 
demand, increasing returns, and regulatory reforms. 
 
Demand is a classic source of innovation. The demand of public transport service is 
based on two principles: user demand and public authority demand.  The user demand 
could be seen as passenger needs that stem from travel demand.  The need for travel 
can be fulfilled by the service that is available at that time.  The authority demand is 
that the service fulfils the social interest, i.e. the service to an area that does not have 
enough user demand but it is essential to supply the service anyway.  The mechanism 
of these demands is complicated and can hardly be defined.  However, it is helpful to 
realise that the demand for public transport comes not only from travel demand, but 
also from public interest. 
 
Both increasing returns and path dependence were presented in a public transport 
context.  Gifford (2003) gives an example of increasing returns in the context of urban 
transportation.  Firstly, an example of economies of scale and scope (large set-up or 
fixed costs) is route redundancy in a dense network.  A large provider can efficiently 
support multiple routes in a particular region.  Secondly, learning affects urban 
transportation.  For instance, routine operation of public transport service would 
provide cumulative knowledge that the operator can use to reduce costs in the long 
term.  Thirdly, coordination effects in urban transportation are widespread, such as the 
use of new technologies that offer greater benefits as the number of users increase.  
Finally, the adaptive expectations (self-reinforcing expectations) include the 
irreversibility or quasi-irreversibility of particular decisions such as a road or location 
of infrastructure. 
 
It is believed that competition, through regulatory reforms, would create innovation.  
Regulation is seen as a constraint of innovation and its reform has probably induced 
some changes to the system.  This source of innovation relies on the two previous 
sources.  The process of evolution occurs because there is a demand for change, either 
from user or government.  It then searches for the possibility of facilitating the 
existing or available technologies.  Consequently, regulatory reform is needed for 
adopting the new technology (or innovation). 
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3.5.2 Innovative capability of the public transport system 
The classification given in Section 3.4 can be translated to more operational 
categories.  This chapter classifies the innovative capabilities of the public transport 
system into three categories, namely, innovative capabilities related to 1) 
infrastructure, 2) vehicle, and 3) service operation. Figure 3-6 shows examples of 
innovations according to this classification of innovative capabilities. 
 
Innovation related 
to vehicle
· Environmental 
friendly engine 
· Low floor bus
· Change in size of 
vehicle
Innovation related 
to infrastructure
· Bus priority
· Guided busway
· New systems    
eg. Light Rail
Innovation related 
to service operation
· Fare
· Timetable and 
Frequency
· Ticketing
· Marketing
 
Figure 3-6 Examples of innovations with respect to innovative capabilities in 
the bus industry 
Source: Ongkittikul (2004a) 
 
This innovative capability is considered as a tool kit to examine innovation in the 
public transport industry.  It is based on the classification in Section 3.4 in the sense 
that the innovation classification presents several overlaps in terms of the 
responsibility between the actors involved in public transport services.  This 
innovative capability attempts to cluster the technological fields of each actor 
involved and elaborate the characteristic approach in a practical and operational 
manner.  We can see the relevance between the classification in Section 3.4 and this 
innovative capability approach.  Clearly, most innovation dictates that both technical 
capability and competence development be implemented.  However, the level of 
capabilities can vary dependent on the type of innovation.  The innovation in vehicle 
and infrastructure may require considerable knowledge and resources in order to 
implement the innovation.  This clearly necessitates technical capabilities.  Yet, soft 
innovation (such as fare, ticketing, and marketing) requires managerial skills to 
operate properly.  This is the sort of competence development in our interest. 
 
Regulatory reform also plays a crucial role in the innovative capability of the public 
transport system.  The important implication here is that there are more roles for 
private operators in providing public transport services.  Private operator participation 
is possible because of the introduction of competition in the sector.  It is common now 
to observe a separate role between public authority and private operator.  The former 
is more engaged at the policy and planning level, whereas the latter is more involved 
at the operation level.  However, what we are interested in here is how these two 
actors differ in innovative capability.  It is obvious that public authority has a high 
level of participation in infrastructure, which in turn reflects its innovative capability.  
For example, bus priority or guided busways are usually introduced by public 
authority.  On the other hand, operators tend to be more active on the operation side, 
such as innovation in timetable or marketing ideas.  Figure 3-7 shows a simple map of 
such a level of participation of public authority and operator. 
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Degree of 
Participation
Service/
Operation Vehicle Infrastructure
High
Low
Authority
Operator
 
Figure 3-7 Level of participation of authority and operator 
 
The authority and operators have different innovative capabilities in each aspect.  It is 
remarkable to see how these responsibilities (which imply innovative capabilities of 
actors) change during the course of regulatory reforms.  The comparison of these 
innovative capabilities’ changes would enable us to analyse the effects of regulatory 
reforms with respect to innovation.  The distinction between potential and practical 
innovative capabilities is noteworthy here.  Potential innovative capabilities are the 
(ideal) capabilities that should happen whereas practical innovative capabilities are, 
generally, what actually happened.  It is always the case that one regulatory regime 
that aims to improve the services turns out not to be successful as the result of 
potential innovative capabilities which are not fully materialised.  This could be 
derived from the fact that incentives are not encouraging enough for organisations to 
do so. 
 
The important aspect of innovative capabilities is not only based on the innovation per 
se, but also on the decision-making process in the organisation.  The most pertinent 
factor now is the regulatory reform which results in the behavioural changes of 
decision-making units of public transport organisations.  This aspect will be discussed 
in detail in Chapter 4. 
 
It must be noted that the authority-operator relationship presented in this innovative 
capability model is rather abstract as the relationship within public transport industry 
is very complicated and often involves more than these two stakeholders.  For 
instance, local authority is usually influenced by central government or, even within 
local authority the public transport section would be affected by the way of traffic 
management works on the normal traffic on the road.  Another example is that of the 
railways where there is an infrastructure company responsible for infrastructure 
management, which is inevitably connected to the public transport operator.  But the 
merit of understanding this innovative capability leads to the realisation of a limited 
scope of the regulatory reforms in public transport, especially in tendering for bus or 
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railway concessions.  The full analysis of innovative capabilities of buses and 
railways will be given in the case studies demonstrated later in this thesis (Chapter 7 
for bus cases and Chapter 8 for railway cases). 
 
3.5.3 Innovation and diffusion 
This chapter establishes a framework whereby the changes within the public transport 
system can be identified, thus innovation can be realised explicitly.  However, two 
dimensions are not explicitly considered in this framework.  The first one is the 
timing of innovation in relation to government intervention.  The second is the spatial 
factor.  The spatial factor is directly related to the element of something being ‘new to 
the market’.  The difficult question here is how to draw market boundaries as the 
public transport market evolves rapidly.  For example, the low floor bus used in one 
area may be considered innovation if it is introduced in another area.  However, the 
idea of using a low floor bus to enhance accessibility is not new anymore.  The merit 
of innovation is lost.  This would suggest that this innovation has reached to the 
diffusion phase.  
 
The view of innovation and diffusion is in line with the classic linear model 
invention-innovation-diffusion of Schumpeter.  However, the process of invention 
and innovation in the service industry are very closely related.  Especially in public 
transport, the process of invention and innovation are merely the same, as most new 
ideas must first be examined by public authority in order to be implemented.  But 
once it becomes commercially possible and socially acceptable, the innovation enters 
the diffusion phase as the risk associated with the uncertainty of the innovation is 
reduced.  An excellent example of the distinction between innovation and diffusion is 
the low floor bus and the cleaner bus engine.  In the Netherlands, both types of 
innovation were introduced.  The low floor bus is now in the diffusing stage as more 
low floor buses are being used, thanks to the tendering process in local transport.  In 
contrast, the cleaner-engine bus has hardly been implemented due to the high cost of 
the system in terms of both vehicle and supporting infrastructure.  The cleaner-engine 
buses may perhaps reach the diffusion process one day.  Here, we regularly observe 
government intervention in terms of regulation in the transition phase between 
innovation and diffusion.  If the intervention is at the early stage of innovation, this 
may be called a technology-forcing policy.  However, a problem still arises because 
the government may not have all the information regarding a specific innovation and 
the effects associated with it.  So, the question is twofold: whether government should 
intervene at all and, if so, when the government should intervene.  Although these 
questions are not the main topic covered in this thesis, the answers can provide some 
useful information about the effects of regulatory reforms on innovation.  In fact, we 
can see this process as an interactive process. 
 
It is useful to locate where the innovation is positioned in time and space.  This refers 
to what stage the innovation is in and where it is heading.  In practice, three levels can 
be identified regarding how new it is to the public transport sector.  Level I contains 
an innovation that is new to the industry.  Often the technological advances have been 
proven in other sectors before being introduced into a new sector.  For example, the 
cleaner-engine is likely to be used in passenger cars before being introduced into the 
buses.  Level II includes an innovation that is new to the country.  The boundary of 
the country is likely to bond some common characteristics, especially the regulatory 
features.  Finally, Level III incorporates those aspects at the micro-level, i.e. this 
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innovation is new to the area.  This level involves a diffusion of the establishing 
innovation.  Table 3-6 summarises the definition and characters of each level.  
Table 3-6 Definition of innovation Level I, II, and III 
 Characteristics Risk and Uncertainty Diffusion Patterns 
Innovation Level I New to the industry Very high, both cost 
and demand 
Diffusion is at an early 
stage: very low pace 
Innovation Level II New to the country Risk about cost is 
reduced: demand is still 
uncertain 
Can be diffused more 
rapidly when 
conditions are right 
Innovation Level III New to the area Risk in cost is minimal: 
demand is likely to be 
predictable 
A successful 
innovation diffuses at 
full pace 
 
The innovation in Level I is normally a demonstration project.  Some are successful 
whereas many have failed.  Examples in this category are the hydro-fuel buses and the 
Maglev train.  These technologies are very new. Although they have a lot of potential 
for the public transport market in the future, the cost and the associated knowledge in 
this technology seems not yet mature enough to be used at a larger scale.  The 
innovation in Level II involves less radical elements.  The technological advancement 
in this category is proven elsewhere but the implementation can be difficult as the 
conditions in each country differ.  An example in this case could be the European 
train traffic management system.  The technology is there, but the implementation can 
be difficult as the risk of implementation is still high.  However, the technology can 
be diffused quickly if there is a proper incentive for the diffusion, such as a regulatory 
regime or a good funding mechanism.  The innovation in Level III is at the diffusion 
stage.  An example in this category is the diffusion of the low floor buses or the use of 
catalytic converters.   
 
It is unlikely that regulatory reform will create the innovation demonstrated in Level I 
in the short term.  We would expect that the regulatory reform may induce or deter the 
innovation in Levels II and III as it can create an incentive for authority or an operator 
to implement any innovation.  However, if we ask whether the regulatory reform 
affects innovation in each level, the answer is different.  The regulatory reform that 
changes the structure of the industry affects innovation at all levels.   
3.6 The implication of innovative capabilities 
This chapter explains the foundation of the concept of innovation for the public 
transport sector.  It is clear that identifying and classifying innovation is a difficult 
task given the multidisciplinary characteristics and various elements involved.  The 
essential perspective is to judge innovation in a broader view.  Furthermore, we have 
to look at innovation as a process.  This chapter provides an analytical framework that 
concentrates particularly on the innovation process.   
 
There are many scholars who pay attention to the theory of innovation. An important 
contribution in studying innovation theory is the work of Schumpeter (1939).  His 
model postulates the adoption process of new technology into three stages: invention, 
innovation, and diffusion.  Based on the Schumpeter’s idea, Nelson and Winter 
(1982) propose that innovation can occur through a process of variation and selection. 
Dosi (1988a) elaborates on this work when he suggests that the innovation should be 
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based on various disciplinary theories.  Not only is innovation itself important, but he 
stresses the relevance of studying the process of innovation as well, and he identifies 
unique characteristics in the process, such as routines and the need for a paradigm 
shift.  Nelson, Winter and Dosi’s approach is widely known as the evolutionary 
theory of technology dynamics. In addition to this, Arthur (1988) argues that past 
technological developments leave a permanent mark on future developments. But he 
stresses the relevance of the diffusion process as a research subject. This phenomenon 
is called a path dependency.  Finally, he observes a typical pattern in the diffusion of 
innovation, described as an S-shaped curve.   
 
Another important concept is the product and process innovation by Utterback and 
Abernathy (1975).  They describe the product and process innovation as an iterative 
process, i.e. products will be developed over time in a predictable manner with initial 
emphasis on product performance, followed by an emphasis on product variety and 
later an emphasis on product standardisation and costs.  Furthermore, they identify in 
the innovation process many variables that are of relevance: product, process, 
organisation, market, and competition.  So, there is no causal relationship between the 
process of innovation and diffusion.   
 
We are interested in the public transport sector, which can be characterised as a 
service sector.  The innovation in this sector is different from the manufacturing 
sector, traditionally studied in the discipline of technology dynamics.  To understand 
an innovation process in the service sector, we need to identify the driving forces 
behind service innovation, namely the so-called internal and external forces.  Internal 
forces are management and strategy aspects related to innovation, and research and 
development and employees interests.  External forces are those from external actors 
and trajectories, such as legislation and market developments.  The innovative driving 
forces relate to the way we measure and classify innovation.  These driving forces 
then reflect the needs for improvement of the service that the system provided.  
However, we need first to find a common understanding in terms of what kind of 
improvements or changes could be called innovation.  Therefore, the next challenging 
task is to classify and measure innovation in the public transport sector. 
 
Innovation in public transport is systematically identified in this chapter.  We adopt a 
broader perspective of innovation which covers both technological and organisational 
aspects of innovative activities.  Innovation in the public transport services is in this 
study characterised as the twin characteristics approach.  This approach defines the 
public transport services as the result of three sets of characteristics: technical 
characteristics, competence, and service characteristics.  Using this approach, the 
innovation can be classified into three groups: service innovation, pure technical 
innovation, and competence development.  Within these three groups of innovation, 
we classify the innovative capabilities of the public transport system into three 
categories, namely, innovative capabilities related to 1) infrastructure, 2) vehicle, and 
3) service operation.  These innovative capabilities can be utilised as a guideline for 
analysing the innovation process in the public transport sector. 
 
Furthermore, we can also analyse the innovation and diffusion process in the public 
transport sector.  We define three levels of innovation to locate where the innovation 
is positioned in time and space.  Level I includes an innovation that is new to the 
industry.  Often, the technological advances have been proven in other sectors before 
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they are introduced into a new sector.  Level II includes an innovation that is new to 
the country.  The boundary of the country is likely to bond some common 
characteristics.  Level III incorporates those aspects at the micro-level, i.e. this 
innovation is new to the area.  This level involves a diffusion of the establishing 
innovation. 
 
However, there is still a missing link for this thesis.  The question that remains is what 
kinds of driving forces and incentives are important for innovation in public transport.  
To understand this process, we need a framework to understand the learning process 
that develops the innovative capability of public transport organisations. 
 
So far we have discussed little about the role of regulatory reform in the innovation 
process, which is a dominant development of the current public transport policies.  
Regulatory reform affects the innovative capabilities as it changes the institutional 
and organisational structure of the public transport sector.  The innovative capability 
approach we discussed in this chapter concentrates on the internal structure of the 
public transport characteristics, i.e. technical characteristics, competence 
development, and service characteristics.  Although the driving force of the change in 
characteristics may occur from driving forces within the system, such as the need for 
better quality of services, external factors can affect the change in characteristics in 
various ways.  We can see regulatory reform as the external factor that triggers the 
changes of characteristics which in turn lead to innovation.  Overall, it can be 
concluded that the process of innovation and diffusion is a complex system. Still, 
some major factors can be identified that help to understand the innovation process 
(ex-post) but, more importantly, some factors can even help contribute to make an 
R&D policy in the service industry possible (ex-ante).   
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Chapter 4 Institutional and Organisational Changes of 
Public Transport Systems 
4.1 Introduction 
The public transport industry’s environment is evolving.  In Europe, the public 
transport sector which is rapidly changing affects both the institution and organisation 
of public transport.  The general trend of the sector is an increase in the participation 
of the private sector, both in operation and in infrastructure management.  The 
increase in participation derives mainly from the regulatory reforms of public 
transport through liberalisation, privatisation, and deregulation.  However, there is a 
strong link between technological and organisational developments in the public 
transport industry.  We discussed in Chapter 3 that an innovation involves both 
technological and organisational developments in order to be successful; the 
technological element was discussed extensively in Chapter 3.  In this chapter, we 
mainly focus on the latter, the organisational developments, which include both 
institutional and organisational aspects of public transport.     
 
In public transport, regulatory reform has a profound effect on both institutional and 
organisational aspects.  The definition of institution and organisation by North 
(1990b, 1994) is that institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, are humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction; organisations 
are groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives.  
Most public transport services are provided according to certain rules or regulations 
which can be regarded as an institutional setting.  In this respect, the regulatory 
framework is an institution and any regulatory reform is an institutional change.  The 
competition that is introduced in the sector changes the structure of the public 
transport firm as well.  When this occurs, the objective of the organisation is changed.  
For instance, the social welfare maximisation in public transport that is owned by 
public authority will convert to profit maximisation when it is privatised.  
 
This thesis focuses on the innovation element of public transport under this regulatory 
setting.  The objective of this chapter is twofold.  First, the theoretical background on 
the subject of regulatory change is provided.  Second, the conceptual framework is 
developed to analyse the effects of regulatory reform on innovation in the public 
transport sector. 
 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows.  The chapter begins with an outline of 
regulation in the public transport sector in Section 4.2.  Then, Section 4.3 explains the 
evolutionary economics perspective.  Section 4.4 introduces a new perspective on 
institutional and organisational aspects for innovation and regulatory reform.  Section 
4.5 compares the conventional approach to the evolutionary economics approach.  
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Section 4.6 introduces a concept of dynamic capabilities and proposes a conceptual 
framework for analysing the effect of regulation on innovation.  Finally, Section 4.7 
summarises the theoretical issue and proposes an implication of this chapter used as 
the basis for the analytical framework of this thesis. 
4.2 Regulation of public transport 
The policy in public utility sectors is dominated by the theory of economic regulation 
which indicates that regulation is needed when an industry is a natural monopolist.  
The rationale among economists is that, in such an industry, the firm would produce 
consumer goods with a decreasing cost function.  Without regulation, such firms 
would expand their production in order to get the lowest unit cost.  This would lead to 
a situation where the firm that has the lowest unit cost would dominate the market.  
Having eliminated all competitors, the monopolistic firm would then enjoy 
supernormal profits.  In this situation, consumers would suffer from the price set by 
this firm.  Therefore, regulation is essential in preventing the market from the 
formation of a monopoly. 
 
The public transport sector is one of the many types of public utilities.  The public 
transport market is usually subject to some types of regulation, but its form, purpose, 
and subject of this can vary widely.  In general, Nash (1982) identifies two reasons as 
to why regulation is necessary: ensuring safety and the prevention of ‘wasteful’ 
competition1.  In a broader perspective, Button and Keeler (1993) define social 
regulation (where the safety aspect belongs) and economic regulation (where wasteful 
competition concerns belong).  The former involves such things as passenger safety, 
environmental controls (i.e. safety to non-user) and operator qualifications, while the 
latter relates to a more economic aspect which has control over such matters as rates, 
fares, number of suppliers, and permissible routings. 
 
The most important driving force of government intervention in the public transport 
markets is market failure.  Under competitive conditions, the market may not be able 
to allocate its resources efficiently.  This occurs for two reasons (Nash, 1982). Firstly, 
the market may be operating in a monopolistic competition.  The theory of monopoly 
assumes that an industry has high sunk costs and that the existing firms would operate 
at minimum average costs.  When this happens, a new entry is deterred and the 
monopolistic firm would set a price above the normal rate of profit.  Secondly, it is 
possible that, in some circumstances, a new entry does occur; the outcome is likely to 
be wasteful competition.  The theory assumes that the operating firms face the same 
technological constraints, thus a new firm could not offer a radical service 
improvement.  This means that the new firm is likely to simply duplicate an existing 
service focusing on both price and quality aspects.  Given the situation that an 
incumbent firm supplies an adequate capacity according to existing demand, the 
excessive service from the new entry would be considered wasteful. 
 
                                                 
1 'Wasteful' competition is a situation where competition may lead to the decrease of average loads (a 
number of passengers per vehicle) from a number of firms that operate duplicated services, hence the 
raising of unit costs.  Even if competition is strong enough to eliminate any excess profits, the resulting 
equilibrium will be a monopolistic competition one of excess capacity and unnecessarily high unit 
costs (Nash, 1982). 
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A number of sources of market failure can be identified, namely externalities, public 
goods, natural monopoly, and imperfect information (Berechman, 1993).  Firstly, 
externalities occur when the production or consumption of an economic agent does 
not reflect its true costs. Common cases of negative externalities are traffic congestion 
and air pollution from road traffic.  Secondly, a public good is when one’s 
consumption is not excludable and is nonrival, where one party’s use of the good does 
not diminish another’s access to it or benefit from it.  Mackie (2001) argues that bus 
travel is clearly not a public good because non-paying customers can be excluded 
from the system.  However, the provision of maintenance, in practice, is defined as a 
public good.  Thirdly, a natural monopoly occurs only under certain conditions of 
scale economies.  Under these conditions, only one monopolistic firm can dominate 
the market with the lowest production costs given the market demand.  Finally, 
imperfect information occurs when information is costly which leads to high 
uncertainties and incorrect market decisions. 
 
In a market failure situation, the economic theory suggests that some forms of 
regulation are needed to resolve the problem.  Berechman (1993) reveals that the most 
predominant forms of public transport regulation are quantity, fare, and entry and exit. 
Quantity regulation, which defines the amount of services to be produced and their 
spatial allotment, essentially constitutes a minimum level constraint on total output 
and on its major attributes, such as frequency.  Fare regulation is primarily manifested 
by a ubiquitous, highly uniform fare structure which is largely independent of the 
actual long-run marginal costs of service provision.  While reasons for this fare 
structure have theoretical and practical explanations, the implications, not 
surprisingly, are harmful for the financial standing and efficiency of public transport 
firms.  Finally, entry and exit regulation essentially bans new suppliers from directly 
competing with existing monopoly public transport firms.  Thus, with respect to the 
organisation of public transport markets and the provision of new or innovative 
services, this type of regulation is most significant (Berechman, 1993). 
 
However, there were critics who questioned the regulation theory between the 1960s 
and 1970s.  Button and Keeler (1993) reveal that there were theoretical developments 
in economics, namely the Chicago models for regulation (Stigler, 1971), and the 
contestability theory (Baulmal et al., 1982).  The Chicago models postulate that the 
public interest is not necessarily served by regulation.  The contestability theory states 
that with sufficiently easy entry and exit in the market (no sunk costs and lags in 
matching price cuts), even a natural monopoly could have a zero-profit, competitive 
outcome.  In sum, Button and Keeler (1993) reveal that the impetus against regulation 
came from two sources: an inherent scepticism of price and entry controls in 
industries, not natural monopolies, and evidence from various sources that a free 
market in transport would work more efficiently than a regulated one. 
 
In the public transport markets, the case against regulation is also prevalent.  Tight 
regulation prevents competition in the sector.  The policy development partly follows 
the theoretical developments discussed above.  Concurrently, the force toward a 
deregulation regime is partly due to the political pressure.  These political drives lead 
to a decline in public transport use and an increase in subsidy level.  The combination 
of the ideology of deregulation (theoretical driven) and financial difficulties (political 
driven) has driven the public transport systems in the past two decades. 
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There are differences in detail and approach in the ways countries have organised and 
regulated their public transport services.  Velde (1999) makes a useful distinction, 
regarding organisation forms in public transport, between systems in which the rights 
of initiative are rested in the (public) authority and those in which the rights of 
initiative are rested in the market (see Figure 4-1).   
 
Organisational forms
Authority initiative
'Concessions'
Market initiative
'Authorisation'
Private
concessions
Regulated
authorisations
Public
network
Open
entry
Management 
contract
Direct public 
management
Dominated by 
private companies
Dominated by 
public companies
 
Figure 4-1 Organisational forms in public transport 
Source:  Velde (1999) 
 
Elaborating on this distinction, Preston (2001a) proposes a simplified classification of 
three broad types of regulatory and organisational structure in public transport usually 
found in European countries. The first category is regulated, public-owned 
monopolies (‘the classic model’).  This model follows the theory of regulation in that 
intervention is necessary in order to serve the public interest. The second is limited 
competition models.  These models follow the argument of Demsetz (1968) in that, 
even though there is evidence of a natural monopoly in a sector, this does not preclude 
the possibility of having a number of bidders when exclusive operational rights can be 
given. The final category is deregulated, free-market models. These models reject the 
theory of regulation and argue that the free market regime is more efficient. 
 
The evolution of regulatory framework is an incremental process resulting from the 
extensive interaction between theoretical developments and empirical evidence during 
the course of its reforms.  As we discussed above, the interaction between the public 
interest theory of regulation and the case against regulation (i.e. the Chicago models 
and the contestability theory) created policy implementations in several public 
sectors.  These cases were then assessed and the new features were elaborated as 
interactive processes that created a new thought in theoretical points of view.  
 
Regulatory reform is a process of change.  From a theoretical point of view, 
economics plays an important part in analysing the effects of regulation in public 
transport.  Moreover, it plays a part in helping the decision-making required to design 
the regulatory framework.  However, once regulatory reform takes place, the effects 
of the reform are not fully explained purely by economic analysis.  The reasons might 
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be that the behaviours of actors are not well understood, or that there is uncertainty in 
the reform process.  
4.3 Evolutionary economics perspective  
4.3.1 Critics of mainstream theory 
The study of regulatory reforms is a study of a change process.  Generally, the 
economy of regulation gives us an idea of how to control the market to ensure 
maximum efficiency, or in other words, eliminate wasteful competition.  However, 
there is a drawback, and that is that the economic approach of institutions to design is 
focused on outcome rather than on analysing the process; it does not adopt a dynamic 
approach to institutional growth and change (Willman et al., 2003). 
 
Past research shows that regulatory reform affects the industry structure in several 
aspects.  However, this research tends to compare the before and after effects of 
regulatory reform rather than actually analyse the reform process.  For instance, it 
states that deregulation in the UK brought the reduction in operating cost to around 
40%. This is a comparison of the situation between t1 and t2 (see Figure 4-2).  What is 
noteworthy is the evolving process between these two periods. 
 
This study of regulatory designs is based mostly on two economic disciplines, namely 
welfare economics and industrial organisation theories.  In the welfare economic 
approach, it assumes a free market condition where the agents in the system would 
maximise their interests.  In the industrial organisation approach, it decomposes a 
market into the structure, conduct, and performance of the market (Shy, 1995).  
Structure signifies how sellers interact with other sellers, buyers, and potential 
entrants.  Market structure also defines the product in terms of the potential number of 
variants in which the product can be produced.  Market conduct refers to the 
behaviour of the firms in a given market structure, that is, how firms determine their 
price policy, sales, and promotion.  Finally, performance refers to the welfare aspect 
of the market interaction.  In other words, to determine performance we measure 
whether the interaction in the market leads to a desired outcome, or whether a failure 
occurs that requires the intervention of the regulator. 
 
The orthodox2 economic approach to the design and operation of regulatory systems 
is prescriptive in the specific sense that the operation of regulatory institutions is 
judged in terms of their ability to ensure certain outcomes (Willman et al., 2003).  
Most commonly, the regulatory systems aim to, first, secure the efficient provision of 
services to consumers at a minimum price, while second, attract private investment by 
allowing a reasonable rate of return (Stern and Holder, 1999).  Furthermore, 
Nooteboom (2000) emphasises that while economics tend to focus on equilibrium 
outcomes, management scholars must pay attention to processes because it is their 
task to provide a basis for intervention.  One can only intervene in processes, not 
outcomes. 
 
                                                 
2 The term ‘orthodox’ is used by Nelson and Winter (1982). Nooteboom (2000) uses ‘mainstream’ to 
represent the similar meaning. He describes this term as neoclassical or neoWalrasian economics. The 
term neoclassic economics is also used by Gifford (2003). 
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Thus, orthodox neoclassical economics studies the following principles: (1) 
equilibrium outcomes in (2) connected markets, based on (3) rational choice by (4) 
autonomous agents.  In contrast, the studies of evolutionary economics is interested in 
its virtual antithesis: (1) out of equilibrium process in (2) markets and organisations 
with significant transaction costs, under (3) conditions of radical uncertainty and 
bounded rationality, with (4) meaning and knowledge arising from interaction 
between people (Nooteboom, 2000). 
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Figure 4-2 Subjects of interest in orthodox and evolutionary theory 
 
The orthodox economic approach considers the process of the regulatory reform as a 
black box (see Figure 4-2).  It imposes some assumptions and interprets the outcomes.  
The assumptions (in this black box) can be divided twofold.  Firstly, it is assumed that 
the technology is fixed, i.e. the economic agents face the same technological 
constraint and this constraint is fixed (either constant or gradually increasing over 
time).  This poses a serious question since technological development presents itself 
often unexpectedly.  Secondly, it is assumed that the economic agents in the system 
are unconditionally rational and also identical among the same group of agents.  For 
instance, the government body is a welfare maximiser and the private operator is a 
profit maximiser.  Further it assumes that the economic agents are identical in that 
every operator is a profit maximiser and has the same technological production 
process.  However, in reality, the operators have their own strategies in organising the 
management and they choose to adopt technology or specific technique to be superior 
in the market.  Concerning these two critiques, an alternative theory is needed in 
which the technology, agent behaviour, and other endogenous forces can be studied 
explicitly. 
 
Evolutionary economics offers the alternative theoretical point of view to approach 
the problem that we face in the process of regulatory reforms.  As noted above, 
orthodox economics tends to focus on the outcomes, not processes.  However, what 
we are interested in is how the industry will respond.  This question is not what 
contemporary positive theory analyses.  Rather, the analysis compares equilibrium 
configurations of input, output, and prices under the two market conditions (Nelson 
and Winter, 1982).  This is the first important feature of evolutionary economics: 
dynamics.  Cumulative knowledge and technology are important in this respect.  This 
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includes the uncertainty of technological advancement in the period of consideration.  
Furthermore, the question also relates to the problem of how agents in the system 
react.  Evolutionary economics assumes that agents have, at best, an imperfect 
understanding of the environment they live in and of what the future will deliver.  
This also implies that there will be technological uncertainty in the future.  Thus, 
‘bound rationality’ in a very broad sense is assumed (Coriat and Dosi, 1998). 
 
4.3.2 Evolutionary theory for behavioural changes from regulatory reform 
There are three important concepts that we need to clarify first when we deal with the 
topic of behavioural changes.  These concepts are interrelated; each of them provides 
an interesting point of view on which the behavioural changes are reflected. 
 
The first concept is the theory of evolutionary economics.  This approach studies the 
process of the economics of technical change.  The term evolutionary stems from 
biology. One of the borrowed ideas which is central to the evolutionary approach is 
the idea of economic natural selection (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Market 
environments provide a definition of success for business firms, and that definition is 
very closely related to their ability to survive and grow.  This theory has been 
discussed in previous chapters, as it is one of the core theories we are employing in 
this thesis.   
 
In the evolutionary view, technological development and innovation play an 
important role in the sense that innovation brings about the changes in the system and 
influences the selection process. One of the important features of evolutionary 
thinking is the term routine. Routine may refer to a repetitive pattern of activity in an 
entire organisation, to an individual skill, or, as an adjective, to the smooth uneventful 
effectiveness of such an organisational or individual performance (Nelson and Winter, 
1982). 
 
Nelson and Winter (1982) argue that much of firm behaviour can be better understood 
as a reflection of general routines and strategic orientations coming from the firm’s 
past than as the result of a detailed survey of the remote twigs of a decision tree 
extending into the future.  They develop an evolutionary theory of the firm where 
organisational capabilities and behaviours of business firms operating in a market 
environment are addressed.  The firms in their evolutionary theory are motivated by 
profitability and engaged in the search for ways to improve their profitability, but the 
firm’s actions are not assumed to be profit maximising over well-defined and 
exogenously given choice sets (Mahoney, 2005).  This assumption is based on the 
theory of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) which is the second concept that we  will 
discuss. 
 
The bounded rationality or problem-solving approach, as defined by behaviourists 
who take their lead from the work of Herbert Simon3, stress some or all of the 
following elements.  Man’s rationality is “bounded”: real-life decision problems are 
too complex to comprehend and, therefore, firms cannot maximise over the set of all 
conceivable alternatives.  
 
                                                 
3 See Simon (1997). 
 Innovation and Regulatory Reform in Public Transport 
 
 
66
The two key attributes to which Simon refers are the cognitive ability and the self-
interestedness of human actors.  Bounded rationality – behaviour that is intendedly 
rational but only limitedly so – is the cognitive condition to which Simon refers. 
‘Frailties of motive’ describes the condition of self-interestedness (Simon, 1985).  
Moreover, the importance of organisational tasks is to formalise the dynamics of 
organisational evolution through models which explicitly consider the interplay 
between three inter-related factors, namely: 1) a cognitive representation of the 
problem(s) the organisation faces; 2) a mechanism of variation, which generates new 
solutions, new ways of doing things; 3) a mechanism of selection, implemented 
through various kind of incentives and reward mechanisms (Dosi et al., 2003). 
 
The concept of bounded rationality is also a foundation in the study of organisation 
theory.  Simon (1997) suggests that the term organisation refers to a complex pattern 
of human communications and relationships.  The relationship between the 
organisation theory and bounded rationality is that organisational behaviour is the 
theory of intended and bounded rationality – it is about the behaviour of humans who 
satisfice because they do not have the ability to maximise.  While neoclassical 
economic man maximises – selects the best alternative among all those available to 
him – organisational man satisfices – looks for a course of action that is satisfactory 
or good enough.  Economic man deals with the real world in all of its complexity, 
whereas organisational man perceives a drastically simplified model of the real world 
(Simon, 1997).  The implication that the decision makers are bounded by rationality is 
essential to this thesis.  They have limited information and they lack the capability to 
process the information that they do posses.  The implication of the concept of the 
behavioural theory of organisation will be presented in Section 4.4. 
 
The third concept is transaction cost economics.  The transaction cost economics 
approach is the product of two fields of economic research, namely the new 
institutional economics and the new economic of organisation (Williamson, 1998).  A 
key conceptual advancement for both was the push beyond the theory of the firm as a 
production function (which is a technological construction) into a theory of the firm 
as a governance structure (which is an organisational construction).  Williamson 
(1985) argues that firms, markets, and relational contracting are important economic 
institutions.  These economic institutions are also the evolutionary product of a series 
of organisational innovations. 
 
To understand this point, Williamson (1998) set out the four levels of social analysis 
as shown in Figure 4-3.  The top level is the social embeddedness level. This is where 
the norms, customs, mores, traditions, etc. are located.  The second level is referred to 
as the institutional environment.  The structures observed here are partly the product 
of evolutionary processes, but design opportunities are also posed (Williamson, 
2000).  Going beyond the “informal constraints” of a Level 1 kind, we now introduce 
“formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” (North, 1990a).  The third level is 
where the institutions of governance are located.  Although property remains 
important, a perfectly functioning legal system, in order to enforce contracts, is not 
contemplated. Transaction cost operates at Level 3.  Finally, Level 4 moves from 
discrete structural to marginal analysis. This is the level with which neoclassical 
economics and, more recently, agency theories have been concerned. The neoclassical 
decision variables are price and output; agency theory deals with an efficient incentive 
Chapter 4 - Institutional and Organisational Changes of Public Transport Systems  
 
 
67
alignment in the face of differential risk aversion and/or multi-task factors or multi-
principal concerns (Williamson, 1998). 
 
Embeddedness:
Informal institutions, custom, 
traditions, norms, religion
Institutional Environment:
Formal rules of the game - esp. 
property (polity, judiciary, 
bureaucracy)
Governance:
Play of the game - esp. contract 
(aligning governance structures 
with transactions)
Resource Allocation and 
Employment:
Prices and quantities; incentive 
alignment
L1:
Social Theory
L2:
Economics of property right
L3:
Transaction Cost Economics
L4:
Neo-Classical Economics/ 
Agency Theory
LEVEL FREQUENCY
(Years)
PURPOSE
102 to 103
10 to 102
1 to 10
Continuous
Often noncalculative; 
spontaneous
Get the institutional 
environment right: 
1st order economizing
Get the governance 
structure right:
2nd order economizing
Get the marginal 
conditions right:
3rd order economizing
 
Figure 4-3 Economic of institutions 
Source:  Williamson (1998) 
 
This thesis will focus primarily on the evolution process in the Level 3 kind, with the 
interaction between Level 2 and Level 4.  This is where the regulatory framework 
shapes innovation in the public transport sector.  If we consider the regulatory reform 
as a given institutional environment (Level 2), then the process of the reaction from 
organisations is the organisational activities in Level 3.  This process is the result of 
the interaction between various agents in the systems.  North (1994) emphasises that it  
is the interaction between institutions and organisations that shapes the institutional 
evolution of an economy.  As previously stated in Section 2.6.1, if institutions are the 
rules of the game, organisations and their entrepreneurs are the players4.  
Furthermore, Level 4 will interact with Level 3 as the result of the change of 
governance structure.  The detailed arrangement of price, quantity, quality, and other 
incentives will be determined as a feedback reaction between these two levels.   
 
The transaction cost economic theory gives the general framework in which the 
regulatory reform takes part.  It is also important to verify the inside mechanisms 
associated in each level.  Two main features are the decision-makers in the system 
and the process at each level.  The useful theories are evolutionary economics, which 
assumes the system to be dynamic, and the bounded rationality, which assumes that 
economic agents in the system have a bounded rationality.  This is the link between 
the transaction cost economic and the behavioural theory of the firm as we described 
above. 
 
                                                 
4 Williamson (1998) adds that the institutional environment is the rules of the game and the institutions 
of governance are the play of the game. 
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4.3.3 Theoretical similarities and differences 
In previous section, we described the theories of evolutionary economics, bounded 
rationality, and transaction cost economics.  It can be seen that there are some 
similarities and differences in the underlined assumptions that differ from the 
orthodox economic theory.  Dosi and Marengo (2000) present an interesting 
comparison between three different theoretical perspectives by concentrating on the 
assumption of agencies in each theory.  Table 4-1 shows their comparative appraisal. 
Table 4-1 Orthodox agency, transaction costs economics, and competence 
perspectives: a comparative appraisal 
Dimensions of 
analysis and 
theoretical 
building blocks 
Orthodox agency 
 
Transaction costs 
economics 
 
Competence (and 
evolutionary) 
perspectives 
Problem 
solving/cognition
/knowledge 
No Not so far 
Yes (central dimension 
of analysis) 
Incentive 
governance 
 
Yes (central dimension 
of analysis) via 
equilibrium contracting 
 
Yes, possible via 
organisations as 
substitutes for 
equilibrium contracting 
Not so far (but see Coriat 
and Dosi 1998) 
 
Behavioural 
microfoundations 
 
Perfect, far-sighted 
rationality 
 
Bounded rationality with 
far-sightedness 
 
Bounded rationality 
(usually, with ‘myopic’ 
attributes) 
Organisational 
behaviour 
Strategic ( in the game-
theoretic sense) 
Cost-economising 
 
Driven by routines, 
heuristics, etc. 
Learning 
 
No 
 
Not so far 
 
Yes (central dimension 
of analysis) 
Unit(s) of 
analysis 
 
- Strategies 
- Allocation of 
information 
- Allocation of property 
rights 
Transactions 
 
- Elementary ‘bits’ of 
knowledge 
- Routines and other 
elementary behavioural 
traits 
Non-economic 
dimensions of 
organisation 
Not as original 
dimensions 
 
No 
 
Power, trust, identity 
building, etc. 
Source:  Dosi and Marengo (2000) 
 
This comparison shows that the orthodox theory lacks several crucial elements for the 
study of regulatory reform.  For instance, the orthodox theory assumes that there is no 
problem-solving mechanism in its agencies, or in other words, the orthodox agency is 
a processor of information.  On the other hand, the evolutionary perspective’s agency 
is a processor of knowledge, i.e. it is also a problem solver.  This demonstrates the 
point that the orthodox agency has no learning component where the evolutionary 
perspective’s agency does, and this fact is a central dimension of its analysis.  In sum, 
the evolutionary perspective can give more explanation to several questions that the 
orthodox theory cannot answer.  Therefore, the introduction of the evolutionary 
perspective would bring about new viewpoints as well as a better understanding of the 
process of regulatory reforms in public transport. 
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The main implication is that the firms do learn and develop their organisational 
capabilities in order to compete and survive in the market.  Innovation is the result of 
accumulated knowledge and improved capabilities.  The regulatory framework in 
which firms operate is the constraint that determines the firms’ innovative activities.  
With these concepts, we can analyse the behaviour of a firm in the public transport 
sector with respect to the innovation in which firms engage.  Therefore, we can 
further explore the process of innovation in public transport. 
4.4 Institutional and organisational aspects for innovation and regulatory 
reform 
In the study of public transport organisational forms, Velde (1999) makes a 
distinction between authority initiative and market initiative (which we discussed 
already in Section 4.2).  This distinction specifies two different categories of the 
organisation of the supply of public transport services and relates closely to the 
regulatory framework where the services are operated.  In authority-initiated regimes, 
transport authorities have the legal monopoly of initiative, i.e. autonomous market 
entry is legally impossible and all production or market entry is the result of a one-
side authority initiative to produce or request the production of services.  In the 
market-initiated regimes, the supply of transport services is based upon the principle 
of autonomous market entry resulting from a market process with only a limited 
regulatory requirement at the entrance. 
 
The above model combined with the distinction of actors involved in the public 
transport systems forms a graphical representation that  is used extensively in the 
MARETOPE Project (2000, 2002).  In general, three (groups of) actors are identified, 
namely government (public authority), operator (public or private), and user (actual 
and potential).  Figure 4-4 shows a simple case of this organisational model.  In the 
MARETOPE Project, this organisational model is used as a basic tool and is adapted 
for real-world cases by adding several details to the model.  The focus of this 
approach is the formal and informal interactions between actors.  Veeneman (2002) 
also uses this perspective to analyse the organisation of public transport.  He defines 
the inter-organisation of public transport services in the metropolitan area.  The focal 
point of his study is the interactions between government and operator, amongst 
operators themselves; and between operator and traveller.   
 
Users
(Actual and 
Potential)
Operator
(Public or 
Private)
Government
(Public 
Authority)
 
Figure 4-4  Organisational model 
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However, this model does not implicitly address the incentives and mechanisms of 
how and why actors participate in the system.  Generally, the government controls 
operators through regulatory framework and the subsidy it gives.  In return, the 
operator offers public transport services to the users (or travellers).  And the users 
participate both by using public transport and controlling the government through the 
political process.  This is a simple explanation as to how the actors interact with each 
other.  But, it still lacks the behavioural explanation of each actor, which is essential 
for the analysis of innovation in the public transport sector. 
 
This chapter introduces a different organisational model based on the behavioural 
theory of the firm by Simon (1997). This approach is a more suitable means of 
analysing innovation in the public transport sector.  Simon (1997) explains there are 
three kinds of participants that can be distinguished: entrepreneurs, employees, and 
customers (Simon, 1997).  Individuals are willing to accept organisational 
membership when their activity in the organisation contributes, directly or indirectly, 
to their own personal goals (Simon, 1997).  In other words, each participant is offered 
an inducement for his participation in the organisation; he then makes a contribution 
in return (Simon, 1957).    
 
Simon (1957) gives a simple example of the system of inducements and contributions. 
Consider an organisation with an entrepreneur, one employee, and one customer.  
Table 4-2 shows an example of this system.  The customer’s contribution of the 
purchase price is used to provide inducements to the entrepreneurs in the form of 
revenue.  The entrepreneur’s contribution provides the employee’s wages.  The 
employee’s contribution is transformed into goods that provide the employee’s wages. 
Table 4-2 The system of inducements and contributions 
Participant Inducements Contributions 
Entrepreneur Revenue from sales Costs of production 
Employee Wage Labour 
Customer Goods Purchase price 
Source: Simon (1957) 
 
This example shows the different characteristics of each participant in organisation.  
In general, the success of organisations is discussed in terms of organisational goals 
and two kinds of personal goals.  Simon (1997) explains that the organisational goals 
are of most direct interest to customers.  In terms of personal goals, the first personal 
goal is to obtain rewards associated with organisational growth and success, and the 
second personal goal is to earn wages and other rewards now associated.  He then 
distinguishes between (1) the motives for individuals’ participation in an organisation 
and (2) the goals and constraints that enter directly as premises into organisational 
decisions.  The term “motives” refers to the aims of the individual, and the terms 
“goals” and “constraints” refer to premises used in the organisational decision 
processes. 
 
In the changing regulatory environment, this model is very helpful.  The institutional 
and organisational changes, caused by regulatory reforms, affect the organisational 
participants’ behaviours, i.e. motives, goals, and constraints.  Hence, the decision for 
engaging innovation might be deterred as a result of behavioural change. 
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We can apply this model to the public transport service. Figure 4-5 shows the 
conceptual model of the organisation of the public transport service.  Note that this is 
an example in bus tendering where the operator may, or may not have a power to 
design services. 
 
Transport agency
Tendering agency
OperatorParticipant Government
Ministry of transport
Regional Authority
Manager
Drivers
Other staffs
PassengersPotential 
passengers
Entrepreneur
Employee
Customers
 
Figure 4-5 Organisational model for analysing innovation 
Source: Inspired by Simon (1957) 
 
This figure shows the organisation of public transport divided into the three 
participants (vertically in Figure 4-5): entrepreneur, employee, and customers. 
Because of the competitive tendering, the operator now splits from the government.  
This can be seen as a sub-organisation within the public transport organisation.  The 
system of inducement is still applied, but the participants are changed.  Thus, motives, 
goals, and constraints differ to make a new equilibrium within the organisation so that 
it can survive and succeed in the system. 
 
The difference between this model and the general model used in previous studies 
(e.g. Figure 4-4) is that the system of inducements can be identified by way of each 
participant in the public transport organisation.  This will help us to clarify the 
motives, goals, and constraints for the innovation in the public transport in a changing 
regulatory framework. 
 
This concept is very useful in order to understand the innovation process under a 
changing regulatory environment.  The main point is that the regulatory reforms cause 
institutional and organisational changes in the system.  The actors in the system, in 
turn, change, adapt, or react to those changes in various ways.  The evolution can be 
seen as a change in organisational goals, motives, and constraints as discussed above.  
4.5 Evolutionary perspective on regulatory reform 
The economic analysis of the regulatory reform gives us hints in terms of what the 
equilibrium outcome should look like.  However, what is missing is that the reform 
process is not fully predicted and analysed.  In this section, we are looking for a 
detailed explanation of this process. 
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Typically, it is understood that the objectives of reform are cost reduction and quality 
improvement.  These objectives are of interest in most economic analysis studies.  
However, it can also be observed that reform brings about other developments such as 
the beginning of multinational public transport companies.  Thus, there is a need to 
understand the regulatory reforms from a different perspective in more detail. 
 
From the evolutionary theory discussed above, we can get an idea of how 
evolutionary framework evolves in the public transport sector.  This evolution can be 
summarised in three observations as follows. 
 
The first observation is that economic agents in the public transport sector are 
rationally bounded.  We have discussed the experiences of the public transport policy 
in Section 2.2, and that it is only at a period of development which, over time, is 
inconsistent.  In fact, it is still evolving.  Preston (2001b) reveals that, in the case of 
bus reforms in Great Britain, there are regulatory (and ownership) cycles.  The 
objectives of the public sectors, apart from the maximisation of social welfare, have 
been evolving and are partly influenced by political pressure at both local and national 
levels.  From the evolutionary perspective, public policies evolve partly due to 
changes in perceived demands and opportunities, changes that may result from the 
evolution of private technologies and market structures or from other identifiable 
shifts in objective conditions (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  This could explain why we 
need to consider an alternative approach to examine the process of regulatory reforms. 
 
Many researchers try to understand the difference between each regulatory reform, 
and the general approach is to compare the before and after effects of the reform.  As 
mentioned above, this kind of analysis simply compares the equilibrium 
configurations of input, output, and prices under the two market conditions.  To better 
understand the regulatory evolution, one cannot focus solely on economic 
considerations.  Rather, the analysis should include a broader view that can be 
described using the Williamson social analysis framework (see Figure 4-3), 
particularly at the Level 1 and Level 2 kinds.  For the Level 1 consideration, the 
people’s norm could influence politicians to pursue a certain policy.  The politicians 
themselves may also have their own beliefs.  As a result, each country would have its 
own (cultural) ways to direct the policy.  For the Level 2 type, bureaucratic issue 
could also be included in the analysis.  For instance, before the privatisation era, the 
bureaucratic public-owned company has its own management style which criticises its 
inefficiency.  The decision-makers then decide, within their cognitive ability, to solve 
this problem, to opt for the privatisation approach.  This solution has its pros and cons 
and the decision-maker must compromise the costs and benefits of stakeholders. 
 
Second, institutional evolution is shaping the industry structure.  If we accept North’s 
notation of institutional and organisational levels, institutional evolution is the radical 
change in the rules of the game.  Regulatory reform means the government must set 
new rules.  Consequently, the functions of each stakeholder would also be changed.  
In the case of privatisation industries, Willman et al. (2003) identify distinct stages in 
the evolution of the regulatory function: (1) an ad-hoc period; (2) a period 
characterised by the emergence of a formal regulatory role; and (3) the emergence of 
more strategic regulatory management.  This case suggests that the reform’s process 
is significant and it takes time to reconcile the system.  Similar patterns can also be 
observed at the local transport level as the multinational companies originated from 
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the trend towards the deregulation (in UK) and tendering of the concessions (in 
several European countries).  While the regulatory regimes are still evolving, the 
industry structure follows the evolution pattern too. 
 
Third, the organisational responses to the regulatory reform vary significantly.  In the 
case of bus deregulation in the UK, McGuinness et al. (1994) have learned that 
operators responded differently in the 1985 legislation.  As stated earlier, the aims of 
the l985 legislation were that the operators be more innovative, market-oriented and 
commercial companies. McGuinness et al. (1994) identify three broad strategic 
responses: a defensive market for passenger transport, a market sensitive strategy of 
becoming more responsive to changing conditions within the overall travel market, 
and a commercial strategy of identifying opportunities for growth and/or 
diversification. 
 
The variation of organisational responses is found not only on the operator side, but 
also on the authority side.  The trend towards the decentralised approach gives the 
local authority more power to make a decision on transport policy, including the 
public transport section.  Recently, in Great Britain, Atkins (2003) found that there are 
three types of local authorities: the champion, the tactician, and the sceptic.  This 
result indicates that the authority also has cumulative knowledge and perception.  This 
is in line with the works of Velde and Leijenaar (2001) and Velde and Pruijmboom 
(2003) in that authorities have informational and behavioural barriers.  Another 
question pertains to what makes the organisations (either public or private) different. 
 
Clearly, organisational changes play an important part in explaining the behaviour of 
actors in the public transport sector.  The capability and learning elements are of 
importance in this respect.  In order to respond to the changing environment, 
organisations search and acquire knowledge and capabilities to better adapt.  In this 
process, innovation is used as a strategic tool to achieve an organisation’s goal.  One 
explanation is that firms learn and develop their capabilities.  This assumption directly 
corresponds to the evolutionary economics perspective we discussed earlier which 
states that firms do learn and develop their capabilities to compete and survive in the 
market.  In the next section, we discuss the concept of capabilities and learning in 
more detail. 
4.6 Concept of dynamic capabilities and learning 
4.6.1 Dynamic capabilities 
The concept of dynamic capabilities is developed by Teece and Pisano (1994) and 
Teece et al (1997).  They define dynamic capabilities as the firm’s ability to integrate, 
build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments.  Dynamic capabilities thus reflect an organisation’s ability to achieve 
new and innovative forms of competitive advantages given the path dependencies and 
market positions. 
 
The firm’s processes and positions collectively encompass its capabilities or 
competences (Teece and Pisano, 1994, Teece et al., 1997).  The relationship and 
characteristic of competences/capabilities must be recognised.  A difficult-to-replicate 
or difficult-to-imitate competence/capability can be considered a distinctive 
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competence.  Hence, competences and capabilities are intriguing assets, as they 
typically must be built because they cannot be bought.  Dynamic capabilities are the 
subset of the competences/capabilities which allow the firm to create new products 
and processes, and respond to changing market circumstances (Teece and Pisano, 
1994). 
 
Teece and Pisano (1994) elucidate that the competitive advantage of firms lies within 
its managerial and organisational processes, shaped by its (specific) asset position, 
and the paths available to it.  Managerial and organisational processes refer to the way 
things are done in the firm, or what might be called the organisation’s ‘routines’, or 
patterns of current practices and learning.  Position refers to firm’s current 
endowment of technology and intellectual property, as well as its customer base and 
upstream relations with suppliers.  Paths refer to the strategic alternatives available to 
the firm, and the attractiveness of the opportunities which lie ahead.  
 
Organisational and managerial processes 
Organisational processes have three roles: coordination/integration (a static concept); 
learning (a dynamic concept); and reconfiguration (a transformational concept). 
- Coordination/integration:  Managers coordinate or integrate activity inside the 
firm.  How efficiently and effectively internal coordination or integration is 
achieved is very important.  This is also applied for external coordination.  
Increasingly, strategic advantage requires the integration of external activities and 
technologies.   
- Learning:  Learning is a process by which repetition and experimentation enable 
improvement in executing tasks.  It also enables the production opportunities to be 
identified. 
- Reconfiguration and transformation:  In changing environments, there is value in 
the ability to sense the need to reconfigure the firm’s asset structure, and to 
accomplish the necessary internal and external transformations.  In this regard, 
benchmarking is of considerable value as an organised process for accomplishing 
such ends. 
 
Position 
The strategic position of a firm is also determined by its specific assets (Teece et al., 
1997).  Specific assets are specialised plant and equipment, difficult-to-trade 
knowledge assets, and assets complementary to them, as well as reputational and 
structural assets.  Such assets determine a firm’s competitive advantage at any point in 
time.  Teece et al. (1997) identify some examples of these assets as follows. 
- Technological assets and complementary assets are related to technological 
innovation.  A firm’s technological assets may or may not be protected by the 
standard instruments of intellectual property law.  However, the ownership 
protection and utilisation of technological assets are clearly key differentiators 
among firms.  Likewise for complementary assets. 
- Reputations refer to the information about firms and they shape the responses of 
customers, suppliers, and competitors.  Reputational assets are intangible assets 
that enable firms to achieve various goals in the market.  Their main value is 
external, since what is critical about reputation is that it is a kind of summary 
statistic about the firm’s current assets and position, and its likely future 
behaviour. 
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- For structural assets, the formal and informal structures of organisations and their 
external linkages have an important bearing on the rate and direction of 
innovation, and how competences and capabilities co-evolve.   
 
Paths 
Paths and technical opportunities are interrelated as follows. 
- Path dependencies:  Where a firm can go is a function of its current position and 
the paths ahead.  It is also shaped by the path behind.  The notion of path 
dependencies recognises that ‘history matters’.  Thus, a firm’s previous 
investments and its collection of routines constrain its future behaviour.  
- Technological opportunities: the concept of path dependencies is given forward 
meaning through the consideration of an industry’s technological opportunities.  It 
is well-recognised that how far and how fast a particular area of industrial activity 
can progress is partly due to the technological opportunities that lie before it.  
However, technological opportunities may not be completely exogenous to 
industry, not only because some firms have the capacity to engage in or at least 
support basic research, but also because technological opportunities are often fed 
by the innovative activity itself.   
 
In summary, Teece and Pisano (1994) posit that the competitive advantage of firms 
stems from dynamic capabilities rooted in high performance routines operating inside 
the firm, embedded in the firm’s processes, and conditioned by its history.  Because 
of the non-tradability of soft assets like values, culture, and organisational experience, 
these capabilities cannot be bought; they must be built from within the firm. 
 
The dynamic capabilities approach offers a framework for analysing the innovation in 
the public transport sector.  The public transport organisations (both authority and 
operator) have their own capabilities that are essential for them to progress in 
changing environments.  Especially for the operator, public transport firms have to 
build up their competitive advantage through their innovative activities.  The 
questions that this dynamic capabilities approach can answer are how firms can build 
their competences/capabilities and what incentives there are for the firms to innovate.   
 
4.6.2 Learning and feedback 
Learning is vital for an organisation in developing its capabilities/ competences.  The 
concept of learning is the way in which an individual or organisation collects 
information and knowledge and processes it in order to improve performance. 
 
Learning is also a feedback process (Sterman, 2000).  In the learning process, we 
make decisions that alter the real world; we gather information feedback about the 
real world and, using the new information, we revise our understanding of the world 
and the decisions we make to bring out the perception of the state of the system as it 
relates to our goals.  This is called a feedback loop. 
 
The feedback loop obscures an important aspect of the learning process (Sterman, 
2000).  Information feedback about the real world is not the only input in our 
decision-making.  Decisions are the result of applying a decision rule or policy to 
information about the world as we perceive it (Forrester, 1992).  The policies are 
conditioned by institutional structures, organisational strategies, and cultural norms.  
These are governed by our mental model.  This is a fundamental idea of the System 
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Dynamics model.  Forrester (1961) stresses that all decisions are based on models, 
usually mental models.  In system dynamics, the term ‘mental model’ includes our 
beliefs about the networks of causes and effects that describe how a system operates, 
along with the boundary of the model and the time horizon we consider relevant 
(Sterman, 2000). 
 
There are several barriers to learning.  Among them is the issue of limited information 
which can be considered in two manners.  First, the full information is not available.  
Often it is the case that the information is not available or we receive estimated values 
which have to be measured or sampled.  The act of measurement introduces 
distortions, delays, biases, errors, and other imperfections, some known, others 
unknown, and unknowable (Sterman, 2000).  Second, limited information occurs from 
individual perceptions.  This issue relates to the mental models through which we 
define the system, evaluate, and report.  These then condition the perceptions we 
form. Changes in our mental models are constrained by what we previously chose to 
define, measure, and attend to (Sterman, 2000). 
 
The issue of limited information has a close link to the bounded rationality we 
discussed in Section 4.3.  Limited information reduces the potential for learning and 
performance by limiting our knowledge of the real world (Sterman, 2000).   Simon 
(1957) asserts that the capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving 
complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problem whose 
solution is required for objectively rational behaviour in the real world.  Though we 
sometimes attempt to make the best decisions we can, bounded rationality means we 
often systematically fall short, limiting our ability to learn from experience. 
 
We can extend this learning concept into the concept of organisational learning as 
well.  Because all learning takes place inside individual human heads, an organisation 
learns in only two ways: (a) by the learning of its members, or (b) by ingesting new 
members who have knowledge in the organisation who previously did not have it 
(Simon, 1991).  Thus, the process of organisational learning is not only a part of the 
organisational and managerial processes that we discuss in the dynamic capabilities 
concept, but it governs all parts of the development of competences/ capabilities.  
Organisational learning determines organisational and managerial processes as well as 
firm’s positions.  It also evaluates the path dependencies and technological 
opportunities of the firm.   
 
Therefore, understanding the dynamic capability and learning process in organisations 
is useful for analysing the development of the innovative capability of organisations 
in the public transport sector.  Using these ideas can lead to an understanding of how 
organisational behaviours change and react to changing environments (the regulatory 
reform) and how the organisations innovate.  Here we see that under the 
organisational learning, processes, positions, and paths are the key elements that 
determine innovation and shape behaviours of organisations in the public transport 
sector. 
 
If we look at the tendering case for example, the public transport manager has to 
adopt his organisational process to the tendering process that will take place in the 
area.  The manager needs to coordinate and integrate his knowledge from various 
departments of the company in order to prepare the offer.  How efficiently and 
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effectively internal coordination is achieved is crucial here.   In order to prepare the 
bid, the company’s assets must be realised.  The company positions are considered 
here as well.  Then the manager must understand the company’s paths, i.e. the past 
investments and the company practices in the public transport services.  The manager 
also needs to search for technical opportunities to be used in the tender.  All elements, 
i.e. processes, positions, and paths, are developed by using the company’s 
competence/capabilities which are built through the learning process.   
4.7 Innovative capability and learning in public transport 
This chapter focuses on the issue of institutional and organisational changes of the 
public transport sector.  In Europe, the public transport industry’s environment is 
perpetually evolving due to the regulatory reform.  Reform has a profound effect on 
both institutional and organisational aspects.  These institutional and organisational 
changes are of importance for innovation in the public transport sector.   
 
Regulatory reform is a process of change.  From a theoretical point of view, the 
orthodox economic approach plays an important part in analysing the effects of 
regulatory reform in public transport.  Furthermore, it plays a part in providing 
guidance for the decision-making required to design the regulatory framework.  
However, once regulatory reform takes place, the effects of the reform are not fully 
explained purely by the orthodox economic approach.  The reasons are twofold.  
Firstly, it assumes that technology is fixed, i.e. the economic agents face the same 
technological constraint and this constraint is fixed (either constant or gradually 
increasing over time).  This poses a serious question since technological development 
presents itself often unexpectedly.  Secondly, it presupposes that the economic agents 
in the system are unconditionally rational and also identical among the same group of 
agents.  However, in reality, the operators have their own strategies on how to 
organise the management and choose to adopt technology or specific techniques to 
ensure superiority in the market.  Concerning these two critics, an alternative theory is 
needed in which the technology, agent behaviour, and other endogenous forces can be 
studied explicitly. 
 
Evolutionary economics offers an alternative theoretical point of view to approaching 
the problem that we face in the process of regulatory reform.  In this chapter, we 
described three concepts that are necessary for the analytical framework of this thesis.  
The first concept is the theory of evolutionary economics.  This approach studies the 
process of the economics of technical change.  Nelson and Winter (1982) develop the 
evolutionary theory of a firm where organisational capabilities and behaviours of 
business firms operating in a market environment are addressed.  The firms in their 
evolutionary theory are motivated by profitability and engaged in the search for ways 
to improve their profitability, but the firm’s actions are not assumed to be profit 
maximising over well-defined and exogenously given choice sets (Mahoney, 2005).  
The second concept is the bounded rationality or problem-solving approach.  Simon 
(1997) suggests that man’s rationality is bounded: real-life decision problems are too 
complex to comprehend and therefore firms cannot maximise over the set of all 
conceivable alternatives.  The third concept is transaction cost economics.  
Williamson (1985) argues that firms, markets, and relational contracting are important 
economic institutions.  These economic institutions are also the evolutionary product 
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of a series of organisational innovations.  The transaction cost economic theory gives 
the general framework in which the regulatory reform takes part.  The main 
implication of these three concepts is that the firms do learn and develop their 
organisational capabilities in order to compete and survive in the market.  Innovation 
is the result of accumulated knowledge and improved capabilities.  The regulatory 
framework in which firms operate is the constraint that determines the firms’ 
innovative activities.  With these concepts, we can analyse the behaviour of a firm in 
the public transport sector with respect to the innovation in which firms engage.   
 
From this evolutionary perspective, we make three observations of the regulatory 
reform in the public transport sector.  The first observation is that economics agents in 
the public transport sector are rationally bounded.  The objectives of the public 
sectors, apart from the maximisation of social welfare, have been evolving and are 
partly influenced by political pressure at both local and national levels.  Public 
policies evolve partly due to changes in perceived demands and opportunities, 
changes that may result from the evolution of private technologies and market 
structures or from other identifiable shifts in objective conditions (Nelson and Winter, 
1982).  Second, institutional evolution is shaping the industry structure.  Regulatory 
reform means the government must set new rules of the game.  Consequently, the 
functions of each stakeholder would also be changed.  While the regulatory regimes 
are still evolving, the industry structure follows the evolution pattern too.  Third, the 
organisational responses to the regulatory reform vary significantly.  Empirical 
evidence in the past has shown that the operators who face regulatory reform 
contribute strategic responses.  An example is that, in the case of bus deregulation in 
the UK, there were three broad strategic responses: a defensive market for passenger 
transport, a market sensitive strategy of becoming more responsive to changing 
conditions within the overall travel market, and a commercial strategy of identifying 
opportunities for growth and/or diversification. 
 
Organisational changes play an important part in explaining the behaviour of actors in 
the public transport sector.  In order to respond to the changing environment, 
organisations search and acquire knowledge and capabilities to better adapt.  In this 
process, innovation is used as a strategic tool to achieve an organisation’s goal.  One 
explanation is that firms learn and develop their capabilities.  This relates to two 
important concepts to analyse the capabilities/competences development and learning, 
namely the dynamic capabilities and learning.  
 
Teece and Pisano (1994) define dynamic capabilities as the firm’s ability to integrate, 
build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to address rapidly changing 
environments.  Thus, dynamic capabilities reflect an organisation’s ability to achieve 
new and innovative forms of competitive advantage given the path dependencies and 
market positions.  Second, the concept of learning is the way in which an individual 
or organisation collects information and knowledge and processes it in order to 
improve performance.  The process of organisational learning governs all parts of the 
development of competences/ capabilities.  Organisational learning determines 
organisational and managerial processes as well as firm’s positions, and it evaluates 
the path dependencies and technological opportunities of the firm.   
 
Therefore, understanding the dynamic capability and learning processes in 
organisations is useful in analysing the development of the innovative capability of 
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organisations in the public transport sector.  Using these ideas can lead to an 
understanding of how organisational behaviours change and react to changing 
environments (the regulatory reform) and how the organisations innovate.  Here we 
see that under the organisational learning, processes, positions, and paths are key 
elements that determine innovation and shape behaviours of organisations in the 
public transport sector. 
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Chapter 5 Dynamic Capabilities and Learning: An 
Integrated Approach 
5.1 Introduction 
As stated in Chapter 3 and 4, innovation plays an important role in improving public 
transport services.  A recent example is the introduction of low floor buses where 
passengers who are disabled have better access to the bus and, others can board the 
bus more quickly.  Furthermore, the new technique and technology help the public 
transport operator to improve its performance both technically and financially.  For 
example, the computerised fleet management system allows the full utilisation of the 
fleet which can reduce cost significantly.  This takes place in a dynamic environment, 
where there are strong influences from regulatory reform of public transport services.  
Thus, regulatory reform in public transport sector affects the innovation in the sector.  
Innovation in public transport is also influenced by the behavioural changes of actors 
(authority, operator, and traveller) in the system.  The changes within the institutional 
setting (competitive tendering regime) create a new role for each actor, especially the 
interaction between authority and operator.  In the past, the public authority formally 
provided the public transport service through public-owned companies.  The authority 
is now changing its role to control and regulate positions.  Consequently, the 
involvement of private operators is increasing.  It is hoped that the shifting of this 
setting and interaction between authority and operator creates a new opportunity for 
innovation in the public transport sector.   
 
This chapter presents the analytical framework for the case study from an empirical 
standpoint.  Section 5.2 provides a background for regulatory change and innovation.  
More explicitly, this section deals with the dynamics of the tendering process and 
discusses how the learning process is positioned in the tendering process.  Moreover, 
the concept of innovative capability is introduced to analyse both the authority and 
operators’ ability to innovate.  Section 5.3 discusses the dynamic process of the 
tendering.  The section begins with an introduction to the tendering process and 
discusses the indicators for public transport analysis.  Then, the dynamic models for 
authority and operator are proposed.  Finally, Section 5.4 proposes the analytical 
framework for the case study, the innovative capability model. 
5.2 Regulatory changes and innovation: the dynamic process 
5.2.1 Regulatory reform in public transport: trend towards tendering 
We revealed in Chapter 2 that the public transport sector is in a transition phase.  The 
European Union (EU) has placed more emphasis on the public transport sector as a 
means to help the congestion problems.  The EU stressed that the public transport 
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must improve its efficiency, and the quality of the public services has to be improved 
at the same time.  In the course of this development, we see how regulatory reform is 
used as a tool to enhance both the efficiency of the public transport operations and 
quality of the public transport services.  Regulatory reform creates a wide variety of 
organisational forms in European public transport.  One of the common features is the 
growing involvement of the private sector in the public transport industry.  We could 
see this as a structural change in the public transport industry. 
 
Technological innovation plays an important role in the transport sector.  In Chapter 
2, we reviewed the transport mode concept (Zwaneveld et al., 1999), which partitions 
transport into three components: propulsion system, vehicle concept, and transport 
concept.  Additionally, we pointed out several implications of ICT in the transport 
sector.  Technology seems to be closely connected with the government interventions.  
 
Not only does technological development play an important role in public transport, 
but so do institutional and organisational developments.  The institutional aspect is 
introduced in the form of regulatory framework.  Regulatory reform then results in 
overall organisational change and the creation of new organisations due to the 
privatisation and deregulation processes.  Thus, it is crucial to understand the role of 
the organisational aspect in the presence of regulatory reform.  In general, there are 
three major actors involved in the public transport sector: government agency, public 
transport operator, and passenger.  Each actor has its goals, objectives, and 
expectations from the way public transport services are organised.  In this regulatory 
changing environment, we see each actor adapt its role in order to achieve its goals, 
especially government agencies and the public transport operators. 
 
The relationship between innovation and regulatory reform is complex.  In Chapter 2, 
we reviewed the complexity of both technological innovation and the institutional and 
organisational factors in the public transport sector.  Then we addressed two 
important issues: understanding innovation and understanding the behaviour of 
decision-makers in public transport.   
 
5.2.2 Innovation in public transport: a characteristic approach 
In Chapter 3, we explained the concept of innovation in public transport.  It is clear 
that identifying and classifying innovation is a difficult task given the 
multidisciplinary characteristics and various elements involved.  The essential 
perspective is to judge innovation in a broader view.  Furthermore, we have to look at 
innovation as a process.   
 
We adopt a broader definition of innovation which covers both technological and 
organisational aspects of innovative activities.  In Chapter 3, innovation in the public 
transport services is, in this thesis, described in the ‘twin characteristics’ approach.  
To recapitulate, this approach defines the public transport services as the result of 
three sets of characteristics: technical characteristics, competence, and service 
characteristics.  Using this approach, innovation can be classified into three groups: 
service innovation, pure technical innovation, and competence development.  Within 
these three groups of innovation, we classify the innovative capabilities of the public 
transport system into three categories, namely, innovative capabilities related to 1) 
infrastructure, 2) vehicle, and 3) service operation.   
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In Chapter 3, we also defined three levels of innovation to locate where innovation is 
positioned in time and space.  Level I includes an innovation that is new to the 
industry.  Often the technological advances have been proven in other sectors before 
they are introduced into a new sector.  Level II includes an innovation that is new to 
the country.  The boundary of the country is likely to bond some common 
characteristics.  Level III incorporates those aspects at the micro-level, i.e. this 
innovation is new to the area.  This level involves a diffusion of the establishing 
innovation. 
 
5.2.3 Institutional and organisational changes 
Regulatory reform brings about the institutional changes in the public transport sector.  
The new institutional setting that is influenced by the tendering process creates new 
roles for all actors (authority, operator, and traveller).  Particularly, the tendering 
process allows the authority to give the concession and create a competitive 
environment for operators in the public transport sector.   
 
Initially, the tendering process generally aims at cost reduction.  It is believed that 
tendering will reduce the subsidy of the public transport service.  Cost reduction is 
typically the result of productivity gain from the reorganisation of public transport 
firms.  However, the authority tends to pay more attention to the quality aspect than 
cost.  For example, there is a Quality Bus Partnership scheme that aims to increase the 
quality of public transport services.  In the Netherlands, the quality elements are 
explicitly indicated in the tender document.  This is in line with the observations we 
made in Chapter 4 about the economic agents in the public transport sector who are 
rationally bounded.  The public policies evolve due to the changes in public 
authorities’ interests.  The changes of the authorities’ attention from cost to quality are 
a good example of this observation.  
 
Innovation and regulatory reform have a close relationship.  Regulatory reform affects 
innovation in the public transport sector.  The tendering process creates a competitive 
situation in which the operators can propose their innovation through their offers.  
After the bidding process, the operator who loses the bid will be able to innovate 
again only in the next round of tender.  If we are introducing a new type of buses as 
an innovation, then the renewal of the buses must occur during the concession period.  
Innovation also plays an important part in achieving the aims of the tendering process.  
 
But, innovation still requires the cooperation between authority and operator.  
Although the tendering process tends to separate the responsibility between the two, 
they can still work together in practice to achieve a better quality of public transport 
services.  The challenge is how to manage this process that incorporates both 
competition (tendering) and innovation. 
 
5.2.4 Tendering process: an analysis of dynamic capability and learning 
Competitive tendering is now a common practice in public transport service.  Thus, 
this thesis focuses on the tendering process.  The main point is the effect of the 
tendering process on innovation in public transport services.  As the variety of 
reforms exists, the tendering may differ from case to case, and some areas are also an 
exception to the tendering.  
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There are several factors that influence the competitiveness of the tendering process.  
Among these various factors, the type of contract is the most crucial one.  In general, 
tender contracts in the public transport sector are divided by the risks that are 
associated with production cost and revenue of public transport services.  Using the 
division of those risks, the tender contracts can be divided into three categories: 
management contract, gross cost contract, and net cost contract.  A management 
contract is the contract that both production cost and revenue risks are borne by 
authority.  A gross cost contract is the contract that shows that revenue risk is borne 
by the authority and production cost risk is borne by the operator.  A net cost contract 
is the contract that exemplifies that both production cost and revenue risks are borne 
by the operator.  We will discuss in detail the types of contracts and their 
consequences in Chapter 6. 
 
In public transport tendering, the gross cost contract and the net cost contract are the 
most typical.  For example, local bus contracts in Sweden and Denmark use the gross 
cost contract.  In the Netherlands, Provincie Zuid Holland uses the net cost contract in 
their three concession areas.  The factors that determine the types of contracts vary in 
terms of the national legislation, the regulatory practice, and the national ticketing 
system. 
 
The type of contract employed could determine innovation in the public transport 
sector.  The risk division between authority and operator is the key that gives 
organisations the incentives to innovate.  For example, the management contract gives 
no incentive to the operator to improve the infrastructure and vehicle as the operator 
has no benefit from that investment.  The authority would initiate most of the 
innovation in this case.  Alternatively, if the operator is responsible for both 
production cost and revenue risks, then the operator might invest only in the revenue-
producing aspects.  In this case, the duration of the contract is also another important 
factor as the level of investment depends on the payback period from which the 
operator can benefit. 
 
As the tendering is a process with changing requirements over time, it requires an 
adoptive behaviour of all actors involved.  Therefore, we apply the concept of 
dynamic capability and learning that we described in Chapter 4 (Section 4.6) to the 
tendering process in the public transport sector.  The dynamic capability is the firm’s 
ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences to 
address rapidly changing environments.  Three elements are addressed: organisational 
and managerial processes, positions, and paths.  In our case, we consider that the 
regulatory reform (the tendering process) takes place in a rapidly changing 
environment.  Thus, the dynamic capabilities of the authority depend on their ability 
to use resources to organise the tendering process in order to achieve their objectives, 
and control the operation of public transport according to the contracts that are 
granted.  For operators, the dynamic capabilities include the capacity to use and 
integrate their resources to produce the bid that attains the tender, and also the ability 
to manage the operation of public transport that grants a profit according to the initial 
planning in the tendering process.  It should be noted that innovation is one of the 
strategic tools that operators use for winning the tender.  
 
We also need to treat the tendering process as a continuous development process that 
leads to organisational learning for both authority and operator.  Although a tender in 
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one area may depend on the length of the concession contract, there are several 
tenders in the surrounding areas that the authority and operators must work on 
simultaneously.  The information and knowledge that the authority and operators 
acquire during the tendering process are key elements in that they can learn from the 
tendering experiences.  We call this process ‘organisational learning’.  The process of 
organisational learning appears in all parts of the development of competences/ 
capabilities of the organisation.  The implication of this learning concept will be fully 
elaborated in Section 5.4. 
5.3 Towards an integrated approach 
5.3.1 Understanding the tendering process 
The introduction of innovation is a complex process.  The driving forces for 
innovation vary, and regulatory reform is one among them.  In fact, as we emphasised 
earlier, one of the objectives of reform is to stimulate innovation. 
 
We described the trend towards competitive tendering in public transport.  This trend 
is important in relation to the innovation in the sector since competitive tendering 
fosters the implementation of innovation during the tendering process.  In the past, 
competitive tendering aimed to reduce the subsidy of the public transport service.  
Thus, most operators procured various means of cost saving to compete in the tender.  
However, the recent trend in the Netherlands shows that the quality of the services is 
also an important aspect to which the public authority pays attention.  
 
To understand the mechanism behind this tendering process, we identify the 
objectives of the actors (authority and operator).  Under the tendering scheme, the 
authority has five objectives.  The first objective is the financial aspect.  This includes 
the cost of producing public transport services, the pricing system that users pay, and 
the subsidy to be paid to the operator.  The second objective is the vehicle and 
infrastructure aspect.  This is a technical element.  The public transport system must 
be well-equipped with appropriate technological components, both vehicle and 
infrastructure.  The third objective is the service quantity.  Authority must determine 
how the services will be provided to the public.  The main task is to ensure that the 
public has adequate access to the public transport.  The fourth objective is the service 
quality.  Authority must make sure that services provided by operators are 
satisfactory.  Finally, the external criteria are to be met.  There are several external 
criteria, such as the degree of competition (operators compete fairly in the tendering 
process), the transparency of the tendering process, the environmental effect of the 
system, the contribution of public transport service to the mobility of the area, and the 
fare collection and control.    
 
In some cases, the role of users is hindered by the authority in the tendering process.  
The authority tries to include the user in the development of public transport services 
and also the tendering process through a form of organisation such as a consumer 
organisation.  We might find that the authority consults the user representatives, 
usually through a local politician, and some public transport services are suggested 
from this process.  However, a formal means of instigating user participation in the 
development of public transport services is rarely found.   
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The private operator has a different set of objectives.  First, the operator, as a private 
company, seeks profit.  In the economic theory, it usually assumes that a private 
company is a profit maximisation firm.  Second, the operator tries to maintain its 
presence – or continuity – in the market.  In the tendering regime, a way to maintain 
the continuity is to win the tenders to keep the market share for the company.  Third, 
the operator also has to maintain its reputation in the market.  This reputation presents 
the perception of the public (and also authority) to the company.  It implies that 
having a good reputation may increase the chance to win a tender. 
 
An interesting and crucial element in this study is the process where these two 
different actors meet.  The interaction between authority and operator in this tendering 
regime occurs in the bidding process.  In general, the authority provides the program 
of demand and/or tender document to the potential bidders.  The tender document 
usually indicates the basic requirements and specifications of the services to be 
tendered.  It also indicates the winning criteria of the tender.  This is the crucial 
element operators must fulfil in order to win the tender.  By studying the tender 
document, operators prepare their offers.  At this stage, it should be noted that the 
innovation is often included in the offer to increase its appeal. 
 
It is important to note that every stage in the tendering process is a learning process.  
For the authority, the objectives evolve over time.  For example, if a subsidy is cut, 
the authority must decide how to allocate the funds sufficiently and determine what 
the consequences are for the service quantity and quality.  This ultimately leads to 
learning in the stage of preparing both the program of demand and the tender 
document.  The key element in a tender document is how to design the winning 
criteria which affect the offers from operators.  For the operator, the objectives are 
adjusted over time.  The operator’s strategy is laid out according to the current market 
situation.  Thus, both the profit and continuity must be considered before preparing 
the offer.  This is what we call learning to be competitive in the market.  Once the 
objectives of the operator are set, the offer can be prepared.  At this stage, the operator 
can learn from their experiences (both in the tender area from previous tenders and 
other tenders in other areas) to better prepare a competitive bid.  
 
Accordingly, a generic model for the tendering process can be constructed.  Figure 
5-1 shows this generic model for the tendering process. 
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Figure 5-1 Learning in the tendering process 
 
In Figure 5-1, we can see two separate processes.  The first is the tendering process 
design which is done by the authority.  The second is the bidding preparation which is 
done by the operator.  And these two processes meet at the awarding of the tender.  
This diagram simplifies the dynamic process inside each process; the details within 
each process (tendering process design and bidding preparation) will be discussed in 
more detail in Section 5.4. 
 
To identify the learning process in regulatory reform, we need to find indicators that 
show significant changes of the behaviour and knowledge of actors in the system.  
Hence, we will try to search for the indicator in turn. 
 
5.3.2 Searching for indicators 
In Chapter 3, we described the twin characteristics approach.  This approach allows us 
to analyse the public transport services in multi-dimensions, i.e. technical 
characteristics, competences, and services characteristics.  We can apply this 
approach to the tendering process to analyse the innovation and learning in public 
transport service for both the authority and operator. 
 
Authority: 
We can see that the five objectives we described in the previous section are 
comparable with the twin characteristics approach.  The technical characteristics 
consist of vehicle and infrastructure elements; the competence entails the financial 
aspect and service quantity element; and the service characteristics are the service 
quality element.  Table 5-1 shows the criteria of the authority according to the twin 
characteristics approach.  In this table, the five objectives – financial aspect, service 
quantity, vehicle and infrastructure element, service quality, and external factor – are 
defined in more detail. 
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Table 5-1 Indicators of the tendering process model for authority 
Criteria Element Main Factors Indicator/Measurement 
• Cost (price) 
• Subsidy 
• Service quantity 
• Service quality 
• Cost/vehicle km 
• Cost/vehicle hr 
• Subsidy 
• Cost (price) 
• Service quantity 
• Service quality 
• Subsidy/vehicle km 
• Subsidy/vehicle hr  
Financial aspect 
• Contract length • Tender design • Quality of services 
• Average contract length 
(years) 
• Frequency (time of 
day) 
• Financial aspect 
• Number of vehicles 
• Vehicle hr (DRU) 
• Vehicle km Service 
quantity • Network density 
(network design) 
• Financial aspect 
• Number of vehicles 
• Demand 
• Number of lines 
• Number of stops 
• Number of 
vehicles 
• Financial aspect 
• Number of vehicles 
• Demand 
• Number of vehicles 
• Accessibility of 
vehicle 
• Financial aspect 
• Low floor vehicles (service 
quality) 
• % of low floor vehicles 
• Vehicle 
maintenance 
• Financial aspect 
• Comfort and ride quality 
(service quality) 
• Customer satisfaction 
survey  
• Infrastructure 
investment 
• Financial aspect 
• Service quality • Infrastructure investment 
Vehicle and 
infrastructure 
element 
• Infrastructure 
maintenance 
• Financial aspect 
• Service quality 
• Customer satisfaction 
survey 
• Reliability 
• Investment in scheduling system 
• On board vehicle 
communication  
• Punctuality 
• Customer satisfaction 
survey 
• Accessibility 
• Low floor vehicles 
• Network density 
• Stop/station density 
• % of low floor vehicles 
• No. of lines/km2 
• No. of stops/km2 
• Comfort and ride 
quality 
• Average age of vehicles 
• Vehicle maintenance 
• Driver behaviour 
• Other services 
• Average age of vehicles 
• Customer satisfaction 
survey 
• Safety and security • On board security camera • Extra security personnel 
• No. of crime incidents 
• Reports from passengers 
• Ticketing system 
• Point of ticket sale/payment 
• Ease of ticketing system 
• Integrated ticket 
• Channels of ticket sale 
• Degree of integrated ticket 
• Service integration 
• Integrated ticket 
• Service coordination 
(transfer/connection) 
• Degree of integrated ticket 
• Point of transfer/connection 
Service quality 
• Travel information 
• Information at stop/station 
• On board information 
• Pre-trip information 
• Point of information at 
stop/station 
• No. of buses with on board 
information 
• Competition 
• Transparency of the tendering 
process 
• Appropriate contract detail 
• Appropriate contract length 
• Considerable number of bids 
• Average number of bids 
• Environmental 
friendly • Low emission vehicle 
• No. of low emission 
vehicles 
• Contribution to the 
mobility of the 
area 
• Financial aspect 
• Number of vehicles 
• Demand 
• Congestion level 
External criteria 
• Fare collection/ 
control 
• Fairness of the system 
• Social security • No. of fare dodgers 
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Table 5-1 presents the criteria (objectives), elements, main factors, and 
indicator/measurement that the authority must assess in the tendering process.  We 
will see that there are considerable overlaps between objectives, elements, and factors.  
This shows the interdependent nature of the public transport characteristics which we 
will discuss in turn. 
 
Here we will discuss the financial aspect which consists of three main elements: cost, 
subsidy, and contract length.  Cost and subsidy have a close relationship.  The factors 
that determine the cost and subsidy are the service quantity and service quality.  The 
indicators in this case are usually defined as a cost or subsidy per production unit, 
which is a vehicle kilometre or vehicle hour.  Another factor, contract length, plays a 
crucial part in the tender as it determines how long the operator can make a profit 
from any innovation implemented during the concession.  This implies how much 
effort the operator should make for the innovation.  If the contract length is long, it is 
possible for the operator to invest more for an innovation as they have a greater time 
frame to operate to make their profit. 
 
Service quantity is a crucial element in the tendering process.  The service quantity 
can be categorised into two elements: frequency and network density.  Frequency 
represents the availability of services throughout the day, which directly affects the 
waiting time of travellers.  Frequency determines the financial aspect (more frequency 
means more subsidy) and the number of vehicles in use.  Although the frequency can 
be indicated in terms of average frequency (e.g. there is a bus every 10 minutes), 
when there are variations between routes or operating times, this might divert the 
average frequency value.  In practice, the usual indicators for the frequency are unit of 
production, i.e. vehicle hour and vehicle kilometre.  Network density also determines 
the financial aspect and the number of vehicles in use.  It is usually represented by the 
network length, number of lines, and number of stops.  The issue of frequency and 
network density, which is known as network design or service design, is essential in 
the tendering process.  In practice, sometimes the authority is accountable for network 
design, but sometimes the network design is the operator’s responsibility.  This 
responsibility determines the incentives to innovate for either the authority or 
operator.  For example, if the operator is responsible for the network design, it is 
likely to design a network that maximises its profit regardless of the level of service 
quality (if the authority does not control the service quality). 
 
Vehicle and infrastructure aspects are related to the twin characteristics approach and 
innovative capability we discussed in Chapter 3.  They are technical characteristics.  
In terms of the vehicle aspect, we define the number of vehicles, accessibility of the 
vehicles and vehicle maintenance as key elements.  As we discussed in Chapter 3, 
authority can propose or give an incentive for an operator to invest in a new vehicle.  
The investment in new and/or innovative vehicles depends largely on what benefits 
the operator will obtain from this investment.  One of the key incentives to invest in 
new vehicles is the contract length, i.e. a longer contract would give more incentive to 
invest in new vehicles.  The authority is usually responsible for the infrastructure, but 
some financial incentives can be used to collaborate within an infrastructure 
investment.  An example of such cooperation is the Quality Bus Partnership scheme 
in the UK.   
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In reference to the service quality, we list seven elements that can be considered: 
reliability, accessibility, comfort and ride quality, safety and security, ticketing 
system, service integration, and travel information.  As we can see, the service quality 
has a close relationship with the vehicle and infrastructure elements we discussed 
above.  Higher service quality is usually the result of vehicle and infrastructure 
improvements.  For example, the accessibility is improved  due to the use of low floor 
buses.  The travel information is improved due to the investment in information and 
communication technology. 
 
Finally, we have external criteria that influence the way the authority prepares the 
tendering process.  In this category, we define four elements: competition, 
environmental concern, contribution to mobility, and fare collection and control.  The 
authority must produce a fair and transparent tendering process which provides 
appropriate information for the potential bidders.  The competitiveness in the 
tendering process should bring about the better efficiency.  For the environmental 
concern, the European Commission has already set a standard for any public authority 
to follow in terms of emission, and they leave it to the authority to enhance and 
promote the use of better, environmental-friendly buses.  The contribution to the 
mobility of the area is also important for the authority, especially in an area where 
there is a congestion problem.  Most authorities prefer the increase in modal share of 
public transport.  Lastly, the fare collection and control is related to the fairness of the 
system and social security issues. 
 
Operator: 
In the previous section, we suggested three objectives for the operator: profitability, 
continuity, and company reputation.  Table 5-2 summarises the criteria, elements, 
main factors, and indicator/measurement for the operator.  
Table 5-2 Indicators of the tendering process model for operator 
Criteria Element Main Factors Indicator/Measurement 
• Operating cost 
• Labour cost 
• Energy cost 
• Overhead cost 
• No. of staffs 
• Wage 
• Energy cost 
• Vehicle cost • Vehicle investment • No. of new vehicles • Cost of new vehicles 
• Maintenance 
cost 
• Vehicle maintenance cost 
• Vehicle cleaning ocst 
• Garage 
• Cleaning contract 
• Infrastructure 
• Infrastructure investment 
cost 
• Infrastructure access cost 
• Type of infrastructure 
• Cost of infrastructure 
• Cost 
• ICT 
• Vehicle scheduling 
• Automatic Vehicle 
Location (AVL) 
• Dynamic travel 
information 
• Cost of ICT equipments 
Profitability 
(Financial 
aspect) 
• Revenue 
• Subsidy 
• Type of contract 
• Ticket sales (for net cost 
contract) 
• Total subsidy 
• Total revenue from ticket 
sales 
Continuity • Total market share 
• Number of operating 
concessions 
• Contract length of 
operating concessions 
• Number of operating 
concessions 
Reputation • Company reputation • Performance • Number of operating concessions 
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First and foremost, the main objective for the operator is profitability.  The operator, 
as a private company, seeks profit.  There are two main elements that determine the 
profitability of the firm, namely cost and revenue. 
 
In terms of cost, it can be further divided into four elements: operating cost, vehicle 
investment cost, maintenance cost, and infrastructure cost.  Operating cost is a major 
cost of the public transport operation.  Factors that determine the operating cost 
include labour, energy, and overhead costs.  The main factor is the labour cost.  The 
type and condition of the vehicles determines the vehicle investment cost and 
maintenance cost.  The infrastructure cost depends on infrastructure investment and 
access costs.  The infrastructure investment and access costs are very important 
factors for railway transport;  but, for the bus sector, the infrastructure investment and 
access costs seem less important.  However, there is an increasing amount of attention 
being paid to the investments in information and communication technology in the 
bus sector, so it might be relevant in this case. 
 
Revenue is determined by three factors: subsidy, type of contract, and ticket sales.  
The subsidy and type of contract relate to the financial aspect of the authority (we 
discussed previously).  The ticket sale relates to the demand that the operator 
forecasts, given the information available to the operator. 
 
Continuity of the business is also an important criterion of the public transport 
operator.  The operator tries to maintain its presence in the market.  In the tendering 
regime, a way to maintain continuity is to win the tenders to keep the market share for 
the company.  Also, the length of concession is another factor that determines the 
continuity of the company.  For instance, a long contract-length concession can be 
vital to the operator in that the operator might seek less profit (than it usually asks for) 
in order to win this concession. 
 
Finally, the operator also has to maintain its reputation in the market.  This reputation 
presents the perception of the public (and also the authority) to the company.  It 
implies that a good reputation may increase the chance to win the tender.  In general, 
the reputation is represented by firm performance, which is usually indicated by how 
the company operates according to the contractual agreement.  This is closely related 
to the way authority monitors the public transport operation. 
5.4 Dynamic capabilities and learning: an analytical framework 
The analytical framework for this thesis is divided into two parts: the dynamic process 
of tendering and the innovative capability analysis.  For the dynamic process of 
tendering, we set a framework to analyse the decision process of the actors (authority 
and operator) in the tendering process.  The emphasis of this framework is on the 
effects of varying elements within the system that change over a period of time.   
 
5.4.1 Tendering as a dynamic process 
In Chapter 4, we discussed the bounded rationality theory and noted that actors in the 
public transport sector are rationally bounded.  The implication to this notation is that, 
in a real world situation, actors face a complex decision whereby the criteria for the 
selection are not clear, and are changing over time.   
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An example illustrating the evolving criteria over time is the criteria that the authority 
wants to achieve from the tendering process.  Figure 5-2 shows an example of the 
objective-constraint representation of the authority. 
 
Financial aspect
Quantity Quality
 
Figure 5-2 Objective-constraint for authority 
 
In Figure 5-2, the authority has three criteria: financial, quantity, and quality aspects.  
These three aspects are interrelated.  However, the emphasis that authority gives to 
each factor evolves over time.  First, the authority might consider the financial aspect 
as most important since an increasing subsidy in public transport services concerns 
the central government.  Thus, tendering is introduced as a part of the subsidy cutting 
measure.  However, a lower subsidy should not deter the service quantity that is 
offered.  Consequently, it might happen that, given constant quantity, the service 
quality might decrease.  But later, we see the increasing concern on the quality of 
public transport.  So, the balance between quantity and quality is required.  At this 
stage, financial aspects are relegated to constraint rather than objective.  However, 
when it comes to practice sessions, financing public transport is still problematic.  
This leads us to a new set of framework where the financial and service quality 
aspects can be combined together. 
 
We discussed that in the tendering process there are two separated processes: the 
tendering process design, and the bidding preparation (see Figure 5-1).  In the 
subsequent section, we will propose the dynamic models of these processes. 
 
Dynamic model of the tender design of authority: 
There are a number of criteria and elements that the authority must take into account 
when preparing for the tendering process.  Based on the criteria, elements, and factors 
that we discussed in Section 5.3.2 (Table 5-1), we can construct causal relationships 
between the criteria and elements for this tendering process design as follows.   
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Figure 5-3 Dynamic process model of tendering for authority 
 
Figure 5-3 shows the complex causal relationships between each factor associated 
with the tendering process.  We can see that one element may have several causal 
relationships with other elements and factors: a change in one element will most 
likely affect other elements.   
 
For illustrative purposes, we identify a phenomenon that could be found in practice: 
the knock-on effect1.  The low floor bus could be considered as an example of the 
knock-on effect.  The introduction of low floor buses results in better accessibility 
which in turn decreases boarding time.  Shorter boarding time means that buses can 
increase their travel speed.  The high speed results in both higher frequency and lower 
production cost.  In terms of quality, low floor buses increase not only the 
accessibility, but also the comfort and ride quality as well.   
 
Additionally, we will address an ambiguous causal relationship we will address.  An 
example is the relationship between contract length and the number of bidders.  On 
the one hand, longer contracts may attract more bidders, as it is financially attractive. 
On the other hand, longer contracts imply more investment wherein only big 
operators can be involved. So there are a few operators involved in the bid. 
                                                 
1 This is similar to the Mohring effects (Mohring, 1972).  This Mohring effects state that as transit 
frequencies increase, wait times decrease, demand increases, and transit frequencies can increase again. 
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In sum, the dynamic model of tendering design allows us to analyse the cause-and-
effect relationship of the changes in the public transport system.  In practice, detailed 
information regarding all elements may not available, but at least we can see the trend 
in the development of the tendering design that changes over time in a specific area. 
 
Dynamic model of bidding preparation for the operator: 
In the dynamic model of bidding preparation, we focus on how the operator develops 
and learns in preparing the offer through the repeated tendering process.  Figure 5-4 
shows a detail of this model. 
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(Estimated)
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Subsidy
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Unsuccessful 
offers
Successful 
offers
Company 
market share
Preparation of the offers
Internal learning 
(with delayed)
Internal learning 
(with delayed)
External 
knowledge
External learning
(with or without delayed)
 
Figure 5-4 Dynamic model of tendering decision for operator 
 
In this model, we focus on how the offer is constructed as well as what the result of 
the tender is.  These two elements represent the main interest of the operators in 
submitting the bid.  In order to prepare the offer, the operator uses both internal and 
external information and knowledge.  The most important internal information is the 
operation design.  Within the operating design, cost and revenue must be estimated.  
As previously discussed, the major element of operation cost is the labour cost.  
Further, the investment in new vehicles may play a part in the offer, which incurs an 
investment cost.  In terms of revenue, the subsidy and revenue from ticket sales must 
be estimated.  The service design, together with innovation in infrastructure, vehicle, 
and service, will form an offer; the result of the tendering process will indicate 
whether the bids are successful or unsuccessful. 
 
All in all, the decision of the operator when preparing the offer is dependent on the 
experiences gained from previous tenders and also the external knowledge acquired 
during the preparation of the offer.  This process, the dynamic capability and learning, 
was discussed in Chapter 4.  We will expand on the issue of dynamic capability and 
learning in the next section. 
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5.4.2 Dynamic capability and learning 
Dynamic Capability: 
The analysis of technical and organisational capabilities is needed for both authority 
and operator.  Table 5-3 gives examples of those capabilities in the public transport 
sector. 
Table 5-3 Examples of technical and organisational capability 
 Technical Organisational/Competence
Authority 
• Infrastructure planning 
and development 
• System integration 
• Tendering process 
• Monitoring 
• Service coordination 
Operator 
• Vehicle development 
• Vehicle scheduling 
• Information technology 
• Tendering process 
• Managerial capability 
• Marketing 
 
The technical capability of the authority lies mostly in the planning and development 
of infrastructure.  For the organisational capability, the authority needs to design the 
tendering process.  Furthermore, it must also monitor the services that the operator 
provides and coordinate these services in case there is more than one operator 
working in the system. 
 
For the operator, the technical capability lies mostly in vehicle development.  The 
utilisation of vehicles is the key in this capability development.  For the organisational 
capability, two elements are important.  First, the operator must be capable enough to 
handle the tendering process well.  Second, managerial capabilities are needed to 
organise public transport services. 
 
Learning: 
Organisations should exemplify their learning capability from their experiences in the 
tendering process.  This learning is essential for the innovation because organisations 
need this opportunity to learn and acquire the knowledge to improve the way they 
manage the public transport services.  Learning can be acquired both through the 
organisations own experiences, internal learning, or other experiences, external 
learning.  This learning element may be considered as the dynamic capabilities that 
we defined in Chapter 4 because it is based on the organisation’s ability to integrate 
the internal and external knowledge (and competences) to address the rapidly 
changing environment of the tendering process. 
 
In public transport organisation, internal learning occurs among both authority and 
operator.  The internal learning of the authority includes both technical and 
organisational/ competence elements.  For example, the authority needs to plan the 
infrastructure from their own experiences based on the demand for public transport in 
their area.  For the organisational/competence element, in the tendering process, the 
authority learns how to make the tender document from the previous round of tender.  
An example for internal learning of the operator is that, for companies that operate in 
more than one concession, they have an advantage in that they can learn from their 
previous tenders.  The knowledge acquired includes both technical and organisational 
aspects. 
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External learning is the way in which an organisation acquires information and 
knowledge externally to integrate and develop technical and organisational 
capabilities.  External learning is often costly, especially when another external 
organisation is involved, such as the use of a consulting firm. 
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Chapter 6 Regulatory Reform in the Public Transport 
Sector: European Experiences 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to review the European experiences on regulatory reform in public 
transport, with a focus on the tendering process.  Moreover, this chapter will provide 
background information for the case studies in Chapter 7 and 8. 
 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows.  Section 6.2 reviews the current 
development of the regulatory reform of local public transport in European countries.  
In this section, we will emphasise on the issue of the tendering process and the 
organisational developments of the public transport sector.  Section 6.3 examines the 
development of the regulatory reform in the Netherlands.  The results of the tendering 
process to date are discussed.  In Section 6.4, the regulatory reform in the railway 
sector is examined.  The railway sector in the United Kingdom (UK) and the 
Netherlands is discussed in detail as well.  Finally, Section 6.5 summaries the chapter. 
6.2 Regulatory reform of local public transport in European countries 
6.2.1 Introduction 
The regulatory framework of the European public transport sector has changed 
significantly over the last 15 years.  The move towards the Single European Market 
(SEM) within the European Union (EU) is a particularly important catalyst for this 
acceleration (Button and Costa, 1999).  The SEM was a necessary condition for the 
creation of liberal transport markets to meet the overall objectives of exploiting 
national comparative advantages in the production of goods and services within 
Europe.  Additionally, it compelled the need for the co-ordination and planning of 
transport infrastructure provision.   
 
The EU realise the importance of the public transport sector and it is attempting to 
increase the efficiency of the system through the introduction of competition.  We 
have witnessed in the past 15 years that the public transport sector, both the bus and 
railway, has gone through radical changes in terms of its organisational structure. 
  
In this section, we will look briefly at the development of local public transport in 
European countries.  We will begin with the development of the UK bus reform as 
Britain was considered the first country that began the regulatory reform in the public 
transport sector. 
 
97
 Innovation and Regulatory Reform in Public Transport 
 
 
98
6.2.2 The UK bus deregulation  
The UK led the way in significantly deregulating the urban (and rural) public 
transport market when it introduced the 1985 Transport Act (Button and Costa, 1999).  
This act set the following objectives for the local bus service in Great Britain: to 
abolish quantity controls (road service licensing) on local bus services outside 
London; to restrict subsidy payments in support of public transport for local services 
to unprofitable routes required to meet social need; and to make fundamental 
structural changes to public sector bus ownership (McGuinness et al., 1994).  What 
was most vital about this regime was that the operators could determine fares and 
services on a purely commercial basis, with the exception of those areas that were not 
commercially feasible, and where socially necessary services were needed. 
 
There are a number of studies that discuss the effects of deregulation in the UK.  The 
main effects of deregulation were the excessive capacity, the decreased quality of bus 
services, and the increase in real fares (White, 1995).  It was the lower quality of 
services and the increase in real fares that resulted in the sharp decrease of bus 
ridership.  The increase in bus-kilometres seemed to have had very little effect on 
demand (White, 1997).  There are several service dimensions, not only the subsidiary 
service, but also infrastructure and vehicle investment, in which both operators and 
local authorities have to take a responsibility (Mackie, 1999).  Investment in bus 
infrastructure dropped dramatically after the year of deregulation as a result of both 
‘the effective divorce of bus operation from social planning and reforms of funding 
mechanisms by government’ (Huntley, 2001).  Thus, there was an effort to stimulate 
the investment in this gap.  After several years, trial projects had been introduced and 
the Quality Bus Partnerships (QBPs) or Quality Partnerships (QPs) scheme emerged. 
 
The concept of the QP was introduced in the early 1990s.  Since then, the QP has 
been widely accepted by the local governments.  In this scheme, QPs exist through 
partnerships at the local level involving bus operating companies, local authorities, as 
well as Passenger Transport Executives and Authorities (PTE/PTA).  There are two 
different types of QPs: Quality Bus Partnerships (QBPs) and Quality Contract 
Schemes (QCSs).  The difference between these two is that QPs are based on the 
voluntary partnerships (i.e. do not legally bind by any legislation), whereas the QCSs 
are based on statutory contract which ensures that both authorities and operators are 
legally responsible for any commitments that are made in the contract.   
 
In terms of the effects of deregulation on innovation, Ongkittikul and Geerlings 
(2006) observed that the UK deregulation presented a radical movement of the 
innovation.  The deregulation had profound effects on all three innovative 
capabilities1, i.e. infrastructure, vehicle and service operation. The innovation in 
infrastructure and vehicle development seemed to have had negative effects, such as 
the lag of investment in infrastructure and the decrease of the average vehicle age. 
But, the result of that lag of investment led to the introduction of the Quality Bus 
Partnerships to improve the infrastructure and vehicle qualities, as we discussed 
earlier.   
 
It is also worth mentioning that the tendering of the bus services in London differs 
from the rest of the UK.  In London, the provision of service networks is tendered out 
                                                 
1 See the definition of the innovative capabilities in Section 3.5. 
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to private operators, but the specification of the type of service to be provided is 
determined by the regulatory authority (London Transport).  The detail of the London 
tendering regime will be discussed in Chapter 7. 
 
6.2.3 Current regulatory developments of local public transport 
There is a variety of regulatory frameworks of local public transport in the European 
countries.  The different local public transport modes (e.g. bus, tram, or underground 
railway) also have different organisational structures.  We have seen many public 
transport organisations undergo the privatisation process.  The aim of privatisation is 
to pave the way for the public transport market into the competitive industry.  In 
Europe, there is an increasing trend towards the tendering in the local public transport 
service.  Competitive tendering seems to be the most effective approach to 
introducing competition into the public transport sector.   
 
Preston (2001a) proposes a simplified classification of three broad types of regulatory 
and organisational structure in public transport usually found in European countries.  
The first category is regulated, public-owned monopolies (‘the classic model’).  This 
was the dominant organisational form in Western European countries.  However, 
there may be some cities that have variations on this regulatory structure.  Moreover, 
many countries opt to move towards the second model, the tendering or limited 
competition model.  There are a number of variants in this category.  The two most 
common are the Scandinavian model, based on minimum cost tenders at the route 
level; this is the dominant form in Sweden, Denmark, and Finland, and the French 
model (outside Paris), based on network management contracts (Preston, 2001a).  The 
third category is a deregulated, free-market model.  This is the dominant form in the 
UK outside London.   
 
The MARETOPE Project (2002) surveys the recent development of the regulatory 
system of local public transport in European countries.  Table 6-1 shows the summary 
of this development.  The project observes four main groups of countries that share 
common characteristics with regard to the transition stage and political targets.  The 
first group is a highly deregulated and privatised market.  The UK is the only country 
in this group.  The second group comprises countries in transition towards 
competition by public tendering.  Countries in this group are the Scandinavian 
countries, the Netherlands, France, and Italy.  The third group consists of those 
countries with a mixed public/private regime without public tendering.  Countries in 
this group are Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Greece, Portugal, and Spain.  The 
final group is made up of countries in the decentralisation and privatisation process. 
Countries in this group are mostly Central European countries such as Hungary, 
Poland, and the Czech Republic.   
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Table 6-1 The regulatory system of local public transport in European 
countries 
Group Deregulated and free market 
Transition towards 
tendering 
Mixed public/private 
regime without 
tendering 
Decentralisation and 
privatisation process 
Countries UK Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, France 
Germany, Italy, Portugal, 
Belgium, Luxemburg, 
Austria 
Central European 
countries 
Similarities 
• Private initiative 
• Deregulated 
market 
• Tender for loss 
making lines 
• Public tendering 
introduced 
• Not yet everywhere 
applied 
• Not (yet) 
privatisation of 
(some) public 
companies 
• Not (yet) transition 
towards tendering 
• Financial problems 
at local and regional 
level 
• In privatisation 
process 
Differences/ 
Exceptions  
• Scandinavian 
countries are 
advances in the 
tendering process 
• The Netherlands 
and France are still in 
the middle of 
transition 
• Belgium 
experiments with 
sub-tendering of 
operations 
• Austria and Italy 
have already 
legislation to 
introduce compulsory 
tendering 
• Poland and 
Hungary started with 
tendering 
experiments 
 
Source: MARETOPE Project (2002) 
 
It should be noted that it is not easy to classify the countries into a certain group of 
regulatory regimes as within many countries a number of different regulatory forms 
coexist.  Especially in the transition countries, many tendering styles are implemented 
during a trial period.  Sometimes, after the first round of tendering, the authority may 
lock-in to a certain type of tender style and, as a result, it would take years to change 
the tender style as the contract usually runs for at least a couple of years. 
 
6.2.4 The competitive tendering contract 
In the competitive tendering regime, the type and detail of the contracts have several 
consequences on the competition and the operation of the public transport services.  In 
this section, we will discuss two issues: types of contract and contract length. 
 
In general, contracts in the public transport sector are usually categorised by the risks 
associated with production cost and revenue of the public transport services.  
Typically, risks are shared between authority and operator in either the public or 
private sector.  Figure 6-1 shows three types of contracts that are usually found in the 
public transport sector.  These types of contracts are the management contract, gross 
cost contract, and net cost contract.  The management contract is the contract stating 
that both production cost and revenue risks are borne by the authority.  The gross cost 
contract is the contract that warrants that revenue risk is borne by the authority, and 
production cost risk is borne by the operator.  The net cost contract maintains that 
both production cost and revenue risks are borne by the operator. 
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Figure 6-1 Risk division of public transport contracts 
Source: MARETOPE Project (2000) 
 
However, the risk division explained in Figure 6-1 is only a simplified description.  In 
reality, there are many intermediate forms of contracts that can be seen.  Either 
product cost risk, revenue risks, or both can be shared by the authority and operator 
which results in new forms of contracts.  Furthermore, the authority can give an 
incentive for the operator to improve their performance that, again, results in new 
forms of contracts.  
 
Various types of contracts are used in the tendering regimes.  For example, Sweden 
and Denmark (Scandinavian model) use the gross cost contract.  Another example is 
the French model (which dominant in France outside Paris) which is based on 
network management contracts.  In such cases, the authority normally provides the 
vehicles and related infrastructure, and firms compete for the right to manage these 
resources (Preston, 2005).  In the Netherlands, Provincie Zuid-Holland uses the net 
cost contract in their three concession areas (Hoeksche Waard, Goeree Overflakkee; 
Drechtsteden, Albasserwaard, Vijherenlanden; and Rijn- Bollenstreek, Midden 
Holland), whereas Provincie Groningen uses the gross cost contract approach.  For 
regulatory purposes, it seems that each country should use the same contract type, but 
this is not always the case.  The reason for this is that the local authority has an impact 
on the way the contract is arranged.  Then, the government gives some freedom 
through legislation to the local authority to design what is best for an area.   
 
Another important issue in public transport contracts is the contract length.  Contract 
length varies throughout Europe (MARETOPE Project, 2002).  It ranges from a few 
years to 30 years.  Among the many reasons for this variation are the investments that 
are associated with the contract.  A high investment contract tends to have a longer 
contract duration such as a BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) contract.  Table 6-2 gives 
an example of the maximum contract duration in several countries. 
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Table 6-2 Contract duration of the local public transport tender 
Country Type of contract Contract duration 
The Netherlands Publicly tendered contract Maximum 6 years 
   
Standard contract 5 – 15 years 
France 
Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contract Up to 30 years 
   
Concession 8 years 
Germany 
Publicly tender contract (practice) 2 – 5 years 
   
Austria Publicly tendered concession 10 years 
   
Norway Publicly tendered concession 5 years 
   
UK Generally (some exceptions) 5 years 
   
Current management contract 5 years 
Belgium 
Discussion to prolong the duration to 8 years 
Source: MARETOPE Project (2002) 
 
Thus far, there is no generalisation of what the duration of the contract should be.  
Originally, it was suggested in the proposal for the regulation at the EU level 
(European Commission, 2000), that the contract should be no longer than 5 years, but 
with some exceptions for the investments that are made apart from the normal 
operation.  However, this duration was too short and, later, there was a new proposal 
(European Commission, 2005) recommending that the duration of the bus contracts be 
8 years, and for railways, 15 years.  In sum, we can conclude that the contract 
duration should and will vary, as the investment conditions of individual operations 
differ significantly.  
 
6.2.5 The presence of multinational companies 
The regulatory reform of the public transport sector creates a wide variety of 
organisational forms in Europe.  One of the common features is the growing 
involvement of the private sector in service production through either deregulation or 
competitive tendering regimes.  Furthermore, one of the biggest changes in the 
industrial environment has come in the form of the merger wave and market 
concentration (Mackie, 2001).  In the UK bus sector, the big five companies (see 
Table 6-3 below) control more than two-thirds of the national market.  Additionally, 
as a result of the privatisation of British Railway in the mid 1990s (which effectively 
let out the passenger train operations)2, there is also a sign of market concentration.  
Roberts (2003) summarises the degree of concentration within, and between, the 
railway and bus sectors in Britain in Table 6-3 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 See Section 6.4.2 later in this chapter. 
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Table 6-3 British railway franchises and bus market shares 
Rail franchises  
(no. of franchises) 
Bus market share in 2002 
(%) Ownership form Company 2001 2003 Great Britain London 
National Express 9 9 5.6 0.2 
Stagecoach 
plus joint venture with Virgin 
2 
2 
2 
2 15.7 15.4 
First Group 3 4 22.5 16.6 
Arriva 2 1 14.9 18.4 
Major UK 
transport 
groups 
Go-Ahead 
plus joint venture with Keolis 
1 
1 
1 
2 7.5 17.5 
CGEA (Connex) 2 1 <0.5 2.3 
John Laing 1 1 - - 
Sea Containers (GNER) 1 1 - - 
GB Railways 1 0 - - 
Other 
NedRailways/Serco 0 1 - - 
Source: Roberts (2003) 
 
In addition, Velde (2003) observes that the growth of private involvement has led to 
the development of major international operators.  These operators have originated 
almost exclusively from Britain and France in the past decade.  Table 6-4 shows the 
summary of the major players of public transport in Europe. 
Table 6-4 Major players of public transport in Europe and global players 
Number of countries it operates 
Company Origin Inside Europe 
(including its origin) Outside Europe 
Arriva The UK 7 0 
Concordia Norway 3 1 
Connex France 15 4 
First Group The UK 1 2 
Keolis France 6 1 
National Express The UK 1 3 
Stagecoach The UK 1 3 
Transdev France 5 1 
Source: UITP (2003) 
 
We can conclude that the British deregulation of the local bus outside London led to 
the appearance of new private operators: Arriva, First Group, Go-Ahead and 
Stagecoach.  In France, the new European trend of public transport tendering led to 
the expansion of French operators: Connex, Keolis and Transdev.  Thus far, the most 
active company is Connex, which operates in 15 countries in Europe and 4 countries 
outside Europe.  We also see that the majority of multinational companies are of both 
French and British origin.  Three companies that are active in the European countries 
are Arriva (the UK), Connex (France), and Keolis (France).  It should be noted that 
three other British companies (First Group, National Express, and Stagecoach) do not 
operate in mainland Europe, but rather in North America (Canada and the US). 
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6.3 Situation of regional public transport in the Netherlands 
6.3.1 Public transport in the Netherlands 
The overall picture of transport in the Netherlands is provided in Table 6-5.  As we 
can see, the dominant transport mode is the passenger car.  It accounts for around 
three quarters of the total distance travelled by the Dutch population.  The train and 
bicycle are equally important in the Netherlands.  They account around 6-8% of the 
market share each mode.  
Table 6-5 Total distance travelled by the Dutch population by mode of 
transport 
Mode 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Car 107 (74.2%) 
125.9 
(75.1%) 
131.4 
(74.7%) 
141.3 
(75.7%) 
141.1 
(75.6%) 
141.6 
(75.5%) 
144.2 
(76.1) 
146.1 
(76.5%) 
Train 7.7 (5.3%) 
11.2 
(6.7%) 
13.0 
(7.4%) 
15.0 
(8.0%) 
15.4 
(8.3%) 
15.5 
(8.3%) 
15.5 
(8.2%) 
14.5 
(7.6%) 
Bus/Tram and 
Underground 
6.4 
(4.4%) 
6.9 
(4.1%) 
8 
(4.5%) 
7.5 
(4.0%) 
7.5 
(4.0%) 
7.6 
(4.1%) 
7.2 
(3.8%) 
6.6 
(3.5%) 
Bicycle 12.2 (8.5%) 
13.5 
(8.1%) 
13.7 
(7.8%) 
13.1 
(7.0%) 
13.1 
(7.0%) 
13.1 
(7.0%) 
13.0 
(6.9%) 
13.9 
(7.3%) 
Walking 3.8 (2.6%) 
3.9 
(2.3%) 
4.1 
(2.3%) 
3.9 
(2.1%) 
3.9 
(2.1%) 
4.0 
(2.1%) 
4.0 
(2.1%) 
3.9 
(2.0%) 
Other 7.1 (4.9%) 
6.3 
(3.8%) 
5.8 
(3.3%) 
5.8 
(3.1%) 
5.6 
(3.0%) 
5.7 
(3.0%) 
5.5 
(2.9%) 
6.0 
(3.1%) 
Total 144.2 167.7 176 186.6 186.6 187.5 189.4 191.0 
Note: Distance travelled is in billons of kilometres.  The modal shares are in brackets.  
Source: AVV Transport Research Centre (2004) 
 
Within the public transport sector, there are two main modes: bus, tram, and metro; 
and train.  Bus, tram, and metro are the main modes of urban and rural public 
transport, whereas the train is important for inter-urban and intercity transport.  We 
see that the trend towards bus, tram, and metro utilisation has declined since 1995.  
But the trend in train use increased in 1990 and has declined slightly since 1995.  It 
should be mentioned that the increase in train use in the early 1990s was the result of 
the introduction of the student public transport card (Openbaar Vervoerkaart voor 
Studenten) in 1991.  This card provided free use of public transport (any mode at any 
time) for Dutch students3. 
 
In sum, the public transport situation in the Netherlands is causing some concern as 
the market shares for train and bus, tram, and metro are declining.  Next, we will look 
at the policy development of the public transport sector in the Netherlands.  
 
6.3.2 The Passenger Transport Act 2000 
In general, public transport in the Netherlands is organised separately between 
regional public transport and railway transport.  For regional public transport by bus, 
tram, metro and lightrail, regional authorities have been responsible for organising the 
public transport services since January 2001, when the Passenger Transport Act 2000 
(Wet personenvervoer 2000: Wp2000) came into force (UITP, 2003).  There were 35 
                                                 
3 However, due to the fact that students had excessively used public transport for personal reasons 
rather than for educational purposes, which was the original intention, the second generation of the 
student card was introduced in 1994 to restrict the use of this pass. 
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regional authorities responsible for regional public transport.  These authorities were 
the 12 provinces (Provincies), 7 regional corporations of municipalities in the larger 
urban regions (so-called kaderwetgebieden), and 16 middle-large cities 
(Vervoersautorteiten Openbaar vervoer Centrum gemeenten: VOC-gemeenten).  
However, from 1 January 2004, the responsibility for the regional transport for these 
16 cities was transferred to the 12 provinces.  Thus, there are 19 public transport 
authorities that are active at the moment (see Annex 2 for the full list of these 
authorities). 
 
The introduction of the Wp2000 has been the greatest development in Dutch public 
transport in recent years.  This reform’s aim was twofold: more attractive public 
transport services (especially in areas worst hit by congestion) and an improvement in 
cost recovery ratios (Velde, 2003).  This act decentralised the power to provinces and 
regional authorities, and competitive tendering of public transport services for 
concessions was introduced gradually.  A time scale of 6 years was chosen in which, 
at first, some 35% of all bus concessions were to be tendered (Hermans and Stoelinga, 
2003).   Table 6-6 shows the progress of this reform process. 
Table 6-6 The progress (including planned) of the concessions put for tender 
in the Netherlands 
 2002 2003 2004 2005* 2006* 2007* After 2007* 
Provincie1 8 4 6 10 6 0 2 
Kaderwetgebieden2 1 1 1 1 8 5 6 
VOC-gemeenten3 3 0 4 4 1 2 2 
Total no. of concessions 12 5 11 15 15 7 10 
Cumulative no. of concessions 12 17 28 43 58 65 75 
Cumulative % (n=75) 16% 23% 37% 57% 77% 87% 100% 
Note:  1 Province 
2 Regional corporations of municipalities in the larger urban regions 
3 Middle-large cities 
* Estimated figures 
Source: Appelman et al. (2004) 
 
The tendering process was subject to an evaluation by the Dutch Parliament in 2005.  
The result of the evaluation was positive4, and the Parliament agreed to go ahead with 
the plan that all bus concessions as well as tram and metro concessions had to be 
tendered by the year 2007.  However, there was an exception to the big four 
municipally-owned companies (GVB of Amsterdam, RET of Rotterdam, HTM of the 
Hague, and GVU of Utrecht) in that a separate plan should be discussed. 
 
As a result of this act, there has also been reform among the public transport operators 
in the Netherlands.  Prior to this act, before the mid 90s, almost all of the regional bus 
transport operators in the country were provided by subsidiaries of a national bus 
company, VSN (later called Connexxion).  After that, Connexxion sold its northern 
subsidiaries to Arriva (the UK public transport company) and its southern subsidiary 
to Connex (the French transport company) which led to a situation where there were 
three large companies active in the bus transport market.  Note that in the 
Netherlands, Connex took over the BBA which operated in the Brabant area.  To 
avoid confusion between Connex and Connexxion, Connex is usually referred as 
                                                 
4 See Section 6.3.4 for the detail of the evaluation of the Wp2000. 
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BBA/Connex or just BBA.  The current market structure will be discussed in Section 
6.3.4. 
 
The Wp2000 also covers the issue of the labour force in the public transport sector.  
Employees who were directly involved in transport provision (e.g. bus drivers) would 
transfer to the new concession holder if their current employer lost the concession.  
Employees who were not directly involved in transport operation would transfer to the 
new concession holder proportionately to the size of the concession (Velde and 
Leijenaar, 2001).  Existing labour agreements and conditions of employment continue 
to apply to all staff transferring to a new employer.  These provisions are valid for a 
period of ten years. 
 
Thus far, the main implication of the reform in the Dutch public transport market is 
the tendering process that began in 2002.  As we can see in Table 6-6, the tendering 
process has been implemented gradually, and we could say that the Dutch public 
transport market is now in an emerging stage.  The tendering procedure that is used in 
the Netherlands is complicated and is still evolving.  Next, we will discuss the details 
of this tendering process. 
 
6.3.3 The tendering process 
In the Netherlands, the new Passenger Transport Act 2000 (Wp 2000) created a need 
for more information and knowledge regarding the concession procedure.  The 
tendering process requires considerable practical information.  Most local authorities 
had no previous experience in the tendering process, thus local authorities attempted 
to gather the information via various channels, such as external consulting firms or 
government agencies.  One of the organisations that provides knowledge for the local 
authorities is Centrum Vernieuwing Openbaar Vervoer (CVOV)5.   
  
CVOV (2003) develops the framework for the tendering procedure, which is called 
‘the concession cycle’.  The concession cycle consists of ten steps as follows. 
1. Formulating transport policy 
2. Formulating public transport policy 
3. Definition of the concession 
4. Determining the program of demand 
5. Determining the tender document 
6. Invitation to tender 
7. Selection procedure 
8. Awarding the concession 
9. Managing the concession 
10. End of the concession 
 
The relationship of each step is shown in Figure 6-2 and each step is discussed in turn. 
 
                                                 
5 From January 1st, 2005, the CVOV changed its name to Kennisplatform Verkeer en Vervoer (KpVV). 
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Figure 6-2 Concession cycle 
Source: CVOV (2003) 
 
Step 1: Formulating the transport policy 
During this first step, the public transport authority formulates the transport policy 
and stipulates the place of the public transport service.  At this stage the public 
transport identifies the available instruments to realise the policy objective.  Thus, 
public transport can contribute to the prevention of undesirable car use, which results 
in congestion in the urban areas.  However, there are also other employable 
instruments.  For this reason, it is necessary to assess and harmonise the different 
political perspectives. 
 
Step 2: Formulating the public transport policy 
Once the role of public transport is determined in the transport policy as a whole, the 
goal for the public transport policy can be developed.  The public transport authority 
must realise that this policy is composed of several elements.  Not only are the public 
transport services important, but also other elements such as the infrastructure, the 
parking spaces, spatial activity, accessibility, and information of the services.  The 
public transport also concerns a number of strategic choices that are related to the 
actors of the public transport system, namely passenger, operator, and public 
authority.  It concerns the definition of the division of the responsibility between 
government and public transport companies, and the involvement of the passenger 
(user).  Also, at this stage, the public transport authority must make choices 
concerning the invitation to tender in later stages. 
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The following steps (Step 3 to Step 8) of the concession cycle describe the process of 
the preparing and awarding of the concession.  Other aspects of public transport 
policy follow parallel routes.  
 
Step 3: Definition of the concession 
This step aims to identify which means of transportation to use, in which areas, and 
how long the concession will be.   
 
Step 4: Determining the programme of demand 
The public transport authority establishes the programme of demand (Programma van 
Eisen: PvE) to reflect the objective of the concession. Also, it is stipulated in the PvE 
which selection and awarding criteria one will use to decide who wins the concession.  
Developing and determining the PvE asks not only for calculated substantive 
assessments, but also careful internal and external processes.  
 
Step 5: Determining the tender document 
The tender document has been aimed to fulfil the public transport policy to which the 
concession can contribute.  It is built on the PvE in more detail. 
 
Step 6: Invitation to tender of the concession 
Once the tender document is ready, the formal tendering process begins according to 
the European Directive.  At this stage, the public transport authority organises a so-
called pre-bid meeting in which potential operators can ask their questions. 
 
Step 7: Selection procedure 
Assuming that a number of potential operators will respond to the invitation to tender 
by submitting their offers, the selection procedure begins.  On the basis of the 
selection criteria described in the tender document, the public transport authority 
chooses the best offer.   
 
Step 8: Awarding the concession 
After the tender is awarded, the winning operator will be invited to discuss the 
concession details.  The discussion does not cover what is in the tender document 
which is already fixed.  Rather, the discussion aims for cooperation between the 
public transport authority and the new operator.  Also in this step, the public transport 
authority grants the concession officially.  
 
Step 9: Management and monitoring of the concession  
From the moment that the concession starts, the public transport authority has a new 
role.  The authority will monitor and evaluate the concession according to the 
concession agreement discussed in the tender document. 
 
Step 10: End of the concession 
The maximum length of concession is six years.  It is important that the transfer of the 
contract from the end of the previous contract to the new one is well-planned so the 
continuity of the public transport services is retained.  In the case of a change in 
operator, new fleets are an important issue because often the new operator cannot 
prepare new fleets (if it is offered in the bid) in such a short period of time.  
Furthermore, the transfer of personnel is also a critical issue.  The transfer of the 
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backroom staff is a difficult task as some staff is not full-time.  When this occurs, the 
transfer cannot take place.  This issue is to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.  
 
The tendering process is a time-consuming process.  CVOV suggests that the length 
of the tender process should be about 18 months (from Step 3 to Step 9).  From the 
defining of the concession (Step 3) to determining the program of demand (Step 4) 
takes around 6 months.  Then, from determining the program of demand to awarding 
the concession should be around 6 months.  Once the decision is made in terms of 
who wins the concession, there should be a gap of 6 months for the operator to start 
the concession.  Clearly, the entire tendering process must be planned in advance, and 
it requires considerable resources and knowledge.  
 
In practice, the given guidelines for the tendering process are just suggestions.  There 
is considerable variation.  The tendering process of the train concession seems to be 
longer than that of the bus, especially from the awarding of the concession and the 
start of the concession.  Although the average time gap between the awarding of the 
concession and the start of the concession is around 7 months, there are considerable 
differences in various circumstances depending largely on the authorities’ experience 
in the tendering process.  Table 6-7 shows the average time gap between the awarding 
and start of the concession in the Netherlands.  As the train concession tends to 
announce the winning bid well in advance, this table excludes train concessions from 
the calculation.   
Table 6-7 Average time gap between awarding and start of the concession 
Gap between awarding and start of 
concessions (months) 
 No. of 
concessions Average Min. Max. 
Concessions started in 2002 12 4.5 2.1 7.7 
Concessions started in 2003 6 7.1 4.8 11.2 
Concessions started in 2004 8 6.2 5.2 8.0 
Concessions started in 2005 7 7.3 4.0 9.4 
Source: KpVV (personal communication) and KNV (2005) 
 
As we can see, the year 2002 shows a rather short time between the awarding of the 
tender and the day that the concession starts.  This may due to the fact that most 
authorities had not much experience in tendering process.  But after 2003, this time 
gap increased to the level that CVOV suggested, i.e. around 6 months.  The main 
problem if this time gap is too short revolves around the preparation of the new 
operation, especially when the operator must bring in new vehicles.  For instance, in 
one of the tender areas in the Provincie Zuid-Holland, the time gap between the 
awarding and start of the concession was too short, so the new buses were not ready 
by the time the concession started.  Thus, the services commenced with very old 
buses.  This issue will be examined in more detail in the case study in Chapter 7. 
 
6.3.4 The current market situation and the tendering process 
The tendering process started in 2001 and the concessions were in operation at the 
beginning of 2002.  Regional public transport authorities are responsible for the 
tendering process for public transport services in its areas and for the subsidy it 
receives from the government.  According to a summary report by the Koninklijk 
Nederlands Vervoer (KNV, 2005), there were 29 concessions (only bus concessions) 
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that put out for tender between 2002 and 2004.  It should be noted that KpVV 
identifies 67 concessions to be put out for tender.   
 
With respect to the results of the implementation of the Wp2000, the Evaluation 
Report of the Wp2000 (Groenendijk et al., 2005) summaries the developments since 
the implementation of the Wp2000 in January 2001.  It stated that the original 
objectives of the Wp2000 were: 1) to increase the growth of public transport use, and 
2) to increase the cost recovery ratio of the public transport operation (i.e. ratio of the 
revenue to the total cost of the public transport services).  First, the report found that 
both objectives had not been realised according to their assessment.  The expected 
growth in the public transport use has not been achieved in either the tendering or 
non-tendering areas.  The explanation for this difficulty is that the factors of the 
public transport use lie outside the influence of the Wp2000, such as the growth of car 
ownership and demographic and economic developments of the economy.  Second, as 
a result of a decrease in public transport use, the cost recovery of the public transport 
operation has not yet been fulfilled.  This development came mainly from the fact that 
the passenger growth has declined, and thus revenues also decreased. 
 
Nevertheless, the Evaluation Report also revealed positive developments in some 
aspects.  In some areas, the use of public transport was increased, especially in the 
large cities.  There were a number of public transport infrastructure projects that 
started to operate in the past years, thus these projects contributed to the growth of the 
public transport use.  Furthermore, the production costs of the public transport 
services have dropped considerably since the implementation of the Wp2000.  In the 
areas where the authorities put the public transport services out for tender, the 
production costs, in terms of cost per vehicle-kilometre, were reduced by 10 – 20%.  
Up until the beginning of 2005, there were only 40% of the (potential) bus 
concessions that were put out for tender.  Therefore, further efficiency improvements 
can be expected (Groenendijk et al., 2005). 
 
A major concern in the tendering process is the market concentration problem.  The 
Wp2000 aims to stimulate competition in the sector.  However, the number of bidders 
in the tender was rather small.  In many cases, the tender leads to the competition 
between three big companies namely Arriva, BBA-Connex, and Connexxion.  
Currently, these three big companies dominate the bus tendering market.  These 
companies are usually referred as ABC companies.  These three companies account 
for around 90% of the bus tendering market in the Netherlands.  Table 6-8 shows the 
market situation. 
Table 6-8 The current situation of the bus tendering market in the 
Netherlands 
2002 2003 2004 
Company No. Concessions 
won 
No. Concessions 
won 
No. Concessions 
won 
Total concessions 
(Market share) 
Arriva 5 2 1 8 (28%) 
BBA-Connex 3 2 2 7 (24%) 
Connexxion 3 3 5 11 (38%) 
Others 1 0 2 3 (10%) 
Total 12 7 10 29 (100%) 
Source: Calculated from KNV (2005) 
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There were some issues regarding the concession.   The authority that gives the 
concession can decide whether the network design (and development) should be done 
by the authority itself or by the operators.  However, in most cases, the network that 
was agreed upon in/during the concession cannot be changed.  This hinders the 
innovation in the sector (Groenendijk et al., 2005).   
 
In the tendering process, the Program of Demand (PvE) and the tender documents 
(Bestek) are important.  The Evaluation Report suggested that the tender documents 
were described in every detail.  This left little room for the operators to come up with 
new ideas, i.e. limiting the innovative capabilities of the operators6.  Furthermore, 
there was a problem with the transparency of the tendering process.  One might 
expect that, in general, the information of the tendering process should be made 
available to the public.  However, this was not the case.  The offers from bidders were 
kept confidential because of the commercial sensitivity which, in fact, decreases 
transparency of the system.  This limits the creativity and knowledge development in 
the bus industry.   
 
In addition, the Evaluation Report stated that the position of individual travellers 
weakened after the implementation of the Wp2000.  Under this new law, the authority 
and operator can change the public transport services (usually timetable of the 
services) after consulting with the consumer organisations.  However, it was criticised 
that all user groups of the public transport were not proportionally represented in the 
consumer organisations.  This limits the degree of user participation in the public 
transport services.   
 
6.3.5 Fares and revenue allocation 
Since 1980, the Netherlands has maintained a national system for urban and regional 
public transport fares (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2003).  With the 
exception of most train trips: this covers virtually the entire public transport network.  
The main advantage of this system is that the passengers can travel throughout the 
country using the same ticketing and pricing system.   
 
Pricing is based on the number of geographical zones ‘crossed’, which are uniform 
over the same ticket category (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2003).  A ‘zone’ 
(the Netherlands is split into 2,200 zones) is on average about 4 to 4.5 kilometres in 
cross-section.  A ticket entitles a passenger to travel on all forms of public 
city/regional transport operating within the zones paid for.  It should be noted that, 
especially in urban areas, there might be several transport companies operating.  
There are several types of tickets that are used in this system.  The first type is the 
period ticket which is valid for one-week, one-month or one-year.  The second type is 
the ‘strippenkaart’ (‘strip card’), which is a presale ticket.  The strip card or strip 
ticket, sold from numerous outlets across the country, consists of a number of parallel 
strips that are validated, generally by the passengers themselves, in a special 
stamping-machine on the tram or bus.  There is also an onboard strip ticket, which is 
sold on the bus and tram, but this ticket costs more than the presale strip ticket.  In 
addition, outside the national system, different fares may be applied by regional 
                                                 
6 However, our case studies (see Chapter 7) observe different developments.  This might due to the fact 
that our case studies were conducted in 2005, whereas the Evaluation Report used information that was 
largely collected in 2004. 
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authorities; this usually happens in a restricted area and is valid within only one 
transport company. 
 
The important issue is the allocation of revenue from the national ticket sales to the 
public transport companies.  The basic principle of this allocation is that it should be 
in proportion with the service delivered.  The farebox is allocated to transport 
companies per sales area and per ticket group – or to be slightly more specific to 
public transport concessions.  A regular national survey, called the WROOV system, 
was introduced to determine the allocation ‘keys’ (Ministerie van Verkeer en 
Waterstaat, 2003).  This shows the percentage of the farebox that needs to be 
allocated in each concession.  
 
Over the coming years the Dutch government and regional transport companies will 
introduce a ‘smart’ or ‘chip’ card system (in Dutch: Chipkaart) for the entire public 
transport network (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2003).  This will put an end 
to the current national payment system based on paper tickets.  It will also put an end 
to the allocation issue of sales proceeds.  Each smart card will provide detailed and 
accurate information on all journeys actually made. 
 
The development of the smart card began in 2002 when the five public transport 
companies jointly established one company, Trans Link Systems, to implement a 
single payment system using the smart card technology.  The five public transport 
companies are: Connexxion, GVB (Amsterdam), HTM (The Hague), the NS (Dutch 
Railway Company) and the RET (Rotterdam).  The pilot phase of the implementation 
of this smart card involved RET, NS, and Connexxion (rural bus in Rotterdam area).   
It was trialled in mid 2005.  However, there were technical problems that delayed the 
implementation, and the system has yet to be implemented.  
 
The smart card will change the way Dutch people pay for the public transport services 
if it is implemented.  Clearly, the benefit of the ‘zone’ system is that it is easy to 
understand and it reduces the onboard payment or fare collection.  However, the smart 
card could replace this system easily.  In fact, currently, most concessions, that are in 
operation or are being put out for tender, include the possibility of the implementation 
of the smart card as a part of the concession agreement.  The smart card will also 
make the all-in-one ticketing system possible.  At the moment, travellers who use 
both bus and train must have two separate tickets7 for each mode.  The smart card will 
be used for all public transport in the Netherlands.  Furthermore, there have already 
been discussions on how pricing can be changed if the smart card is implemented.  
With this smart card technology, it might be possible to change the pricing system 
from zone-based to another system, such as distance-based or a combination between 
distance-based and area (i.e. urban or rural areas).  Also, it might be possible to utilise 
the peak-hours pricing, which does not currently exist in the Dutch public transport8.  
But, the conclusion to those issues remains to be seen until the smart card system is 
eventually implemented. 
                                                 
7 Although it is possible to have an annual ticket for both bus and train.   
8 There is a discount card for off-peak travellers, but it is available only for the railway system.  
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6.4 Railway reform in European countries 
6.4.1 Railway reform in European countries: an overview 
European railway has changed dramatically in the past decade.  The privatisation 
process had been an issue for the railway in most countries in Western Europe.  
Furthermore, the European Directive 91/440, on the accounting separation of 
infrastructure and operation, also brought about the industrial restructuring in the 
European railway sector.  There is a considerable difference between these two 
sectors in terms of infrastructure and services.  Recently, this distinction has become a 
major topic of discussion, especially in the railway industry in which much 
organisational analysis is presented in many studies. 
 
Nash and Toner (1999) suggest three possible alternative models of organisation in 
the railway industry, namely the vertically-integrated railway, the internal market 
approach, and the vertically-separated railway.  First, the vertically-integrated railway 
is the traditional model of railway operations, with one organisation controlling all 
infrastructures as well as operating and marketing functions.  In this model, ownership 
can be either public or private, and there is the possibility of horizontal separation into 
area or regional monopolies.  In the second model, the internal market approach, 
railways are separated into different businesses for the purpose of offering products to 
the consumer; these business purchases service from an operating department 
organised on regional and functional lines.  The businesses are generally defined in 
terms of market sector – freight, long distance passenger, regional passenger, etc. – so 
any competition between them for traffic is minimal.  Originally, those businesses 
operated on a financial basis, and operating costs were allocated to the business 
sectors on the basis that each sector was responsible for the costs of assets (including 
infrastructure) and staff who were the prime users, while other sectors using those 
assets paid the avoidable costs.  By the early 1990s, this form of organisation had 
developed to the extent that the maintenance management and operation of the 
infrastructure as well as rolling stock was being disaggregated to the sectors.  This led 
to the establishment of the third model, the vertically separated railway.  Under this 
model, the entire infrastructure is the property and responsibility of one owner (either 
publicly or privately owned).  Providers of train services are required to pay for 
access to the infrastructure.  European legislation now requires separation, at least to 
the extent of separate accounting, so that there is the possibility for a degree of open 
access to the infrastructure for particular types of services. 
 
Using the separating infrastructure and services in railway industries framework, 
Brooks and Button (1995) find a surprisingly large number of alternative options 
around the world.  The examples of these options are grouped into 5 broad categories 
as in Table 6-9 below. 
Table 6-9 Options of vertical disintegration of railway industries 
Options Countries of example 
Public Operations/Private Track USA 
Private Monopoly Operations/Public Track New Zealand and Argentina 
Private Competitive Operations/Public track UK 
Public Operator/Public Track Monopoly Sweden 
Private Operators/Private Partnership Owned Track Canada 
Source: Brooks and Button (1995) 
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Railway infrastructure is normally owned by the public sector; however, the USA and 
Canada may be seen as exceptional cases.  As indicated before, European legislation 
now requires separation of infrastructure and services.  Nonetheless, in practice, each 
country has different characteristics.  Monami (2000) analyses the institutions of 
European passenger rail industries, and the results of this study are shown in Figure 
6-3. 
 
Germany
The Netherlands
Access also for 
regional
traffic operations
Access limited
to int'l services
for int'l groupings
Institutional
Separation
Organisational
Separation
Separation 
of accounts
Absence of
separation
National
monopoly
Tendering 
of all traffic
operations
Type of vertical
separation
Form of 3rd
party access to 
national networks
Finland
Denmark
Austria
France
Intaly
Portugal
Spain
Belgium
Greece
Luxembourg
Irland
Sweden Great-Britain
 
Figure 6-3 Synoptic presentation of the deregulation of passenger rail in the 
EU 
Source:  Monami (2000) 
 
Most EU Member states now have accounting separation between operations and 
infrastructure (NERA, 2004).  However, the difference remains in terms of the 
infrastructure charging.  The extent to which infrastructure charges cover total 
infrastructure costs varies between countries with a number of countries, including 
Denmark, Finland, and Sweden levying them on a marginal cost basis.  For the 
Netherlands, up until the year 2001, infrastructure charges were set at zero.  The 
government (through ProRail, the Dutch rail infrastructure company) has now 
introduced charges and plans to increase them steadily until they cover the marginal 
costs caused by different traffic types by 2007 (NERA, 2004). 
 
It should be noted that a possible form of competition of service operations in the 
railway industry is the competitive tendering, i.e. competition for the market.  Direct 
competition (i.e. on-track competition where railway tracks are open to all operators 
to operate at will subject to certain requirements) is not found in practice in the 
passenger railway sector, although it is common in the freight transport sector.  As we 
can see, European passenger railways are now in a transition period, especially in 
forming the organisational structure.  The nature of these characteristics and the 
Chapter 6 - Regulatory Reform in the Public Transport Sector: European Experiences  
 
 
115
proper control of government can be designed to gain better efficiency from the 
railway sector. 
 
Empirical studies of rail tendering are less common than bus (Preston, 2005).  In 
many European countries, experience in the tendering process is limited with the 
exception of the UK and Sweden.  In the UK, the tendering (or franchising) process 
has taken place for the second time already.  Table 6-10 shows an example of 
empirical cases of railway tendering in European countries.  Preston (2005) indicates 
that the European tenders (except in the UK) are relatively short (5 years or less), the 
winning firm has no responsibility for infrastructure, and fare and service levels and 
other aspects of performance are heavily prescribed by the government.  In Sweden, 
local authorities usually bear the revenue risk, and hence, local tenders are awarded 
on a net cost basis.  Germany has a combination of gross and net cost contracts.  
Elsewhere (the Netherlands, Switzerland, and more recently, Denmark), net cost 
contracts are norm.  However, it should be noted that some tenders can have a long 
contract period (up to 15 years) if there is a considerable investment in the tender.  
For example, the tender in Provincie Groningen and Friesland is 15 years long 
because there is an investment in new rolling stocks9. 
Table 6-10 Example of empirical cases of European passenger rail tendering 
Case Study
UK
Germany – 
VRR (two routes)
5-15
Length
(years)
3-8
No. of 
bidders
Major 
investment
Varies
Maintenance of 
rolling stock
Rolling stock 
companies
(ROSCOs)
Maintenance of 
infrastructure
Track authority
(Railtrack now 
Network Rail)
Contract 
specification
Passenger service 
requirements
Fares
Operating 
performance
Award criteria
Net cost
5 3/1 No Franchisee Track authority
(DB AG)
Fares
Timetable 
performance
Gross cost
Germany – 
VRS (three routes)
15 3/2/2 No Franchisee Track authority
(DB AG)
Fares
Timetable 
performance
Net cost
Sweden Jönköping 
Länstågen
4 2 No Franchisee (heavy 
maintenance by 
JLT)
Track authority
(Banverket)
Fares
Timetable 
performance
Gross cost
The Netherlands – 
Groningen and 
Fryslân
15 2 Yes Franchisee Track authority
(ProRail)
Fares
Timetable 
performance
Net cost
The Netherlands – 
Gelderland
5 3 No Franchisee Track authority
(ProRail)
Fares
Timetable 
performance
Net cost
 
Sources: Preston (2005), KNV (2005), and case study in Chapter 8 
 
6.4.2 Railway reform in the United Kingdom 
The UK rail industry has been radically reformed since the beginning of the 
privatisation process in 1994. The details of this process are well-documented 
elsewhere10. Briefly, the industry was restructured into potentially profitable units that 
have been privatised by outright sale, and non-profitable units that have been 
privatised by franchising. The potentially profitable units are the rolling stock leasing 
companies (ROSCOs), Railtrack, the infrastructure supply companies (ISCOs) and 
the trainload freight companies. However, a unique aspect of British Rail’s 
                                                 
9 This case will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8. 
10 See, for example, Kain (1998) 
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privatisation was the transfer of businesses to the private sector that had little chance 
of making a profit, i.e. the passenger rail industry (Preston et al., 2000). This transfer 
process has become known as franchising. 
 
The passenger rail industry was split up into 25 Train Operating Companies (TOCs) 
which were franchised in a series of trenches administered by the Office of Passenger 
Rail Franchising (OPRAF) between February 1996 and March 1997. For each rail 
franchise, OPRAF sets minimum service standards (the passenger service 
requirement: PSR) in terms of frequency, speed, the controlling of certain fares, and, 
in some cases, other criteria such as reliability and crowding.  Generally, PSR was set 
close to the levels of service before privatisation for franchises received a large state 
subsidy, but more freedom is given to operators where the franchise is closer to 
commercial viability. 
 
Since the privatisation process has finished, the structure of the railway organisations 
has been changed several times.  At this moment, we can indicate five groups of the 
key stakeholders in the UK rail industry (Steer Davies Gleave, 2003b).  Figure 6-4 
provides an overview of the key stakeholders. 
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First North Western 
Trains
Railway 
Undertakings
 
Figure 6-4 Key stakeholders in the UK rail industry 
Source: Steer Davies Gleave (2003b) 
 
In the first group, there are two stakeholders from the government.  The first 
stakeholder, who is particularly important, is the Strategic Rail Authority (SRA).  
SRA provides overall strategic direction for the UK’s railways.  It is responsible for 
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the franchising process and manages the franchises.  Furthermore, it develops and 
sponsors major infrastructure projects.  It should be noted that, in 2001, the SRA took 
over the functions of the ORPAF.  Another stakeholder, Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE), is concerned with promoting compliances with health and safety laws as well 
as developing and reviewing railway health and safety policies (Steer Davies Gleave, 
2003b). 
 
The second group is the regulatory bodies.  There are three regulatory bodies in the 
UK’s railway system.  The first regulatory body is the Office of the Rail Regulator 
(ORR).  The ORR is responsible for ensuring fair and equitable treatment for 
operators of trains, stations, networks and depots, and for protecting the public 
interest in holding the privatised, infrastructure provider of the rail network to account 
for its performance and stewardship of the network, and in doing so, to determine its 
income for the delivery of its customers’ and funders’ reasonable requirements (SRA 
and ORR, 2002).  Second, the Office of Fair Trading is an independent competition 
and consumer protection authority, and works concurrently with the ORR.  The third 
is the Rail Safety and Standards Board (RSSB), which is a non-profit company owned 
by the railway industry.  It is independent of any single railway company, and leads 
and develops the long-term safety strategy of the industry.   
 
For railway infrastructure, Network Rail owns, manages, improves and upgrades the 
UK railway infrastructure.  It should be noted that in 2001 RailTrack was forced into 
administration, and then the government transferred the ownership of the UK railway 
infrastructure to Network Rail.  It is a company limited by guarantee, and is a private 
sector organisation which operates as a commercial business but without shareholders 
(Steer Davies Gleave, 2003b).  For the capacity allocation, the ORR has responsibility 
for primary allocation of track capacity, which is exercised through the approval of 
Track Access Agreements between railway operators and Network Rail.  Network 
Rail has responsibility for secondary allocation of track capacity, which is exercised 
through timetable provisions (Steer Davies Gleave, 2003b). 
 
In reference to the TOCs, since the first round of the franchising process in 1996-1997 
up until 2001, there were 25 franchises that had been settled down so that most 
franchises are currently operated by the big five British transport companies.  In the 
first round of the franchising process, the contracts were awarded in lengths between 
5 and 15 years with a median of 7.25 years (Preston et al., 2000).  Longer franchises 
(i.e. 15 years contracts) were awarded on the condition that investment in rolling 
stock would be undertaken.  Because some franchises had a short contract length, they 
have already ended.  Thus, there was a refranchising process in 2002 and 2003.  
Consequently, there were some changes in TOCs.  Table 6-11 shows the development 
of the British railway franchises. 
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Table 6-11 British railway franchises in 2003 
Rail franchises (no. of franchises) Ownership form Company 2001 2003 
National Express 9 9 
Stagecoach 
plus joint venture with Virgin 
2 
2 
2 
2 
First Group 3 4 
Arriva 2 1 
Major UK 
transport groups 
Go-Ahead 
plus joint venture with Keolis 
1 
1 
1 
2 
Total of the major UK transport groups 20 21 
CGEA (Connex) 2 1 
John Laing 1 1 
Sea Containers (GNER) 1 1 
GB Railways 1 0 
Other 
NedRailways/Serco 0 1 
Total no. of franchises in the UK 25 25 
Source: Roberts (2003) 
 
The majority of the franchises’ holders are in the five major UK transport groups.  
This is in line with our previous discussion regarding the concentration of the public 
transport operators in the UK public transport market.   
 
6.4.3 Railway reform in the Netherlands 
Since 1995, the Dutch national railway company (Nederlandse Spoorwegen) has been 
split up into several companies.  NS Passengers and NS Cargo are the train operating 
companies for passenger and freight respectively.  NS Rail Infrastructure 
Management, NS Traffic Control, and Railned deal with track management and 
planning and control of rail traffic.  These three companies are subsidiaries of the NS 
Holding, but act under the authority of the government (Schaafsma, 1997).  However, 
in 2003, these three companies were reorganised into one company, ProRail. 
 
The key stakeholders in the Dutch rail industry can be divided into five groups (Steer 
Davies Gleave, 2003a).  Figure 6-5 provides an overview of the key stakeholders.   
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Figure 6-5 Key stakeholders in the Dutch rail industry 
Source: Steer Davies Gleave (2003a) 
 
There are two government bodies responsible for the railway in the Netherlands.  
First, the Ministry of Transport and Water Management (V&W) is responsible for the 
Netherlands transport policy covering traffic by road, rail, air and sea.  In the rail 
sector, it is responsible for passenger transport concessions, legislation and regulation.  
The ministry is the sole shareholder of ProRail and NS Passengers.  Second, the 
Regional authorities (see Section 6.3) are responsible for some railway lines under the 
Passenger Transport Act 2000 that are not to be part of the core NS Passengers 
network.  Five railway concessions are in operation at the moment. They are: 
Zutphen/Hengelo/Oldenzaal, Zutphen-Apeldoorn, Arnhem-Tiel, Friesland/ 
Groningen/Nedersaksen (Groningen case: Chapter 8), and Ede/Wageningen-
Barneveld-Amersfoort. 
 
There are three regulatory bodies concerning the railway sector.  First, Inspectie 
Verkeer en Waterstaat (IVW), Divisie Rail (The Railways Inspectorate) is an 
independent government authority within the Ministry of Transport and Water 
Management responsible for maintaining and improving the level of safety within the 
Dutch rail industry.  Second the Dutch Transport Safety Board investigates transport 
accidents and incidents in aviation, shipping, rail, road traffic and pipeline transport.  
Third, the Dutch Competition Authority (Nma Vervoerskamer) is a government 
agency, accountable to the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications.  
In this competition authority, there is a subsection called the Netherlands Transport 
Regulatory Authority.  This body is set up to supervise the competition in the railway 
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sector (as well as for other public transport, trams, and bus transport).  It is also 
responsible for overseeing compliance against legally defined standards and 
obligations. 
 
In terms of railway infrastructure, ProRail takes responsibility for the management 
and maintenance of rail infrastructure and stations which includes the planning for the 
revision and extension of the infrastructure, building of rail infrastructure and stations, 
directing of trains on the network, and the collection of up-to-date information about 
the rail network.  ProRail is also responsible for capacity allocation which is done on 
an independent basis in accordance with the appropriate domestic legislation. 
 
For the operating companies, NS Passengers is the main operator in the Dutch railway 
passenger market.  NS Passengers is 100% state-owned; it operates across the whole 
of the Netherlands and carries approximately 320 million passengers annually.  In 
principle, it receives no subsidy.  The core network is operated as a commercial 
business without subsidies.  However, there are some lines that are operated by 
contract with subsidies from local authorities to maintain the social services. 
 
As mentioned earlier, regional authorities are responsible for some railway lines under 
the Passenger Transport Act 2000 that are not to be part of the core NS Passengers 
network.  Up until now, five railway concessions have been in operation.  The 
operators are NoordNed and Syntus.  We will expand later on the case of Groningen 
which NoordNed is the current operator. 
6.5 Regulatory reform in the public transport sector: concluding remarks 
The regulatory framework of the European public transport sector has changed 
significantly over the last two decades.  Although there are a variety of regulatory 
frameworks of public transport, most systems are now moving towards a competitive 
tendering system.  Fundamentally, local public transport (mainly bus) and railway 
transport are different, especially in terms of industrial structure.  In this chapter, we 
described these two systems separately. 
 
The recent development of the regulatory systems of local public transport in 
European countries shows that most countries are moving towards the competitive 
tendering framework.  The MARETOPE Project (2002) observed that the only 
country that is using the deregulated and privatised approach is the UK.  Scandinavian 
countries, the Netherlands and France are in transition towards the competitive 
tendering.  In the tendering regime, various types of contracts are used. 
 
The regulatory reform of the public transport sectors creates a wide variety of 
organisation forms.  One of the common features is the growing involvement of the 
private sector in service production.  Furthermore, one of the biggest changes in the 
industrial environment has come in the form of the merger wave and market 
concentration (Mackie, 2001).  In addition, Velde (2003) observes that the growth of 
private involvement has led to the development of major international operators.  
These operators have originated almost exclusively from Britain and France in the 
past decade. 
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For the local public transport in the Netherlands, the introduction of the Wp2000 has 
been the greatest development in recent years.  This act aimed to introduce 
competition in the public transport market through competitive tendering systems.  It 
decentralised the power to provinces and regional authorities in organising the 
tendering processes.  The tendering process has been introduced gradually since 2002.  
The Evaluation Report of the Wp2000 (Groenendijk et al., 2005) suggested that the 
act failed to realise the original objectives.  The report found that the expected growth 
in the public transport use has not been achieved in both the tendering and non-
tendering areas.  As a result of a decrease in public transport use, the cost recovery of 
the public transport operation has not been improved either.  However, the Evaluation 
report also revealed some positive developments.  In some areas, the public transport 
use was increased, especially in the large cities.  In the areas where the authorities put 
the public transport services out for tender, the production costs, in terms of cost per 
vehicle-kilometre, were reduced by 10 – 20%.  The major concern in the tendering 
process is the market concentration problem.  The number of bidders in the tender 
was rather small.  In many cases, the tender leads to the competition between three 
big companies namely Arriva, BBA-Connex, and Connexxion.  The Evaluation 
Report also pointed out some issues in the tendering process.  It questioned whether 
the authority should give the task of the network design (and development) to the 
bidders or not.  Without the right to develop the network, the operator may not be able 
to innovate.  This hinders the innovation in the sector (Groenendijk et al., 2005).  In 
addition, the Evaluation Report observed that the tender documents were described in 
very detail.  This left little room for the operators to come up with new ideas, i.e. 
limiting the innovative capabilities of the operators.  Furthermore, there was a 
problem regarding the transparency of the tendering process.  One might expect that 
the information of the tendering process should be made available to the public: 
however, this was not the case.  The offers from bidders were kept confidential due to 
commercial sensitivity which, in fact, decreases the transparency of the system.  This 
limits creativity and knowledge development in the bus industry.   
  
For the railway sector in Europe, the railway organisations have changed dramatically 
in the past decade.  The privatisation process had been an issue for the railway in most 
countries in Western Europe.  Furthermore, the European Directive 91/440, on the 
accounting separation of infrastructure and operation, also brought about the 
industrial restructuring in the European railway sector.  This Directive made the 
competition in the railway sector possible.  The form of competition of railway 
passenger services is competitive tendering.  As we can see now, European passenger 
railways are in a transition period, especially in forming the organisational structure.  
However, in terms of the competitive tendering in passenger railway, experience in 
the tendering process is limited with the exception of the UK and Sweden. 
 
This chapter described the railway reforms in the UK and the Netherlands in detail.  
The UK rail industry has been radically reformed since the beginning of the 
privatisation process in 1994.  Briefly, the industry was restructured into potentially 
profitable units that have been privatised by outright sale, and non-profitable units 
that have been privatised by franchising.  Five groups of stakeholders in the UK rail 
industry after the privatisation process are: the government, regulatory bodies, 
infrastructure manager, capacity allocation, and railway undertakings.   For the 
passenger services, there were 25 franchises that had descended so that most 
franchises are currently operated by the big five British transport companies.  The 
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second-round franchising process began in 2002.  For the Netherlands railway 
industry, the Dutch national railway company (NS) has been split up into several 
companies since 1995.  Also, five groups of stakeholders in the Dutch rail industry 
can be identified.  For the passenger services, NS Passengers is the main operator.  
However, some parts of the networks were put out for tender+ by regional authorities.  
Up until now, five railway concessions are in operation. 
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Chapter 7 Empirical Cases in the Bus Industry: Service-
Oriented Innovation 
7.1 Introduction 
The predominant form of regulatory reform in the bus sector in Europe is the 
competitive tendering approach.  We reviewed the development and economic effects 
of this regulatory reform in the previous chapter.  The current chapter aims to 
illustrate empirical evidence of the effects of regulatory reform (i.e. the competitive 
tendering) on innovation in the bus sector.  The case studies to be discussed involve 
two countries: the Netherlands and the UK (London).  The regulatory framework in 
both cases follows the competitive tendering model.  The Dutch cases will illustrate 
an emerging system because the Netherlands has just begun to use the tendering 
approach in the public transport sector.  We will show how innovation is considered 
in such circumstances.  The London case will illustrate a more stable regulatory 
framework because it has used the competitive tendering model for two decades.  We 
will see the innovation issue that has emerged through the quality improvement 
scheme in the system.  We will then compare and analyse the innovation in both 
cases.   
 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows.  Section 7.2 presents a description of 
the Dutch case study.  Then Section 7.3 analyses the case study using the analysis 
framework developed in Chapter 5.  Section 7.4 makes a comparison of the Dutch 
case with the London bus tendering system.  Finally, Section 7.5 summaries the 
findings of this chapter and outlines the policy implication of the innovation within 
the bus sector. 
7.2 The Dutch cases 
7.2.1 Introduction 
The tender process in the Netherlands began in 2001 as the result of the Passenger 
Transport Act 2000 (See Chapter 6).  Although every tender that proceeds must 
follow the EU requirement (Hermans and Stoelinga, 2003), the details of the tender 
process vary dependent on the public transport authorities who put the public 
transport services to tender.  
 
The bus sector in the Netherlands is evolving at the moment.  The Passenger 
Transport Act 2000 required that the bus sector should first be put out for tender.  In 
this chapter, we concentrate on three specific cases.  The cases have been selected 
based on two criteria.  First, the cases represent the development of the tendering 
procedure and involve different companies.  There are three major companies that are 
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active in the Dutch public transport market: Arriva, BBA-Connex1, and Connexxion.  
Thus, the selected cases should represent at least two of these three major companies.  
Second, the case study requires an intensive qualitative analysis in which information 
is gathered through an interview. Both the authority and operator involved in the cases 
must be willing to participate in these interviews.   
 
According to the selection criteria, we selected three areas.  We contacted the 
authorities and operators to ask for their participation, and they were willing to 
participate.  The cases are centred in two areas in Provincie Zuid-Holland and one 
area in Stadregio Rotterdam.   
 
The data collection methods for the cases are twofold.  First, the interview method is 
used to collect qualitative information.  We interviewed relevant parties, i.e. 
authorities who are responsible for the concession area and the company who operates 
the concession (see Annex 1 for a list of interviewees).  The interview is divided into 
two parts.  The first part consists of several open-end questions regarding the 
tendering process and innovation.  The second part of the interview is opened for 
general discussion regarding the incentives and barriers of innovation in the tendering 
process.  Second, the secondary information is gathered from various publications, 
such as policy documents, press releases, consulting reports, and tender documents.  
With these two sources of information, we then analyse the cases according to the 
analysis framework that we proposed in Chapter 5. 
 
It should be noted that the confidentiality of the information on the concession is a 
main barrier for analysing the case study.  Often, the quantitative data on public 
transport is not readily available, except the data collected on an ad-hoc basis for 
specific research.  Furthermore, the competitive pressure in the bus tendering market 
makes companies unwilling to give any financial figures regarding the concession 
operation.  Besides, the authority is obliged to withhold this information even if it is 
on hand.  Most information available is estimated figures.   
 
All cases are located in the Provincie Zuid-Holland area, which is the most densely 
populated part of the Netherlands.  The case study areas include the surrounding 
urban areas of the Hague and Rotterdam cities.  Figure 7-1 shows the map of the areas 
in the case study.  There are three authorities that are responsible in those areas: 
Provincie Zuid-Holland (PZH), Stadsregio Rotterdam (SRR), and Stadsgewest 
Haaglanden.  PZH is the provincial authority that is responsible for the greater area of 
Zuid-Holland (South-Holland).  PZH is responsible for all public transport services in 
the above-mentioned areas except in the areas of the region Haaglanden and the 
region of Rotterdam where it delegates the responsibility to the regional authorities.  
There are two regional authorities that are in the Zuid-Holland: SRR and Stadsgewest 
Haaglanden.  SRR is the regional authority of the Rotterdam region, which consists of 
18 municipalities.  Rotterdam city is the second largest city in the Netherlands after its 
capital, Amsterdam, and it has a large container port.  Stadsgewest Haaglanden is the 
regional authority of Haaglanden, which consists of nine municipalities (including the 
                                                 
1 BBA-Connex is a subsidiary company of Connex (the French transport company).  BBA was 
previously owned by several local authorities in the southern area of the Netherlands.  The company 
was then sold to Connex prior to the introduction of competitive tendering.  BBA-Connex is often 
referred as BBA to avoid confusion with another Dutch operator Connexxion, which is currently 
owned by the Dutch government.  We will refer BBA-Connex as BBA for the rest of this chapter. 
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Hague itself).  The region Haaglanden is located in the area that surrounds the Hague, 
northwest of Rotterdam city. 
 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Voorne-Putten
2
Regio Rijmond 
streekvervoer
Hoekse Waard/Goeree-
Overflakkee
Drechtsteden-
Alblasserwaard-
Vijfheerenlanden 
(DAV)
Duin- en Bollenstrerl/
Leiden and Rijnstreel/
Midden-Holland
(DBL/RMH)
Rotterdam City (Urban 
area)
Dordrecht
1:
2:
3:
4:
5:
6:
7:
Concession area ResponsibleAuthority
SRR
PZH
PZH
PZH
SRR
SRR
PZH
8
The Hague8: Stadgewest Haaglanden  
Figure 7-1 Map of the areas covered in the case study 
 
The timeline of the cases is very important in understanding the development of the 
public transport tendering process.  This set of case studies will illustrate the learning 
process of the authorities and the operators in the tender procedure and the operation 
and management of the concessions.  We will see that both authority and operator 
learn from their past experiences, even in a very short timeframe (3 years).  Figure 7-2 
shows the timeline of our three cases. 
 
 
2003 2004 2005
DAV
(Arriva) Won
(7 August 2002)
Start Tender
(1 January 2003)
Tender end at
31 December 2006
Won
(5 June 2003)
Voorne-Putten
(Connexxion)
Start Tender
(1 January 2004)
Tender end at
1 January 2008
Won
(31 August 2004)
DBL/LRM
(Connexxion)
Start Tender
(1 January 2005)
Tender end at
31 December 2010
 
Figure 7-2 Timeline of three concessions in the case studies  
 
The first case is the tender in the Drechtsteden-Alblasserwaard-Vijfheerenlanden 
(DAV) area.  The tender process commenced in mid 2002 and the concession began 
in 2003.  This case was the second bus tender in this area.  Therefore, the authority 
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and operator had little experience in the tendering process.  The second case is the 
tender in the Voorne-Putten area.  The tender process started at the beginning of 2003 
and the concession began in 2004.  The last case is the tender in the Duin- en 
Bollenstreek/Leiden and Rijnstreek/ Midden-Holland (DBL/LRM) areas.  The tender 
process started in mid 2004 and the concession began in 2005. 
 
Furthermore, the case of the Rotterdam public transport company (RET) is added to 
understand how the threat of regulatory reform affects the way a monopoly operator 
reacts to the system.  RET is a municipally-owned company that operates metro, tram, 
and bus lines in the Rotterdam urban area.  It is a monopoly operator in this area.  
However, the public transport services in Rotterdam city are planned to be put out for 
tender between 2007 and 2012.  The plan is to first put the bus service for tender in 
2007 and then tram and metro in 2012.  The case will discuss the innovative 
capability of the RET under the pressure of the privatisation process.   
 
7.2.2 Bus tendering in DAV area (Provincie Zuid-Holland) 
The Drechtsteden-Alblasserwaard-Vijfheerenlanden (DAV) area of the regional 
government, Provincie Zuid-Holland (PZH), is located near the Rotterdam city on the 
eastern side.  The bus network length of this concession is around 500 kilometres.  
The turnover of this concession is around €16.4 million (Appelman et al., 2003) of 
which around 60% is the subsidy. 
 
The tendering process:   
The first experience for PZH in tendering occurred in 2001 in the area of Hoeksche 
Waard/Goeree Overflakkee2.  The DAV’s tender was the second tender that PZH 
initiated.  In this tender, PZH also chose for a competitive tendering with pre-
selection, as in the previous tender.  The authority selected four public transport 
companies to make a bid: Arriva, BBA, Connexxion, and SVN.  The existing 
network, service hours, frequencies and connections were the basic requirements in 
the tendering procedure, which is called a basic package.  Each company had to fulfil 
these basic conditions.  
 
In addition to the basic package, the authority also introduced a quality element into 
the winning criteria, which was called the plus package.  This plus package could be 
considered as a sort of authority’s wish list.  Companies could win extra points if they 
could fulfil the items on this wish list.  The wish list was divided into three categories 
based on mobility function (3 points), quality aspect (2 points) and preferences with a 
social function (1 point). Other points could be won by having the best ranking on 1) 
accessibility (3 points); 2) environmentally friendly rolling stock (3 points); and 3) 
view on mobility (10 points).  The authority gave these extra points on the basis of the 
most innovative proposal.  Furthermore, the company suggesting the highest attractive 
aim in ridership growth on the most important corridors to the neighbouring large 
cities could win 5 points. Lastly, the company could win 3 points if it offered a lower 
cost for additional services if the authority requested them during the contract. 
 
The tender document was released in May 2002 and the result of the tendering was 
announced on August 7th, 2002. The concession started on January 1st, 2003 and will 
be concluded at the end of 2006.  The contract length is 4 years.  Although PZH had 
                                                 
2 This area is located to the south of the Rotterdam city area. See Figure 7-1. 
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the option to grant the concession for a maximum of 6 years, they decided to grant the 
concession for only 4 years because they planned to combine this area with the city of 
Dordrecht, which would be put out for tender in 2006.  Moreover, they also intended 
to have a multi-modal concession, which would combine the bus and regional railway 
lines; it will probably be tendered in 2007. 
 
Tendering outcomes: 
All four companies made offers.  Arriva won the concession.  PZH stated in their 
press release that the winning company offered improved public transport services 
which include the following: 
- many new fast services to Rotterdam city; 
- many new lines; 
- on exiting lines, increased frequency is offered; 
- new low floor buses; and 
- environmentally friendly buses. 
 
Evaluation and lessons learned: 
In a general assessment, a report by the Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 
(Ministry of Transport and Public Works) (Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 
2004) suggested that there is 10.5% more service hours for 6% lower subsidy 
(compared to the situation before the tender).  This seems inline with PZH’s 
expectations. 
 
However, there was a problem at the beginning of the concession with the new buses.  
This area was formerly operated by Connexxion, and Arriva had to start the 
concession by taking over staff from Connexxion.  The issue was that Arriva could 
not order the new buses to be ready at that time.  The concession had to start with old 
buses.  The main reason for this was that the period between awarding the concession 
and the start of the concession did not allow enough time (just 4 months) to order new 
buses.  However, this problem was solved, and the authority now seems satisfied with 
the current operation.  In terms of revenue from the concession, Arriva reported that 
the revenue from this tender did not meet their expectations in terms of what they had 
initially predicted. 
 
The key lesson from this tender is that, if there is a change of operator, it is crucial to 
ensure the smoothness of the transfer of the services.  It was the case that the new 
operator, Arriva, needed a greater transition period in the ordering of the new buses, 
which would have taken some months.  It is possible that the incumbent (Connexxion) 
could withdraw all the buses that are currently being used in the area after the end of 
their contract, and Arriva would face a problem if unable to find replacement buses in 
time (either new or standby buses).   
 
Analysis of the tender process: 
We can analyse this case using the analysis framework that we developed in Chapter 
5.  Figure 7-3 shows the analysis of the DAV case. 
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Financial Aspect
Cost reduction is indicated (10.5% 
more service hour for 6% lower 
subsidy).
Contract for 4 years.
Service quantity
Network is mostly pre-described. The 
winner came up with the most new 
lines. 
The increase in DRU (10.5% more 
compare to the situation before).
Four companies 
submitted the bids:
Arriva, BBA, 
Connexxion, SVN
Arriva won
Vehicle
Offer mostly new and low floor 
buses. 
Buses are environmental-friendly (not 
specify the detail).
Good for the environment due to new 
buses.
Good accessibility due to the low 
floor buses
Service quality
Better network coverage with extra 
bus lines and extra services.
NoneInfrastructure
 
Figure 7-3 Analysis of the tendering process: the DAV case 
 
In terms of competition, the four companies, which were invited to submit their bids 
in the pre-selection phase, submitted their bids.  Three of those companies are major 
players in the Netherlands (Arriva, BBA, and Connexxion). This case had the highest 
number of bids among our three cases.  
 
In addition to the improvement from a financial perspective, the quality of public 
transport services is also improving.  The new bus lines and increased frequency give 
the traveller more service options.  Furthermore, the quality of the vehicle has 
improved.  The new low floor buses give more convenient services to the travellers.  
It should be noted that the issue of infrastructure was neglected in this tendering 
process. 
 
Authority – innovative capabilities and learning: 
In terms of technical capability, PZH has improved the quality of the vehicle through 
the tendering process.  They left some room for the operator to come up with an 
initiative on vehicles, and they chose the company who offered the new, low floor 
vehicle.  However, they did little on the infrastructure side.  It seems that PZH, at that 
moment, had little knowledge in terms of how to innovate in infrastructure through 
the tendering process.  However, in the subsequent tender, PZH demonstrates that the 
innovation infrastructure is also important, which we shall see later in the case of 
DBL/LRM areas. 
 
In terms of organisational capability, this tender is the second tender that PZH 
organised.  The tender process seemed successful.  PZH exploited the tendering 
process using quality elements to induce the investment in the new, low floor buses 
successfully.  However, the issue that PZH neglected was the change in operators 
which affected the commencement of the concession and resulted in some unfortunate 
circumstances, i.e. the old bus problems.   
 
In terms of learning, PZH shows that they have used their own experiences in order to 
exploit the tendering process.  It is worthy to note that PZH also allowed Arriva to 
modify the timetable, which was not originally agreed in the tender document.  
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However, the results from the freedom PZH gave in terms of network development in 
this case did not meet their expectations as the ridership growth was only slightly 
increased.   
 
Operator – innovative capabilities and learning: 
In terms of technical capability, Arriva used its facilities wisely and, with their offer 
on low floor buses, won the concession.  Although the low floor buses were not the 
only element that helped Arriva win the concession, they might be one of the 
influential factors.   It should be noted that other technologies were not included in 
this tendering, such as dynamic information and smart card technology.  The reason 
would be that this tender was an early one and the operator tended to choose for 
proven technologies which had low financial risk.  Furthermore, the smart card 
initiative was not yet developed when this tendering process started.   
 
In terms of organisational capability, Arriva showed a disappointing start, as they 
could not order the new buses in time for the start of the concession.  Also, apart from 
what was established in the tender agreement, Arriva did not initiate any new ideas to 
the services.  This could be that there was no incentive for them to do so.  PZH also 
recognised this point as they have since changed to a new approach of tendering.    
 
In terms of learning, it could be identified that the use of low floor buses was an 
external learning process.  The operators have seen the low floor buses as a new 
opportunity in this new concession.  However, we will assess the learning element of 
the operator in detail later in Section 7.3. 
 
7.2.3 Bus tendering in Voorne-Putten (Stadregio Rotterdam) 
The public transport authority is a part of the regional authority of the Rotterdam 
region (Stadregio Rotterdam: SRR).  SRR must cooperate with the regional 
government (PZH).  SRR will have other two areas to put out for tender in the future: 
the bus service in suburban area (Regio Rijmond streekvervoer; Connexxion is the 
current operator) and the bus service in the city of Rotterdam (the Rotterdam 
municipally-owned company, RET, is the current operator3).  Furthermore, SRR will 
be responsible for the Rotterdam city area when the RET is privatised (i.e. bus, tram 
and metro).    
 
The tendering area is the suburban area of Rotterdam, which is called Voorne-Putten.  
It is located south of the Rotterdam city.  The bus network length in this area is 
around 230 kilometres.  Although the exact figure of the turnover of this concession is 
not available, Appelman et al. (2004) report it to be around €10 - 20 million. 
 
The tendering process:  
SRR had no experience in the tendering process before this case.  SRR chose to use 
competitive tendering with pre-selection.  It indicates what the selection criteria are 
based on: the company’s experience and performance, quality and process control of 
the company, and knowledge of the Dutch public transport system and the relevant 
law and legislation.  Three companies (Arriva, BBA, and Connexxion) were invited to 
make offers. 
 
                                                 
3 We will discuss the case of RET later in Section 7.2.5. 
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The requirement set in the tender document stated that the operator must design the 
frequency of the bus services to meet the minimum requirements set by SRR.  The 
minimum requirements were based on the situation before the tender took place.  SRR 
required that the quality, such as frequency, information provision, and quality of 
buses, would not drop.  However, SRR indicated that the quality requirement was set 
in a broader term where the company could make their own initiatives to offer higher 
quality of public transport services.   
 
The judgment criteria for the awarding of the concession were based on price (subsidy 
level) and quality of the services.  The criteria were divided into four aspects: 
financial aspect, availability of services, quality of services (during the trip), and other 
aspects (such as information provision and customer services). 
 
The program of demand was released in December 2002, and the result of the tender 
was announced on June 5th, 2003.  The concession started on January 1st, 2004 and 
will be finalised at the end of 2007.  The contract length is for 4 years. 
 
The tendering outcome: 
All three companies made offers.  Connexxion won the concession.  SRR stated in 
their press release that they considered not only the number of bus timetable hours 
and the price of the offer, but also the quality of the services.  The tender outcomes 
can be summarised as follows:  
- increased frequency; 
- new fast service lines; 
- new buses and low floor; 
- Euro-3 standard buses; 
- customer service; and 
- possibility of fast implementation of the smart card (Chipkaart). 
  
Evaluation and lessons learned: 
In a general assessment, a report by the Ministry of Transport and Water Management 
(Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2004) suggested that there was around 18% 
cost reduction (compared to the situation before the tender).  In general, SRR is 
satisfied with the progress of the current operator. 
 
The lesson from this tender is aimed at the operator.  It appears that Connexxion 
learned that the quality of the vehicle is important for the offer, thus the new, low 
floor buses were included in their offer.  Furthermore, it appeared that, after this 
tendering process, the authorities were looking for improvements in quality aspects, 
such as travel information and the smart card technology as well.  These quality 
aspects were then realised by the bidders in the later concessions. 
 
Analysis of the tender process: 
We can analyse this case using the analysis framework that we developed in Chapter 
5.  Figure 7-4 shows the analysis of the Voorne-Putten case. 
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Financial Aspect
Cost reduction is indicated (not 
known the exact number).
Contract for 4 years with option of 2 
years extension.
Service quantity
Operator has some freedoms to design 
the network and timetable, though it 
is limited.
The increase in DRU (not know the 
exact number).
Three companies 
submitted the bids:
Arriva, BBA, 
Connexxion
Connexxion won
Vehicle
Offer mostly new and low floor 
buses. 
Offer the customer services via the 
‘promotion team’ and more customer 
relationship
Possible for the dynamic travel 
information
Buses are EURO-3 standard
Authority had developed the bus lane 
that operator can use. Good reliability due to the bus lane.
Good for the environment due to the 
new EURO-3 bus standard.
Travel information is promising.
More customer-oriented. 
Good accessibility due to the low 
floor buses.
Service quality
Better network coverage with extra 
bus lines.
Infrastructure
 
Figure 7-4 Analysis of the tendering process: the Voorne-Putten case 
 
In terms of competition, three companies, which were invited in the pre-selection 
phase, submitted the bids.  These companies are the key players of the Netherlands 
bus service sectors.  Although the number of bids was smaller than the DAV case, the 
competitive pressure was more or less the same as the previous case because of the 
presence of the big three (Arriva, BBA, and Connexxion). 
 
Although the financial element was still important for the tender, more quality 
elements were added.  The competition in the tendering process was tense.  
Connexxion offered more quality items that are related to technological and 
organisational innovation, such as environmentally friendly buses according to 
EURO-3 standards, the possibility of the dynamic travel information, and the 
possibility of implementation of the smart card (Chipkaart).  Furthermore, the 
operator would benefit from the exclusive bus lane that SRR developed which would 
provide additional improvements to the quality of services that users can benefit from. 
 
Authority – innovative capabilities and learning: 
In terms of technical capability, SRR had an advantage in that the exclusive bus lane 
was developed prior to the tender so the operator could use this facility for express 
services.  This appears to be a very important element for the successful operation in 
the tender area which attracts more passengers.  The role of infrastructure 
development was later realised in the Evaluation Report of the Wp2000 (Groenendijk 
et al., 2005).  Apart from this, SRR opened up the options for improvement through 
their tender document which resulted in the new buses.  This development follows the 
same pattern as in the DAV area.  Furthermore, SRR considered the possibility of ICT 
implementation (dynamic travel information). 
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In terms of organisational capability, this tender was the first tender that SRR 
organised.  The tender process seemed successful.  SRR exploited the tendering 
process using quality elements to induce the investment in the new, low floor buses 
and the commitment of the operator on the smart card and information provision.   
 
In terms of learning, SRR had limited knowledge for internal learning as this was 
their first tender.  However, SRR showed considerable learning capabilities through 
an external source which allowed them to organise the first tender smoothly.  The 
external source was a consulting firm that SRR employed to help them to prepare the 
tender document.   
 
Operator – innovative capabilities and learning: 
In terms of technical capability, Connexxion repeated what Arriva did in the DAV 
tender which proves that the technical capability can be imitated rather easily.  But the 
infrastructure innovation, in terms of information provision cannot be ignored here.  
In all, Connexxion illustrated innovative ideas that matched SRR’s expectations, 
which helped them to win the concession.  
  
In terms of organisational capability, an interesting development should be addressed 
here.  Connexxion lost several concessions to their rivals, so the strategic reaction was 
to create a tendering team which was assigned the special task of preparing all offers 
in the Netherlands.  This seems to have helped them considerably.  The concession 
team is also the innovation department where innovative ideas are created to be put 
into the offers. 
 
In terms of learning, Connexxion learned quickly from their experience in the DAV 
tender.  This was an internal learning.  As a result, their offer was improved, and was 
more competitive.  The learning element of the operator will be discussed in more 
detail in Section 7.3. 
 
7.2.4 Bus tendering in Duin- en Bollenstreek/Leiden and Rijnstreek/Midden-
Holland areas (Provincie Zuid-Holland) 
The ‘Duin- en Bollenstreek/Leiden and Rijnstreek/Midden-Holland’ area of the 
regional government, Provincie Zuid-Holland (PZH), is located northeast of the 
Hague and south of Amsterdam city.  This area also includes the city of Leiden.  The 
bus network length of this concession is around 800 kilometres.  This concession is 
very large and accounts for the government subsidy of more than € 25 million per 
year. 
 
Tendering process: 
PZH gained experience from the previous two tenders (Hoekse Waard/Goeree-
Overflakkee and Drechtsteden-Alblasserwaard-Vijfheerenlanden areas).  PZH’s 
experience was useful in designing the tender process for the new tender area.  The 
area of tender was in fact two combined areas.  These areas were Duin- en 
Bollenstreek/Leiden (DBL), which includes city of Leiden, and Rijnstreek/Midden-
Holland (RMH).  The company could submit a bid for DBL, RMH, or both areas. 
 
Initially, PZH invited four companies to bid for this concession.  However, there were 
only two operators that offered the bids: Arriva and Connexxion.  The reason might 
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have been that the size of the tender was very large which resulted in only two 
operators who were capable enough to handle the bid. 
 
For these tenders, the winning criteria were more complicated. The concession was 
divided into: 1 big area, or 2 separate areas. The winning criteria would then assess all 
offers in formula.  There were 9 aspects to be fulfilled, 1 aspect on price and 8 aspects 
on quality.  The details of these aspects are as follows: 
 Price aspect: 
1. The subsidy per timetable hour 
Quality aspect: 
2. Development of the new public transport services 
3. Development on marketing and communication 
4. Accessibility improvement 
5. Business plan and the company 
6. Social security 
7. Setting up of the smart card  
8. Setting-up of dynamic travel information on board and at the stops 
9. Image of the public transport system 
 
There was a special feature in this tender document related to the financial 
arrangement.  PZH provided around € 1 million (in addition to maximum subsidy of € 
24.4 million on the normal operation) on the development of new public transport 
services (the quality aspect no. 2 above). 
 
The tender document was released in July 2004 and the result of the tendering 
announced on August 31st, 2004. The concession started on January 1st, 2005 and will 
be concluded at the end of 2010.  The contract length is 6 years.   
 
Tendering outcome: 
As mentioned earlier, only two companies, Arriva and Connexxion, made the offers.  
Connexxion won the concession from the combined offer of both areas.  The tender 
outcomes can be summarised as follows:  
- 22.6% more timetable hours; 
- all new low floor buses; 
- onboard information of the stops in every bus; 
- all air conditioned buses; 
- dynamic travel information at twenty important stops; 
- improved provision of information; and 
- fast setting-up of the smart card (Chipkaart). 
 
Evaluation and lessons learned: 
It is too soon to make any assessment on the operation in this case as the tender just 
began at the beginning of the year 2005.  However, it should be noted that the 
duration between the awarding and the start of the concession is again very short, only 
4 months, similar to the case of DAV.  Yet, there have not been any reported 
problems with the operation at the beginning of the concession.  The reason might be 
that Connexxion was an incumbent operator (contracted to operate at the area before 
the tender). 
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Analysis of the tender process: 
We can analyse this case using the analysis framework developed in Chapter 5.  
Figure 7-5 shows the analysis of the Duin- en Bollenstreek/Leiden and 
Rijnstreek/Midden-Holland case. 
Financial Aspect
Cost reduction is indicated (not 
known the exact number).
Contract for 6 years.
Service quantity
Operator has all freedoms to design 
the network and timetable.
The increase in DRU (22.6% more 
than the situation before).
Two companies 
submitted the bids:
Arriva, Connexxion
Connexxion won
Vehicle
New low floor buses
Air conditional bus
Possible for the implementation of 
Chip Card
Dynamic travel information at twenty 
important stops
Integrated ticketing system is 
promising
Good travel information
Comfortable
Good accessibility due to the low 
floor buses.
Service quality
Better network coverage with extra 
bus lines.
On broad information
NoneInfrastructure
 
Figure 7-5 Analysis of the tendering process: the DBL/RMH case 
 
In terms of competition, only two companies (Arriva and Connexxion), out of the four 
companies invited in the pre-selection phase, submitted bids.  The reason might be, as 
suggested previously, that the size of the concession was too large, so the risk 
involved might have been too high for other operators.  However, we might argue that 
the other operators could also have submitted to only one area, either DBL or RMH. 
But the operator might have considered that by submitting a bid to only one area, 
there would be less chance of winning. 
 
Even though there were only two bids, we can still see the positive development in 
terms of the innovation.  In this case, we see that the winning operator, Connexxion, 
emphasises on both vehicle and infrastructure aspects.  Again, the quality aspects are 
the most important developments in this tender outcome.  However, it should be noted 
that the infrastructure development was not included in this tender.   
 
Authority – innovative capabilities and learning: 
In terms of technical capability, PZH was able to indicate the possibility of technical 
development through their wish list in the tender document.  The outcome of the 
tender regarding the technical capability was very positive.  It is shown that PZH 
considered the importance of the role of information technology, which is explicitly 
indicated in their winning criteria. 
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In terms of organisational capability, PZH opted to use the complex tendering process 
that contains two tenders at a time.  This created some difficulties in terms of the 
number of bidders.  The small number of bidders may have implied a lesser degree of 
competition.  However, it might be compensated by a greater degree of investment; 
the available fund for investment is increased as the size of tender is increased.  This 
fund would give more incentive for the operator to innovate in various aspects, 
including infrastructure and vehicle elements.  Indeed, the result of the tender has 
shown that the infrastructure in information provision and the vehicles equipped with 
air conditioning systems were proposed in the bid. 
 
In terms of knowledge, PZH learned a great deal through previous tenders; this is a 
clear signal that PZH has moved towards a more quality-oriented approach of 
tendering.  Although it may be too early to say that the quality of the public transport 
services has increased as the concession has just started, the financial incentive 
through the available investment for the network development can be seen as a good 
initiative.  An illustration of internal learning occurred when PZH decided to add 
more incentive via extra funds (subsidy) to encourage the operators to come up with a 
more innovative service design. This transpired after PZH gave some freedom in the 
concession to Arriva in the DAV area, but Arriva failed to induce more passengers to 
the network adjustment that it made. 
 
Operator – innovative capabilities and learning: 
In terms of technical capability, Connexxion responded well to PZH’s initiatives on 
information technology, i.e. introducing onboard information and dynamic travel 
information at the bus stops.  In addition to this, Connexxion also initiated air-
conditioned buses as an extra element which shows the effective work of the tender 
team.  
  
In terms of organisational capability, the tender team seems to be a working model in 
this situation as it is capable of initiating the information provision into the bid.  
Although the authority signals the requirement of information provision through its 
wish list in the tender documents, the tender team still has considerable work to do to 
integrate them into the bid.   
 
In terms of learning, Connexxion explored the internal learning through their tender 
team in this case.  They generated a knowledge base for the tendering process.  Thus, 
they could prepare the bid by using their own experience, both from the same 
authority and from different authorities.  In this case, we observed that the bids they 
prepared in the PZH’s areas were improved over time.  Furthermore, the relationship 
between authority and operator was also strengthened.  Again, the learning element of 
the operator will be discussed in more detail in Section 7.3. 
 
7.2.5 The case of RET 
The Rotterdam public transport company (RET) is the main public transport operator 
in the Rotterdam urban area.  RET operates in a monopoly position and annually 
carries around 167 million passengers (in 2004).  RET operates three modes of public 
transport: bus, tram, and metro.  Table 7-1 shows the detailed information of the 
public transport systems that are operated by RET. 
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Table 7-1 Indicators for public transport systems by RET  
 1996 1998 2000 2002 2003 2004 
Tram       
Number of lines 13 12 9 9 9 9 
Length (km) 127.9 126.8 99.9 93.4 93.4 98.3 
Vehicle-km (mill.) 6.0 6.0 - 6.2 6.1 6.0 
Seat-km (mill.) 618.8 674.1 653.6 679.8 668.0 693.6 
Passengers (mill.) 53.2 55.8 58.3 60.6 59.0 53.4 
Passenger-km (mill.) 138.6 151.4 159.1 162.0 158.0 147.0 
Bus       
Number of lines 44 42 40 36 38 32 
Length (km) 440.3 407.7 372.6 422.6 432.7 348.2 
Vehicle-km (mill.) 13.0 14.1 - 12.1 11.8 10.2 
Seat-km (mill.) 796.5 864.4 753.7 726.1 706.4 602.9 
Passengers (mill.) 40.9 40.4 39.3 38.4 35.2 29.7 
Passenger-km (mill.) 135.4 136.0 132.7 131.0 121.0 95.0 
Metro       
Number of lines 5 5 5 8 8 8 
Total length (km) 72.9 72.9 72.9 175.6 175.6 175.6 
Vehicle-km (mill.) 12.5 13.0 - 13.7 16.2 17.6 
Seat-km (mill.) 1916.0 2051.7 2052.0 2157.0 2570.7 2506.3 
Passengers (mill.) 78.9 78.0 83.7 87.9 86.1 84.0 
Passenger-km (mill.) 414.4 405.1 431.0 444.0 476.0 463.0 
Total Seat-km (mill.) 3331.3 3590.2 3459.3 3562.9 3945.1 3802.8 
Total Passengers (mill.) 173.0 174.2 181.3 186.9 180.3 167.1 
Total Passenger-km (mill.) 688.4 692.5 722.8 737.0 755.0 705.0 
Source: RET Annual Report 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2004 
 
There has been a significant development in the public transport services under RET 
management in the past decade.  For the tram services, the number of lines and 
network lengths were reduced significantly.  Tramlines were reduced from 13 lines in 
1996 to 9 lines in 2004, and network length was reduced from 127.9 km. in 1996 to 
98.3 km. in 2004.  However, the seat-km. was increased during that period.  This 
implies that the tram network is more concentrated in urban areas (the decrease of 
network length) and operates at a higher frequency.  This increase might have taken 
place so that RET could maintain the level of passengers in the past decade.  
However, if we compare the current numbers to the year 2000, the number of tram 
passengers has been reduced by around 10%.  It should be noted that there is a plan to 
extend the tram network; many tram lines are under construction at the moment.  The 
results of the tram network’s extension remain to be seen.  For the bus services, the 
number of bus lines and network lengths was greatly reduced.  The bus lines were 
reduced from 44 lines in 1996 to 32 lines in 2004, and the network length was 
reduced from 440.3 km. in 1996 to 348.2 km. in 2004.  This resulted in a 25% 
decrease in the number of passengers in the past decade.  The reasons for the 
decreases in both bus services and the number of passengers may be twofold.  First, 
the extension of the metro lines (described below) was finished in 2002, and these 
metro services have replaced the bus services in many areas.  Second, there is 
uncertainty that surrounds the bus services in the Rotterdam urban area at the 
moment.  As the privatisation of RET is being planned, the bus services are likely to 
be the first to be put out for tender.  Thus, these might be reasons for the 
underdevelopment in the bus services in this area.  
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The greatest development in the public transport systems in the Rotterdam urban area 
was the extension of the metro lines.  RET runs two main metro lines4: the 
Erasmuslijn (from north to south) and the Calandlijn (from west to east).  These two 
lines were extended from 72.9 km. to 175.6 km. in the year 2002.  This network 
extension boosted the number of passenger-kilometre from 414.4 million in 1996 to 
463.0 million in 20045.   
 
In terms of innovation, RET has initiated and implemented several innovations in the 
past decade.  We will describe a few examples here.  As mentioned above, the public 
transport network has developed extensively, especially the metro and tram networks.  
The extension of the metro lines allowed for considerable passenger growth for RET.  
For the tram systems, there is a new concept called TramPlus that was studied in the 
mid 90s.  This concept aimed to increase the speed of the tram by reducing the 
number of stops.  This means passengers who use the tram may have to walk a longer 
distance to the tram stops, but they will travel much quicker.  This concept of 
TramPlus is now being implemented on some tram lines.  Recently, there have been 
new trams introduced into the system, such as the low floor tram Citadis/Alstom.  
This tram also has higher capacity, 150 seats and stands, compared to the old version 
which had 110 seats and stands.  Finally, there are dynamic travel information 
displays at most of the tram stops.  Another important project in which RET is 
involved is the smart card (Chipkaart) project (see Section 6.3.5).  RET is currently 
testing the Chipcard in the Rotterdam metro system; it is one of the first parties to test 
this technology. 
 
The major regulatory reform that affects the status of RET is the plan for 
privatisation.  This plan is concurrent with the plan of the implementation of the 
Passenger Transport Act 2000 (described in Chapter 6).  The privatisation of RET is 
an important step in the statutory level playing field; conflicts of interest between 
concession grantor (the authority) and company (RET) are forbidden in tendering 
processes and in the granting of the concession.  As long as the RET is still publicly 
owned, competition cannot be initiated.  The main argument for privatisation is the 
inefficiency of the public-owned company.  This inefficiency is the result of increased 
subsidy.  
 
However, there are also arguments against privatisation.  First, privatisation leads to a 
decentralised system that has poor long-term planning.  The privatised firm is a 
private company that might disregard the public interest that would allow the 
betterment of public transport services.  In terms of the public transport systems in the 
Rotterdam urban area, it would seem that, after privatisation, the public transport 
services would be put on tenders in more than one package. This means there will be 
more than one operator in that area.  Thus, a synergy within the system might be 
missing.  The system integration will be reduced if the authority does not have a well-
defined plan of the service integration.  Furthermore, the private operator is unlikely 
to innovate in the long term, i.e. an investment that has a long payback period.  As the 
                                                 
4 These two lines form many sub-lines: 5 lines in 1996 and 8 lines in 2004. 
5 We might see that the passenger-kilometre increased by just only 11% but the metro network length 
has more than doubled; this might be due to the fact that the metro network extension was developed in 
the suburban area, which has less demand than the established network that serves into the central area 
of Rotterdam. 
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length of the contract is usually 5 years for buses, long-term innovation might not 
occur if there are no significant incentives given to the operators. 
 
In the end, privatisation seems inevitable.  The government plans to privatise the 
municipally-owned companies in the coming years (see Chapter 6).  The question 
now is not ‘privatise’ or ‘not privatise’, but rather ‘how to privatise?’  Last year, the 
Minister of Transport and Public Works wrote a letter to the Dutch parliament 
suggesting that all bus services must be put on tender from the first of January 2009, 
and initially for the railways (including metro and tram in larger cities) from the first 
of January 2017. 
 
This privatisation process can be considered as a threat to the RET operation.  It is 
stated that buses are used not only for scheduled services, but also as replacement 
services when tram or metro services are not available, such as accidents, technical 
problems, or public events (especially for tram services).  If bus services are put on 
tender and RET loses the tender (which is most likely the case), the cost incurred to 
RET would be significant, especially since it would not have spare buses in such 
cases.  However, RET seems already prepared for this situation.  It appears that RET 
has followed the development of the tenders closely, although it cannot be directly 
involved in any tender.   
 
Innovative capabilities and learning: 
RET shows strong technical capabilities.  We previously discussed that RET has 
developed extensive public transport networks of tram and metro in the past decade.  
Furthermore, they invested in new vehicles (both metro and tram rolling stocks).  
However, it is important to stress that network and vehicle developments in metro and 
tram systems are very slow processes.  The planning and construction of the metro 
and tram infrastructure takes a lot of time, more than 5 years before the systems are 
even operating. 
 
Another important innovation in which RET is involved is a smart card (see also 
Section 6.3.5).  RET is one of the five companies that established the Trans Link 
Systems, the company that runs the smart card system.  Furthermore, the metro 
system is one of the systems that will be implemented in a pilot phase (which is in a 
trial phase at the time of writing).  It is apparent that RET will benefit from being the 
first to have implemented the smart card system.   
 
In terms of organisational capabilities, RET seems slow, almost resistant to the 
privatisation process.  However, RET follows the tendering processes elsewhere.  
This indicates that RET is preparing for the change as well. 
 
Conclusion: 
RET has high technical capabilities in both the tram and metro systems.  However, it 
paid little attention to the bus sector.  The competition in the bus sector in Rotterdam 
city is next on the agenda.  Thus, RET must now consider what strategy it will pursue 
in order to survive in the public transport market.  We would suggest that the bus 
services are complementary to tram and metro, thus the involvement in this sector 
would be beneficial to the organisation as a whole.  Simply leaving the bus market 
would not be a wise idea.  Bus operation can be supplemented to tram and metro 
services when needed.  Furthermore, the bus market is now moving towards the 
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competitive tendering regime, which results in a growing number of concessions.  
This means that RET can expand their market in the future.  Given the appropriate 
investment in developing competence in the tendering procedure in conjunction with 
the advantage of the knowledge in the area, RET should be able to compete with new 
entrants in the bus service in the Rotterdam city area and expand their market in other 
areas as well. 
7.3 The Dutch innovation model for bus tendering process 
In this section, we will discuss two separate aspects.  First, the innovation model will 
be proposed.  In this innovation model for the bus sector, we consider two separate 
actors: authority and operator.  These actors are the ‘first-order’ actors who are 
involved in the tendering process.  Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 will discuss models for 
authority and operator respectively.  Second, in addition to these first-order actors, 
there are also issues that are directly and indirectly involved in the tendering process.  
We call these issues the second-order effects.  We will discuss three issues revolving 
around the second-order effects: the infrastructure, the vehicle manufacturer, and 
consumer organisation.  Section 7.3.3 deals with a role of infrastructure, and Section 
7.3.4 deals with the vehicle manufacturer and consumer organisation issues.  
 
7.3.1 The first-order actor I: authority 
We consider the authority as a first-order actor.  From the case studies, we found 
strong evidence in terms of an increased focus on quality aspects.  In the PZH area, 
the authority learned to change during the course of the tender.  We observed that the 
tender result was based more on the better quality of the public transport services.  
This occurred as the result of the inclusion of quality aspects into the tender 
document, which was found in all three cases.  The cases illustrate clearly that PZH 
used a combination of price and quality criteria which left the quality initiative to the 
operator. 
 
Analysing the information we disclosed from the case study, it is possible to map the 
pattern of the tendering development of PZH as depicted in Figure 7-6 below.  It 
should be noted that we analyse only PZH.  As SRR only experienced the tendering 
process once in the Voorne-Putten area, there is no sufficient evidence on the 
tendering development. 
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Figure 7-6 The tendering development path of PZH 
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We see the development path in three steps.  First, PZH can choose whether to put the 
tender for gross cost contract or net cost contract.  It appears that PZH followed the 
path of the net cost contract where the operator is responsible for the revenue risk.  
Second, PZH chose to give some services design freedom6.  As noted earlier, in the 
DAV case, PZH did not originally grant the operator (Arriva) services design 
freedom.  However, PZH changed its strategy to give some freedom to Arriva.  At a 
later concession, PZH gave the freedom of services design to the operator in the 
tendering process.  This indicates that PZH believes that this should benefit the users 
more than restrict the services design within the authority.  Third, we observe that 
PZH followed a path toward the investment in innovation.  PZH chose to go for ICT 
that required an investment in the infrastructure. 
 
Apart from the tendering development path we discussed above, we also observed the 
trend towards the inclusion of quality aspects into the tender documents.  Both PZH 
and SRR incorporate the quality aspects as criteria for awarding the concessions.  
Although quality has a broader definition, authorities tend to anticipate the quality 
improvement through certain kinds of technological innovation, such as low floor 
buses, the travel information system, and the smart card.  In all, passengers seem to 
benefit from this improvement, although it is not yet known whether this will sustain 
in the long-term. 
 
It should be noted that the insertion of the quality aspect is found elsewhere in the 
Netherlands.  Provincie Groningen (PG) also uses the combination between price and 
quality.  However, PG gives less weight to quality than does PZH.  Further, PG gives 
guidelines for the quality aspects that leave little room for the operator to initiate any 
innovation.  Note that PG also uses this for the train concession (see Chapter 8). 
 
7.3.2 The first-order actor II: operator 
We also consider operators as first-order actors.  In this section, we will map the 
situation in each tendering case based on the model for the operators we constructed 
in Chapter 5.  The model focuses on the observations of each round of tenders, from 
the years 2002 (DAV case), 2003 (Voorne-Putten case), and 2004 (DBL/RMH case).  
We will discuss each case in turn.   
 
In the first case (DAV), we observe the strong link between vehicle innovation and 
the successful bid.  Figure 7-3 depicts this pattern.  The vehicle innovation (new and 
low floor buses) included in the offer is a prominent factor for the successful bid, 
                                                 
6 PZH revealed that, in the first tendering process in Hoeksche Waard and Goeree-Overflakkee, there 
was indeed no freedom of service design during the tendering-procedure and very limited freedom of 
service-design during the concession period (only the extra quantities within the so-called plus 
package).  PZH realised that this was too rigid, and for that reason, in the DAV case, they decided to 
define the existing network at the start of the concession, but to give the new operator (Arriva) full 
freedom to adjust the network during the rest of the concession period.  On one hand, PZH stated that 
the existing network should be maintained at the beginning of the new concession-period. On the other 
hand, new operators did not have to design a complete new network during short time of the tendering 
procedure.  Thus, a level playing field for all potential operators was guaranteed.  In the DBL/RMH 
case, although the bidders had no obligation to offer an existing network, in the tender documents and 
the following information-sessions, PZH told them the existing network was sufficient to fulfil the 
minimum-demands at that point.  Thus, both bidders made offers based largely on that network, in 
combination with some extra, new lines and major service-extensions on the existing network. 
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according to our information from the interviews.  The idea of this innovation largely 
came from the external knowledge for which Arriva was looking.   
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Figure 7-7 The tender development in DAV case (Arriva) 
 
In the second case (Voorne-Putten), we observe a learning element that led to vehicle 
innovation, which in turn played a part in the successful bid.  Experiential learning 
(the unsuccessful bid in DAV case) instigated Connexxion’s introduction of vehicle 
innovation.  Furthermore, the learning element we found came from the competence 
development within the firm that led to the organisational developments (the tender 
team).  Figure 7-4 depicts this pattern in the Voorne-Putten case.  
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Figure 7-8 The tender development of the Voorne Putten case (Connexxion) 
 
We can see that Connexxion learned from their experience, that the new low floor 
buses were an important factor in the tender.  Thus, they came up with the new low 
floor buses.  It should be noted that the development of the tender team helped them 
to identify opportunities (in this case the vehicle innovation and other innovations 
included in the offer) that led to a successful bid. 
 
In the third case (DBL/RMH), we observe a learning element from a successful bid.  
Figure 7-5 depicts the development of the tendering process in the DBL/RMH case.   
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Figure 7-9 The tender development in the DBL/RMH case (Connexxion) 
 
Repeatedly, Connexxion uses their experience by offering the new and low floor 
vehicle as their strategic tool in winning the concession.  Furthermore, not only is 
vehicle innovation employed, but also infrastructure innovation, i.e. information 
provision.  It should be noted that this is the result of the work of the tender team. 
 
In sum, we observe positive developments in the innovative capabilities of the 
operators in all three cases.  The competitive pressure from the tendering process 
leads to situations in which the operators must innovate in order to be competitive in 
the market.  One common development that we found is the use of a tender team.  
Although our cases illustrate only the success of Connexxion’s tender team, Arriva’s 
tender team has been successful elsewhere in the Netherlands as well.   
 
Our general observation from the interviews we conducted suggested that operators 
tend to use innovations as strategic tools to win the contracts.  Some gimmicks were 
used such as a coffee service at bus stops.  This illustrates that operators tend to widen 
the quality aspects of their public transport services to capture more passengers, or to 
show to the authority that they are willing to innovate in other areas.  Although the 
result of the implementation of such innovations is not yet clear in terms of whether it 
benefits the passengers or not, it seems that these kinds of gimmicks do work in some 
cases.  
 
However, we observe that both technological and organisational innovations in the 
tender are easy to imitate.  In terms of technological innovation, we see both the 
duplications of the new, low floor bus and the travel information system.  These kinds 
of innovations have a very short life-cycle.  As one of our interviewees stated, this is 
because once an innovation is included in an offer that wins a concession, in the next 
round of tender, whenever it occurs (possibly two to three months from the innovation 
that was included in the offer), the competitor can easily include it in their offer as 
well.  In terms of organisational innovation, both Arriva and Connexxion have 
employed the same type of the tender team to handle all tenders in the Netherlands, in 
both bus and train concessions.   
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7.3.3 The second-order effect I: a role of infrastructure 
The issue of infrastructure had been mostly ignored in the tendering process.  In all 
case studies, the role of infrastructure in the concession area was not mentioned.  This 
observation is inline with our assumption in Chapter 3 that the innovative capabilities 
in terms of infrastructure remain largely the authority’s responsibility.  Figure 7-10 
shows again the level of participation of the authority and operator in different 
aspects. 
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Figure 7-10 Level of participation of authority and operator 
 
The tendering processes in our cases show that the operators were heavily involved in 
developing the service/operation and vehicle innovation.  But, they hardly participated 
in the infrastructure innovation.  This might be due to the fact that the infrastructure 
issue was not explicitly addressed by the authority.  The infrastructure development in 
the tendering regime must be initiated by the authority.  There are several reasons 
why the operators might not be able to develop the infrastructure by themselves.  
First, the tendering documents might not allow the operator to initiate an 
infrastructure development.  Most tender documents concentrate on the services, such 
as frequency and network of operation, and the financial aspect, i.e. the subsidy.  
They might specify some material requirements, such as new buses or engine types, 
but hardly mention the infrastructure element.  Second, developing the infrastructure 
might be too expensive to be financially feasible in the tendering period.  Even if the 
tender document allowed the implementation of the infrastructure initiative, it is 
questionable whether it is practically possible.  We did, however, note an 
infrastructure development in the Quality Bus Partnerships (QBPs) regimes in the 
UK7, but this was done with the cooperation between the authority and operator.  The 
tenders in our cases seem to lack this kind of initiatives. 
 
The Evaluation Report of the Wp2000 (Groenendijk et al., 2005) stated that an 
improvement in the infrastructure is needed if we want to see an increase in the public 
transport ridership.  The infrastructure, such as exclusive bus lanes, will improve the 
service quality significantly.  This is the way to attract more new passengers to use 
                                                 
7 See Section 6.2.2. 
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public transport.  However, we have not yet seen any significant development of the 
infrastructure in the tendering process. 
 
The innovation in the infrastructure element must come from the authority initiatives.  
The operators are not interested in investing in the infrastructure unless there are 
significant benefits from doing so.  The pay back period of investment in 
infrastructure, such as an exclusive bus lane or guided bus lane, is considerably long, 
perhaps more than 15 years.  However, it is not possible to allow such a long contract 
in the current setting of the tendering process in the bus sector.  The solution might be 
that the authorities develop the infrastructure by themselves, and let the operator use it 
under certain conditions, such as with a lower subsidy level or a contribution to the 
infrastructure maintenance cost8.   
 
7.3.4 The second-order effect II: the vehicle manufacturer and consumer 
organisation 
We were also able to discuss with two external parties who were indirectly involved 
in the tendering process.  They are the consumer organisation (ROVER) and the bus 
manufacturer (VDL).  The issues regarding the effects of the tendering process on 
innovation with respect to their roles are described as follows. 
 
In the Netherlands, there is an organisation of public transport users called ROVER.  
In the tendering process, ROVER plays a small role.  The role of ROVER can be 
separated into two parts.  The first part is the stage where the authority prepares the 
program of demand9.  ROVER is consulted at this stage to give some perspectives on 
the services they wish to have in the area of concession.  The second part occurs 
during concession period.  If the operator wishes to change the public transport 
services, it needs to consult with ROVER first before it can make any adjustments.  
However, we observe that ROVER has little influence on the tendering process, as it 
does not have a formal status within the tendering procedure.   
 
This is in line with the Evaluation Report on the Wp2000 (Groenendijk et al., 2005).  
It stated that the position of individual travellers has weakened after the 
implementation of the Wp2000.  Although the change in the public transport services 
during the concession was consulted with ROVER first, it was criticised that all user 
groups of the public transport were not proportionally represented in this consumer 
organisation.  Unfortunately, this reduces overall users participation in the public 
transport services. 
 
The tendering process also affects the bus manufacturer.  We had a discussion with 
the Dutch bus manufacturing company, VDL, on this topic.  In general, innovation in 
bus manufacturing is based on two factors: the engine and vehicle design, and the 
technological add-in items.  We observed that tendering seems to affect add-on items, 
for instance, ICT, new ticketing systems, the automatic vehicle location system.  It 
illustrates that, in the short term, this is a more client-oriented innovation.  However, 
in the long term, the manufacturers may not have the incentive to develop an 
innovation for the bus sector, as they do not have the financial resources for that.  
                                                 
8 This is similar to the QBPs in the UK. 
9 See Section 6.3.3 for the full cycle of the Dutch tendering process. 
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Thus, tendering might be a threat for the innovation in terms of engine and vehicle 
development.  
 
7.3.5 Discussion 
The authorities (PZH and SRR) in the PZH area have shown a considerable degree of 
capabilities development and learning in the tendering process in the past three years.  
Although the process of tender has just begun in 2002, and only four concessions 
have been awarded since then, the authorities have utilised the tender process in a 
positive way.  However, one important element that the authorities lack is a 
monitoring system.  The authorities need to be more active in monitoring the public 
transport services that are provided in an area.   
 
There is an issue regarding the concession specification.  This issue is twofold: the 
size of concession area and the contract length.  First, in general, a larger area of 
concession should induce more innovation, as the operator can afford an investment 
in innovation from the large turnover of the concession.  However, we observed that 
the concession areas result in a small number of bidders (as in the DBL/RHM case10).  
This creates entry barriers to new, small operators.  Second, the contract length also 
determines the innovation in the tendering process.  For instance, the operators 
usually state that they need to have a contract of at least 6 years in order to be able to 
invest in the new buses.  However, we also see that the longer contract length creates 
a slower feedback system.  This means that, during the concession period, new 
developments can hardly occur.  Once the contract is given, the possibility to have an 
innovation (in this concession area) is to wait for the next round of the tender.  
Furthermore, the learning on the parts of both the authority and operator depends on 
the tendering and the length of the contract.  A longer contract might create a situation 
where both parties learn slowly.  This problem is more likely to be found on the 
authority side rather than the operator side, because operators are often involved in the 
tendering process in more than one area, probably around 7 – 10 concessions per year.  
The authority normally has less chance to experience the tendering processes, perhaps 
only a concession per year (as in the PZH area).   
 
Fares and revenue allocations were also an issue that was often mentioned in the 
interviews.  Most operators complained about the WROOV system (see Section 
6.3.5).  Although Veeneman (2002) suggested that the WROOV system was able to 
redistribute revenue and subsidies satisfactorily, including some incentives for 
operational efficiency, the operators in our cases did not believe so.  This is inline 
with the Veeneman (2002)’s finding that the WROOV system creates a financial 
uncertainty.  It hampered accurate evaluation of travellers’ reactions to innovation 
(Veeneman, 2002).  The service improvements did not result in an increase of revenue 
allocation from the WROOV system.  
 
Interviewees in our cases saw the WROOV system as one of the barriers to 
innovation, especially in the quality improvement of the services.  They pointed out 
that the WROOV system often allocated revenues in favour of the majors operators in 
                                                 
10 Although it can be argued that the bidders can offer only one of the concession packages, the bidders 
might consider that not offering a whole package would reduce their chance to win the concessions.  
Thus, it might be better not to prepare the offer at all, as the bidding preparation would incur 
considerable cost. 
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the big cities (e.g. Amsterdam and Rotterdam).  Those operators in the big cities used 
some tactics to generate information to contribute to an increase in revenue from the 
system, such as a renewal of annual public transport cards at the reduction rates.  It 
seemed that the operators’ efforts to increase the quality (higher frequency, low floor 
buses) did not affect the revenue that they received from the WROOV system.  In 
some extreme cases, the operators complained that, despite an increase in the number 
of passengers, the revenue surprisingly decreased.  Despite the extensive surveys 
conducted annually, it would appear that the WROOV system does not reflect the real 
changes of the number of passengers at the concession level.  
 
The issue of fares and revenue allocation brings us to the point of the type of 
contracts.  The difference between net cost contract and gross cost contract is the 
revenue risk that is borne by the operator in the net cost contract.  In the PZH cases, 
the authorities employed the net cost contract.  Given the WROOV system currently 
in use, the revenue incentives from the net cost contract are not fully utilised, as the 
revenue is not properly allocated.  An increase in the number of passengers may not 
result in the increase in the revenue, as you might expect from the net cost contract 
regime.  Furthermore, there might be a delay in terms of the revenue allocation from 
the WROOV system as well.  This then reduces an operator’s incentive to attract 
more new passengers.  Nevertheless, we might see a radical change in this aspect, as 
the smart card system will be introduced in the near future.  It is hoped that this smart 
card system will solve this problem.  Thus, the aim of the net cost contract can be 
realised, i.e. the operators would have an incentive to improve the services to attract 
more passengers. 
 
Furthermore, the balance between market power and centralised planning is needed to 
maintain the synergy of the public transport systems.  The problem of the service 
connections has not yet been realised in this area.  However, as the public transport 
services in the Rotterdam city (RET operates at the moment) will be tendered, well- 
coordinated planning for the services is crucial.  There might be a problem if there are 
different operators in two concessions that are connected, but they are not cooperating 
with each other.  Thus, the authority needs to be careful in designing the tender 
documents so that they include conditions that clearly enforce the implementation of 
the cooperation between operators in practice.   
 
Overall, we found that operators have developed their competences in the new 
competitive environment.  We observe positive development of the innovative 
capabilities of the operators.  The competitive pressure from the tendering process 
leads to situations in which the operators must innovate in order to be competitive in 
the market.   
7.4 London bus tendering11 
7.4.1 Introduction 
There have been contrasting regulatory developments in the UK bus market.  Outside 
London, the market has been deregulated since 1985, and within London, there is a 
system of regulated competitive tendering.  These regulatory changes took place at 
                                                 
11 The London case is based on document analysis of secondary data. 
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the same time in the UK bus market.  Here we compare the tendering case in London 
to that of the Netherlands. 
 
Prior to the regulatory reform, bus services in the London area were provided by the 
publicly-owned London Buses Limited.  The London Regional Transport Act of 1984 
reorganised the sector.  The Act designated London Transport as the authority 
responsible for the provision and procurement of public transport services in the 
London area, as well as for the development and operation of bus stations and 
operational maintenance.  The tendering process was gradual.  The auction took place 
in 1985, but it was not until 1995 that half of the network was tendered at least once 
(Cantillon and Pesendorfer, 2006). 
 
The general indicators of the London bus market are provided in Table 7-2.  The 
general trend is that there has been growth in both vehicle-kilometres and the number 
of passenger journeys in the past decade.  In terms of service support, we see some 
fluctuation in the figures for a number of underlying reasons.  The main reason is that, 
before 1994/95, the London entire bus fleet was in the public sector.  The decrease in 
support in the mid-1990s was a reflection of the sale of the bus fleet to the private 
sector.  In recent years, Transport for London (TfL)12, as the tendering authority for 
the network, has increased its bus services by contracts with private sector bus 
operators (Department for Transport, 2005). 
Table 7-2 Indicators of London bus market 1994 – 2005  
Year 
Vehicle 
kilometres 
(millions) 
Passenger 
journeys 
(millions) 
Average fare 
per passenger 
kilometres at 
2004/05 
prices 
(Pence) 
Local authority 
service support a 
(£ million, 
2004/2005 prices) 
Cost per vehicle-
kilometre 
(pence/veh.-km., 
2004/05 prices) 
1994/95 356 1,155 15.9 71 190 
1995/96 353 1,193 16.0 38 177 
1996/97 342 1,230 16.1 14 188 
1997/98 362 1,281 15.7 1 180 
1998/99 358 1,266 16.0 14 178 
1999/00 366 1,294 16.1 11 178 
2000/01 373 1,347 15.3 92 184 
2001/02 379 1,422 14.3 201 193 
2002/03 406 1,527 12.9 446 215 
2003/04 474 1,692 12.3 577 216 
2004/05 470 1,782 12.9 545 221 
Change 
2000/01-
2004/05 
26% 32% -16% 492% 20% 
Note: aLondon support is funded by TfL. Before 1994/95 the London bus fleet was all in the public 
sector. The falls in support in the mid 1990s reflect the sale of the bus fleet to the private sector. In 
recent years TfL, as the tendering authority for the network, has increased its bus services by contracts 
with private sector bus operators. 
Source: Department for Transport (2005) and Transport for London (2006). 
 
With regard to the types of contracts, they were originally put out for tender on a 
smaller scale, and on a routes-based contract.  However, there was an attempt to 
                                                 
12 In July 2000, London Transport was replaced by a new organisation called Transport for London 
(TfL), part of the Grater London Authority. 
 Innovation and Regulatory Reform in Public Transport 
 
 
148
transfer the risk to the private sector, which was a move from gross cost contracts to 
net cost contracts where the operator bore some of the revenue risk.  At first, these 
contracts were negotiated with the incumbent operators and were not subject to 
competition.  However, this trial seemed not successful, and only gross cost contracts 
have been offered since 1999 (Toner, 2001). 
 
There are around 800 bus routes operating in the London.  Although the detailed 
statistics of the contract are not publicly available, some literature suggests interesting 
information.  Cantillon and Pesendorfer (2006) indicate that there are around 3.7 
routes per contract, but the range of the contracts ranges from 1 route to 21 routes in a 
single auction.  Currently, TfL holds an auction every two or three weeks.  
Furthermore, Toner (2001) studied the London tender data which has an average of 
2.8 bids per awarded tender. 
 
It should be pointed out that the London bus services have achieved the highest 
number of passengers in recent years.  As we can see from Table 7-2, there has been 
remarkable growth since the year 2000, around 32% growth from 2001 to 2005.  We 
will discuss the underlying reason for this growth later on. 
 
There are over 30 operators in the bus transport services in London.  However, more 
than 80% of the services are provided by five large operators: Arriva Group PLC, 
First Group PLC, Go-Ahead Group PLC, Metroline PLC, and Stagecoach Group 
Holding PLC.  Table 7-3 shows the market share of London bus services. 
Table 7-3 Market share of London buses in 2005 
Company 
Scheduled 
mileage 
(millions) 
Market share 
by Scheduled 
mileage 
Passenger 
boarding 
(millions) 
Market share 
by passenger 
boarding 
Arriva Group PLC 54.9 19% 359.1 20% 
First Group PLC 43.9 15% 270.9 15% 
Go-Ahead Group PLC 50.4 18% 318.5 18% 
Metroline PLC 38.9 14% 260.8 15% 
Stagecoach Group Holding PLC 45.6 16% 305.6 17% 
Total - Big Five 233.7 81% 1514.9 85% 
Transdev PLC 27.6 10% 161.4 9% 
National Express Group PLC 13.3 5% 61.3 3% 
Others 12.9 4% 55.4 3% 
Total 287.5 100% 1793.0 100% 
Source: London Assembly Transport Committee Questions on Bus Contracts, 
19 January 2006. 
 
An important transport policy development in London is the congestion charging 
scheme.  In February 2003, the London Congestion Charging Zone was implemented.  
This scheme charges all passenger cars that enter the inner zone of London.  The 
creation of this scheme offered the opportunity to create real improvements in bus 
service and both a reduction in congestion and improvements in bus services have 
resulted (Hendy, 2005).  
 
7.4.2 Innovation model for London case 
London is unique within the UK because it is the only place where local government, 
namely the Mayor of London and Transport for London, has responsibility for the 
planning and operation of buses (Hendy, 2005).  TfL is also responsible for the 
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provision of bus stations, stops, bus priority measures, information, performance 
monitoring, and other support services including transport policing and enforcement.  
It is clear that the centralised system is one of the factors that contribute to the growth 
of bus use in recent years.   
 
Hendy (2005) lists key recent policies that account for the success of the London 
buses as follows: 
- Creating a new image 
- Social inclusion 
- Local economy 
- Tickets – Oyster (smart card) 
- Congestion charging 
- Vehicles – introduction of 
articulated buses 
- Quality investment contracts 
- A comprehensive service 
- Transport policy and pricing 
- Better information 
- Environmental improvements 
- Better standards for staff 
- Funding 
 
A key element of the London bus system is the power of local authority in planning 
and controlling over fares and services.  All policies come from the authority 
initiatives.  This gives a more integrated policy.  Next, we will discuss the analysis of 
innovative capabilities and learning in the London case. 
 
Innovative capabilities and learning: 
The authority (TfL) has developed both technical and organisational capabilities.  In 
terms of technical capabilities, TfL has initiated both infrastructure and vehicle 
innovation.  In addition, TfL has focused on service improvements, such as the 
introduction of the Oyster card (the smart card) system and a comprehensive service.  
Furthermore, the quality investment contracts can be seen as an organisational 
development.  This brings about a service improvement. 
7.5 The Dutch tendering vs. London tendering 
This section aims to compare the innovative capabilities of the two cases, PZH and 
the London areas.  But a definite conclusion as to which case is more innovative is 
beyond our scope as both areas differ in their demographical characteristics and 
overall transport systems.  Nonetheless, this comparison analyses the process of 
capability development and learning which could contribute some useful lessons in 
terms of innovation in the public transport sector.   
 
PZH and London are rather different in terms of areas and population.   Table 7-4 
shows demographical and transport indicators of PZH and London areas.  In terms of 
population density, even with the PZH area being the most populated area in the 
Netherlands, the London area is far more populated.  In fact, the London area is 
considered a mega city, whereas the PZH area is still a mixture of urban and rural 
areas.  For the transport modal share, the share of public transport (train, bus, tram, 
and metro or underground) in London (35.4%) is higher that in PZH (17.8%).  It 
shows that travellers in PZH are still car-dependent.  It should be noted that, given the 
high public transport modal share, London should benefit from the economy of scale 
of the public transport services.  Here, the service integration is a crucial aspect.  
Failure in the service connections may result in a decrease in public transport users. 
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Table 7-4 Demographical and transport indicators of PZH and London areas 
 PZH Londona 
Population (millions) 3.45 7.43 
Area (km2) 2,818 1,579 
Population density (per km2) 1,227 4,697 
Transport mode share (%)b   
Car 67.1% 40.9% 
Bus, tram, metro (underground) 10.5% 28.3% 
Train 7.3% 7.1% 
Other modes 15.2% 23.8% 
Note: a London information came from London Travel Report 2005 (Transport for London, 2006). 
b Transport mode shares of PZH are calculated from passenger-km in 2002 from ov-monitor 
data (www.ov-monitor.nl).  Mode shares of London are calculated from average number of 
daily journeys. 
Source: See notes in the table 
 
In terms of tendering processes, the main difference between tendering in PZH and 
London is that the London authority has substantial experience in the tendering 
process as it conducts tenders every two to three weeks.  On the contrary, PZH has 
only 1-2 tenders each year and just began utilising the tendering process in 2002. 
 
We can compare the innovative capabilities between PZH and London using the 
analyses we discussed earlier.  Table 7-5 shows a summary of this comparison. 
Table 7-5 A comparison of innovative capabilities between Provincie Zuid-
Holland and London 
  Provincie Zuid 
Holland Case London Case 
Technical capability Moderate High 
Organisational/Competence High High Authority 
Learning Fast Moderate/bus strong 
Technical capability Moderate Low 
Organisational/Competence High Moderate Operator 
Learning Fast Moderate 
 
In terms of innovative capabilities, both authorities showed a considerable degree of 
technical and organisational capabilities.  In the PZH case, the technical capability is 
moderate because PZH hardly initiated any technical development, especially in the 
infrastructure aspect.  PZH seems to lack technical capabilities which forces to the 
operator to initiate the ideas in this area.  However, the organisational and competence 
of PZH is high because they can develop their knowledge to organise the tendering 
process very well.  We see the quality improvement from the operator as one of the 
successful features in their tendering processes. 
 
TfL has a very high technical capability and organisational competence.  In terms of 
technical capability, TfL initiated many technical developments, including a smart 
card system.  It is a strong commanding authority, which has initiated many 
innovations that benefit passengers in the public transport system.  However, this 
gives little room for operator to innovate, which results in a weaker operator in terms 
of technical capability and organisational competence.  Compared to the London case, 
PZH shows a fast learning curve in the tendering process as it utilises the system in a 
very short period of time.   
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The operators in PZH tend to have higher innovative capabilities than the operators in 
London.  In London, the operators have little room to initiate any new ideas, as the 
contracts are based on gross cost.  It can be concluded that the operators in London 
have low innovative capability in infrastructure division.  However, the operators in 
London have moderate organisational and competence capabilities, as they have to 
improve their service quality in order to compete in the tender. 
7.6 Innovation in bus sector: Is tendering good for innovation?  
This chapter presented the case study on innovation in the tendering process in the bus 
sector.  We analysed the relationship between the tendering process and innovation 
with the empirical evidences from the case studies in the Netherlands and in London.  
In this section, we will categorise our findings into four topics: the tendering process 
and innovation, the role of innovative capabilities and learning, lessons from the 
cross-case comparison, and the conclusion.  These findings are described below. 
 
The tendering process and innovation 
The authorities in the Netherlands are moving towards quality-oriented public 
transport services.  Using the tendering process as a tool, the authorities have 
achieved better quality of the public transport services.  The empirical cases in PZH 
illustrate the development path in three steps.  First, PZH followed the path of the net 
cost contract where the operator is responsible for the revenue risk.  Second, PZH 
chose to give the services design freedom.  This indicates that PZH believes that this 
should benefit the users more than restrict the service design made by the authority.  
Third, PZH followed a path toward the investment in innovation.  PZH chose to go 
for ICT that required an investment in the infrastructure. 
 
It is clear that quality is now an important issue in the tendering process in the 
Netherlands.  We observe the trend towards the inclusion of quality aspects into the 
tender documents.  Both PZH and SRR incorporate the quality aspects as criteria for 
awarding the concessions.  Although quality has a broader definition, authorities tend 
to anticipate the quality improvement through certain kinds of technological 
innovation, such as low floor buses, the travel information system, and the smart card.  
In all, passengers seem to benefit from this improvement, although it is not yet known 
whether this will sustain in the long-term. 
 
On the operator side, we observe that the innovation is used as a strategic tool for 
winning the concession.  Where it is possible, operators tend to widen the quality 
aspects of their public transport services to capture more passengers, or to show to the 
authority that they are willing to innovate in wider issues.  
 
In addition, we observe that both technological and organisational innovations in the 
tender are easy to imitate.  In terms of technological innovation, we see the 
duplications of the new, low floor bus and the travel information system.  In terms of 
organisational innovation, operators in the Netherlands have developed the same type 
of the tender team to handle all tenders in both bus and train concessions.   
 
The contract specification is a crucial element of the tendering process.  This issue is 
twofold: the size of concession area and the contract length.  First, in general, a larger 
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area of concession should induce more innovation, as the operator can afford to invest 
in innovation from the large turnover of the concession.  However, we observed that 
the large area results in a small number of bidders.  This would create entry barriers to 
the new small operator to enter the market.  Second, the contract length also 
determines the innovation in the tendering process.  For instance, the operators 
usually state that they need to have a contract of at least 6 years in order to be able to 
invest in the new buses.  However, we also see that the longer contract length create a 
slower feedback system.  This means that, during the concession period, new 
developments can hardly occur.  Once the contract is given, the only possibility of 
incurring an innovation (in this concession area) is to wait for the next round of 
tender.  Furthermore, the learning of both the authority and operators depends on the 
tendering and the length of the contract.  The longer contract might create a situation 
where both parties learn slowly.  This problem is more likely to be found in the 
authority side rather than the operator side, because operators are often involved in the 
tendering process in more than one concession, probably around 7 – 10 concessions 
per year.  The authority normally has less chance to experience the tendering 
processes, perhaps only a concession per year (as in the PZH area).   
 
Fares and revenue allocations were also an issue often mentioned in the interviews.  
Interviewees in our cases saw the WROOV system as one of the barriers to 
innovation, especially in terms of the quality improvement of the services.  They 
pointed out that the WROOV system often allocated revenues in favour of the major 
operators in the big cities (e.g. Amsterdam and Rotterdam).  The operators in the big 
cities used some tactics to generate information that contributes to an increase in 
revenue from the system, such as the renewal of annual public transport cards at the 
reduced rates.  It seemed that the operators’ effort to increase quality (higher 
frequency, low floor buses) did not affect the revenue that they received from the 
WROOV system.  In some extreme cases, the operators complained that, despite an 
increase in the number of passengers, the revenue was surprisingly decreased.  
Despite the extensive surveys conducted every year, it appeared that the WROOV 
system did not reflect the real changes in the number of passengers at the concession 
level.  The issue of fares and revenue allocation brings us to the point of the type of 
contracts.  The difference between net cost contract and gross cost contract is the 
revenue risk that is borne by the operator in the net cost contract.  In the PZH cases, 
the authorities employed the net cost contract.  Given the WROOV system currently 
in use, the revenue incentives from the net cost contract seemed not to fully utilise, as 
the revenue was not allocated properly. The increase in a number of passengers may 
not result in the increase in the revenue, as you might expect from the net cost 
contract regime. Furthermore, there might be a delay in terms of the revenue 
allocation, from the WROOV system as well. This then reduces an operator’s 
incentive to increase the effort to attract more new passengers. Nevertheless, we 
might see a radical change in this aspect, as the smart card system would be 
introduced in the near future. It is hoped that this smart card system will solve this 
problem. Thus, the aim of the net cost contract can be realised, i.e. the operators 
would have an incentive to improve the services to attract more passengers. 
 
 
Overall, we found that operators have developed their competences in the new 
competitive environment.  We observe positive development of the innovative 
capabilities of the operators.  The competitive pressure from the tendering process 
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leads to situations in which the operators must innovate in order to be competitive in 
the market. 
 
The role of innovative capabilities and learning 
We should see innovation in the bus sector as a process, not a technological 
advancement.  Although technologies, such as low floor buses, dynamic travel 
information, and the smart card, improve the quality of the public transport services, 
the mechanism of influencing these technologies through the tendering process is 
more important for the policy decision-makers.  If we could understand the 
behaviours of the decision-makers in the system, then we would be able to design 
incentive schemes to induce more innovation that can improve the public transport 
services. 
 
In sum, we can conclude that the operators react positively to the tendering process.  
As a result of the tendering processes, the operators offer better public transport 
services.  However, it should be noted that the operators are innovative because 
winning the tender is the operators’ commercial interest.  We observed that the 
authorities used the tendering process as a tool to encourage innovation that is 
compatible with their commercial objectives from the operators. 
 
However, there are two serious issues that the tendering process in the Netherlands 
did not cover: the infrastructure provision and the monitoring aspect.  First, the 
infrastructure provision is not incorporated in the tendering process.  In all cases, we 
have found no interest in the infrastructure provision (e.g. bus lane or bus priority 
initiatives) in the tender documents.  The infrastructure development is important for 
the authority in terms of its ability to compete with the private cars.  For instance, the 
bus priority and exclusive bus lanes would allow faster bus travel time, especially in 
the traffic-congested area.  Although the operators would benefit from this 
infrastructure in terms of lower operating costs, we did not find this issue important to 
the operator. 
 
Clearly, the operators are not interested in investing in the infrastructure unless there 
are significant benefits from such a project.  The payback period of investment in the 
infrastructure, such as a guided bus lane, is rather long, probably more than 15 years.  
It seems impossible to allow such a long contract in the current setting of the 
tendering process in the bus sector.  Alternatively, the authority could develop the 
infrastructure by itself, and let the operator use it under certain conditions, such as a 
lower subsidy level or a contribution to the infrastructure maintenance cost.  This kind 
of innovation must come form the authority’s initiative.     
 
The second aspect is the monitoring issue.  We observed that the authority relied upon 
the operator to provide the public transport operation.  Information regarding the 
performance of the operator is hardly available.  This makes the assessment and 
comparison issues very difficult.  Thus, in terms of service quality and operating 
performances, it is not easy to identify the progress.   
 
Lessons from the cross-cases comparison 
In comparing the London and PZH areas, the London case illustrates a strong 
centralised policy.  The coherence between the public transport policy and the general 
transport policy in the area is one of the successful factors in the recent growth of the 
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public transport ridership.  Innovative capabilities of the London authority (TfL) are 
high, and its learning element is moderate but strong.  One lesson that we can learn 
from the London case is that the public authority should consider not only the policy 
in the public transport sector, but also the transport policy as an integrated system.   
 
Furthermore, the authority should also take initiative as a system integrator.  The 
public transport concessions should not be operated independently. The authority 
should provide an incentive to the operators to cooperate in terms of service 
integration.  This integration should be encouraged both between concessions and 
between modes.  This integration covers not only the transfer facilities, such as the 
integration between bus stops and train stations, but also the timetable integration as 
well.  
 
Conclusion 
The tendering process leads to the service-oriented innovation.  The operators adopt 
their strategies to widen the quality aspects of the public transport services in order to 
win more concessions.  However, the operators concentrate only on the aspects that 
suit their commercial interests (profitability and continuity).  This leaves an important 
task to the authority to facilitate a tendering process that influences the operators in 
innovating in a way that benefits the society.    
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Chapter 8 Empirical Cases in Railway: Is Innovation an 
Issue?1 
8.1 Introduction 
As we discussed in Chapter 6, the organisation of European railways is rapidly 
changing due to competition.  In the passenger railway sector, direct (on-track) 
competition is not practically plausible, thus only competitive tendering can be used.  
The current chapter will illustrate empirical evidence of the effects of tendering (or 
franchising in the UK) on innovation in the railway sector.  The case studies to be 
discussed involve two countries: the Netherlands and the UK.  The regulatory 
framework in both cases follows the competitive tendering model.  Additionally, we 
will look at the roles of infrastructure managers and rolling stock developments in the 
railway sector in this changing regulatory environment.   
 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows.  Section 8.2 analyses the railway 
tendering case in the Provincie Groningen and surrounding areas in the northern part 
of the Netherlands.  Section 8.3 analyses the railway franchising case of Merseyrail 
Electrics in the UK.  Section 8.4 examines the role of infrastructure managers in the 
tendering process.  Section 8.5 discusses the relationship between technological 
innovation in rolling stock and regulatory reform.  Finally, Section 8.6 analyses to 
what extent an innovation can play a role in the railway sector. 
8.2 Tendering railway services in the Netherlands: the Case of Groningen 
8.2.1 Introduction 
The Netherlands has little experience in railway tendering.  Since 2000, only 5 
concessions have been put out for tender, and the majority of those were small 
concessions, mostly regional train services.  The first train concession included the 
regional train services in the northern part of the Netherlands in the areas of Provincie 
Groningen (PG) and Provincie Friesland (PF) (see Figure 8-1).  Each Provincie 
Authority has a public transport division which prepares the public transport planning.   
 
The Groningen case is interesting because it was a pioneer of the decentralisation of 
the railway services in the Netherlands.  The first tender began in 1999 and the 
concession started in 2000.  The contract lasted 5 ½ years.  The second round of 
tender commenced in 2005 and the concession will start in 2006.  This current 
                                                 
1 Section 8.5 of this chapter is partly based on an article in the Journal of the Eastern Asia Society for 
Transportation Studies (Ongkittikul and Geerlings, 2005). 
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concession is a 15-year contract.  The details of the first and the current concessions 
are described in the next section. 
 
 
Figure 8-1 Map of the Provincie Groningen and Provincie Friesland 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Netherlands_map_large.png  
 
The data collection methods for the Groningen case are twofold.  First, an interview 
method was conducted to collect qualitative information.  We interviewed the 
authority who is currently responsible for the concession area (PG in this case2) and 
the company who will be operating the concession (Arriva in this case).  In addition to 
these main actors in the tendering process, we interviewed the infrastructure 
company, ProRail, focusing primarily of the role of infrastructure managers in the 
tendering process.  Each interview session was divided into two parts.  The first part 
consisted of several open-ended questions regarding the tendering process and 
innovation.  The second part of the interview was open for general discussion 
regarding the incentives and barriers of innovation in the tendering process.  The 
secondary source of information consists of various publications, such as policy 
documents, press releases, consultancy reports, and tender documents.  With these 
two sources of information, we analysed the cases according to the analysis 
framework that we proposed in Chapter 5. 
 
8.2.2 The previous concession 
In 1995, during the reform of the Dutch national railway company (Nederlandse 
Spoorwegen: NS) (see Chapter 6), the Ministry of Transport and Public Works and 
NS Passengers agreed that the subsidy from the government would gradually be 
reduced over time.  Moreover, from mid-1998, NS Passengers had the freedom to 
modify otherwise unprofitable train services.  In order to preserve these social 
services, the government created additional contracts.  NS Passengers ran thirty 
different train services offered by the Ministry of Transport and Public Works on 
March 20th, 1996.  Despite these contracts, future NS Passenger services reduced in 
                                                 
2 Although both PG and PF awarded this railway concession, PG was the authority that organised the 
tender.  Thus, we will refer PG as the authority in this case. 
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number.  Consequently, the government chose to use the competition ‘for’ the track, 
through the tendering process to resolve the problem.  
 
In 1998, PG and PF agreed to experiment with the decentralisation of the railway.  
The contract services previously operated by NS Passengers were put out for tender.  
In 1999, the invitation to tender was introduced to cover the three regional train 
services in Groningen.  The tender procedure was conducted and the result of the 
tendering process was that NoordNed3 would operate these lines from June 1st, 2000 
to December 11th, 2005.  PF and the Ministry of Transport and Public Works also had 
an agreement with NoordNed to work with train service line between Leerwarden and 
Groningen.  This agreement was finished at the end of the timetable 2005 (11 
December 20054). 
 
The concession in 1999 was rather experimental.  PG had little experience in the train 
tendering process, so they opted for a short-term contract (5 ½ years).  This short-term 
contract constrained the operator from making any major investments in rolling stock 
and infrastructure.  Later, PG stated that it had a bad experience with the old material 
(rolling stock) from NoordNed.  As a result, in the second round of concessions, they 
opted for new rolling stock.  Next, we will discuss the tendering process in that 
concession. 
 
8.2.3 The tendering process 
When PG began to discuss the tendering process for the three train services in 
Groningen, the Ministry of Transport and Public Works suggested that it might be 
possible to put the train services in the northern part of the Netherlands together at 
once.  In a discussion with the relevant parties, an agreement was reached that the 
tender would be divided into three separate packages.  Two packages included train 
services in Groningen and Friesland, and the other package entailed train services 
between Groningen and Leer (a city in the western part of Germany).  The parties 
involved in that concession were PG, PF, the Ministry of Transport and Public Works, 
and the regional authority of Germany (Landesnahverkehrsgesellschaft 
Niedersachsen: LNVG).  
 
The three packages were divided as follows.  Package A consisted of two railway 
lines: Leeuwarden – Harlingen Haven and Leeuwarden – Stavoren.  Package B 
involved of one railway line: Groningen – Leeuwarden.  Finally, Package C consisted 
of three railway lines: Groningen – Roodeschool, Groningen – Delfzijl, and 
Groningen – Nieuweschans – Leer (Germany).  The bidders could make an offer on 
all of the packages or any of them separately.   
 
The tender document in this case is dissimilar to the tender documents we discussed 
in the bus cases (in the Provincie Zuid-Holland cases).  In this case, the service 
requirements were described meticulously, which left little room for the operator to 
come up with new ideas.  As mentioned earlier, PG opted for new rolling stock due to 
                                                 
3 It should be noted that NoordNed in the first concession (2000–2005) was a consortium of two 
parties: Arriva and NS.  But later Arriva took over all the shares of the company and became the sole 
shareholder to prepare for the bid in later concessions. 
4 The railway timetable of the Netherlands (and most parts of Europe) changes around 11-13 December 
every year.  Therefore, concessions usually start on this date.  
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their bad experience in the previous concession.  With the help of the Ministry of 
Transport and Public Works, PG put forward a proposal for a long-term contract (15 
years) including an investment in new rolling stocks.  The requirement for the new 
rolling stocks was explicitly stated in the tender document.  In addition, some other 
quality elements, such as the accessibility issue and the implementation of the smart 
card (Chipkaart), were indicated.  Based on a one hundred point scale, ninety points 
were to be awarded for the price aspect, and ten points were to be awarded for quality.  
It should be noted that the contract of this concession was based on a net cost contract 
basis.  The train tariffs are generally based on NS Passenger train services’ tariffs.  
 
The tendering process started in mid-2003 and the result of the tendering was 
announced on March 29th, 2005.  The concession started on December 11th, 2005 and 
will conclude at the end of 2020.  The contract length is 15 years. 
 
PG anticipated offers from 3 or 4 companies, but only two companies participated: 
Arriva and BBA-Connex.  Originally, there were three companies that had expressed 
their interest.  The other was Connexxion who decided, in the end, not to make an 
offer.  The result was that Arriva won the concession for all three packages.  The 
tender outcomes can be summarised as follows (as stated in the Arriva’s press 
release): 
- New rolling stocks: air-conditioned, low floor (same height as the platform). 
- Implementation of the smart card by January 20065. 
- Coffee service onboard. 
- Improvement of social security on the train: cameras onboard and presence of 
staff at the stations. 
- Travel information provision 
- More public bicycle services (OV-fietsen6) and treintaxi7 services. 
- The trial of the mobile stations: an innovative development whereby a 
movable (temporary) platform can be used. 
 
The procurement process for the new rolling stock takes time.  Arriva planned to have 
the first new rolling stock by November 2006 and expected to have all new trains by 
September 2007. 
 
In general, the authorities (PG and PF) were pleased with the tendering result.  Thus 
far, Arriva has begun to operate the concession, but the new trains have yet to arrive.  
Therefore, it is too soon to make any assessment on the operation at this time.   
 
8.2.4 Innovative capabilities and learning 
Next, we will discuss the innovative capabilities and how the authority and operator 
learned from this case.  It should be noted that there is less evidence in reference to 
the learning element as we focus only on one case.  A more thorough and accurate 
analysis would necessitate more cases. 
  
 
                                                 
5 There was a delay as a consequence of the implementation of the smart card at the national level.  The 
new schedule is now at the beginning of 2007. 
6 OV-Fietsen is the bicycle rental service at the train station.  
7 Treintaxi is the shared-taxi service at the train station. 
Chapter 8 - Empirical Cases in Railway: Is Innovation an Issue?  
 
 
159
Authority  
PG shows a considerable degree of development in terms of its technical capabilities.  
Although it had assistance from various partners (including ProRail) in terms of the 
compatibility of new equipment (such as new rolling stock), it showed a great deal of 
radical decision-making when preparing the proposal for the tender documents.   
 
In terms of organisational capabilities, PG utilises the tendering process very well.  
Because they prescribed service characteristics in great detail, they acquired what they 
demanded.  The major element in this tendering process is the new rolling stock.  PG 
explicitly described in the tender documents that the new rolling stock must be 
equipped with high accessibility, i.e. low floor trains. 
 
Operator: 
In this case, Arriva shows very high technical capabilities of bringing in new rolling 
stock.  Furthermore, ICT and the smart card system are also included in the offer.  
The new rolling stock is low floor.  They are, in fact, the first low floor trains to be 
used in the Netherlands.  There are some issues revolving around the implementation 
of the new vehicles, however.  For example, ProRail casts some doubts in reference to 
the differences in the height of the platforms on the train lines.  As the new trains have 
not yet arrived, the solution to this problem remains to be seen.  Moreover, there is an 
issue with the implementation of the mobile station.  At the moment, ProRail will not 
allow Arriva to implement this concept due to safety regulations. We understand that 
there is still some discussion between the two parties revolving around this issue. 
 
Another concern in this concession is that Arriva chose to contract out the 
maintenance activities to a German company (Voith Railservices Ltd.) for two 
reasons.  Arriva stated (in their press release) that it requires the highest demands in 
the maintenance of their trains; Voith Railservices Ltd. met those demands.  This was 
somewhat of a surprise, however, since Nedtrain, a subsidiary of NS, is a monopoly in 
terms of the maintenance activities in the Netherlands.  Arriva also stated that more 
competition in the maintenance market would strengthen the railway sector. 
 
In addition, the new trains will be delivered by a relatively small manufacturing 
company, Stadler (Swiss based manufacturing company), rather than the big 
companies.  We anticipate that the rolling stock order of this concession is rather 
small, compared to a large contract order from the national railway.  Nonetheless, the 
innovation issue of the new rolling stocks is fascinating because the low-floor train is 
a new concept.  It is wise to implement the new technology on a small scale in the 
beginning.  In this way, we slowly learn from the implementation of the low-floor 
train, and apply that knowledge in the years to come. 
 
Infrastructure company: 
In this case, ProRail is the infrastructure provider.  The network in this concession is 
mostly a regional network with some points that connect to the main routes.  In terms 
of capacity allocation, ProRail has received a complaint from Arriva regarding delays 
at some parts of the network where there was a great deal of NS train traffic.  It is 
possible that NS trains, which are both regional and intercity trains, are delayed, 
which in turn cause a delay among Arriva trains, which are regional trains.   
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In the tendering process, ProRail plays a small, rather passive role in the innovation.  
In principle, ProRail provided advice to both the authority and the operator regarding 
the technical aspects of the tracks and stations.  It provided information on the 
capacity of the tracks that was included in the tender.  From our discussion with 
ProRail, we observed that the bidders (potential operators) often discussed with 
ProRail, both formally and informally, the possibility for innovation that could be 
included in the offers.  The bidders also asked about the capacity of the tracks, as that 
information was crucial in designing a timetable in the offers.  However, ProRail had 
and has no initiatives to innovate on a particular concession.  The ProRail innovation 
program was based primarily on the Dutch network.  We will elaborate on the role of 
the infrastructure managers in Section 8.4. 
 
8.2.5 Discussion 
In general, both parties, the authorities and operator, have shown a great deal of 
innovative capability throughout the tendering process; much innovation was 
proposed and implemented from this tender.  We observed the learning process from 
the standpoint of both the authority and operator.  The authority learned from their 
previous experience that new rolling stocks are needed in order to improve the service 
quality.  The authority then saw an opportunity for a new rolling stock investment and 
came up with the 15-year contract.  This long-term contract seems suitable for the 
rolling stock investment.   
 
There were some barriers at the operational level when the concession began.  
Arriva’s proposal for the implementation of a mobile station was not approved by 
ProRail to be implemented.  ProRail was concerned about the safety issues related to 
this concept.  This issue is still being discussed.  This is just one example of the 
complexity of railway operation.  Also, we observed that the interdependence of the 
infrastructure and vehicle (rolling stock) complicates the tendering process in the 
railway sector, especially in terms of the technical elements.  Because the railway 
system is less flexible, the implementation of the innovation, such as changes in 
infrastructure or the traffic management system, may be slower than in the bus sector.  
Furthermore, the result of the low floor train still remains to be seen, as it has not yet 
been implemented. 
 
We observed the passive role of ProRail in the tendering process.  In general, ProRail 
provided the technical information concerning the tracks and stations in the 
concession area.  Formal and informal discussions were conducted between the 
bidders regarding potential innovations to be included in the offers.  Clearly, the role 
of ProRail needs to be addressed more explicitly in the tendering process; their 
playing field level in this process needs to be identified.  We will discuss this issue 
later in Section 8.4. 
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8.3 Franchising a long-term contract: the case of Merseyrail Electrics8 
8.3.1 Introduction 
As described in Chapter 6, the privatisation of the UK railway system began in the 
mid-1990s, and the railway passenger services were put out for tender (franchising) in 
1996.  Originally, the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF) administered 
the franchising process.  But later, there was a reorganisation of the railway 
government bodies.  The Strategic Rail Authority (SRA) took over the functions of 
the ORPAF in 2001. 
 
The Merseyrail Electrics case is interesting because the current operator is a 
consortium in which a Dutch company is involved.  Furthermore, the contract of this 
franchise is an exceptionally long 25 years. 
 
The Merseyrail Electrics franchise includes passenger rail services between Liverpool 
and Southport, Ormskirk, Kirkby, Hunts Cross, New Brighton, West Kirby, Chester, 
and Ellesmere Port (see Figure 8-2).  This is a small franchise, just around 121 
kilometres of track.  The network is also self-contained in nature.  The railway system 
is a third-rail electrification (750V DC) and encompasses 67 stations.  The franchise 
in the first-round was awarded in January 1997 and the contract length was 7 years 
and 2 months.  The first contract was awarded to MTL Trust Holding Ltd., renamed 
Northern Spirit, which was later relocated to Arriva Train Ltd. (under the name Arriva 
Trains Merseyside) in February 2000 (Knowles, 2004).  We will now discuss the 
second-round of the franchise in this case. 
 
 
                                                 
8 We have a limited access to the authority side of this case.  Thus, most information regarding the 
Merseytravel and the Public Transport Executives is drawn from secondary data sources. 
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Figure 8-2 Operating territories of the former Regional Railways TOCs 
Source: Shaw (2001) 
 
8.3.2 The tendering process and current situation 
The new franchising process of the Merseyrail Electrics franchise had a unique 
characteristic.  Normally, a franchise is awarded by SRA.  However, this franchise 
was awarded by the Merseyside Passenger Transport Executive (MPTE).  The 
franchising process began in 2002.  A number of parties were interested in submitting 
bids.  SRA announced on October 1st, 2002 that they had short-listed three bidders for 
the new contract: Keolis SA, Serco Ltd/NedRailways, and TRANSDEV Plc/RATP 
International.  The franchise was awarded to Serco Ltd/NedRailways and it began in 
July 2003.  The contract is a 25-year management contract. 
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This franchise is the only franchise in the UK awarded by a local authority 
(Merseyside PTE).  SRA stated that the self-contained nature of the network, the 
services, and the market it serves mean that the Merseyrail Electrics network is 
uniquely suited to greater local control and accountability (SRA, 2003).  However, 
SRR expressed that, as no other network (in the UK) has these unique attributes, there 
are no plans to transfer responsibilities for other franchises to local Passenger 
Transport Executives. 
 
The partnership, Serco-NedRailways, is a new partnership.  Serco is a public service 
company operating on a global basis in a diverse range of sectors.  NedRailways is a 
fully-owned subsidiary of NS.  NedRailways concentrates on the international railway 
market.  In general, Serco contributes to the function of the public sector 
management, labour union, and administrative contracts as they have vast experience 
in the UK, while NedRailways contributes to the technical function of the railway, 
such as maintenance and fleet operation.  This franchise marked the entry of the Serco 
and NedRailways into the UK heavy rail market.  Subsequently, Serco-NedRailways 
won the new Northern Rail franchise in December 2004. 
 
Since the start of the contract, there have been significant improvements in terms of 
overall performance.  Punctuality has increased significantly (93.8% of train ran on 
time in 2003/04 compared to 91.4% in 2002/03, 81.3% in 2001/02, and 78.4% in 
2000/01).  Overall, the PTE is satisfied with the performance of this franchisee.  
 
8.3.3 Innovative capabilities and learning 
Authority: 
In general, MPTE shows a considerable degree of development in terms of its 
organisational capabilities.  This is the only franchise led by the local authority.   
MPTE opted for a radical 25-years contract which is rather unique in the UK railway 
market.  However, in terms of technical capabilities, it relies mostly on the operator 
(Serco-NedRailways) and the infrastructure provider (Network Rail). 
 
It should be pointed out that a 25-year long contract is unusual for the UK rail 
franchise.  As mentioned in Chapter 6, the contract length of the first round franchises 
is around 5 – 15 years, with a median of 7.25 years. But between 1999-2002, the 
SRA9 revealed a policy in favour of long-term franchises.  Longer franchises ranging 
from ten to twenty years were expected to encourage substantial private sector 
investment commitments in rolling stock, track infrastructure, stations, and rail 
service enhancements (Knowles, 2004).  As a result of this policy, SRA awarded a 
20-year contract to Chiltern Railways in 2002.  This policy also influenced the 
franchising process of the Merseyrail Electrics.  However, after the Hatfield crash10, 
SRA changed its direction, as the private sector lost its confidence.  The new 
franchising policy of SRA then concentrated on medium or short-term franchises 
(Knowles, 2004).  However, the issue of the long-term contract was welcomed by 
                                                 
9 The Shadow Strategic Rail Authority (SSRA) was created in the summer of 1999 and then SRA in 
2001.  See also Section 6.4.2 for the organisation of the UK rail industry. 
10 In October 2000, a fatal high-speed train derailment at Hatfield, caused by a broken rail, triggered a 
loss in public confidence in the privatised rail system (Knowles, 2004).  1000 temporary speed 
restrictions and emergency track work to repair cracked rails and damage caused by flooding made 
many rail journeys much longer and unreliable.  Rail services did not return to normal until the summer 
of 2001.  See also Walmar (2001). 
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MPTE.  We observed that MPTE was pleased with the long-term partnership with the 
operator (Serco-NedRailways).   
 
Operator: 
We were able to discuss the issue of innovation and knowledge exchange with 
NedRailways regarding the Merseyrail Electrics franchise.  The observations are as 
follows. 
 
NedRailways contributed their knowledge on maintenance and fleet management 
based on their experience with the Netherlands operation.  One remarkable effort is 
that NedRailways does the maintenance of the rolling stock in-house, which is 
unusual for a train operation company in the UK.  NedRailways stated that the in-
house maintenance significantly improves performance, especially in terms of 
punctuality.  NedRailways has also implemented some other activities in addition to 
the railway operation, such as the business activities in the train station.  For instance, 
they implemented activities that cater to the Dutch public such as a combined ticket 
sale and specific retail.  Furthermore, they are interested in the knowledge exchange 
in terms of the train traffic control.  They stated that they are learning how to integrate 
the knowledge from the UK and the Netherlands in order to improve performance on 
both sides. 
 
NedRailways states clearly that, by entering the UK market, it is not looking for 
profitability alone.  It wants a long-term partnership in which it can build up a 
network of knowledge.  Although it is difficult to justify whether this approach is 
much different from other TOCs in the UK, the technical approach, especially in 
reference to the maintenance activities, is indeed different.  This might elicit an 
innovative strategy for the tendering process in the railway sector.  Nevertheless, we 
still have to wait and see the result of this concession’s long-term impact. 
 
Recently, NedRailways has made an effort to bring infrastructure into their 
management.  As the Merseyrail network is a stand-alone network, NedRailways 
proposed the model of vertical integration to the Network Rail.  However, this issue is 
unlikely to occur in the near future as it involves a structural change in the 
relationship between train operating companies and the infrastructure company. 
 
In summary, NedRailways has recently begun to exploit the international market and 
they have been considerably successful in the UK market.  Although it is too early to 
conclude much of anything in terms of performance, we observe that they are capable 
of innovating and exchanging the knowledge between two markets.  Their approach 
to bringing back the in-house maintenance activities is contradictory to what other 
operators in the UK are doing.  This is a very promising approach, and it will be 
interesting to investigate the case further in the years to come. 
 
Infrastructure company: 
In this case, Network Rail11 is the infrastructure provider.  It is similar to what we 
observed in the Groningen case in that, like ProRail, Network Rail plays a rather 
passive role on innovation in the franchising process.  In general, Network Rail 
                                                 
11 See the development of the UK’s infrastructure company in Section 6.4.2.   
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focuses on delivering the track (with the track’s maintenance).  The role of Network 
Rail in the franchising process was only to provide the technical standards. 
 
8.3.4 The Groningen case vs. Merseyrail Electrics case 
This section compares the innovative capabilities of the Groningen and Merseyrail 
Electrics cases.  This comparison analyses the capability of each actor which could 
yield some useful lessons in terms of innovation in the railway sector.  However, the 
general conclusions regarding the innovation from the cases cannot be generalised in 
other railway tendering procedures because we are focusing on only two (rather 
unique) cases.   
 
A comparison of the learning elements in these cases is limited because the 
development period of both cases was relatively short, and these were only the 
second-round tenders (where the first round tenders were more or less experimental).  
Furthermore, a direct comparison between these cases must be considered carefully.  
It is important to take into consideration the fact that we are comparing two cases, not 
two countries. 
 
Using the analyses in the previous sections, we can compare the innovative 
capabilities between the Groningen and Merseyrail Electrics cases.  Table 8-1 shows a 
summary of this comparison. 
Table 8-1 A comparison of innovative capabilities between Groningen and 
Merseyrail Electrics cases 
 Groningen Case Merseyrail Electrics Case 
Authority PG and PF Merseyside PTE 
Technical capability Low Low 
Organisational/competence High High 
Operator NoordNed (Arriva) Serco-NedRailways 
Technical capability Moderate High 
Organisational/competence High High 
Infrastructure provider ProRail Network Rail 
Innovative capabilities Low Low 
 
In the Groningen case, both authorities (PG and PF, and MPTE) show a low technical 
capability and high organisational competence.  In terms of technical capability, PG 
played a small part in making technical decisions.  The operator (Arriva) made most 
of those technical decisions, with the help of ProRail.  This was the same in the 
Merseyrail Electric case where MPTE played a limited role on the technical side.  In 
terms of organisational competence, the authorities in both cases show a considerable 
degree of development.  We consider that both authorities have a high level of 
organisational competences.  Though they both had little experience in the railway 
tendering process, they facilitated the tendering processes well.  In the Groningen 
case, PG included the new rolling stock requirement in the tender documents and they 
succeeded in obtaining new rolling stocks.  Additionally, they expressed that the 
accessibility of the trains was a necessity, and the operator offered the low-floor 
trains.  This illustrated the success of this tendering process.  In the Merseyrail 
Electrics case, MPTE succeeded in awarding a long-term contract to the Serco-
NedRailways consortium.  Thus, we see that both authorities have high organisational 
capabilities. 
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The operators in both cases show very high managerial competence; they both 
introduced innovative management.  Arriva introduced a new rolling stock 
maintenance partner.  Contrarily, Serco-NedRailways reverted to former maintenance 
activities, which were previously outsourced to a third party.  The explanation to this 
reverse decision is that the NedRailways had confidence in managing the maintenance 
activities more efficiently on their own.  They believed that they could bring in their 
knowledge from the operation in the Netherlands.  Additionally, the size of the 
operation in this franchise is rather small, thus risk associated with the maintenance 
activities is small as well.  It was for those reasons that NedRailways decided to keep 
the maintenance activities of this franchise in-house.  Although the concession 
operations remain to be seen, the companies were successful in acquiring what they 
needed. 
 
In terms of the infrastructure providers, we observed that both infrastructure 
companies were rather passive in the tendering process.  In this respect, we need to 
address the importance of integrated planning for innovation in the sector.  The track 
and train relationship should be strengthened in order to develop successful 
innovation in the railway sector.  Next, we will discuss the role of the infrastructure 
companies. 
8.4 The role of infrastructure companies in the innovation process 
The organisation of the railway company was changed by the European Directive 
91/440, on the accounting separation of infrastructure and operation.  The industry 
changed in that the government, operator, and infrastructure manager had been 
separated.  In terms of technological development, before the reform in the mid-
1990s, the European railways had operated under a national model, where the national 
railway was the main actor in innovation.  For instance, in high-speed train 
technology, the French railway developed the Train à Grand Vitesse (TGV), and 
Germany developed the InterCity Express (ICE).  But the development of innovation 
in the railway sector has completely changed since the reform.   
 
The separation of the infrastructure and operation brought about the overall structural 
change of the railway sector.  In several cases, infrastructure managers have retained a 
closer relationship with national governments (NERA, 2004).  The UK is the only 
country where the infrastructure company was privatised.  However, the UK’s 
experience resulted in the entity, Railtrack, being placed in administration because of 
its severe financial difficulties.  The new company, Network Rail, was established in 
2002 and does not have shareholders, though for public budgeting purposes it remains 
in the private sector.  As such, it is an unusual entity that relies solely on debt 
financing.  The exact way it will operate remains to be seen (NERA, 2004). 
 
NERA (2004) observed that, in Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, and Denmark, the 
infrastructure manager is a government agency rather than a commercial company.  
These organisations do not necessarily prepare accounts according to standard 
commercial principles.  Companies’ balance sheets are not normally available in these 
countries.  However, this situation may change.  In Denmark, for example, greater 
independence from government intervention is being planned, with an independently 
appointed board and public funding arranged through contract (NERA, 2004). 
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A relevant issue in the area of infrastructure separation is the infrastructure access 
charges.  The regulatory reforms create diversity among the access charge regimes.  
There is a noticeable gap in the amount infrastructure companies in each country 
charge for infrastructure usage.  Furthermore, the charging rates are also different.  
For example, the UK infrastructure company, Network Rail, charges €3.66 per 
passenger train-km on average, whereas the Netherlands infrastructure company, 
ProRail, charges €1.01 per passenger train-km on average (ECMT, 2005).  The access 
charge will be one of the many factors in designing the tendering process in the 
railway sectors, which subsequently determines the innovation in the tender.   
 
Schaafsma (1997) identifies four important aspects that should be considered when 
focusing on the effects of the separation of the infrastructure and operation.  The first 
aspect is the technical interrelationship between track and train.  Track and train have 
technically strong bonds.  These bonds are rail-wheel contact, stations, and a traction 
supply system (if the train is electric).  The second aspect is the expensiveness of the 
means of production; locomotives and infrastructure costs have always been 
expensive.  Another characteristic of infrastructure and rolling stock is their long 
lives.  The planning of the infrastructure alone usually takes years.  The third aspect is 
the central role of the timetable.  In a congested train network, the timetable design is 
crucial to the utilisation of track (including stations) and train.  The final aspect is 
government involvement.  As the production costs are expensive, government support 
is crucial.  Furthermore, the government has to subsidise some services that are 
important to society, such as social services.  For these reasons, the government must 
use the railways as one of its policy instruments. 
 
Based on our case studies, both infrastructure companies played a little role in 
innovation in the railway tendering process.  In the Groningen case, ProRail acted as a 
government agency in providing the track and stations for the operator (Arriva) to use.  
ProRail’s role in the tendering process is to provide necessary information regarding 
the infrastructure in the concession area.  However, ProRail stated that the signalling 
system in the concession area was recently upgraded.  The train operator can benefit 
from this upgraded system.  It must be stressed that the track and signalling 
development has been independently planned and implemented from the tendering 
process.  
 
It is the same situation in the Merseyrail Electrics case.  As the network in the 
Merseyrail Electrics case is independent from other networks, it can be seen that 
Network Rail has concentrated on the task of providing an infrastructure that meets 
the operator’s demand.  Most developments in this case lie in the area of operational 
management tasks, i.e. the train traffic management.   
 
There were some structural problems in the infrastructure company in the UK 
railway.  These problems trace back to the beginning of the privatisation of the British 
Railway (see also Chapter 6).  Regarding the infrastructure manager in the early 
stages of the UK railway privatisation, it was sited in Gourvish (2002) that the 
original intention was to create Railtrack as an engineering-free corporation.  
Railtrack was to own the track and signalling, but not the engineering activities.  It 
was to function as an access, capacity management, and sales organisation, and it 
would buy in all its engineering requirements, not only the physical renewals and new 
construction, but also the detailed inspection and monitoring functions (Gourvish, 
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2002).  In retrospect, Gourvish (2002) pointed out that this situation appeared to have 
weakened Railtrack’s capability to manage the infrastructure properly.  Soon after 
Railtrack went into the administration, Network Rail took over its responsibility.  
Network Rail is planning to contribute greater direct control of engineering and 
inspection in-house (Tyrrall, 2003).  Since 2002, the performance of the track has 
improved significantly according to the Network Rail report (Network Rail, 2005).  
However, we noticed that the role of Network Rail in the innovation process was 
limited in conjunction with the TOCs and the franchising processes. 
 
In conclusion, the issue of infrastructure was not explicitly addressed in the railway 
tendering processes.  Although the infrastructure managers were involved in the 
tendering process, their role was limited and rather passive.  Most innovation, 
especially technical innovation, developed separately from the tendering process.  
This could be one of the drawbacks of the tendering process in the railway sector.  
Innovation should be developed from both operator and infrastructure manager.  This 
is a challenge for the authority who must incorporate both the operator and 
infrastructure manager in the tendering process and during the operational phase of 
the concession. 
8.5 Technological innovation in the rolling stock industry and railway reform 
8.5.1 Railway reform and railway technology 
Rolling stock innovation is an essential part in operating a railway.  The significant 
development of rolling stock can be observed with instances such as high-speed rail, 
lightweight material, and energy-efficient propulsion.  The rolling stock supply 
industry is concentrated in Europe, and the manufacturers of this supply are the major 
players in this industry.  As the railway markets in Europe are moving towards 
liberalisation, the rolling stock suppliers are also in the midst of a restructuring and 
concentration process.  This development is in line with the observation by Tilière and 
Hultén (2003). 
 
Tilière and Hultén (2003) proposed a ‘European Rail Innovation Model’. Its main 
characteristics are as follows: 
- The collaboration between operator and manufacturer (at the national level) 
will disappear: this fact leads to a disinvolvement of operators in the early 
stage of the innovation process.  Their role now remains only in identifying 
functional specifications.  
- Research and Development (R&D) will be funded mainly or fully by the 
manufacturers (operators will not provide any more study contracts for generic 
technologies). 
- Technology will receive only partial validation as operators are not fully 
involved. 
- For commercial contracts, operators are looking for fully-proven technologies. 
- The final technology should now be priced by the manufacturer including 
R&D costs (which is not necessarily in practice for some businesses, such as 
signalling technology). 
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In this model, rolling stock plays an important role in the tendering process.  We see 
that, in the Groningen case, new rolling stocks were included in the offers.  These new 
rolling stocks will have a huge impact on the operation and maintenance.  As more 
operators begin to function in the same network, this might create problems for 
infrastructure companies in utilising the network capacity due to the fact that various 
rolling stock types would be operating simultaneously. 
 
It is clear that the rolling stock manufacturers will have an important role to play in 
the tendering process of the railway sector.  Next, we will discuss the current situation 
of the rolling stock industry. 
 
8.5.2 Production capacity and trend for the rolling stock manufacturers 
Rolling stock suppliers play a vital role in rolling stock development.  Most rolling 
stocks were dominated by domestic manufacturers to fulfil the specific needs of 
national operators who have their own standards and wishes.  However, there have 
been some changes in recent years; non-domestic companies have entered the market 
in various forms.  In most cases, the non-domestic companies present their products 
(in terms of knowledge, patents, etc.) to cooperate with domestic manufacturers. 
 
This trend affects the development of the rolling stock in two ways.  First, the 
expansion of the market means the reduction of the unit cost of production.  The more 
rolling stocks that are produced, the greater the likelihood of a lower unit cost.  This 
factor encourages manufacturers to develop technologies according to market needs.  
However, it is essential to identify which market is a potential one.  Second, the 
domestic manufacturers might see these expansions as threats, and they will sustain 
their market position by either competing or cooperating. 
 
The reason behind the industry’s restructuring is due to the open market of the railway 
in most European countries.  Milz (2002) reveals that, since the introduction of 
procurement legislation, the price of rolling stock has significantly dropped.  In fact, 
the price of rolling stock has been quoted to have reduced by around 20-30%.  
Furthermore, operators in different countries are beginning to ‘mutually recognise’ 
the specifications.  This opens up increased competition.  In addition, R&D costs are 
high, thus railway suppliers often establish joint venture consortia in order to share 
know-how and risk.  In particular, the joint development between suppliers and 
railway operators will expand because the suppliers want to both reduce technical risk 
and also find a market opportunity for new technology. 
 
Within the passenger rolling stock market, the big three (Alstom, Siemens, and 
Bombardier) have dominated the market and account for about 56% of the total 
market (Ongkittikul and Geerlings, 2005).  Note that Bombardier purchased Adtranz 
(of DaimlerChrysler) in May 2001, which pushed Bombardier into the top of the 
league of major rolling stock suppliers.  
 
Another significant matter is the worldwide presence of the big three.  For example, 
Bombardier has more than 50 production sites over the world, namely 37 production 
sites in 16 countries in Europe, 8 production sites in North America, 3 production 
sites in China, and 2 production sites in Australia.  Siemens also has a worldwide 
presence, though to a lesser extent, with its main facility in Germany, 2 subsidiary 
companies in China, and one service site in Australia. 
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There are a number of factors that influence the rolling stock procurement, including 
technical, organisational, and political factors.  Firstly, the rolling stock is highly 
customised as national or private rail operators continue to have specific requirements 
and infrastructure constraints.  The different technical systems in each country; such 
as different railway gauges, power supplies, or automatic train control systems, lead 
to different requirements in each case.  The standardisation of railway systems would 
lead to a decrease in the cost of rolling stock production, and also, in the case of 
international operators, the cost of extra equipment that allows trains to operate in 
different systems.  Yet, the cost of infrastructure standardisation is much higher and it 
requires a considerable amount of time to adopt such a standard.  Notwithstanding, 
the case of ERTMS (European Rail Traffic Management System) is a good example 
of the implementation of a standard that would lead to lower costs and 
interoperability; however, the final outcome is unclear at this moment.  The EU 
regulation has played a dominant role in setting this standard (demand pull). 
 
Secondly, government support and local manufacturing (localised) railway operators 
have been characterised by their need for local, state/regional and central government 
funding in order to maintain their financial performance.  As a result, rolling stock 
orders depend on the level of government support in railways, and order selection 
may favour suppliers with local manufacturing bases, thus creating and/or sustaining 
local employment. 
 
Thirdly, the reforms of the railway sector in recent years have also affected the rolling 
stock procurement.  In many countries, deregulation of the industry and privatisation 
of the railway sector have changed expectations and introduced new customers faced 
with the competitive pressures of the private industry.  These new railway enterprises 
include private operators, leasing companies and private sector infrastructure owners.  
While presenting major opportunities for development for suppliers, the changing 
nature of the customer base can also generate new performance expectations from the 
contractual relationship.  However, customers (train operators in this case) in 
competitive markets tend to concentrate on their core business and increasingly 
outsource maintenance of the trains. 
 
In addition, one characteristic of the railway system is that there is a strong 
relationship between infrastructure and rolling stock.  This relationship is the most 
important issue for both train operators (who manage the rolling stock) and 
infrastructure managers.  Thus, the decision of new rolling stock procurement must be 
closely consulted with the infrastructure manager in terms of both technical and 
administrative matters. 
 
Milz (2002) depicts an interesting development of the rolling stock industry.  Figure 
8-3 shows rolling stock supply’s industry activities.  He reveals that there is a 
reduction in the number of market actors regarding the system integrators in which 
the big three are the dominant players.  Furthermore, there is increased competitive 
pressure from Asian and American players in the component market. 
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Figure 8-3 Rolling stock supply’s industry activities 
Source: Milz (2002) 
 
The driving force of this concentration is that the competition between manufacturers 
and the pressure from the railway deregulated market requires a reduction in the 
rolling stock investment.  Milz (2002) reveals that, since the Public Procurement 
Directive and the opening of the Rail and Public Transport Markets, the prices of new 
rolling stock have decreased by more than 40%.  This has led companies to 
restructure, merge or exit the market. 
 
The globalisation of the manufacturers exists in various forms, such as establishing 
the overseas production sites, taking over domestic manufacturers, or bidding in joint 
ventures for the rolling stock supply.  Many mergers and acquisitions have taken 
place in Europe and North America.  However, the rolling stock production is still 
localised, either produced by local manufacturers or multinational manufacturing 
firms with a joint venture with the local firm.  Furthermore, in less-developed railway 
manufacturing industries, orders placed with established European and Japanese 
companies often include requirements for technology transfer.  For example, an order 
of TGVs from Alstom by South Korea stipulated the involvement of local firms. 
 
With respect to rolling stock production, the suppliers also adopt modularisation 
and/or standardisation of products to reduce their costs.  This is due to the fact that 
Europe is aiming towards the harmonisation of European railway systems.  As 
discussed earlier, the railway systems in European countries are different.  Therefore, 
the supplier may decide on a modular design that may cover roughly 80% of the 
universal product, with 20% room for customised design.  
 
Modularisation is similar to the term ‘platform-based products’ that is used by the EU 
Commission.  The Commission (European Commission, 2001a) also observes this 
trend towards the platform-based products.  In the past, the development and 
manufacturing of rail technology products took place in close collaboration between 
suppliers and customers (which are railway national companies), with customers 
having a strong and direct influence on the products to be manufactured and the 
selection of the firms producing them.  These products may be called ‘tailor-made 
products’.  The trend is now for rolling stock suppliers to offer their own set of 
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products, which are referred to as “platform-based products”, from which customers 
can choose.  The purpose of this is to serve all customers from a limited number of 
platforms rather than to design and produce completely new vehicles for each project.  
Even where national or customer-specific technical requirements differ, a platform-
based approach allows manufacturers to obtain economies of scale and scope for 
those parts of the train that do not require customisation.  We expect that the degree of 
customisation will be reduced from 100% to around 20%.  This process began in the 
1960s, when each customer ordered rolling stock and equipment based on its own 
unique specifications. 
 
European Commission (2001a) summarises the development of the platform-based 
products as follows.  Siemens was the first supplier to introduce a platform-based 
LRV product, in Potsdam in 1996.  At the same time, the existence of platform-based 
products exerted significant price pressure on competitors and resulted in an overall 
decrease in price.  At present, all major European manufacturers have developed their 
own platform-based product lines.  Alstom, for instance, is promoting its Citadis 
(trams), Metropolis (underground trains), X’Trapolis, and Coradia (regional trains) 
platforms.  ADtranz (which now Bombardier) has begun to offer its Incentro (trams), 
Movia (underground trains), Itino (regional trains), and Crusaris (intercity trains) 
platforms.  AnsaldoBreda has developed a platform in the tram sector called Sirio.  
Siemens’ product portfolio includes the Combino (trams), MOMO (underground 
trains), and Desiro (regional trains) platforms.  Bombardier’s Cityrunner (trams) and 
Talent (regional trains) product lines are also platform-based. 
 
It is clear that competition between manufacturers leads to a market for a standard 
product.  Tilière and Hultén (2003) indicate that the standard product provides more 
efficiency in terms of R&D efforts with increased value for operators.  However, 
there are several disadvantages.  First, there are higher financial risks for R&D 
investment because of the lack of research contracts funded by operators.  Second, 
technical risks are higher as the operator plays a small role in the validation process 
(and is not as involved as before in the early stages in the innovation process).  Thus, 
system integration done by the operator and the infrastructure company is becoming 
more complex.  Finally, there are higher commercial risks, such as the captive nature 
of the national markets of non-standardisation rolling stocks that tend to disappear. 
 
8.5.3 The role of rolling stock development in the tendering process 
In most tendering processes, in both the bus and railway sectors, vehicle innovation is 
an important element.  In the railway sector, the new rolling stock must be compatible 
with the existing infrastructure.  For this reason, the separation of the operator and the 
infrastructure company has a profound effect on the investments in rolling stocks.  
 
Regulatory reform affects the way each actor in the railway industry participates in 
rolling stock innovation.  The operators (and authorities who award the contract) have 
to shift their roles from technical to functional.  They are no longer the shareholder in 
technological development as they were before, letting manufacturers do their roles in 
specifications (Tilière and Hultén, 2003).  However, this shift leads to a complicated 
situation in terms of system integration.  The number of partners and decision-makers 
is significantly increasing, and therefore the implementation of innovations is now 
more complex. 
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However, the tendering process in the railway sector is resulting in a trend wherein 
operator and authority choose the proven technologies rather than new technologies 
that might involve a massive risk in terms of technical difficulties and commercial 
aspects.  In other words, the authority and operators are now the technical selectors 
rather than the technical developers.  They focus more on the operational aspect, 
especially in terms of operational performance. 
 
As we can see from the Groningen case, the authority and operator are the technical 
selectors.  They selected the new low-floor trains.  We could expect more investment 
in new rolling stocks which is the direct result of the tendering process.  However, it 
might be too early to suggest that the railway sector will be comparable with the bus 
sector in terms of vehicle investment.  The difficulty of this investment is that the 
rolling stock has a longer life cycle, more that 30 years.  Generally, the commitment 
in the investment in new rolling stocks requires a contract of 15 years or longer.  
Thus, in most cases, the explicit intention for the rolling stock investment is often 
expressed through the tender document. 
 
In conclusion, a clear strategy for technological innovation in the railway sector is 
mandatory at the government level.  The tendering process in the railway sector leads 
to a situation where the authority, who gives the concession, and the operators, who 
operate the railway services, focus on the operational aspect.  They are not interested 
in (and not capable of) developing the technology.  This task must be led by the 
government at the national or international level (for example at the EU level).  
Furthermore, the infrastructure company should lead the technological strategy 
because it is directly connected to both track and train development.  The 
implementation of the new type of rolling stocks should be done with the close 
consultation of an infrastructure manager.  
8.6 Opportunities for innovation in the railway sector 
This chapter presented the case study on innovation in the tendering process in the 
railway sector. We analysed the relationship between the tendering process and 
innovation with empirical evidence from two cases: the Groningen and Merseyrail 
Electrics cases.  In the final section of this chapter, we will outline the findings from 
our case studies by focusing on the tendering process and innovation, the role of 
infrastructure managers, the role of rolling stock developments, and our conclusion.   
 
The tendering process and innovation 
In principle, there is not much difference between bus and railway in terms of 
innovation apart from a few fundamental differences, such as infrastructure and the 
investment level (the life cycle of the vehicle and infrastructure).  However, railway is 
less flexible; the diffusion of the innovation may be slower than that of the bus, 
especially in terms of the traffic management system and the infrastructure provision.  
Clearly, the innovation in the train system needs cooperation from all parties, 
including the infrastructure company.  However, currently, the role of the 
infrastructure company is not explicitly elaborated.   
 
In this chapter, we also compared the innovative capabilities of the Groningen and 
Merseyrail Electrics cases.  These cases illustrated two unique examples of railway 
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tendering in the Netherlands and UK.  The Groningen case presented a transition 
system, from a short-term contract to a long-term contract (with investment in rolling 
stock).  The Merseyrail Electrics case presented an exceptionally long contract (25 
years).  However, it should be noted that the observations made in this chapter are not 
ubiquitous in all railway tenders, as both cases are rather unique.  This comparison 
was made between two cases, not two countries. 
 
In terms of the authorities’ innovative capabilities, both authorities (PG and PF, and 
MPTE) show a low level of technical capabilities and high organisational 
competence.  In terms of technical capabilities, authorities played a limited role in 
developing the technical side.  The operator, in consultation with the infrastructure 
manager, made most of the technical decisions.  However, the authorities in both 
cases show a considerable degree of development in terms of their organisational 
capabilities.  Although they both had little experience in the railway tendering 
process, they facilitated the tendering well. 
 
The operators in both cases show very high managerial competence.  They both 
introduced innovative management.  For example, Arriva established a new rolling 
stock maintenance partner, and Serco-NedRailways reintroduced the maintenance 
activities, which were previously outsourced to a third party. 
 
The role of infrastructure managers 
In terms of the infrastructure providers, we observed that both infrastructure 
companies were rather passive to the tendering process.  The issue of infrastructure 
was not explicitly addressed in the railway tendering processes.  Although the 
infrastructure managers were involved in the tendering process, their role was limited 
and rather passive.  Most innovation, especially technical innovation, was developed 
separately from the tendering process.  This could be one of the drawbacks of the 
tendering process in the railway sector.  Innovation should be developed by both 
operator and infrastructure manager; we need to address the importance of the 
integrated planning for innovation.  Additionally, the track and train relationship 
should be strengthened in order to develop successful innovation in the railway sector.  
In order to do this, the authority must coordinate between operator and infrastructure 
manager in the tendering process and during the operational phase of the concession.   
 
The role of rolling stock developments 
In the tendering process in the railway sector, both the operator and authority choose 
the proven technologies rather than new technologies due to a potential risk in terms 
of technical difficulties and commercial aspects.  As a result, the authority and 
operators are now the technical selectors rather than the technical developers.  They 
focus more on the operational aspect, especially in terms of operational performance.  
In the Groningen case in particular, it is evident that the authority and operator are the 
technical selectors having chosen the new low-floor trains.  As a result of the 
tendering process, we can expect more investment in new rolling stocks.  However, it 
might be too early to compare the railway sector with the bus sector in terms of the 
vehicle investment.  This is due to the fact that the rolling stock has a much longer life 
cycle, more that 30 years.  Generally, the commitment for the investment in new 
rolling stocks requires a contract of 15 years or more.  Thus, the explicit intention for 
the rolling stock investment is often expressed through the tender document.   
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A clear strategy in the implementation of technological innovation in the railway 
sector is necessary at the government level.  The tendering process in the railway 
sector forces the authority, who gives the concession, and the operators, who operate 
the railway services, to focus more on the operational aspect instead of on developing 
the technology.  The government must manage this task at the national or 
international levels (for example at the EU level).  The infrastructure company should 
lead a technological strategy that coheres track and train development.  The 
implementation of the new type of rolling stock should be done in conjunction with 
the infrastructure manager.    
 
In conclusion 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this chapter.  First, in the railway 
tendering process, the authority and operators focus on developing their 
organisational capabilities rather than technical capabilities.  We observed in the 
railway cases that the authorities were inexperienced in terms of the railway business, 
but that they can organise the railway tender perfectly.   
 
Second, based on the two case studies, it is evident that the operator and authority 
select proven technologies rather than new technologies that involve a massive risk in 
terms of technical difficulties and commercial aspects; they are now the technical 
selectors rather than the technical developers.  They focus more on the operational 
aspect, especially in terms of operational performance 
 
The tendering process in the railway sector has also induced innovation.  However, 
we should look at the tendering process as a part of the regulatory reform process.  
The reform in the railway sector resulted in a partition among players, i.e. track and 
train were managed by different organisations.  Thus, the reform effectively 
introduced new players in the railway sector.  For instance, the regional authority, 
which had no experience in the railway business before, must now organise the 
tendering process.  Nevertheless, the authority managed to complete this task 
successfully.  But, we should place more emphasis on the track and train relationship 
because this relationship is important for overall railway operation.  
 
Innovation in the railway sector concentrates on vehicle investment and service 
improvement.  This is a direct result from the tendering regimes.  Competition for the 
markets seems to work on a short-term basis.  Public transport users benefit from 
these improvements (new trains, more services, better accessibility).  However, the 
tendering process has paid little attention to the medium-to-long-term development, 
i.e. in terms of network, new service development (i.e. new lines), and service 
integration.  For that reason, there is a need to emphasise more on the issue of long-
term planning of innovation in the railway sectors to incorporate the tendering process 
as a part of the transport policy.   
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Chapter 9 Conclusions 
9.1 Introduction 
The public transport sector is in a transition phase.  This is due to the fact that the 
European Union (EU) is paying more attention to the public transport sector as a 
means of improving the quality of life especially in urban areas, as we addressed in 
Chapter 2.  The EU stressed that public transport must improve both its efficiency and 
quality.  During the course of this transition, we can see how regulatory reform is 
actively being used as a tool in the process.  Regulatory reform is resulting in a wide 
variety of organisational transformations in European public transport.  One example 
of a structural change is the growing involvement of the private sector in the public 
transport industry.  In addition, technological innovation plays an important role in 
improving the public transport service.  Many new technologies such as low floor 
buses, electronic ticketing systems, and dynamic travel information systems have 
been introduced.  However, there is little research that explicitly examines the 
relationship between regulatory reform and technological innovation in the public 
transport sector. 
  
Regulatory reform is institutional change.  It is also connected to organisational 
change because it creates new organisational structures due to the privatisation and 
deregulation processes.  Thus, it is crucial to understand the role of organisational 
development in the midst of regulatory reform.  In general, there are three major 
actors involved in the public transport sector: government agencies, public transport 
operators, and passengers.  Each actor has its goals, objectives, and expectations 
regarding the way in which public transport services are organised.  We see how each 
actor adapts in order to achieve those goals during regulatory change procedures, 
especially the government agency and public transport operator. 
 
The objective of this final chapter is to summarise the theoretical developments as 
well as the empirical findings from the case studies.  Section 9.2 is a summary of the 
theoretical chapters (Chapter 2 – 5).  Section 9.3 will discuss the empirical findings 
(Chapter 6 – 8).  Finally, in Section 9.4, numerous recommendations for the future 
research are discussed. 
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9.2 Theories on innovation and regulatory reform in public transport 
9.2.1 The research questions  
The main research question of this thesis is: 
 
‘What effect does regulatory reform (in the public transport market) have on 
innovative capability of the actor, and which routes of innovation will prevail?’ 
 
In order to answer this research question, we define four sub-questions that would 
help us understand and address the main research question comprehensively.  These 
sub-questions are: 
 
1) What is innovation in public transport? 
2) How does regulatory reform in the public transport sector affect innovation? 
3) What are the behavioural changes (with respect to innovation) of public 
transport actors when influenced by regulatory reform? 
4) What are the policy recommendations for public transport stakeholders on 
innovation? 
 
These questions correspond to both the theoretical and empirical parts of this thesis.  
Each question will be answered in the following sections according to the relevant 
findings of this thesis.  Question 1, which is related to the theoretical finding in 
Chapter 3, will be answered in Section 9.2.2; questions 2 and 3 concern both 
theoretical and empirical findings; thus they will be answered in Sections 9.2.3, 9.2.4, 
and 9.3; and question 4, which is related to the policy recommendations that are 
drawn essentially from the empirical findings, will be addressed in Section 9.3.4.    
 
9.2.2 Innovation study for public transport 
Chapter 3 explains the foundation for innovation for the public transport sector.  It is 
clear that identifying and classifying innovation is a difficult task given the 
multidisciplinary characteristics and various elements involved.  It is vital to look at 
innovation in a broader view; we must look at innovation as a process.  
 
There are many scholars who pay attention to the theory of innovation.  An important 
contribution to that theory is the work of Schumpeter (1939).  His model postulates 
the adoption process of new technology into three stages: invention, innovation, and 
diffusion.  Based on the Schumpeter’s idea, Nelson and Winter (1982) added that 
innovation can occur through a process of variation and selection.  Dosi (1988a) 
expands on that notion by suggesting that the innovation should be based on various 
disciplinary theories.  Not only is innovation itself important, but he stresses the 
relevance of studying the process of innovation as well. He identifies unique 
characteristics in the process, such as routines, learning processes, and the need for a 
paradigm shift.  The approaches of Nelson, Winter and Dosi are widely known as the 
evolutionary theory of technology dynamics.  
 
Another important concept is product and process innovation by Utterback and 
Abernathy (1975).  They describe this form of innovation as an iterative process 
which states that products will be developed over time in a predictable manner with 
initial emphasis on product performance, then emphasis on product variety and later 
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emphasis on product standardisation and costs.  Furthermore, they identify in the 
innovation process many variables that are of relevance: product, process, 
organisation, market, and competition.  
 
This thesis describes a broader perspective of innovation which focuses on both the 
technological and organisational aspects of innovative activities (as described in 
Chapter 3).  Innovation in the public transport service is, in this study, characterised 
by the ‘twin characteristics’ approach.  This approach defines public transport in 
terms of three sets of characteristics: technical characteristics, competence, and 
service characteristics.  Using this approach, innovation can be classified into three 
groups: service innovation, pure technical innovation, and competence development.  
Within those three groups, we can then break down the innovative capabilities of the 
public transport system into three categories, namely, innovative capabilities related 
to 1) infrastructure, 2) vehicle, and 3) service operation.  These innovative capabilities 
are guidelines for analysing the innovation process in the public transport sector. 
 
We then analysed the innovation and diffusion process in the public transport sector 
in more detail.  We defined three levels of innovation to locate where the innovation 
is positioned in time and space.  Level I includes innovation that is new to the 
industry, such as technological advancements.  Often, these advancements have been 
tested and approved in other sectors before they are introduced to a new sector.  Level 
II includes innovation that is new to the country.  Level III incorporates those aspects 
at the micro-level, i.e. an innovation that is new to the area.   
 
The explanation above is the answer to Question 1.  Overall, it can be concluded that 
the process of innovation and diffusion in the public transport sector is complex.  The 
complexity arises from the fact that innovation should be regarded in a broader 
perspective.  The process also involves many actors.  When the regulatory change 
takes place, each actor must find its new role and responsibility.  The innovation in 
public transport refers to the technological and organisational changes in the public 
transport system.  It should be regarded as a process of innovation and diffusion of 
both technical characteristics and competencies. 
 
9.2.3 Institutional and organisational changes 
In Chapter 4, the focus is on the issue of institutional and organisational changes of 
the public transport sector.  In Europe, the public transport industry’s environment is 
perpetually evolving due to regulatory reform.  Reform has a profound effect on both 
institutional and organisational aspects.  These institutional and organisational 
changes are of importance for innovation in the public transport sector.   
 
The regulatory reform is a process of change.  From a theoretical point of view, the 
orthodox economic approach plays an important role in analysing the effects of 
regulatory reform in public transport.  Furthermore, it plays a part in providing 
guidance for the decision-making required to design the regulatory framework.  
However, once regulatory reform takes place, the effects of the reform are not fully 
explained purely by the orthodox economic approach. 
  
We described three concepts that are necessary for the analytical framework of this 
thesis in Chapter 4.  The first concept is the theory of evolutionary economics.  This 
approach studies the process of the economics of technical change.  Nelson and 
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Winter (1982) develop the evolutionary theory of a firm where organisational 
capabilities and behaviours of business firms operating in a market environment are 
addressed.  Essentially, it states that the firms are motivated by profitability and 
engaged in searching for ways to improve their profitability, but the firm’s actions are 
not assumed to be profit maximising over well-defined and exogenously given choice 
sets (Mahoney, 2005).  The second concept, defined by Simon (1997), is the bounded 
rationality or problem-solving approach.  In sum, it demonstrates that man’s 
rationality is bounded: real-life decisions are too complex to comprehend and 
therefore firms cannot maximise over the set of all conceivable alternatives.  The third 
concept is transaction cost economics.  This notion, proposed by Williamson (1985), 
argues that firms, markets, and relational contracting are important economic 
institutions.  These economic institutions are also the evolutionary product of a series 
of organisational innovations.  The transaction cost economic theory gives the general 
framework in which the regulatory reform takes part.  The main implication of these 
three concepts is that, in the long-run, the firms do learn and develop their 
organisational capabilities in order to compete and survive in the market.  Innovation 
is the result of accumulated knowledge and improved capabilities.  The regulatory 
framework in which firms operate in is the constraint that determines the firms’ 
innovative activities.  By combining these concepts, we can analyse the behaviour of 
a firm in the public transport sector with respect to the innovation in which firms 
engage.   
 
From this evolutionary perspective, we make three observations of the regulatory 
reform in the public transport sector.  The first observation is that economic agents in 
the public transport sector are rationally bounded.  The objectives of the public 
sectors, apart from the maximisation of social welfare, have been evolving and are 
partly influenced by political pressure at both local and national levels.  Public 
policies evolve due to changes in perceived demands and opportunities or changes 
that may result from the evolution of private technologies and market structures or 
from other identifiable shifts in objective conditions (Nelson and Winter, 1982).  
Second, institutional evolution is shaping the industry structure.  Regulatory reform 
means the government must set new rules of the game.  Consequently, the functions 
of each stakeholder would also be changed.  While the regulatory regimes are still 
evolving, the industry structure follows the evolution pattern too.  Third, the 
organisational responses to the regulatory reform vary significantly.  Empirical 
evidence in the past has shown that the operators who face regulatory reform 
contribute strategic responses.  An example is that, in the case of bus deregulation in 
the UK, there were three broad strategic responses: a defensive market for passenger 
transport, a market sensitive strategy of becoming more sensitive to changing 
conditions within the overall travel market, and a commercial strategy of identifying 
opportunities for growth and/or diversification. 
 
Furthermore, organisational changes play an important part in explaining the 
behaviours of the actors in the public transport sector.  In order to respond to the 
changing environment, organisations search and acquire knowledge and capabilities 
to better adapt.  In this process, innovation is used as a strategic tool to achieve an 
organisation’s goal.  This relates to two important concepts in analysing development 
and learning, namely the dynamic capabilities and learning. 
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Understanding dynamic capability and learning processes in organisations is useful 
for the analysis of developing innovative capability.  Using these ideas can lead to the 
understanding of how organisational behaviours change and react to changing 
environments (the regulatory reform) and how the organisations innovate as a result 
of that change.  Here we see that under the organisational learning, processes, 
positions, and paths are key elements that determine innovation and shape behaviours 
of organisations in the public transport sector. 
 
The explanation above answers the questions 2 and 3 in the theoretical point of view.  
Question 2 asked ‘how does regulatory reform in the public transport sector affect 
innovation?’  The answer is that, based on theoretical study in Chapter 4, regulatory 
reform changes the structure of the public transport organisation, which then affects 
the way innovation is introduced.  Thus, we observe that the change in regulatory 
framework results in the new roles of actors in the system.  New organisations have 
different objectives.  These objectives are then utilised into firm’s innovative 
capabilities which are essential for innovation in public transport.  Thus, the 
innovative capabilities are changed as a result of the regulatory reform.   
 
Question 3 asked ‘what are the behavioural changes (with respect to innovation) of 
public transport actors when influenced by regulatory reform?’  The response is based 
on the three observations which state that 1) economics agents in the public transport 
sector are rationally bounded; 2) institutional evolution is shaping the public transport 
industrial structure; and 3) the organisational responses to the regulatory reform vary 
significantly. 
 
9.2.4 Innovative capabilities and learning: an integrated approach 
Based on these theoretical building blocks, we constructed a model for analysing the 
effects of regulatory reform on innovation in the public transport sector in Chapter 5.  
Competitive tendering is now a common practice in public transport service.  Thus, 
this thesis focuses on the tendering process as a core process.  The tendering process 
is also the most determinant factor that affects the public transport organisational 
behaviours.  The main interest point is the effect of the tendering process on 
innovation in public transport services.  Nevertheless, as a variety of reforms exists, 
the tendering may differ from case to case, and some areas are also an exception to 
the tendering.  
 
There are several factors that influence competition in the tendering processes, and 
consequently innovations in the tendering outcomes.  One is the type of contract that 
is utilised in the tendering procedure.  In general, tender contracts in the public 
transport sector are divided by risks that are associated with production cost and 
revenue of public transport services.  Using the division of risks associated, the tender 
contracts can be divided into three categories: management contract, gross cost 
contract, and net cost contract.  A management contract illustrates that both 
production cost and revenue risks are borne by authority.  A gross cost contract shows 
that revenue risk is borne by authority and production cost risk is borne by the 
operator.  A net cost contract exemplifies that both production cost and revenue risks 
are borne by the operator (see Chapter 6).  
 
The type of contract employed could determine what innovation is introduced in the 
public transport sector.  The risk division between authority and operator is the key 
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that gives organisations the incentive to innovate.  For example, the management 
contract gives no incentive to the operator to improve the infrastructure and vehicle as 
the operator has no benefit from that investment.  The authority would initiate most of 
the innovation in this case.  Alternatively, if the operator is responsible for both 
production cost and revenue (when revenue has risks), then the operator might invest 
in those aspects that they think will improve their profit.  In this case, the duration of 
the contract is also another important factor as the level of investment depends on the 
payback period from which the operator can benefit. 
 
As stated before, the tendering process requires all actors to adapt.  A firm’s dynamic 
capability is defined by its ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and 
external competencies in rapidly changing environments.  Three elements are 
addressed: organisational and managerial processes, positions, and paths.  In our case, 
regulatory reform (the tendering process) is a rapidly changing environment.  Thus, 
the dynamic capabilities of the authority depend on its ability to use resources to 
organise the tendering process in order to achieve their objectives, and control the 
operation of public transport according to the contracts that are granted.  For 
operators, the dynamic capabilities include the capacity to use and integrate resources 
to produce a bid that attains the tender, and also the ability to manage the operation of 
public transport that financially benefits according to the initial planning in the 
tendering process.  Innovation is one of the strategic tools that operators use for 
winning the tender. 
 
We also need to treat the tendering process as a continuously developing process.  
Although a tender in one area may be dependent on the length of the concession 
contract, there are several tenders in the surrounding areas that the authority and 
operators have to deal with.  The information and knowledge that authority and 
operators collect during the tendering process are key elements.  This process, called 
‘organisational learning,’ appears in all parts of the development of competence/ 
capabilities of the organisation.  In the tendering process, organisational learning is 
very important for both authority and operator. 
  
This leads to the integrated approach based on dynamic capabilities and learning 
concepts, which were presented in Chapter 5.  This model is built for the case of 
tendering in public transport.  Two separate models were introduced for both the 
authority and the operators.  Furthermore, the technical and organisational capabilities 
are defined, as well as the learning element.  
 
An interesting and crucial element in this study is the process where the authority and 
operator meet in the bidding process.  The interaction between authority and operator 
in this tendering regime occurs through the bidding process.  In general, the authority 
provides the program of demand and/or tender document to the potential bidders.  The 
tender document usually indicates the basic requirements and specifications of the 
services to be tendered.  It also indicates the winning criteria of the tender.  This is the 
crucial element operators must fulfil in order to win the tender.  By studying the 
tender document, operators prepare their offers.  At this stage, it should be noted that 
the innovation is often included in the offer to increase its appeal. 
 
It is important to note that every stage in the tendering process is a learning process 
(see Figure 9-1).  For the authority, the objectives evolve over time.  For example, if a 
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subsidy is cut, the authority has to decide how to allocate the funds sufficiently and 
determine what the consequences are for the service quantity and quality.  This 
ultimately leads to learning in the preparation stage of the bidding process.  The key 
element in a tender document is how to design the winning criteria which affect the 
offers from operators.  For the operator, the objectives are adjusted over time.  The 
operator’s strategy is determined according to the situation in the market.  Thus, both 
the profit and continuity must be considered before preparing the offer.  Taking all 
these factors into consideration, the operators can learn from their experiences (both 
in the tender area from previous tenders and other tenders in other areas) to better 
prepare a competitive bid.  
 
Program of demand/
Tender document Offer
Authority
Ξ Financial aspect
Ξ Vehicle and 
infrastructure
Ξ Service quantity
Ξ Service quality
Ξ Externality
Operator
Ξ Profitability 
Ξ Continuity 
Ξ Company 
reputation
Learning to design  
objectives
Learning to design  
tender document
Learning to design  
the offer
Learning to be 
competitive in the 
market
Tendering process design
(for authority)
Bidding preparation
(for operator)
 
Figure 9-1 Learning in the tendering process 
 
In Chapter 5, we discuss the concept of learning in the tendering process, which is 
shown in Figure 9-1.  This diagram simplifies the dynamic process inside each 
process; the details within each process (tendering process design and bidding 
preparation) were discussed in more detail in Section 5.4.  This model was then used 
in the empirical part.  Next, we will discuss the results form our empirical case 
studies. 
9.3 The empirical results 
The empirical part aims to depict the richness of the information of the process 
whereby the tendering and innovation interact with each other.  Based on the model 
we introduced in Chapter 5, empirical cases were analysed: the bus and railway cases. 
 
9.3.1 Innovation in the bus sector 
Chapter 7 presented the case study on innovation in the tendering process in the bus 
sector.  We analysed the relationship between tendering process and innovation with 
empirical evidence from case studies in the Netherlands and in the UK (London).   
 
In the Netherlands, we conducted three cases all located in the PZH areas.  The 
authorities responsible for the tendering process are PZH and SRR.  The results from 
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our case studies show that the authorities are moving towards the quality-oriented 
public transport services.  Using the tendering process as a tool, the authorities have 
achieved a better quality of the public transport services.  The empirical evidence in 
PZH illustrates the development path in three steps.  First, PZH followed the path of 
the net cost contract where the operator is responsible for the revenue risk.  Second, 
PZH chose to give the service design freedom.  This indicates that PZH believes that 
this should benefit the users more than restrict the service design within the authority.  
Third, PZH followed a path toward the investment in innovation.  PZH chose to go 
for ICT that required an investment in the infrastructure. 
 
It is clear that quality is now an important issue in the tendering process in the 
Netherlands.  We observe that both PZH and SRR incorporate the quality aspects as 
criteria for awarding the concessions in the tender documents.  Authorities tend to 
anticipate quality improvement through certain kinds of technological innovation, 
such as low floor buses, the travel information system, and the smart card.  In all, 
passengers seem to benefit from this improvement, although it is not yet known 
whether this will sustain in the long-term. 
 
On the operator side, we observe that the innovation is used as a strategic tool for 
winning the concession.  Where it is possible, operators tend to widen the quality 
aspects of their public transport services to increase the number of passengers, or to 
show to the authority that they are willing to innovate.  
 
In addition, we observe that both technological and organisational innovations in the 
tender are easy to imitate.  In terms of technological innovation, we see the 
duplications of the new, low-floor bus and the travel information system.  In terms of 
organisational innovation, operators in the Netherlands have developed the same type 
of the tender team to handle all tenders in both bus and train concessions.   
 
As mentioned above, the contract specification is a crucial element of the tendering 
process.  This issue is twofold: the size of concession area and the contract length.  
First, in general, the operator would better profit from a larger area of concession 
because it would lead to more investment in innovation.  However, we observed that a 
larger area results in a smaller number of bidders which would create barriers for a 
new small operator to enter the market.  Second, the contract length determines the 
innovation introduced in the tendering process.  For instance, the operators usually 
state that they need to have a contract of at least 6 years in order to be able to invest in 
the new buses.  However, we also see that the longer the contract, the slower the 
feedback system.  This means during the concession period, new developments can 
hardly occur.  Once the contract is given, the possibility for new innovation (in this 
concession area) must occur during the next round of tender.  Furthermore, the 
learning of both the authority and operators depends on the tendering and the length 
of the contract.  In other words, a longer contract might lead to slower learning.  This 
problem is likely to be found on the authority rather than the operator side, because 
operators are more involved in one area.  The authority normally has less chance to 
experience the tendering processes, perhaps only one concession per year (as in the 
PZH area). 
 
Fares and revenue allocations were also an issue mentioned in the interviews.  
Interviewees saw the WROOV system as barrier to innovation, especially in reference 
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to quality improvement.  They pointed out that the WROOV system often allocated 
revenues in favour of the major operators in the big cities (e.g. Amsterdam and 
Rotterdam).  Despite the extensive annual survey, it appeared that the WROOV 
system did not reflect the real changes in the number of passengers at the concession 
level.  The issue of fares and revenue allocation brings us back to the issue of contract 
types.  The difference between net cost contract and gross cost contract creates a 
revenue risk that is borne by the operator in the net cost contract.  In the PZH cases, 
the authorities employed the net cost contract.  Given the WROOV system, the 
revenue incentives from the net cost contract are not fully utilised, as the revenue was 
not allocated properly.   
 
An increase in a number of passengers may not result in an increase in revenue as you 
might expect from the net cost contract regime.  Furthermore, there might be a delay 
in terms of the revenue allocation from the WROOV system.  This reduces an 
operator’s incentive to attract new passengers.  Nevertheless, we may still see a 
radical change with the introduction of the smart card system.  It is hoped that the 
smart card system will resolve this problem and, this being the case, the aim of the net 
cost contract would be realised. 
 
Overall, we found that operators have increased their level of competence in the new 
competitive environment.  We observe positive development of the innovative 
capabilities of the operators.  The competitive pressure from the tendering process 
leads to situations in which the operators must innovate in order to be competitive in 
the market. 
 
In sum, we can conclude that the operators react positively to the tendering process.  
As a result of the processes, operators offer better public transport services.  However, 
the operators introduce innovation in the tendering process primarily so they can win 
the tender, while the authorities use the process as a tool to influence innovation that 
is compatible with their commercial objectives. 
 
Still, there are two serious issues with the tendering process in the Netherlands: the 
infrastructure provision and the monitoring aspect.  First, the infrastructure provision 
is not incorporated in the tendering process.  In fact, in all cases, we have found there 
is no interest in the infrastructure provision (e.g. bus lane or bus priority initiatives) 
included in the tender documents.  The infrastructure development is important, 
especially for the authority in order for public transport services to compete with the 
private car.  For instance, the bus priority and exclusive bus lanes would allow faster 
bus travel time, especially in the traffic-congested area.  Although the operators would 
benefit from this infrastructure in terms of lower operating costs, we did not find this 
to be a significant issue. 
 
Clearly, the operators are not interested in investing in the infrastructure unless there 
are significant benefits.  The payback period of investment in the infrastructure, such 
as a guided bus lane, is rather long, probably more than 15 years.  Currently, it is not 
possible for such a lengthy contract in the bus sector.  Alternatively, the authority 
could develop the infrastructure by itself, and let the operator use it under certain 
conditions, such as a lower subsidy level or a contribution to the infrastructure 
maintenance cost.  This kind of innovation must come form the authority’s initiative.     
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The second aspect, the monitoring issue, is a problem due to the fact that information 
regarding the performance of the operator is hardly available.  We observed that the 
authority relies on the operator to provide the public transport operation.  This makes 
assessment and comparison issues very difficult; progress of a project, as denoted by 
the operator, is difficult to identify in terms of service quality and operating 
performances.  It hardly identifies the progress, in terms of service, which is made by 
the operator.   
 
If we compare the London and PZH areas, the London case illustrates a strong 
centralised policy.  The coherence between the public transport policy and the general 
transport policy in the area is one of the most successful factors in the recent growth 
of the public transport ridership.  Innovative capabilities of the London authority 
(TfL) are high, and its learning element is moderate but strong.  A lesson that we can 
learn from the London case is that the public authority should consider not only the 
policy in the public transport sector, but also the transport policy as an integrated 
system.   
 
Furthermore, the authority should take initiative as system integrator.  The public 
transport concessions should not be operated independently. The authority should 
provide an incentive for the operators to cooperate in service integration.  This 
integration should be encouraged between both concessions and modes.  Additionally, 
it should cover not only the transfer facilities, such as the integration between bus 
stops and train stations, but also the timetable integration as well.  
 
Finally, the tendering process leads to the service-oriented innovation.  The operators 
adopt their strategies to broaden the quality aspects of the public transport services in 
order to win more concessions.  However, the operators concentrate solely on those 
aspects that suit their commercial interests (profitability and continuity).  This leaves 
the task of influencing operators to innovate in a manner that benefits society to the 
authority. 
 
At this point, we can answer the research questions (questions 2 and 3) from the 
empirical perspective, from the bus sectors.  Question 2 asked ‘how does regulatory 
reform in the public transport sector affect innovation?’  Experience from the bus 
sector tells us that the tendering process, which is a part of the regulatory reform, 
leads to the service-oriented innovation.  In our case studies, the authorities seek to 
improve the quality of public transport services, and the operators react to this 
requirement using innovation.   
 
Question 3 asked ‘what are the behavioural changes (with respect to innovation) of 
public transport actors when influenced by regulatory reform?’  The answer is that 
both the authorities and operators change their behaviour after the tendering process 
occurs.  In our case studies, the authorities moved toward quality-oriented services.  
They tried to improve the quality of public transport services by using tendering and 
this is expressed by the quality aspects that are included in the tender document.  The 
operators also adjusted themselves competitively in the bus market.  Although the 
operators concentrated primarily on their commercial interests (profitability and 
continuity), they realised that improving the overall quality of public transport is the 
key to the tendering process in the Netherlands.   
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9.3.2 Innovation in the railway sector 
Chapter 8 presented the case study on innovation in the tendering process in the 
railway sector. We analysed the empirical evidence from two cases: the Groningen 
and Merseyrail Electrics cases.  
 
In principle, there is not much difference between bus and railway in terms of 
innovation apart from a few fundamental differences, such as infrastructure and the 
investment level (the life cycle of the vehicle and infrastructure).  However, railway is 
less flexible; innovation diffusion may be slower than that of the bus, especially in 
terms of the traffic management system and the infrastructure provision.  Clearly, the 
innovation in the train services needs cooperation from all parties, including the 
infrastructure company.  However, the role of the infrastructure company is not 
explicitly stressed.   
 
In terms of the authorities’ innovative capabilities, both authorities (PG and PF, and 
MPTE) show low technical capabilities and high organisational competence.  In terms 
of technical capabilities, authorities played a limited role in developing the technical 
side.  The operator, in consultation with the infrastructure manager, made most of the 
technical decisions.  When focusing on organisational competence, the authorities in 
both cases show a considerable degree of development.  They both had little 
experience in the railway tendering process, but they facilitated the tendering well.  
The operators in both cases show very high managerial competence.   
 
One of the drawbacks of utilising the tendering process in the railway sector is that 
most innovation, especially technical innovation, was developed independently from 
the process.  Innovation should be developed from both operator and infrastructure 
manager.  The case studies illustrated that both infrastructure companies were rather 
passive in the tendering process.  In fact, the issue of infrastructure was not explicitly 
addressed in the railway tendering processes.  Therefore, we need to address the 
importance of integrated planning for innovation in the sector.  The track and train 
relationship should be strengthened in order to develop successful innovation for 
railway.  This is a challenge for the authority who must act as a coordinator for the 
cooperation between operator and infrastructure management in the tendering process 
and during the operational phase of the concession.   
 
Currently, the operator and authority choose the proven technologies rather than the 
new technologies in the tendering process in the railway sector.  Thus, the authority 
and operators are now the technical selectors rather than the technical developers.  
They focus more on the operational aspect, especially in terms of operational 
performances as it is shown in the Groningen case where the authority and operator 
are the technical selectors.  They selected the new train type, low floor trains.  We 
could expect more investment in new rolling stocks that is a result of the tendering 
process.  However, it might be too early to suggest that the railway sector will be 
comparable with the bus sector in terms of the vehicle investment.  The difficulty of 
this investment is that the rolling stock has a longer life cycle, more that 30 years.  
Generally, the commitment for the investment in new rolling stocks requires a 
contract of 15 years or longer.  Thus, the explicit intention for the rolling stock 
investment was often expressed through the tender document in most cases.  Because 
the authority and operators are not interested or capable of developing the technology, 
the government must now lead this task at both the national and international levels. 
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It is needed to identify a clear strategy in terms of technological innovation in the 
railway sector at the government level.  The tendering process in the railway sector 
leads to a situation where the authority, who gives the concession, and the operators, 
who operate the railway services, focus on the operational aspect.  They are not 
interested in (and not capable of) developing the technology.  This task has to be led 
by the government at the national or international levels (for example at the EU level).  
Additionally, infrastructure companies should assist in leading the technological 
strategy because their task automatically combines both track and train development.  
In particular, the implementation of the new rolling stocks should be done with close 
consultation with the infrastructure manager. 
 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the empirical findings.  First, in the 
railway tendering process, the authority and operators focus on developing their 
organisational capabilities rather than technical capabilities.  We observed in the cases 
that authorities were inexperienced in terms of the railway business, but they can 
organise the railway tender perfectly.   
 
Second, our observation from the case studies is that, in the railway tendering process, 
both the authority and operator chose proven technologies rather than new ones 
because there was less risk involved in terms of technical difficulties and commercial 
aspects.  The authority and operators are now the technical selectors rather than the 
technical developers, and, as a result, they focus more on the operational aspect. 
 
Thirdly, the tendering process in the railway sector has also induced innovation.  
However, we should look at the tendering process as a part of the regulatory reform 
process that leads to organisational reconstruction.  Thus, reform effectively induces 
new players into the railway sector.  For instance, the regional authority who has no 
experience in the railway business before now has to organise the tendering process.  
Nevertheless, the authority managed to complete this task successfully.  But, we 
should place more emphasis on the track and train relationship because this 
relationship is very important for railway operation.  
 
Finally, there is a need to emphasise more on the issue of long-term planning of 
innovation in the railway sectors to incorporate the tendering process as a part of 
transport policy.  On a positive note, innovation in the railway sectors concentrates on 
vehicle investment and service improvement which is the direct result of the tendering 
regimes.  Public transport users benefited from these improvements (new trains, more 
services, better accessibility).  However, competition for the market seems to work on 
a short-term basis.  The tendering process pays little attention to the medium-to-long-
term development, i.e. in terms of network, new service development (i.e. new lines), 
and service integration.   
 
Looking at Question 2 empirically, we can answer how regulatory reform effects 
innovation by noting that, in the railway sector, reform had a profound impact on the 
industry structure.  New organisations were created as a result of the privatisation 
process.  The separation of infrastructure from operation makes competition in the 
sector possible.  This competition is often a tendering regime.   We see, similar to the 
bus sector, that tendering leads to innovation in vehicle investment and service 
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improvement.  This innovation is a short-term basis where the medium-to-long-term 
development is neglected.  
 
Question 3 asked ‘what are the behavioural changes (with respect to innovation) of 
public transport actors when influenced by regulatory reform?’  The answer to this 
question is not much different from the bus sector.   From the empirical perspective, 
both the authorities and operators changed their behaviours after the tendering process 
as well.  The quality aspect is now very important for the authorities and operators.  
Furthermore, other actors, such as infrastructure management and rolling stock 
manufacturing, change their behaviours as well. 
 
9.3.3 Comparison between bus and railway sectors 
There are similarities and differences between the bus and railway sectors in terms of 
innovation in the tendering process.  It is often perceived that there should be more 
innovation in the railway sector than the bus sector.  This view exists because railway 
has a broader scope for innovation than bus does, such as station, track, and rolling 
stock.  It seems that there is much room for technical improvement. 
 
In most tendering processes, we observed that innovation in public transport 
concentrates mainly on the service and vehicle elements which were more developed 
in the bus sector.  For example, low-floor buses were introduced rapidly in the 
Netherlands when the tendering process began in 2002.  We might view that low-floor 
buses may no longer be categorised as an innovation anymore since they are now 
widely used.  Nevertheless, we posit that the tendering was one of the catalysts that 
speed up the diffusion of the low-floor buses in the Netherlands.  However, the 
railway sector seems to elicit a slower response time to the tendering than in the bus 
sector.  This is due to the fact that railway is less flexible, i.e. difficult (or costly) to 
change.  Although the Groningen case provided us with the example of the new 
rolling stock innovation, it came with specific circumstances, i.e. a long-term contract.  
This illustrates clearly the difference between railway and bus in terms of the 
systems’ life cycles. 
 
We have to stress that many innovations develop internally, thus we might not 
perceive them as an innovation.  For instance, buses and new rolling stocks are 
usually efficient in terms of fuel and energy.  This engine and fuel technology is 
continuously improved as well.  Still, from an innovation perspective, we have 
evidence that in the bus sector, innovation is characterised by a short term cycle and, 
in the railway sector, we observe a longer term cycle, but in the end, the ambition and 
realised level of innovation is comparable.   
 
Clearly, the length of the contract determines innovation in the public transport sector.  
In the bus sector, it often perceived that the investment in new fleets is possible with a 
minimum contract length of 4 years, but preferably 6 years.  We observed in the PZH 
cases that the authorities were pursuing the (rather) long-term contract for the bus 
tendering (4-6 years) and they received new buses as a result.  The railway system 
needs a longer contract length if the authority wants to have new rolling stocks. 
 
The role of infrastructure is different in the railway and bus sectors.  In the bus sector, 
the infrastructure is not complicated.  Generally, buses share road space with other 
vehicles with some facilities such as bus stops and bus lanes that are exclusive only to 
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buses.  Thus, innovation in the bus sector relies more on the management and 
organisational development of the infrastructure and the operator rather than on the 
technical components.   
 
On the contrary, the technical aspect of the railway is rather complicated because it 
includes the train traffic signalling system, the safety system, and the traction system.  
It is evident that in the railway tendering process, we cannot underestimate the role of 
the infrastructure.   
  
9.3.4 Synthesis and policy recommendation 
In the public transport sector, the tendering process generally leads to innovation.  
The driving force of this innovation is the competitive pressure from this tendering 
process.  However, types and patterns of innovation vary as the regulatory framework 
and degree of competition differ.   
 
In the public transport sector, competition leads to the changes in actors’ behaviours.  
Although the regulatory reform in the public transport sector aims to simulate 
innovation, it does not lead to a better understanding of innovation. 
 
From the synthesis discussed above, we can answer Question 4, which asked ‘what 
are policy recommendations for public transport stake holders on innovation?’  These 
policy recommendations regarding innovation and regulatory reform in public 
transport can be defined as follows: 
 
First, the most important aspect is the monitoring issue.  In order to identify the 
opportunities for innovation, we need a better understanding of the current situation, 
i.e. the current performance and identification for improvements.  Insufficient 
monitoring means that information regarding current performance is not known.  
Also, a comparison between tendering areas is impossible; this leads to a situation 
where overall improvement is unattainable.  A good monitoring system would assist 
both authorities and operators in identifying a long-term, integrated strategy for the 
public transport services in all areas.  The authorities would be better able to identify 
service improvement opportunities, such as a new infrastructure plan or a new bus 
route or network.  They can then make suggestions to the current operator or 
incorporate their ideas into the new concession.  For the operators, monitoring would 
better demonstrate how well they performed.  This would provide valuable 
information in future tendering processes in which operators might be involved. 
 
Second, the government and regional authority should lead in the long-term 
innovation planning.  This should be an integrated approach in which the process of 
innovation is fully recognised (organisational and institutional elements should be part 
of it).  But also infrastructure development along with the manufacturing industry and 
infrastructure providers should be part of it.  A clear vision on innovation in the long 
run is very important.  The operators seem to be interested only in the short-term 
profit.  Thus, the government must be active in this aspect. 
 
Third, there is also an area where operator initiatives are more effective than the 
public sector.  Clearly, the service-oriented trend in the tendering process proved that 
the operator could deliver an innovative service given the right conditions.  This 
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should be encouraged, for instance, by creating space in the tender contracts for 
policy development by the operators. 
 
Finally, innovation in the railway sectors revolves more around vehicle investment 
and service improvement.  This is the direct result of the tendering regimes.  Though 
public transport users benefited from these improvements (new trains, more services, 
better accessibility), the tendering process paid little attention to the medium-to-long-
term development, i.e. in terms of network, new service development (i.e. new lines), 
and service integration.  Unfortunately, competition for the market seems to work on 
a short-term basis.  For that reason, there is a need to emphasise more on the issue of 
long-term planning of innovation in the railway sectors to incorporate the tendering 
process as a part of transport policy. 
9.4 Recommendations for future research 
There are a number of topics for future research that can be identified here. 
 
First, we learned some lessons from the comparison between PZH and London cases.  
It is relevant that when the four big cities (Amsterdam, the Hague, Rotterdam, and 
Utrecht) privatise their public transport companies, the lessons from the empirical 
cases in Chapter 7 will be very useful.  Clearly, the models need to adapt to the 
varying situations in each city in Europe, but their application is promising in a new 
environment. 
 
Second, as more railway concessions in the Netherlands will be put out for tender, 
more research is needed to understand how authorities and operators learn from the 
railway tendering process.  We should encourage the transfer of knowledge between 
concessions.  There is much to learn from each other, both the authorities and the 
operators.   
 
Thirdly, it is remarkable that there is not much research on the effects of innovation in 
public transport on the users, while the tendering is introduced to attract more users to 
utilise public transport.  This is a crucial element that can help indicate where we 
should pay extra attention in developing innovation.  The interesting question is, 
‘what kind of innovation do public transport users expect?’  Furthermore, it should 
address the users’ perception of the innovation as well.  
 
Finally, it is possible to develop a tool using the Simulation Approach to test 
behaviours of actors in the public transport sector with regard to innovation.  In 
Annex 3, we provide an example of the simulation model that is based on the System 
Dynamics Approach.  The models examine the case of a deregulated system.  As 
direction for future research, this subject is very promising.  The tendering process 
can be modelled using this approach.  The model would provide a decision-support 
system for both the authority and the operators to participate in the tendering process. 
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Annex 1:  List of Interviewees 
 
Ing. C.A. Braam   ROVER 
A. Cnesson    Arriva Nederland 
T. van Eck    ROVER 
mr. H. Froentjes   OV-bureau Groningen Drenthe 
M. Gerritsen    Connexxion Openbaar Vervoer 
dr.ir. M.G. van den Heuvel  ProRail 
ing. A. Jacobi    Connexxion Openbaar Vervoer 
drs. ing. L. Jansen   Provincie Zuid Holland 
ing. J.A. Jansen   Connexxion Openbaar Vervoer 
drs. G.A. van Kesteren  Kennisplatform Verkeer en Vervoer (KpVV) 
R. Köhler    ProRail 
drs. R.I.T. Koolen   Kennisplatform Verkeer en Vervoer (KpVV) 
ing. M.A.H. Kruis   Arriva Nederland 
drs. C. van der Maas   Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat 
drs. E. Pelle    TransTec 
drs. R. Rippens   Connexxion Openbaar Vervoer 
dr.ir. A.A.M. Schaafsma  ProRail 
drs. M. Scheerders   RET 
drs. M.P. Sloot   Kennisplatform Verkeer en Vervoer (KpVV) 
mr.ing A. Stoelinga   Adviesdienst Verkeer en Vervoer (AVV) 
drs. W. Sweers   Stadregio Rotterdam (SRR) 
ing. T.J. van der Veen  VDL Berkhof 
J.A.J. Westerhof   Arriva Nederland 
drs. M.A.H. Wieman   NedRailways 
D. Wijen    ROVER 
E.R. Zijderveld   Connexxion Openbaar Vervoer 
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Annex 2:  List of the Authorities in the Netherlands 
 
Provincial authority Regional authority(within that province) 
Provincie Noord Holland
Provincie Zuid Holland
Provincie Noord Brabant
Provincie Gelderland
Provincie Utrecht
Provincie Limburg
Provincie Overijssel
Provincie Friesland
Provincie Groningen
Provincie Drenthe
Provincie Zeeland
Provincie Flevoland
Regionaal Orgaan Amsterdam (ROA)
Knooppunt Arnhem-Nijmegen (KAN)
Samenwerkingsverband Regio Eindhoven (SRE)
Regio Twente
Bestuur Regio Utrecht (BRU)
None
 Stadsgewest Haaglanden 
None
None
None
None
None
7 Regional authorities12 Provinces 
Stadsregio Rotterdam (SRR)
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Annex 3:  System Dynamics Model: From Real World to 
Model World1 
Introduction 
 
We conclude that, in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, innovation evolves and plays an 
important role in public transport sector.  The empirical evidences show that 
innovation is a complex and dynamic process.  This is in lines with our observation 
that local public transport services in Europe have gone through a fundamental change 
over the last two decades, moving from a publicly owned heavily regulated industry 
towards a privately owned competitive industry.  This fundamental change is a 
complex process in that it had sharpened not only the way the local public transport 
services are provided, but also the behaviours of the stakeholders involved.  The 
effects of this fundamental change were substantial.  For instance, the operator who 
formerly enjoyed a monopoly position now has to face competition, either in the 
market or for the market.  
 
Decision-making in the regulatory reform process, especially in the case of 
deregulation, is difficult because there has been neither historical experience to learn 
from, nor reasonable analogies elsewhere.  This inexperience is common to all 
companies, as well as the regulators, and the political framework in which everybody 
operates.  The challenge for the deregulated company is thus to understand the 
strength and weakness of the system, and then to develop the company’s strategies for 
competitive exploitation to influence future change (Larsen and Bunn, 1999). 
 
This annex tests the development of a tool, the system dynamics approach, to study 
the dynamical process of bus service with respect to regulatory reform (through 
regulation) and innovation.  Bus industry has gone under industry reforms mainly 
from the transformation of public to private operation.  The stakeholders involved in 
the industry have been repositioned dramatically.  This change is at fundamental 
level.  This system dynamics approach seeks to depict the microstructure of a system 
at an operational level with a feedback loop structure.  The feedback loop structure of 
any dynamic system embodies the physical structure of the system, the flows of 
information characterising the state of the system, and the decision rules of the agents 
in the system.  One important element of any dynamic system’s structure is its 
nonlinear relationship as every significant economic process and institution involves 
nonlinearity. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 This annex is based on a paper presented at 8th TRAIL Congress (Ongkittikul, 2004b). 
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System Dynamics Models 
 
System dynamics models can be characterized as structural, disequilibrium, 
behavioural models (Radzicki and Sterman, 1994).  System dynamics models seek to 
portray the microstructure of a system at the operational level.  The feedback loop 
structure of any dynamic system consists of the physical structure of the system, the 
flows of information characterizing the state of the system, and the decision rules of 
the agents in the system, including the behavioural decision rules people use to 
manage their affairs (Radzicki and Sterman, 1994). 
 
Radzicki and Sterman (1994) stress that a fundamental feature of system dynamics 
models is that they rest on the theory of bounded rationality (Simon, 1981, Nelson and 
Winter, 1982).  The essence of the theory is summarized in Herbert Simon’s principle 
of bounded rationality (Simon, 1957): 
 
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex 
problems is very small compared to the size of the problem whose solution is 
required for objectively rational behaviour in the real world or even for a 
reasonable approximation to such objectively rationality. 
 
The attributes described above make system dynamics modelling well suited to the 
study of evolutionary dynamics in human systems (Radzicki and Sterman, 1994).  The 
flexibility of the simulation method and emphasis on empirical assessment of the 
decision rules of the actors means the microstructure of a system can be represented 
with great fidelity. 
 
The behaviour of a system develops from its structure.  That structure consists of the 
feedback loops, stocks, flows and nonlinearities created by the interaction of the 
physical and institutional structure of the system which the decision-making processes 
of the actors involved in the system (Sterman, 2000).  The feedback loop is 
considered as an important element of system dynamics models2.  It represents the 
relationship between structure and behaviour of the model. There are two types of 
feedback loops; positive and negative.  Figure A-1 shows an example of these 
feedback loops. 
 
Number of 
passengers
Fares
Unit cost
(of production)
Service 
Quality
+
-
-
+
-
1 2
 
Figure A-1 Example of two feedback loops 
                                                 
2 Detail explanation of the feedback loops, stocks, and flows can be found in Sterman (2000). 
Annex 3 - System Dynamics Model: From Real World to Model World  
 
 
199
Mayo et al. (1999) give a simple example of these two feedback loops related to 
public transport service.  Figure A-1 above, adapted from Mayo et al. (1999), 
illustrates how such feedback loops are represented.  In the positive or self-reinforcing 
loop on the left (1), if fares are cut, the number of passengers increases.  A negative-
sign arrow means that the change is in a reverse direction.  An increase in the number 
of passengers lowers unit costs. This also presents by a negative-sign arrow.  A 
decrease in unit costs lowers fares.  This presents by a positive-sign arrow as the 
change is in the same direction.  For this loops, it is called exponential growth; it 
arises from positive feedback (Sterman, 2000).  The negative or balancing loop on the 
right (2) illustrates that as the number of passengers increases, service quality 
problems increase if the capacity is not adequate enough to meet the increased volume 
of passengers.  These negative loops seek balance, equilibrium, and stasis (Sterman, 
2000). 
 
This annex uses the system dynamics model described above as a tool to model the 
competition and innovation in bus services.  The details of the modelling process are 
described in the following section. 
 
 
The simulation exercise 
Overview 
This section seeks to develop the system dynamics model of the competition and 
innovation of the deregulated system in the bus sector.  Figure A-2 shows an 
overview of the model structure which consists of three parts.  These are the demand 
model, market share model, and operation model (at firm level). 
 
Demand model
y Pool price
y Pool service
Market share model
y Firm 1 service characteristics
y Firm 2 service characteristics
Operation model
y Price
y Service
y Quality
Operation decision
Innovation decision
Firm 1
Operation model
y Price
y Service
y Quality
Operation decision
Innovation decision
Firm 2
 
Figure A-2 Model overview for the deregulated system case 
 
Figure A-2 also shows feedback structure of the bus operation model.  The demand 
interacts with the services provided by two operators via the market share model.  The 
operation model is a key to interact with both consumer demand and the competitor.  
Two decisions are of importance here are the operation decision and the innovation 
decision.  The former presents the act of adjusting the operating component, such as 
fare or frequency, in order to compete with the competitor.  The latter presents the 
strategic choice that involves the use of new techniques or new production processes.  
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Then the simulation exercise will be performed to study the interaction between 
operation and innovation decision of two operators.  The demand, market share, and 
operation model are described in the following sections. 
 
It must be taken into account that the methods and models adopted by Williams and 
Abdulaal (1993) provide a touchstone for this annex.  However, unlike Williams and 
Abdulaal’s work, this annex does not attempt to use the concept of optimisation 
process to solve to equilibrium.  Instead, this annex uses a system dynamics approach, 
including feedback structure, with a dynamic process to see the pattern of changes in 
the system. Then the simulation results are analysed using the game theory concept.  
This will give some fruitful results to understanding the process of competition and 
innovation in bus sector.  However, it must be noted that the innovation included in 
the model is rather simplified.  The detailed qualitative analysis of innovation in 
public transport can be found elsewhere (Ongkittikul, 2004a).  Nonetheless, a better 
treatment of innovation in a quantitative aspect is required.  
  
Model formulation 
The demand model: 
This section uses the negative exponential demand model, adapted from Williams and 
Abdulaal (1993).  It is represented by the following equation: 
 
( ){ }
( ){ }
λ
φ
φ
λ
λ Δ
⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
+−
+−
= ∑
∑
j
jjj
j
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DD
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 (1) 
Where D is the total market demand for public transport and D  is the reference state 
of the public transport demand.  The exponential form is taken from the concept of the 
composite cost (Williams, 1977) where the parameter Δ  determines the dependence 
of the total market demand for public transport services D on the configuration of 
fares and frequencies associated with the operators (Williams and Abdulaal, 1993).  
The term ( ){ }jjj dfw +− λφ exp  represents the additive generalised cost (or disutility) 
where fj is the fare, wj is the frequency, and dj is all the measured attributes which 
influence demand other than fj and wj.  The term φjw  called the frequency dependency 
is similar to that adopted by Hanson (1990), in which the frequency is taken as a 
measure of the ‘size’ of an aggregate alternative.  A parameter φ  determines the 
frequency cross-elasticity of demand.  This formula also links to the market share 
model, which uses the logit function, as follows: 
 
jj MSDD ×=  (2) ( ){ }
( ){ }∑ +−
+−=
j
jjj
jjj
j dfw
dfw
MS λ
λ
φ
φ
exp
exp
 (3) 
 
Where Dj is the public transport demand of operator j and MSj represents the market 
share of operator j.  The parameter φ  determines the frequency cross-elasticity of 
demand between the operators and λ  determines the fare (and other attributes) cross-
elasticity of demand between operators.  The relative importance of frequency and 
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fare in determining the demand of each operator, and the nature of competition, will 
depend on the values of the parameters φ  and λ  (Williams and Abdulaal, 1993). 
 
The firm operational model: 
The linear cost model with operator-dependent fixed and variable cost components is 
used in this annex as follows: 
 ( ) jjjjj wkkwC += *  (4) 
 
Where *jk  represents the fixed cost and kj represents the variable cost.  The variable 
cost component (kj) is determined by the frequency of the services (wj).  Further, the 
service offered by operator Oj is wjsj trips per hour, where sj is the vehicle capacity. 
 
For the equilibrium situation, the fare and frequency can be calculated from 
information available to the operator.  It is assumed that the operator knows the 
previous demand in order to design the frequency of the next period.  Thus the 
frequency of operator j at the t period is: 
 
j
t
jt
j s
D
w
1−
=  (5) 
 
Where 1−tjD  is the demand of operator j’s service at time period t-1.  However, this 
formula will suffer from the fluctuation of the demand and supply, as the price is set 
as a function of services produced.  It is thus wise to average the demand of some 
periods in the past to overcome the fluctuation problem.  This procedure will be 
discussed later in the simulation exercise section. 
 
For a fare setting, this annex assumes the operators set price from the total cost of 
production plus the profit margin (pmj).  This formula can be seen as a price mark-up 
equation which seems plausible in the bus operation (Romilly, 2001).  Furthermore, 
the operator knowledge about demand is similar to the case of frequency, i.e. the 
operator knows only the previous demand information for designing the fare in the 
next period. Note that the average of the demand over the past period will be also be 
used in this formula as in equation (5) but will be described in more detail in the next 
section.  The fare equation is as follows: 
 
( ) jjj
t
jt
j pmwC
D
f −×=
−
1
11  (6) 
 
Finally the revenue can be calculated as follows: 
 ( )jjjjj wCfD −×=Π  (7) 
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Simulation exercise 
Reference model: 
The simple model of the bus system is built to illustrate the effects of the competition 
and innovation. The model has two operators competing in the system. The model 
utilised in the system dynamics program called ‘PowerSim®’. 
 
In this simulation exercise, most of the values are taken from Williams and Abdulaal 
(1993).  The variables and parameters are defined in terms of following units: 
 
DD,   = passenger trips per hour; 
kkdf ,,, *  = pence (100p = £1); 
φ   = dimensionless; 
Δ,λ   = pence-1; 
w  = hour-1; and 
Π,C   = pence per hour. 
 
In the reference model, the variables and parameters are set as follows. φ  was given 
the value of 1.0, and D  was chosen to be 500 trips per hour. The original setting of 
the cost components were *k   = 1000p and k = 500 p.  A value of λ  was set to 
be 0.1 pence-1.  In an inelastic market ( 0=Δ ) under symmetric conditions between 
two operators (i.e. d1 = d2; k1 = k2) the equilibrium fares and frequencies were 20p and 
5 per hour, respectively.  According to this equilibrium configuration, the profit 
margin is 30%, which is considerably high.  The common profit margin for bus 
companies is about 15% (White, 2001).  Thus this simulation exercise uses 30% and 
15% profit margins as high and low levels respectively.  Furthermore, the delay of 
demand information, as described in the previous section, is set to be one period delay 
while the demand information that used in equation (5) and (6) is set to be an average 
demand of 5 previous periods, which called the expected demand. 
 
The period of simulation is set at a one hour per period. This setting is for the sake of 
convenience in terms of modelling unit compatibility. With this setting, it is plausible 
to assume that a period of one hour represents the one-hour of operation of the month 
during the course of the month.  The ‘one month’ period would be realistic in terms of 
operation planning. Thus, a simulation run of 12 periods would represent a year of 
operation. 
 
There are two reference models in this annex: inelastic demand and elastic demand 
cases.  In the inelastic demand case, 0=Δ .  In the elastic demand case, 04.0=Δ .  
This makes the price elasticity around -0.55.  The following scenarios will introduce 
some changes and to see how the system would react to these changes.  The first 
scenario is that one of operators is considering frequency competition.  This operator 
aims to increase services frequency by 50% of its previous demand.  It is assumed that 
another operator (Firm 2) does not change its strategy, i.e., in game theory 
terminology, Firm 2 plays a dominant strategy.  The market share and cumulative 
revenue of the two operators of this scenario are presented in Figure A-3 and Figure 
A-4 for inelastic demand and elastic demand cases respectively. 
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Figure A-3 The cumulative revenue and market share of an inelastic demand 
case 
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Figure A-4 The cumulative revenue and market share of an elastic demand 
case 
 
It is obvious that when one firm improves its service, the market share increases.  In 
Figure A-3, the market share of Firm 1 is around 80% at period 12.  Further, revenue 
of Firm 1 increases while cumulative revenue of Firm 2 starts to decline, which 
means there is a negative revenue change per period.  A point to be addressed is that 
in the first few periods, the cumulative revenue of Firm 1 was dropped while that of 
Firm 2 was increased.  An explanation for this is the demand delay.  This delay 
caused mislead the setting of the Firm 1’s fare before Firm 1’s expected demand is 
met in later period. 
 
The patterns of the cumulative revenue and market share between inelastic demand 
and elastic demand cases are similar.  For market shares, the results are just slightly 
different and the pattern is alike, i.e. Firm 1 is going to dominate the market. For 
cumulative revenues, the elastic demand gives more revenues for Firm 1 than the 
inelastic demand case. As expected, more frequency would induce more passengers. 
 
There are two scenarios that introduced in this section: operation decision scenarios 
and innovation decision scenarios.  Each scenario sets variables for which firms can 
choose.  The results will be analysed using a game theory approach3.   
 
                                                 
3 See Preston (1991) for the literature review of using game theory for analysing bus competition. 
 Innovation and Regulatory Reform in Public Transport 
 
 
204
Operation decision scenarios: 
For operation decision scenarios, each firm has to choose its frequency and profit 
margin level.  Each firm can choose either a normal frequency setting or high 
frequency setting.  The normal frequency is calculated as described in the reference 
model setting.  The high frequency necessitates that the firm increase their expected 
demand by 10%.  In terms of the profit margin, each firm has to choose either high 
(30%) or low (15%) profit margins.  The scenarios’ results consist of 16 simulation 
runs.   
 
This annex uses the game theory to analyse the simulation results.  The pay-off matrix 
is constructed using cumulative revenues at the end of period 12.  Table A-1 below 
shows a pay-off matrix for operation decision scenarios with inelastic demand. 
Table A-1 Pay-off matrix for operation decision scenarios with inelastic 
demand 
This annex uses a Nash-equilibrium solution concept4 to solve the game in each 
scenario.  A Nash-equilibrium is a set of strategies, one for each player, such that no 
player has incentive to unilaterally change her action. Players are in equilibrium if a 
change in strategies by any one of them would lead that player to earn less than if she 
remained with her current strategy.   
  
The Nash-equilibrium outcome of the game presented in Table A-1, when both firms 
play normal frequency and high profit margin, is (180,180).  This solution is palpable 
as this is an equilibrium outcome of the setting and both firms have no incentives to 
deviate from playing (normal-high) strategy.  We now turn to the results of the elastic 
demand case. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 For the formal definition, see Gibbons (1992), for example. 
137,137
Frequency High
Profit margin High
High
Low
Frequency Profit margin
Firm 1
Firm 2
Note: The elements in this table refer to the cumulative revenue (in pound) at the end of period 12 for firms 1
and 2 respectively.
100,42 35,35
180,180
147,74 74,74
High High
High Low
Normal High
Normal Low
Normal
High
Normal
Low
178,135 79,119
122,39 62,43
135,17874,147
119,79
39,122
42,100
43,62
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Table A-2 Pay-off matrix for operation decision scenarios with elastic 
demand 
160,160
Frequency High
Profit margin High
High
Low
Frequency Profit margin
Firm 1
Firm 2
Note: The elements in this table refer to the cumulative revenue (in pound) at the end of period 12 for firms 1
and 2 respectively.
152,82 92,92
180,180
180,100 117,117
High High
High Low
Normal High
Normal Low
Normal
High
Normal
Low
192,146 113,155
173,71 117,91
146,192100,180
155,113
71,173
82,152
91,117
 
 
The solution for the game presented in Table A-2 is (160,160) which is when both 
players play high frequency and high profit margin.  The equilibrium outcome in this 
case is changed from the equilibrium outcome in the inelastic demand case.  The 
reason for this change is that, in the case of elastic demand case, there is an incentive 
for firms to increase their frequencies due to the fact that the demand will increase as 
frequency increases. But, in the case of inelastic demand, there is no incentive for 
both firms to move away from playing normal-high.  We can see that the highest pay-
off for Firm 1 is when Firm 1 plays high-high and Firm 2 plays normal-high.  In fact, 
Firm 2’s normal-high is a reference configuration, so if Firm 1 moves to play high 
frequency and Firm 2 does not react, Firm 1 will be better off.  However, it must be 
noted that, in terms of the Nash-equilibrium, cumulative revenues of both firms are 
lower than the solution in the case of inelastic demand.  In the next section, we will 
discuss the innovation decision scenarios.  
 
Innovation decision scenarios: 
In terms of innovation decision scenarios, each firm has to choose one of the two 
following strategies; cost advantage and innovation.  The cost advantage strategy 
reduces the variable cost (kj) by 20%. This can be seen as the labour cost cutting 
measurement. The innovation strategy is to increase d (additional attribute; see 
equation (1)) by 5 pence per trip. This strategy requires an extra fixed cost of 700 
pence per hours. This strategy can be seen, for example, as an introduction of the 
travel information or the use of minibus (which can be seen as an increase frequency 
option). The results of simulation are, again, present in the form of a pay-off matrix.  
Table A-3 shows a pay-off matrix for innovation decision scenarios with inelastic 
demand. 
 
The equilibrium outcome of the game, when both firms choose to use cost advantage 
and innovation strategies, is presented in Table A-3. In this case, the revenue is 
(70,70).  This is a unique Nash equilibrium.  This result shows, again, a change from 
the equilibrium outcome of the reference case. 
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Table A-3 Pay-off matrix for innovation decision scenarios with inelastic 
demand 
96,96
Cost advantage No
Innovation Yes
No
No
Cost advantage Innovation
Firm 1
Firm 2
Note: The elements in this table refer to the cumulative revenue (in pound) at the end of period 12 for firms 1
and 2 respectively.
11,236 180,180
70,70
13,186 154,154
No Yes
No No
Yes Yes
Yes No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
9,137 176,79
-48,218 93,221
137,9186,13
79,176
218,-48
236,11
221,93
 
 
Table A-4 shows the simulation results in the case of elastic demand.  Again, it 
illustrates a unique Nash equilibrium for cost advantage-innovation strategy 
(196,196).   
Table A-4 Pay-off matrix for innovation decision scenarios with elastic 
demand 
189,189
Cost advantage No
Innovation Yes
No
No
Firm 1
Firm 2
Note: The elements in this table refer to the cumulative revenue (in pound) at the end of period 12 for firms 1
and 2 respectively.
45,327 180,180
196,196
68,322 193,193
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
108,265 269,126
-5,360 134,249
322,68 265,108
126,269
360,-5
327,45
249,134
Cost advantage Innovation
No Yes
No No
Yes Yes
Yes No
 
 
The results from these innovation decision scenarios show that if the capacity for 
improvement is available to firms, it is likely that both firms employ innovation, 
providing that other firms do so as well.  This result can be found in practice where 
innovation has an effect on the user attributes.  One example is the use of minibus.  
Minibus allows the operator to provide a more frequent service (which reduces the 
travel time).  Thus if one operator uses minibus, the best reply of another operator is 
also using minibus.  However, there is also an exception.  If the innovation cannot 
improve the service’s attributes significantly, the best strategy is doing nothing.     
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Concluding remarks 
 
The result of the operation decision scenarios is in line with Preston (1991) in that 
firms are more likely to increase frequency and less likely to change price.  For the 
innovation decision scenarios, the result shows that if innovation is available to firms, 
it is likely that firms will make use of it.  Although parameters in the model needs to 
be calibrated using empirical data, this result gives a useful guideline, and it is a 
beneficial framework for further developments in this field.  It is noted that the model 
uses here is a simplified bus operation that does not take into account other 
constraints.  For instance, it might be the case that incumbent operator has normal 
buses in operation, so it is costly to switch to a minibus option. 
 
The analysis of the simulation results gives a new perspective for the analysis of 
innovation and competition in bus services.  This is a promising approach; however, it 
has to be noted that more developments are needed especially validation with 
empirical information.  The parameters and variables should be calibrated either 
statistically or expert judgement.  Nevertheless, this annex shows the potential of this 
approach. 
 
 
Opportunities for simulation model in public transport tendering  
 
Regulatory reform and innovation in public transport services is a complex process.  
This annex provides a first step to understanding the complexity of the process by 
proposing a system dynamics model as a tool. The model is based on an evolutionary 
economics theory where the theory of complex systems and the theory of bounded 
rationality of decision making are combined.  
 
The dynamic model in this annex provides a notable approach to dealing with the 
dynamic system of competition and innovation in bus services.  A system dynamics 
model of bus services is constructed.  The model consists of three main parts; 
demand, market share, and operation models.  The model then tests two scenarios 
namely operation and innovation decisions.   In the operation scenario, the simulation 
results show that firms are more likely to increase frequency and less likely to change 
price.  These results show a consistency with previous works, such as Preston (1991).  
In the innovation decision scenarios, it is likely that firms will make use of 
innovation, if it is available to firms.  This simulation, however, still needs empirical 
validation in terms of the parameters and variables.  Nonetheless, this is a promising 
approach in which the dynamical process of the system and the complexity of 
decision-making can be analysed.  
 
Further research is needed in various aspects.  As aforementioned, the experiential of 
validation of the simulation model is needed.  Additionally, the interaction between 
demand and supply at the network level needs to be incorporated.  This may require 
more complicated demand specifications as well as an estimation of the parameters.  
Nevertheless, this may help to examine the competition between operators at network 
level.  Furthermore, this model can be used in the case of tendering.  In this case, the 
demand function must include the authority decision element. 
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Summary 
This thesis studies the effects of regulatory reform on innovative capabilities, mainly 
technological and organisational innovation and learning, in the public transport 
organisations.   Though there is little research that explicitly examines the relationship 
between regulatory reform and technological innovation in the public transport sector, 
we utilise, in this thesis, various theories and studies correlating to the issue as well as 
empirical evidence (case studies) to support the analyses.  In this thesis, the main 
research question asks: 
 
‘What effect does regulatory reform (in the public transport market) have on 
innovative capability, and which routes of innovation will prevail?’ 
 
The thesis is based on two theoretical perspectives: innovation theory and institutional 
and organisational studies.  This thesis provides a broader perspective on innovation; 
it focuses on both the technological and organisational aspects of innovative activities.  
In this thesis, the public transport service is exemplified by the ‘twin characteristics’ 
approach which defines public transport in terms of three sets of characteristics: 
technical characteristics, competence, and service characteristics.  It then classifies 
innovation into three subgroups: service innovation, pure technical innovation, and 
competence development.  Within those three groups, the innovative capabilities of 
the public transport system can be divided into three more categories, namely, 
innovative capabilities related to 1) infrastructure, 2) vehicle, and 3) service operation.  
These innovative capabilities can be considered as guidelines for analysing the 
innovation process in the public transport sector.  Furthermore, the thesis defines three 
levels of innovation to locate where the innovation is positioned in time and space.  
Level I includes innovation that is new to the industry, such as technological 
advancements.  Level II includes innovation that is new to the country.  Level III 
incorporates those aspects at the micro-level, i.e. an innovation that is new to the area.   
 
The second theoretical perspective, institutional and organisational changes in public 
transport, states that regulatory reform is a process of change.  In order to better 
understand this concept, the orthodox economic approach allows us to analyse the 
effects of regulatory reform in public transport.  Furthermore, this approach plays a 
part in providing guidance for the decision-making required in designing regulatory 
framework.  However, once regulatory reform takes place, the effects of the reform 
are not fully explained purely by the orthodox economic approach. 
  
The thesis describes three concepts that are necessary for the analytical framework.  
The first concept is the theory of evolutionary economics.  This approach studies the 
process of the economics of technical change.  Nelson and Winter (1982) develop the 
evolutionary theory of a firm where organisational capabilities and behaviours of 
business firms operating in a market environment are addressed.  The second concept, 
defined by Simon (1997), is the bounded rationality or problem-solving approach.  In 
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sum, it demonstrates that man’s rationality is bounded: real-life decisions are too 
complex to comprehend and therefore firms cannot maximise over the set of all 
conceivable alternatives.  The third concept is transaction cost economics.  This 
notion, proposed by Williamson (1985), argues that firms, markets, and relational 
contracting are important economic institutions.  These economic institutions are also 
the evolutionary product of a series of organisational innovations.  The transaction 
cost economic theory gives the general framework in which the regulatory reform 
takes part.  The main implication of these three concepts is that, in a long-run, the 
firms do learn and develop their organisational capabilities in order to compete and 
survive in the market.  Innovation is the result of accumulated knowledge and 
improved capabilities.  The regulatory framework in which firms operate ultimately 
determines the firms’ innovative activities.  By combining these concepts, we can 
analyse the behaviour of a firm in the public transport sector with respect to the 
innovation in which firms engage.   
 
Organisational changes play an important part in explaining the behaviours of the 
actors in the public transport sector.  In order to respond to the changing environment, 
organisations must search and acquire knowledge and capabilities.  In this process, 
innovation is used as a strategic tool to achieve an organisation’s goal.  This relates to 
two important concepts in analysing development and learning, namely the dynamic 
capabilities and learning. 
 
Based on these theoretical building blocks, the thesis constructs a model for analysing 
the effects of regulatory reform on innovation in the public transport sector.  
Competitive tendering is now a common practice in public transport service.  Thus, 
this thesis focuses on the tendering process as a core process as it is the most 
determinant factor that affects the public transport organisational behaviours.  The 
main point is the effect of the tendering process on innovation in public transport 
services.  Nevertheless, as a variety of reforms exist, the tendering may differ from 
case to case, and some areas are also an exception to the tendering.  
 
The tendering process requires all actors to adapt.  A firm’s dynamic capability is 
defined by its ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external 
competencies in rapidly changing environments.  Three elements are addressed: 
organisational and managerial processes, positions, and paths.  In our case, regulatory 
reform (the tendering process) is a rapidly changing environment.  Thus, the dynamic 
capabilities of the authority depend on its ability to use resources to organise the 
tendering process in order to achieve their objectives, and control the operation of 
public transport according to the contracts that are granted.  For operators, the 
dynamic capabilities include the capacity to use and integrate resources to produce a 
bid that attains the tender, and also the ability to manage the operation of a public 
transport system that financially benefits according to the initial planning in the 
tendering process.  Innovation is one of the strategic tools that operators use for 
winning the tender. 
 
An interesting and crucial element in this thesis is the process where the authority and 
operator meet in the bidding process.  In general, the authority provides the program 
of demand and/or tender document to the potential bidders.  The tender document 
usually indicates the basic requirements and specifications of the services to be 
tendered; it also indicates the winning criteria of the tender.  This is the crucial 
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element operators must fulfil in order to win the tender.  By studying the tender 
document, operators prepare their offers.  At this stage, it should be noted that the 
innovation is often included in the offer to increase its appeal. 
 
The empirical part will depict the richness of the information of the process thereby 
the tendering and innovation interact each other.  Based on the model constructed in 
this thesis, two empirical cases were analysed: the bus and railway cases. 
 
The first empirical case presented is a case study on innovation in the tendering 
process in the bus sector.  The thesis analyses the relationship between the tendering 
process and innovation with empirical evidence from case studies in the Netherlands 
and in the UK (London).  In the Netherlands, three cases were conducted, all in the 
Provincie Zuid-Holland (PZH) areas.  The results from these case studies show that 
the authorities are moving towards the quality-oriented public transport services.  It is 
clear that quality is now an important issue in the tendering process in the 
Netherlands.  The thesis observes that authorities in our cases incorporate the quality 
aspects as criteria for awarding the concessions in the tender documents.  Authorities 
tend to anticipate quality improvement through certain kinds of technological 
innovation, such as low-floor buses, the travel information system, and the smart card.  
In all, passengers seem to benefit from this improvement, although it is not yet known 
whether it will sustain in the long-term.  On the operator side, the thesis observes that 
innovation is used as a strategic tool for winning the concession.  Where it is possible, 
operators tend to widen the quality aspects of their public transport services to 
increase the number of passengers, or to show to the authority that they are willing to 
innovate.  In addition, the thesis observes that both technological and organisational 
innovations in the tender are easy to imitate.  In terms of technological innovation, the 
duplications of the new, low-floor bus and the travel information system were found.  
In terms of organisational innovation, operators in the Netherlands have developed the 
same type of the tender team to handle all tenders in both bus and train concessions.   
 
Furthermore, the thesis examines the innovative capabilities in the London case where 
the tendering regime for the bus services is also used.  The London case illustrates a 
strong centralised policy.  The coherence between the public transport policy and the 
general transport policy in the area is one of the most successful factors in the recent 
growth of the public transport rider-ship.  Innovative capabilities of the London 
authority (Transport for London: TfL) are high, and its learning element is moderate 
but strong.  A lesson that we can learn from the London case is that the public 
authority should consider not only the policy in the public transport sector, but also 
the transport policy as an integrated system.   
 
In sum, the tendering process leads to service-oriented innovation.  The operators 
adopt their strategies to broaden the quality aspects of the public transport services in 
order to win more concessions.  However, the operators concentrate solely on those 
aspects that suit their commercial interests (profitability and continuity).  This leaves 
the task of influencing operators to innovate in a manner that benefits society to the 
authority. 
 
The second case study, the case of innovation in the tendering process in the railway 
sector, analyses the empirical evidence from two cases: the Groningen and Merseyrail 
Electrics cases.  In principle, there is not much difference between bus and railway in 
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terms of innovation apart from a few fundamental differences, such as infrastructure 
and the investment level (the life cycle of the vehicle and infrastructure).  However, 
railway is less flexible; innovation diffusion may be slower than that of the bus, 
especially in terms of the traffic management system and the infrastructure provision.  
Clearly, the innovation in the train services needs cooperation from all parties, 
including the infrastructure company.  However, the role of the infrastructure 
company is not explicitly stressed.  A clear strategy must be identified in terms of 
technological innovation in the railway sector at the government level.  The tendering 
process in the railway sector leads to a situation where the authority, who gives the 
concession, and the operators, who operate the railway services, focus on the 
operational aspect.  They are not interested in (and not capable to) developing the 
technology.     
 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the empirical findings.  First, in the 
railway tendering process, the authority and operators focus on developing their 
organisational capabilities rather than technical capabilities.  The thesis observes that 
authorities are inexperienced in terms of the railway business, but they can organise 
the railway tender perfectly.  Second, in the railway tendering process, both the 
authority and operator chose proven technologies rather than new ones because there 
is less risk involved in terms of technical difficulties and commercial aspects.  The 
authority and operators are now the technical selectors rather than the technical 
developers, and, as a result, they focus more on the operational aspect.  Thirdly, the 
tendering process in the railway sector has also induced innovation.  However, we 
should look at the tendering process as a part of the regulatory reform process that 
leads to organisational reconstruction.  Thus, reform effectively creates new players 
into the railway sector.  For instance, a regional authority with little experience in the 
railway business before now organises the tendering process, and manages this task 
successfully.  But we should place more emphasis on the track and train relationship 
because this relationship is very important for the railway operation.  Finally, there is 
a need to emphasise the issue of long-term planning of innovation in the railway 
sectors to incorporate the tendering process as a part of transport policy.  On a 
positive note, innovation in the railway sectors concentrates on vehicle investment 
and service improvement which is the direct result of the tendering regimes.  Public 
transport users benefit from these improvements (new trains, more services, better 
accessibility).  However, competition for the market seems to work on a short-term 
basis.  The tendering process pays little attention to the medium-to-long-term 
development, i.e. in terms of network, new service development (i.e. new lines), and 
service integration.  Additionally, infrastructure companies should assist in leading 
the technological strategy because their task automatically combines both track and 
train development.  In particular, the implementation of the new rolling stocks should 
be done with close consultation with the infrastructure manager. 
 
Finally, the thesis proposes a number of policy recommendations.  First, the most 
important aspect is the monitoring issue.  A good monitoring system would assist both 
authorities and operators in identifying a long-term, integrated strategy for the public 
transport services in all areas.  The authorities would be better able to identify service 
improvement opportunities, such as a new infrastructure plan or a new bus route or 
network.  They can then make suggestions to the current operator or incorporate their 
ideas into the new concession.  For the operators, monitoring would better 
demonstrate how well they performed.  This would provide valuable information in 
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future tendering processes in which operators might be involved.  Second, the 
government and regional authority should lead in long-term innovation planning as an 
integrated approach where the process of innovation is fully recognised.  It should 
incorporate organisational and institutional elements, and infrastructure development 
including the manufacturing industry and infrastructure providers.  A clear vision on 
innovation in the long run is very important.  Third, there is also an area where 
operator initiatives are more effective than the public sector.  Clearly, the service-
oriented trend in the tendering process proves that the operator can deliver an 
innovative service given the right conditions.  This should be encouraged, for 
instance, by creating space in the tender contracts for policy development by the 
operators.  Finally, innovation in the railway sectors revolves more around vehicle 
investment and service improvement.  This is the direct result of the tendering 
regimes.  Though public transport users benefit from these improvements (new trains, 
more services, better accessibility), the tendering process pays little attention to the 
medium-to-long-term development, i.e. in terms of network, new service development 
(i.e. new lines), and service integration.  Unfortunately, competition for the market 
seems to work on a short-term basis.  For that reason, there is a need to emphasise 
more on the issue of long-term planning of innovation in the railway sectors to 
incorporate the tendering process as a part of transport policy. 
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Samenvatting 
In dit proefschrift is onderzoek gedaan naar het effect van marktwerking, deregulering 
en privatisering in de openbaar vervoer (OV) sector op het innovatief en lerend 
vermogen van de betrokken organisaties. 
Het is vanzelfsprekend dat de overheden een belangrijke rol spelen in dit proces. Door 
de introductie van marktwerking en het stimuleren van deregulering en privatisering 
dragen zij bij aan een situatie waarin de OV-bedrijven genoodzaakt zijn om zich aan 
te passen aan de veranderende omstandigheden. Beide organisaties, de overheden en 
de aanbieders, zijn daardoor geïnvolveerd in een continu zoekproces naar de vraag 
hoe zij hun (eigen) doelen in deze dynamische omgeving het best kunnen realiseren. 
Technologische innovatie speelt bij de introductie van marktwerking, deregulering en 
privatisering een belangrijke rol. In de periode waarin de hervormingen werden 
gepresenteerd en geëffectueerd, kwamen gelijktijdig nieuwe technologieën 
beschikbaar, zoals bussen met een lage-vloer instap en elektronische betaalsystemen 
en dynamische reisinformatie voor passagiers. Er is echter nooit onderzoek gedaan 
naar de directe relatie tussen hervorming van de aansturing van het OV en het proces 
van technologische innovatie in deze sector. De hoofdvraag van dit proefschrift luidt 
dan ook: 
 
Welk effect heeft de veranderende regulering in de openbaar vervoersector op het 
innovatieve vermogen van openbaar vervoerorganisaties (overheid en 
bedrijfsleven), en welke rol speelt innovatie in dit proces?  
 
De onderzoeksvraag is vanuit twee theoretische perspectieven wetenschappelijk 
onderzocht: (a) het perspectief van de innovatietheorie en (b) het perspectief uit de 
institutionele en organisationele wetenschapstheorie. Gekozen is voor een brede 
opvatting van het innovatiebegrip. In het onderzoek wordt zowel aandacht besteed aan 
technologische innovaties in de openbaar vervoer sector als aan organisationele 
innovaties. Deze aanpak is uitgewerkt in een benadering die in het theoretisch deel 
van het proefschrift wordt gepresenteerd als de “twin characteristic approach”, 
waarbij de innovaties in de openbaar vervoer sector worden onderverdeeld in drie 
hoofdkarakteristieken, te weten: technische kenmerken, organisationele competenties 
en de geboden dienstverlening die wordt gerealiseerd. Het is op basis van deze 
indeling mogelijk om innovatie in te delen in drie categorieën: zuiver technologische 
innovaties, ontwikkelingen gericht op het verberen van de eigen competenties en 
innovatie gericht op een verbetering van de dienstverlening. Binnen deze indeling 
kunnen de innovatieve capaciteiten van het openbaar vervoersysteem in drie 
subcategorieën worden ingedeeld, namelijk innovaties gerelateerd aan de 
infrastructuur, het transportmiddel en de dienstverlening. Deze categorisering vormt 
het analysekader waarbinnen het innovatieve vermogen van het innovatieproces in de 
openbaar vervoersector wordt geanalyseerd. Daarnaast worden in dit proefschrift op 
basis van tijd en ruimte drie niveaus van innovatie onderscheiden. Het eerste niveau 
omvat de innovaties die nieuwe ontwikkelingen voor de sector als totaal gevolgen 
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hebben en daarmee een belangrijke vernieuwing betekenen. Meestal zijn deze 
innovaties ontwikkeld, getest en geïmplementeerd in andere sectoren voordat ze zijn 
toegelaten in de OV sector. Het tweede niveau beslaat innovaties die nieuw zijn in een 
land of regio. Het betreft dan vaak vernieuwing die binnen de sector vanuit een andere 
regio waar de innovatie al wordt toegepast, wordt overgenomen. Het derde niveau 
voegt deze aspecten samen op microniveau en betreft innovaties die nieuw zijn voor 
een specifiek toepassingsgebied in het OV. 
 
De introductie van marktwerking in de OV sector heeft grote institutionele en 
organisationele gevolgen. Vanuit het theoretisch perspectief wordt in de meeste 
analyses de neoklassieke economische theorie gehanteerd ter verklaring van 
vernieuwingen en de daarbij optredende effecten. Deze benadering is ook veelal de 
leidraad in de besluitvorming als het gaat om de rol van de overheid en de wijze 
waarop beleid moet worden geëffectueerd. Opvallend is dat wanneer de hervormingen 
zijn geïmplementeerd, in de praktijk de effecten maar gedeeltelijk vanuit deze 
benadering kunnen worden verklaard. 
Vanwege de onvolledige verklaringskracht van de neoklassieke benadering is in dit 
onderzoek getracht om een alternatief analytisch kader te ontwerpen dat beter is 
toegesneden op de beantwoording van de hoofdvraag van deze studie. Daarvoor zijn 
drie perspectieven gekozen die als bouwstenen dienen voor het te ontwikkelen 
analysemodel. Het eerste perspectief is de evolutionaire economie. Nelson en Winter 
(1982) ontwikkelden de evolutionaire theorie van bedrijven waarbij de 
organisationele karakteristieken en het gedrag van bedrijven worden behandeld. Het 
tweede perspectief betreft het besef van de beperkte rationaliteit van actoren bij 
probleemoplossing zoals beschreven door Simon (1997). Dit perspectief laat zien dat 
actoren een beperkte rationaliteit hebben omdat nooit alle gevolgen van een beslissing 
kunnen worden overzien. Daarom kunnen bedrijven nooit het optimale alternatief 
vinden. Het derde perspectief, tenslotte, betreft de economie van transactiekosten. 
Vanuit dit perspectief, zoals voorgesteld door Williamson (1985), zijn bedrijven, 
markten en het netwerk waarin zij functioneren belangrijke economische instituties. 
Deze instituties zijn het evolutionair gegroeide resultaat van organisationele innovatie. 
De theorie van economische transactiekosten biedt een algemeen raamwerk 
waarbinnen regulatieve hervormingen plaatsvinden. 
De belangrijkste implicatie van het hanteren van deze drie perspectieven voor het 
analysemodel is dat bedrijven kunnen worden beschouwd als lerende organisaties die 
hun organisationele capaciteiten continu verder ontwikkelen zodat zij in staat zijn om 
te overleven op de markt. Zij worden bij het ontwikkelen van innovaties echter 
begrensd door het raamwerk waarbinnen zij moeten opereren. Door alle 
eerdergenoemde theoretische concepten te combineren is het mogelijk om het gedrag 
van een bedrijf, maar ook dat van overheden, te analyseren als een levende en 
dynamische organisatie, waarbij het bedrijf zich aanpast aan de veranderende 
omgevingsfactoren. 
Het proces van het aanbesteden van concessies is een dergelijk proces dat vraagt om 
adaptief vermogen van alle actoren die bij dit proces zijn betrokken. De wijze waarop 
organisaties daarin slagen wordt in belangrijke mate bepaald door het vermogen 
interne en externe capaciteiten te integreren, uit te bouwen en te herconfigureren in 
een snel wisselende omgeving. De belangrijkste ontwikkeling waarmee de OV-sector 
in Nederland momenteel wordt geconfronteerd is het invulling gegeven aan het proces 
van aanbesteding. Aan de aanbestedende overheden worden hoge eisen gesteld als het 
gaat om het organiseren van het proces zodat op maximale wijze aan de door haar 
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gestelde doelen in de vorm van contractueel vastgelegde diensten invulling wordt 
gegeven. De betekenis die aan innovaties wordt toegekend in proces is vanuit het 
overheidsperspectief vaak nog diffuus.  
Van de OV-bedrijven wordt verondersteld dat zij het vermogen hebben hun 
capaciteiten dusdanig in te zetten en te integreren, dat zij een goed bod kunnen 
uitbrengen op de aanbesteding, maar ook dat zij hun continuïteit kunnen waarborgen. 
Het ligt voor de hand dat een verantwoord financieel aanbod in de offerte een 
randvoorwaarde is, maar innovatie blijkt ook een van de middelen te zijn die wordt 
aangewend om een concessie te winnen.  
 
Op basis van bovengenoemde theoretische inzichten wordt in dit proefschrift een 
nieuw analysemodel gepresenteerd dat ons in staat stelt de ontwikkelingen binnen de 
openbaarvervoersector beter te kunnen doorgronden. En aangezien het openbaar 
aanbesteden van concessies tegenwoordig een standaard praktijk is geworden, kan het 
worden beschouwd als de belangrijkste stimulus voor verandering. Om die reden staat 
dit proces dan ook centraal in het ontwikkelde analysemodel. Daarbij is nadrukkelijk 
rekening gehouden met het feit dat er nog steeds veel variatie is in de wijze waarop de 
aanbesteding plaatsvindt en dat nog niet elke regio onder dit nieuwe regime valt.  
Een cruciaal element in het model is dat ervan wordt uitgegaan dat de doelstellingen 
van de aanbestedende overheden niet automatisch parallel lopen met die van de OV-
bedrijven. De interactie tussen deze organisaties is dus zeer belangrijk en vindt plaats 
op het moment dat tijdens het proces van aanbesteding een offerte moet worden 
opgesteld of op het moment dat een tussentijdse evaluatie wordt gehouden. Het is het 
leerproces in deze communicatie over en weer dat in dit proefschrift wordt ontrafeld. 
Uiteindelijk kan dit betere begrip leiden tot een doelmatiger OV-aanbod. 
 
Het empirische gedeelte van dit onderzoek is gericht op het verzamelen en 
interpreteren van de beschikbare informatie, die veelomvattend en divers is, om van 
daaruit het proces van aanbesteding en de rol van innovaties beter te kunnen 
doorgronden. Twee empirische cases zijn via het in dit proefschrift ontwikkelde 
model geanalyseerd, te weten de ervaringen met aanbesteding in de bussector en een 
aanbesteding in het railvervoer. In beide gevallen is een vergelijking gemaakt tussen 
de ervaringen in Nederland en de ervaringen die in het Verenigd Koninkrijk zijn 
opgedaan.  
 
In de eerste plaats is gekeken naar de innovatie in het aanbestedingsproces in de 
bussector. Daarbij is een vergelijking gemaakt tussen de ervaringen in Nederland en 
de ervaringen in Londen. De Nederlandse casuïstiek die is bestudeerd betreft drie 
aanbestedingen in de provincie Zuid-Holland. Met deze keuze kon een ontwikkeling 
over een langere periode worden bestudeerd. Uit de analyse blijkt dat de 
vervoersautoriteiten zich steeds meer oriënteren op kwaliteit in het openbaar vervoer, 
nadat aanvankelijk het primaat lag op de kostenkant. Dit komt duidelijk terug in de 
aanbestedingscriteria waarbij kwaliteit één van de belangrijkste criteria is. Voor de 
vervoersautoriteiten blijkt kwaliteit vooral te zitten in de technologische innovatie 
zoals lage-vloer bussen, reisinformatiesystemen en het gebruik van de ov-chipkaart. 
Op korte termijn lijkt dit de reiziger ten goede te komen, maar de vraag is of, en op 
welke wijze, dit kwaliteitsniveau in de toekomst kan worden gehandhaafd. 
Innovatie blijkt in deze casus voor de OV-bedrijven een belangrijk element te zijn in 
de bredere strategie om een concessie te winnen. Indien enigszins mogelijk proberen 
de OV-bedrijven, gebruikmakend van de mogelijkheden die innovatie hen biedt, 
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variërend van airconditioning in het voertuig tot een koffievoorziening op de 
overstaphaltes, de kwaliteitsaspecten in hun bod uit te breiden. Daarbij speculeren zij 
onder meer op de veronderstelling dat een betere service een toename van het aantal 
passagiers kan betekenen. Hiermee verwachten zij de doelstellingen van 
winstmaximalisatie en continuïteit effectiever te kunnen realiseren. Tegelijkertijd 
willen de OV-bedrijven de aanbestedende overheden kunnen tonen dat zij bereid zijn 
te innoveren. Daarnaast blijkt uit dit onderzoek dat technologische en organisationele 
innovatie eenvoudig te kopiëren zijn. Voorbeelden van het dupliceren van 
technologische innovatie zijn de lage-vloerbussen en reisinformatiesystemen. De 
lage-vloer bus heeft zich in een periode van minder dan 10 jaar ontwikkeld van een 
“servicegerichte innovatie” tot standaardproduct in de OV-sector.  
Op het organisationele vlak valt op dat de OV-bedrijven per bedrijf één team 
formeren dat in het sterk gedecentraliseerde systeem voor alle regio’s waar een 
aanbesteding gaat plaatsvinden een offerte voorbereidt (hierbij gaat het om ca. 80 
concessies voor bus- en (personen)-treinvervoer). Deze teams hebben expertise 
opgebouwd om zowel concessies voor bus- als treinverbindingen te behandelen.  
De casus Londen laat zien dat ook daar de concessie wordt verleend in de vorm van 
openbare aanbesteding. Maar de organisatie is in tegenstelling tot Nederland, sterk 
gecentraliseerd. De samenhang tussen het openbaar vervoerbeleid en het algemenere 
transportbeleid in het gebied is daarbij een van de meest belangrijke succesfactoren en 
vormt de belangrijkste verklaring voor de recente groei van het aantal 
passagierskilometers in Londen. Het innovatieve vermogen van de aanbestedende 
overheid in Londen (Transport for London) is in algemene zin hoog en ook het 
leervermogen is gemiddeld genomen hoger dan dat in Nederland. De casus Londen 
laat zien dat de vervoersautoriteiten daar niet alleen over een goed ontwikkeld 
openbaar vervoersbeleid beschikken, maar dat dit ook is ingebed in het algemene 
transportbeleid. Door betere afstemming en integratie kan met de aanbesteding een 
evenwichtig en op alle modaliteiten (zowel van het openbaar als het privaat vervoer) 
gericht beleid worden gevoerd. Samengevat kan worden gesteld dat het proces van 
openbare aanbesteding in de bussector leidt tot de introductie van meerdere 
servicegerichte innovaties in een poging meer concessies te winnen. Zij blijven 
daarbij echter nadrukkelijk binnen de randvoorwaarden van hun eigen commerciële 
belang (winstgevendheid en continuïteit). De vervoersautoriteit zou daarom extra 
aandacht moeten besteden aan het creëren van voorwaarden waardoor het voor de 
aanbieders aantrekkelijk wordt hun innovatieve vermogen aan te wenden voor 
innovaties die de samenleving als totaal wenselijk zijn. 
 
Naast het busvervoer is ook het aanbesteden van de concessies in het railvervoer 
geanalyseerd. Twee specifieke regio’s zijn onderzocht: het railvervoer in  
Groningen/Friesland (NoordNed) en de regio Liverpool waar het railvervoer wordt 
verzorgd door Merseyrail Electrics. Los van fundamentele verschillen als de 
koppeling met de railinfrastructuur en de hoogte van het investeringsniveau (hoge 
kosten aanschaf rollend materieel en lange levenscyclus van het materieel in het 
railvervoer), bestaan in beginsel weinig verschillen in termen van innovaties tussen 
bus- en treinvervoer. Toch zijn enkele verschillen te noemenswaardig.  
Zo is in tegenstelling tot het busvervoer het railvervoer minder flexibel en kan de 
verspreiding van innovaties trager zijn dan in het busvervoer, vooral waar het traffic 
management systemen en het veranderen van infrastructuur betreft. Innovatie in de 
railsector vereist samenwerking van diverse actoren, zoals de bedrijven die 
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verantwoordelijk zijn voor aanleg, beheer en capaciteitstoedeling van de 
infrastructuur. 
In het proces van openbare aanbesteding van concessies in de railsector blijken de 
aanbestedende overheden en de aanbieders vooral gericht te zijn op het operationele 
aspect rond de uitvoering. Zij lijken geen interesse, of mogelijkheden te hebben om 
technologische veranderingen tot stand te brengen 
Het onderzoek in de railsector leidt tot een aantal bevindingen. In de eerste plaats valt 
op dat zowel de aanbestedende overheden als de openbaar vervoerbedrijven zich 
vooral richten op de organisationele aspecten rond het OV en dat zij veel minder zijn 
gericht op de technische innovatiemogelijkheden. Het is opvallend dat de 
railvervoersautoriteiten, die toch weinig ervaring hebben met aanbesteding, goed in 
staat waren deze openbare aanbesteding te organiseren.  
Ten tweede kan worden geconstateerd dat beide organisaties bij voorkeur kiezen voor 
technologieën die al bewezen zijn omdat dit een lager technisch en operationeel risico 
met zich meebrengt. Dat maakt dat hun rol zich beperkt tot het aansturen van het 
selectiemechanisme voor bestaande technologie in plaats van de rol van initiator van 
technologische innovatie. Het proces van openbare aanbesteding heeft overigens wel 
geleid tot innovatie in de railsector. Eén van de belangrijkste ontwikkelingen in deze 
context is dat nu meerdere aanbieders toegang hebben tot de railinfrastructuur. 
Ten derde kan te worden vastgesteld dat wil het railvervoer ook op de langere termijn 
competitief kunnen zijn met andere modaliteiten, de nadruk sterker moet komen te 
liggen bij de lange-termijn planning van innovaties. Het verlenen van concessies 
gebeurt nog steeds op basis van korte-termijn perspectieven, waarbij de rol van 
innovaties of de samenhang met het algemene transportbeleid veelal ontbreekt. Het 
ontwikkelen van het netwerk, de aanleg van nieuwe lijnen of de integratie van 
diensten (zoals stationontwikkeling langs lijnen) blijft nu veelal buiten beschouwing.  
Samengevat kan worden vastgesteld dat de innovaties in de railsector zich vooral 
richten op investeringen in het materieel en het verbeteren van de dienstverlening. 
Deze voorkeur is direct te relateren aan het verlenen van concessies via openbare 
aanbesteding. Dit heeft direct invloed op het comfort en gemak voor de reizigers in de 
vorm van nieuwe treinen, meer en betere service en betere toegankelijkheid. Voor de 
introductie van nieuw rollend materieel is het van belang dat er nauw contact is met 
de infrastructuurbeheerders, omdat veel innovaties zijn gebonden aan de interface 
tussen het materieel en de (beschikbare)infrastructuur. Overigens valt voor wat betreft 
de railsector op, vooral omdat de aanbesteding nog in de kinderschoenen staat, dat 
nog geen leerproces is waar te nemen. De eerste stappen zijn echter gezet, zodat kan 
worden verwacht dat dit spoedig wel het geval zal zijn. 
 
 
Tot besluit wordt in het proefschrift een aantal aanbevelingen gedaan. Een eerste 
aanbeveling betreft de monitoring van geleverde diensten en producten. Daar 
ontbreekt het nu aan. Een goed monitoringssysteem kan aanbestedende overheden 
helpen een integrale strategie te ontwikkelen voor de lange termijn als het gaat om het 
openbaar vervoer in een bepaald gebied. De vervoersautoriteit kan middels 
monitoring verbeteringen en kansen tot verbetering identificeren, zoals het plannen 
van een nieuwe busroute of het aanleggen van een nieuwe railverbinding. Deze ideeën 
kunnen worden doorgegeven aan de aanbieder of worden verwerkt in de nieuwe 
openbare aanbesteding. Voor de aanbieders zelf zou het monitoren kunnen helpen in 
het aantonen op welk niveau zij presteren. Dit kan van belang zijn omdat het 
informatie geeft over de vraag hoe in een bepaalde regio wordt gepresteerd. Zo kan 
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via benchmarking inzicht kan worden verkregen over de prestaties in vergelijking tot 
andere bedrijven. Deze informatie kan worden meegenomen in de specificaties van 
het nieuwe bod dat wordt uitgebracht bij een volgende aanbesteding.  
De tweede aanbeveling is dat de nationale en regionale overheden gezamenlijk de 
verantwoording nemen bij de ontwikkeling van de integrale lange-termijn planning 
van het innovatiebeleid. Ook infrastructuurontwikkeling en behoeften gerelateerd aan 
respectievelijke voertuigen en rollend materieel (een visie op innovatie) zouden hier 
integraal onderdeel van moeten worden. Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat het effectiever is 
als de overheid daar een strategie voor ontwikkelt dan om dit aan de markt over te 
laten. Het is aangetoond dat de aanbieder in staat is een gewenst product of dienst te 
leveren. Dit kan echter worden gestimuleerd door in de concessies ruimte te laten 
voor een zekere beleidsontwikkeling door de aanbieders.  
De laatste aanbeveling heeft betrekking op de ontwikkelingen in de railsector. 
Geconstateerd kan worden dat introductie van het aanbestedingsproces vooral heeft 
geleid tot verbetering van het ingezette materieel en de serviceoriëntatie. Zoals 
genoemd, werd in de aanbesteding geen aandacht besteed aan een visie op 
ontwikkelingen voor de lange termijn rond het transportbeleid en de lange-termijn 
integratie met andere OV-diensten die worden aangeboden. In de opwaardering van 
dit transportbeleid liggen grote kansen op belangrijke verbeteringen. 
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